AUT: Iran - articles and links #1

["rc-am" <rcollins@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

[some articles and links on Iran which might go some way to providing a
context to recent events.  if anyone has any further info, i'd like to see
that also.  - Angela]

articles from the Organisation of Revolutionary Workers of Iran
http://www.rahekargar.org/

Labour unrest intensifies

Oil workers strike warning.

In early June Oil Refinery workers in Abadan, Mahshahr, Bandar Abbas, and
Masjed Soleiman warned president Khatami?s administration of strike action if
he does not increase wages in accordance with inflation and is prepared to
accept group negotiation. Teheran refinery workers added their support.

The regime had accepted both demands in January last year after nation-wide
strikes and demonstrations outside the oil company headquarters in Teheran.
Instead hundreds have been arrested. More ominously, a number of oil workers
have died under mysterious circumstances, suggesting extra-judicial
execution. [Atlas June 4]

On August 15 oil refinery workers from Abadan Oil Refinery staged a
demonstration in protest against the delaying tactics of the authorities of
the Islamic regime. In a resolution at the end of this demonstration the
workers summarised their main demands: Implementation of national
negotiation, and wages in line with inflation. They warned the regime once
again that if their demands are not met they will organise mass
demonstrations and protests. [Committee for the Defence and Support of
Iranian oil workers].

Strikes and arrests

Workers in Ahwaz power station have been on strike since May 16. The 450
workers had been promised some additional welfare payments such as travel
allowance and job classification. They remained on strike by Early July. Also
400 workers in Ahwaz Tube Manufactor went on strike and demonstrations (Atlas
42)

Tabriz Tractor manufacture: Here too a strike began on June 7 with a pay rise
as a central demand. The strike was crushed by security forces who arrested
three workers. Yet the workers continued their sit in at the factory. Oil
tanker drivers in Isfahan refinery refused to load oil until their tariffs
were increased. The strike of these 400 drivers caused a fuel shortage in the
city and the surrounding province. The security forces have arrested three
drivers.

Three hundred workers from Iran Wood Industry, the largest and most modern in
the Middle East, had a sit-in outside its central retail store in Teheran on
August 25. They were protesting at non-payment of wages for five months. The
factory had been privatised and returned to its previous owner 8 months
before who then closed the factory without compensation to the workers.
(Atlas 44) the sitdown protest contnued for several days [Iskra]

Closure threats

Many factory closures have left thousands of workers unemployed. Some are
demanding their back pay: 200 workers are threatened with expulsion in the
Isfahan Steel Smelting Plant, one of the largest industrial units of the
country. To forestall potential strikes several workers suspected of left
sympathies have been arrested.

Contract labour in the Abadan Refinery demonstrated outside the Governor?s
office on May 18. 1,200 such workers have been laid off, many after eight
years? of work.

Asia Stocking Making factory workers, threatened with redundancy, went on
hunger strike. Kar Thread making plant stopped work on May 25. The 540
workers had not been paid for 4 months and are under threat of redundancy.
The workers have also been denied health care as the factory has a large debt
to the Organisation of Social Security.

Bandar Abbas port custom officers staged a sit down in protest at poor
facilities.

One hundred workers made redundant in Dezful attacked the labour office with
stoned breaking its windows. In Ilam municipal workers demonstrated and Yazd
Smelting Plant workers went on strike because they had not been paid for
months. [Iran] Tabas coal miners protested outside the Governor?s Office
because they had been laid off without pay or compensation for 9 months.
Teheran Chalk factory workers also demonstrated agaisnt expulsions. [Kar]

Four hundred students in the Art College held a protest sit in on June 7
complaining of insults by the authorities, and poor dormitory conditions.
Protest moves by the nursing students in Teheran has spread to other colleges
in Zanjan, Arak, Isfahan etc. Classes were boycotted because of changes in
the system that increases pressures without any improvement in education or
other facilities.

