AUT: SIPAZ Report, August 1999

["SIPAZ, Servicio Internacional" <mcintire@xxxxxxx>]

SIPAZ Report
August 1999 Vol. IV, No. 3

This report is available on the web at=20
http://www.nonviolence.org/sipaz/


Report Summary
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D

The EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) continued its political
initiatives in recent months in an effort to maintain the issue of
indigenous rights on the national political agenda and to defend its
position as a political force with which to be reckoned. It convened two
gatherings in Chiapas to build on the momentum from the March national
referendum on indigenous rights and to strengthen ties with organizations
elsewhere in Mexico.

For its part, the Mexican government used political and military strategies
to weaken the Zapatistas. In early June, a year after the violent
dismantling of four Zapatista autonomous counties, police and military
forces occupied ten communities in the Ca=F1adas region of the Lacandon
Jungle. Between 100 and 1000 police and soldiers participated in each of
the operations. Reasons given by the authorities for the incursions
included enforcement of the Firearms and Explosives Law, the fight against
drug trafficking, the arrest of criminals, to ensure the delivery of
government aid, and protection of residents who had requested it. The very
variety of justifications, combined with the sudden burst of incursions,
suggest less explicit political/military objectives.

The Mexican government continues to insist on its inexhaustible patience in
seeking a peaceful solution to the Chiapas conflict. Yet periodically it
has undertaken police/military operations that serve to physically slam
Zapatista communities, undermine opposition organizing efforts, and serve
as examples of what Zapatistas and their allies may expect.

The results of the recent incursions, like earlier actions, included
arrests, mistreatment, the displacement of 50 families who fled in fear,
the destruction of household goods by the occupying forces, and new Army
posts in and around the communities. In recent months there have also been
numerous reports of a more aggressive attitude at military, police and
immigration checkpoints in the highlands and jungle regions.

The operations in June coincided with the installation of the new Interior
Minister, Diodoro Carrasco. (He replaced Francisco Labastida who quit to
seek the presidential nomination of the ruling PRI in next year's
elections.) Whether intended as such or not, the police/military operations
served notice that Carrasco's selection does not indicate a shift in
government policy. Carrasco did meet with COCOPA (the congressional
commission named to support the peace process). It was the first Interior
Ministry-COCOPA meeting in ten months, but it did not appear to break any
new ground.

Highly publicized events continued in which purported Zapatistas turned in
weapons in exchange for government economic aid. For its part, the EZLN
denounced these events as a farce. Some of those involved later
acknowledged that they had participated in a masquerade in exchange for
financial assistance.

These questionable desertions and the police/military operations discussed
above appear to be part of a comprehensive government strategy to render
the EZLN politically irrelevant and to declare a unilateral peace. Other
components include earlier state-level legislative initiatives on
indigenous rights and culture, disarmament/amnesty, and redistricting. In
addition, the federal government recently announced an (US)$11 million
project, including a World Bank loan, to benefit 3000 farmers in 116
communities in the Ca=F1adas region, a key base of Zapatista support.
Government assistance is highly controversial in areas of Zapatista
support. Whatever else the project may accomplish, it is likely to result
in increased discord within the communities.

In the ongoing investigation of the December 1997 Acteal massacre, sentence
was pronounced on an ex-soldier accused of training the paramilitary group
responsible for the killings. However, as in the case of ten state police
before him, he was convicted only of carrying weapons restricted to use by
the military. He was sentenced to two years in prison, with the possibility
of release upon payment of a fine. The Army had acknowledged that he was a
soldier, but asserted that he had been on vacation at the time he was
involved with the paramilitary group. He affirmed this version, but later
stated that he had been told to do so. On July 19, 20 indigenous detainees
were found guilty of murder, felony assault, and carrying weapons without a
license and restricted to the use of the Army. They were sentenced to 35
years.

In April, COCOPA President (and PRD Congressman) Gilberto Lopez y Rivas
claimed to have evidence that numerous training camps for paramilitaries
were being established in Chiapas, financed by the federal and state
governments. In response to the furious criticism that his assertions
provoked, he presented the evidence to the Office of the Attorney General
of the Republic (PGR) and called for a thorough investigation.

In July, four opposition parties plus Senator Pablo Salazar, who recently
resigned from the PRI, signed an agreement to field a single candidate in
the 2000 elections for governor of Chiapas. The new coalition represents a
potentially formidable challenge to the historic domination of the PRI in
Chiapas politics.