One hundred workers involved in the reconstruction of the Khorramshahr, a
city almost completely destroyed in the Iran-Iraq war, protested at 4 months
delay in pay and un-compensated expulsion of 80 of their colleagues [Kar].

Lay offs have been reported from Khaneh Gostar constructioncompany lainked to
the ministry of housing [Kar] and Electric in Rasht [Kar va Kargar].

Closures

Four hundred manufacturing units, in textile, leather and shoes, machinery,
food products, carpets, construction, etc have been totally shut down. These
include: 57 industrial units, nylon an nylex making (25), textiles and
carpets (28) filters (13), food products (46), clothes items (26) household
goods (47), construction equipment (27), aluminium and cast iron (11),
syringes (2) [Jame?h, Teheran, June 10]

According to Kar va kargar (published in Iran May 26) in Gilan province alone
20,00 contract workers are in danger of losing their jobs.

Nanshahr Company has laid off 64 workers and threatens many more. The
following factories have also shut down: Pars Compressor in Shiraz, Kashan
machine-made carpet. Bisotun Flour Mill (Kermanshah).

Surveillance of activists

A special committee has been set up in Ray, South Teheran ? called the Pol
Siman Committee. Its job is to interrogate protesting workers in factories
situated south of the capital. By June this committee had interrogated 50-60
workers [Iskra]

Work-related accidents

According to a report by the Organisation of Social Security, 10,977
accidents occurred in workplaces covered by social security in 1997. 5,315
were due to negligence and 1021 due to faulty machinery. There were 113
fatalities and 276 had to be laid of work. Only factories with over 50
workers are covered by social security, hence missing out two thirds of the
work-force. In the first two months of the Iranian calender alone 18 persons
died and 39 severly damaged in occupational accidents.

An example of the neglect of occupational dangers is provided by the
explosion for the second time in Arak Petrochemical factory injuring six
workers [Kar].

Children at work

It was announced in Iran that 1.2 million workers in Iran are below 15 or
above 65 years old. [Atlas June 4]

Alireza Mahjub, Chairman of the Labour House and Majles deputy admitted in an
interview on June 25 that "the real pay of workers is only 1/3 of its current
buying power and is 40% less than it was 20 years ago". He went on to say
that many industrial units are "on the brink of closure", and that many
workers have not been paid for months [Kar].

----

The role of the working class in the May presidential elections

interview with Heshmat Mohseni

iran bulletin: while there are many reports of the dynamic participation of
women and youth (and particularly students) in the elections of Khatami to
the presidency in May 1997, there is little information on the participation
by workers - especially in a form that defines their identity rather than as
individuals among the shapeless mass of voters. Does this picture adequately
portray the labour movement today, or is it a conscious or unconscious
reporting bias.

Heshmat: The May elections were an extraordinary event. Its dimensions went
way beyond the level of participation by women and youth. Therefore one
cannot limit the involvement of people to the participation of these two
groups. What brought Khatami to power was essentially a coalition of forces
opposed to obscurantism, and by and large in favour of secular life, plus the
mass of deprived toiling people who had become fed up with the nightmare-like
structures of the Islamic Regime and its parasitic role in the economy.

In order to arrive at a clear answer to your questions it is important to
examine the origins and grounds for the birth of the movement that led to the
election victory, the makeup of the electors and the peculiarities of the
workers? participation in it.

The May elections was not a thunder in a cloudless sky. It fed from a
preconditions which if ignored will reduce the validity of any analysis of
the May events. The recurring nation-wide movement by the oil workers took
shape before the elections and left their marks on the evolution of the
latter.

When it comes to their social and political influence, oil workers are not a
normal or unimportant layer among Iranian workers. They are the critical
centre of that movement. Even a cursory look at the way oil workers organised
nation-wide, and the nature of their demands shows that significant
developments have taken place in Iranian society.

For the first time in many years demands are expressed which, though not as
yet general among the various layers of the working class of Iran, are
proposals that the Islamic Republic cannot accept. For a regime that does not
even allow the tame Islamic Councils (shora) to be set up in the oil
industry, the oil workers demands for collective bargaining, and for workers?
association, shows that they have become aware of their collective identity,
collective action and a collective personality. This awareness is gaining
practical expression.

The demand for collective bargaining was not a normal demand made in normal
circumstances. It took place under a regime that denies the independent
identity of workers as workers, and has in practice turned them into a
shapeless mass. Its expression was, before all else, an expression that in a
conference table there are two "sides", each of which works for its own ends.
The three large actions by the oil workers in the six month preceding the
elections, and its broad echo in society at large undoubtedly influenced the
result of the elections? A look at the mix of electors will clarify this
question.

To understand what forces voted for Khatami we need to consider the class and
cultural make-up of those who support the velayate faqih (the supreme
clerical ruler Khamene?i). This social and support base is essentially made
up of the well off layers with political privilege and the traditional middle
class who have benefited form the velayate faqih [1]. Those who look for
Khatami?s votes among the middle classes, forget that if Iran had a middle
class of this dimension [2] it would really be a very wealthy country; and
even then what country do you know, no matter how rich, where 70% of its
population are middle class.

In fact, even in official statistics, over 80% of Iranians live below the
poverty line. It is enough to note that while the most recent Central Bank
study shows that the average expenditure of an urban family is 350,000 rials,
the minimum monthly wage for workers is 250,000 rials. Thus a large part of
the 80% live, as labour activists inside the country aptly name, "below the
line of survival". Again according to official statistics 94% of the country?
s savings belong to 6% of the population. Translated into ordinary language,
these statistics say that the Iranian middle class is very weak and compared
to the past, comprises a very small and shrivelling part of the people.

Despite some claims appearing in the Western press it was not the middle
class who won the vote for Khatami. The enormous dimensions of his vote
belonged to the camp of work and toil, which was obviously cast in protest at
the whole system which was causing their destitution. Even if we zoom down on
the social make-up of the women and youth, a large part of these also came
from the camp of workers and the deprived in society.

iran bulletin: Since the presidential elections popular actions are
increasingly focusing on political matters. They also increasingly seek the
solution to their everyday problems in resolving the question of political
power and mobilise to change the balance of power. Yet the labour movement
appears to feed, as before, on everyday economic demands. To what extent is
this the true picture?

Heshmat: That picture on the whole reflects what is happening on the ground.
However we should remember that the logic of a labour movement is not the
same as that of a women?s or youth movement when it comes to the way they
manifest their protests and dissatisfactions.

Unlike the other two, the labour movement fights on a fixed ground, and this
imposes certain restrictions, which if ignored can have undesirable effects
for the workers. The labour movement rarely enters the political battle
abruptly and without intermediaries. It is through immediate economic demands
that the workers approach political struggles.

Moreover, there are a number of unfavourable elements that have joined hands
to limit the labour movement within economic boundaries today. These could be
summarised as the tensions between workers with a job and the huge mass of
the unemployed, workers who fall under the umbrella of the Labour Code and
those who do not, the relatively small industrial sector and the heavy load
of marginal workers etc. All of these weaken the position of the working
class and its bargaining position.

Moreover, at this moment Iranian workers are in a particularly fragile
position. Today many of the larger industries are working at way below
capacity, some as low as 25% of capacity. Under these conditions the
nightmare of expulsion haunts workers. Many realise that their fate hangs on
a string. At the slightest political protest they are out.

Moreover the primacy of the economic over the political struggle is not
confined to these extreme conditions we face today. This phenomenon is seen
even in revolutionary conditions. In the 1979 Iranian revolution we saw how
right up to the final uprising [3], workers hid their political moves beneath
economic demands. While there was a general strike, the majority organised
these strikes under the banner of economic demands until the eve of the
February uprising.

Finally one must not ignore the inner political content of the current
workers? struggles. For example we have witnessed an increase in strikes, bei
ng illegal under the Islamic Republic, have the potential of bringing workers
into open conflict with the regime. It is with this awareness that the
workers go on strike. The demands may be economic, but given the specific
conditions of the country, the methods chosen are clearly political.

iran bulletin: Is there an new features in the recent moves in the oil
industry units, and in some service sectors? If so how do you explain them?
To what extent can we relate these to the after effects of last May?s
elections and the political climate since?

Heshmat: What has been particularly special in the labour movement?s recent
acts of protest is the role of organisation in them, as well as the demand
for association. Khatami?s open defence of civil society has given a crucial
boost to the issue of the right to independent association.

But the issue of independent associations was also brought up before Khatami?
s elections, specifically by the Oil Company workers. Indeed curbing this
tendency has become an urgent preoccupation for the Islamic regime. An
example is the attempts by the Labour House to set up a "worker?s party".
Clearly the issue of independent activity by the working class is on the
agenda of the labour movement, and the Labour House, an official workers?
organisation, is out to rein this in. The real meaning behind these moves to
create a workers? party is to prevent the working class from forming its own
independent organisations outside state institutions.

Finally I must mention the "independent union of Iranian Workers" inside the
country. Regardless of the extent or otherwise of its authority within the
labour movement, this is a sign of progress in this field. Prometheus in
chains has woken up. We must wait for him to tear his chains apart.

Heshmat Mohseni has been a labour activist in Iran. Currently he writes on
the Iranian labour movement for various publications of the left abroad.

Footnotes (by tr.)

1. Article 5 of the Constitution gives absolute rule (velayat) by a just and
knowledgeable religious jurist (faqih) over both civil and political society

2. Over 22 million, 2/3 of the electorate, voted for Khatami.

3. In February 1979 which finally toppled the Shah?s regime.

-----------------------
Facing a stormy unstable and brittle future

While Khatami's allies try to find a united voice to keep promises the ruling
faction hits out

Can he keep on smilling?

The overwhelming defeat of the ruling faction in the presidential elections
last May unexpectedly upset the balance of power. This faction, led by the
supreme clerical ruler (velayate faghih) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is now doing
everything to direct the stream back into its previous path. A new phase has
opened up in the power relations within the governing bloc of the Islamic
Republic of Iran which is best described as brittle and unstable. We will
briefly touch on events and processes that illustrate this point.

Khamenei's faction employes two sets of tactics to repair the damage: one
designed to wear down Khatami's support base, and the other to break up the
coalition which the election process drew round him.

Wearing down

In order to erode Khatami's support base there is a concerted effort to
dampen all hopes that his administration can effect any reforms. This is
combined with a tactic to stoke a climate of fear and repression. A number of
levers have come in handy.

The most important was to weaken the constitutional powers of the presidency
and the administration. The power structure was refashioned by fashioning
parallel institutions. The most substantial of these was the revival of the
Assembly for Expediency1 with greatly expanded powers, and placing at its
head a man of the stature of ex-president Rafsanjani.

Almost as significant was the move to emasculate the Ministry of Interior by



denying that post-holder - Hojjatoleslam Nouri - the command of the internal
security forces (Revolutionary Komitees, Police, Gendarmerie). This had been
normal practice in every single cabinet since the revolution, and until the
recent elections both Ayatolah Khomeini and his replacement Khamenei' had
handed over command over domestic security forces to the Interior Minister.
Without such powers the minister is like a knife without a blade.

Moreover, there are rumours that the Information (security) Ministry is to be
taken out of the hands of the president and placed directly under the control
of Khamenei'. The powers of the "supreme clerical rulership"2 is being
redefined and extended. The Majles (parliament) too is being brought in as
yet another way to paralyse the administration. Ministers are constantly
being questioned. The most important in this line was the savage questioning
of the Interior Minister, Nouri, who was accused of giving permission for the
Student Supporters of the Imam-line 3 to hold public meetings and
demonstrations, to "create disturbances" and conduct "moves against the
[Islamic] order". It should be recalled that the new president had been
overwhelmingly voted in on the promise that he would open the political and
cultural climate, and install "civil society".

Repression

A wave of repression has been launched from several angles. The dominant
faction controls virtually the whole of the state repressive apparatus: the
judiciary, the revolutionary courts, the Pasdaran Corps (revolutionary
guards), the Komitees,4 other armed forces and security organs, and the
secret and security services. They have unleashed a noisy, and well
publicised, wave of arrests and allegations.

Prominent among their victims, have been a number of municipal mayors,
appointees of Teheran's mayor Karbaschi, himself a supporter of Khatami.
These have been arrested and charged with corruption. Karbaschi himself was
called in for interrogation and released on bail. He has been ordered not to
leave the country. More recently the head of the Freedom Movement, Dr Ebrahim
Yazdi was arrested, and later released, accused of plotting against the
security of the country.

Alongside these judicial arrests have been extra-judicial acts. Groups of
thugs have been mobilised under the guise of the "hezbollahi people" (who are
only doing their duty of religious guidance ) to attack and violently disrupt
meetings and gatherings of Khatami's supporters.

Gangs of thugs attacked the office of the student paper Payam-e Danshju,
savagely beat up and hospitalised Tabarzani, one of the leaders of the Office
of Unity,5 disrupted the student meeting in Teheran University where Ebrahim
Yazdi, Dr Peiman and a number of prominent critiques and opponents of the
dominant faction were invited speakers, and smashed up of the house of
Ayatollah Montazeri [see article this issue]. This last was so brazen as to
provoke the protest of even some in the dominant faction.

All this is happening within a backdrop of an ever increasingly difficult
daily life and little hope for an immediate improvement in living standards.
In this atmosphere the dominant ultra-conservative faction hopes that the
combination of Khatami's unfulfilled promises, police pressure and judicial
insecurity will cause people to lose heart and become passive. The ultimate
aim is to erode the president's ability to manoeuvre on the back of popular
support.

Crack the alliance

The second front opened up by the Khamenei' faction is to split the coalition
which gathered round Khatami during the lead up to the election. A key move
was to humour Hashemi Rafsanjani (by making him head of the Assembly for
Expediency), and some of those around him in an effort to break up the so
called "Agents of Construction" faction. 6

Secondly they used the open criticisms of the supreme religious leadership
(velayate faghih), voiced by of Khatami's allies, to create a rift between
the more conservative supporters among Khatami's circle and those inclined to
reform. For example the recent moves by the Student Supporters of the
Imam-line, in dialogue with Islamic political currents outside the circle of
power (such as the Freedom Movement), 7 or even Ayatollah Montazeri's
criticism of the current interpretations of the system of velayate faghih,
and in particular, its embodiment in the person of Ali Khamenei' was used to
create rift among the pro-Khatami alliance.

Khatami's team: not with one voice

The opposing camp, which gathered round the candidacy of Khatami has reacted
to these hostile and obstructive tactics. But these reactions do not add up
to a coherent and co-ordinated policy.

The president himself and some in his circle rely on the weapon of "law" and
"legality". They hope to use this to curb and overcome the gangs of thugs
organised by the security organisations. Moreover, they hope to limit the
illegal interference by numerous recently concocted institutions. Above all
they hope to limit the supreme clerical ruler to act within his
constitutional powers, which, in reality, he has far out stepped.

Others in Khatami's coalition go further. They see a need for constitutional
change which limits the powers and jurisdiction of the supreme clerical
rulership (velayate faghih). They have expressed these views in speeches,
articles, open debates, demonstrations and resolutions. A demonstration 3,000
Student Followers of the Imam-line outside Teheran University openly demanded
a revision of the Constitution. In their view the current system of power,
and the absolute power held by Khamenei', wherein he has taken on himself the
right to be answerable to no one and no organ yet retains the right to
intervene in any situation and have the final say, leaves no room for
policies different to the opinions of the dominant faction and of the person
of Khamenei'.

There is, however, something new in the air. Despite the savage rebukes these
groups have had to face, the actual principle of the velayate faghih and its

current embodiment Khamenei', has become a subject for serious debate. This
has not happened since the early days of the Islamic Republic. On this point
the ruling faction has been manoeuvred into an uncomfortably diffensive
position. The credit for this development must go not just to groups within
the ruling bloc, but undoubtedly to the efforts of many tendencies outside
the circle of power - people like the philosopher Surush, Ayatollah Montazeri
and others.

How to keep the base

There is a third aspect to the policies of the Khatami coalition around which
there is no broad agreement. Not only do they disagree as to whether they
should be incisive and aggressive or passive and defensive in beating back
the ruling faction's obstructive policies, but they also disagree on how to
maintain their links with the millions who voted Khatami into the presidency,
or the extent to which people should be involved and informed of current
developments.

The president, in practice at least, shows that he favours positive and
constructive criticisms, ones not openly critical of the leadership. In his
reports to the people he highlights in a positive way his stress on the
operation of the law and legality. The same policy is more or less being
pursued by the pro-Khatami clerical organisation, the Majma' Ruhaniun
Mobarez. 8

On the other hand, the Mujahedin Enghelabe Eslami, 9 another group in the
pro-Khatami alliance, prefers to frankly expose the obstructive tactics of
the organs of power and influence, and indirectly criticise those around the
supreme clerical ruler and his apparatus. In a series of articles and
leaflets MEE has denounced the intrigues of the opponents of the president
and his promised reforms.

In this way some of Khatami's allies are criticising him indirectly for his
caution and excessive flexibility. They remind him that time works against
him and he is in danger of losing his present momentum.

Consensus on foreign policy

Yet criticisms for domestic policies aside, there appears to be broad
agreement and support for Khatami's more aggressive foreign policy
initiatives. Even those, within his coalition who, one might expect would
have problems with overtures to the West and particularly to the USA, have
apparently for the time being shelved their overt misgivings.

Cannot do it without them... but will Khatami take the plunge?

The president's clever use of the possibilities presented by the Organisation
of Islamic Conference (OIC) in December in Teheran is noteworthy. The OIC
delegates decisively supported Khatami in his two speeches where he expressed
his different, and in essence totally opposite, stance to Khamenei' in public
without any concealment or compromises.

He presented an essentially reformist and modern understanding of Islam, as a
culture which despite differences with Western culture and modernism, is not
in conflict with it. Instead he proposed dialogue and a symbiotic
relationship between the two cultures. He thus openly distanced himself from
Khamenei' who, in a speech to the conference, attacked the West and the USA
and proposed an Islamic alliance (from its Afghani to Lebanese and Sudanese
varieties) to oppose the "West" which he painted as a uniform entity.

Moreover in the same conference, Khatami took the opportunity to frankly
expound a large part of his domestic programme: the rule of law, respect for
the legitimate rights of people in the framework of law and shari'a, and the
acceptance of a civil society and cultural pluralism to a national and
international audience. He even had much of it enter the final Conference
communiqué. In other words he made foreign policy a weapon to isolate the
ruling faction internationally and he used it decisively.

The relationships and clashes among the ruling factions, varied as they are,
may lose some of its momentum under the heavy pressure of compromise and
wheeling and dealing. Yet any lull, as happened in the run up to the OIC is
unlikely to last for long. The contradictions which fuel this crisis are too
deep to allow a pause to be a lengthy or stable.

There is a great deal of evidence that a lull - even if a lull can happen -
will be followed by greater and more savage friction. The gap between the
"republic" and the "caliphate" 10 is so great that its reconciliation can
only be a pipe dream. Some, like Rafsanjani, try to plug the gap by arguing
that instead of trying to give greater power to the velayate faghih, it is
might be better to substitute the single leader with a leadership council.
Even if this were possible, it is probably an antidote too late to save the
patient.






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