The government National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) denounced the
continued practice of torture in Mexico, citing the PGR and the Department
of National Defense (SEDENA) as the targets of most complaints. For the
first time in its history, the CNDH also gave figures on complaints made
against SEDENA, reporting that it had received 1679 complaints, mostly from
civilians who claimed they were victimized by military personnel.

At the international level, criticism of Mexico's human rights record and
handling of the Chiapas conflict included a report from Amnesty
International, a finding by an asylum judge in the US that Mexico "has
killed innocent civilians and engaged in repressive military action" in
Chiapas, and a statement by the US Senate that, "The militarization of
[Chiapas], including the violence perpetrated by pro-government
paramilitary groups, has resulted in civilian casualties and has forced
thousands to flee their homes."

With presidential elections a year away, Mexico is already moving into the
campaign period. The result is less interest in the Chiapas conflict. This
would appear to suit the government, since debate about Chiapas underscores
the lack of resolution there. Hence, rather than seek its resolution, we
may expect the Zedillo government to seek to administer the conflict
between now and the elections: reiterate its commitment to dialogue,
continue its low intensity warfare strategy to sap or at least contain
Zapatista support, and undertake social programs aimed at strengthening its
electoral base. Presumably the EZLN will continue to defend its political
space as best it can, but it shows no sign of willingness to return to
talks as long as its pre-conditions are not met. Thus the near-term
prospects for progress are bleak, and the explosive potential of the
conflict remains.

Recommended Actions

1. . Urge COCOPA to take advantage of citizen support for its legislative
proposal on indigenous rights and culture by finding a way to present it to
the federal Congress, placing the interests of peace above partisan=
 politics.

2. Urge the Zedillo administration to:
- disarm the paramilitary groups that operate in Chiapas;
- order a substantial reduction of the Army presence in the conflict areas
in Chiapas as an authentic and concrete sign of its will to dialogue;
- recognize and respect the efforts of human rights workers and
international observers whose work offers substantial support to the peace
process.

3. Circulate information, such as this Report, on the situation in Chiapas.

Please write:

Comisi=F3n de Concordia y Pacificaci=F3n
Paseo de la Reforma # 10, piso 17
06018 M=E9xico, DF - M=E9xico
Fax: (int-52) (5) 140-3288

Lic. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Le=F3n
Presidente de la Rep=FAblica
Palacio Nacional
06067 M=E9xico, DF - M=E9xico
Fax: (int-52) (5) 271 1764 / 515 4783




IN THIS ISSUE
http://www.nonviolence.org/sipaz/vol4no3/index.htm


REPORT SUMMARY (see above)
http://www.nonviolence.org/sipaz/vol4no3/sume.htm

UPDATE Chiapas:
A New Wave of Harassment
http://www.nonviolence.org/sipaz/vol4no3/updatee.htm

ANALYSIS
Words of Peace, Policies of Force
http://www.nonviolence.org/sipaz/vol4no3/anale.htm


FEATURE:
-The Return of the Heart: Justice and Community=20
 Reconciliation in the Indigenous Tradition
-An Outbreak of Hope
http://www.nonviolence.org/sipaz/vol4no3/feate.htm

UPDATED GLOSSARY:=20
http://www.nonviolence.org/sipaz/glosse.htm

TEAM ACTIVITIES
http://www.nonviolence.org/sipaz/vol4no3/active.htm

(The Spanish and French language versions will be posted shortly)

For additional complete copies of this report, to receive future SIPAZ
reports and Urgent Action appeals, to send contributions, or for
information regarding serving on the SIPAZ team in Chiapas, contact:

SIPAZ International Office
P.O. Box 2415
Santa Cruz, CA 95063 USA
Tel. & Fax: 831 425 1257
E-mail: sipaz@xxxxxxx
http://www.nonviolence.org/sipaz=20



Servicio Internacional para la Paz/International Service for Peace is a
coalition of North American, Latin American and European organizations
formed to support the peace process in Chiapas, Mexico. SIPAZ combines
violence reduction and peacebuilding strategies in Chiapas with efforts to
inform and mobilize the international community.


SIPAZ also publishes in Spanish and French. If you are interested in
subscribing to the SIPAZ Spanish or French lists - or if you wish to be
unsubscribed from the SIPAZ English language list send a message containing
the words:

subscribe/unsubscribe SIPAZ english/french/spanish=20
to mcintire@xxxxxxxx


     --- from list aut-op-sy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ---