AUT: Re: passe-montagne (1/2)

[Antagonism <mrnobody@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

The Ab Irato text is now on line at
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill//Lobby/3909/beyond.html

Here's the text, footnotes to follow
--------------------

BEHIND THE BALACLAVAS OF
SOUTH-EAST MEXICO

"Because those who are too quick to admire and who are suddenly convinced
are rarely the salt of the earth" *
- B. Traven, In The Freest State In The World, 1919, Insomniac Edition, Paris
1995.

1.

In the Golden Age of 'actually non-existing socialism' journeys were organised
to the
countries of the radiant future. Believers were then invited to express their
enthusiasm for a reality staged by the lords of the manor. In this way people
visited
the soviet socialism of the USSR, the Maoist socialism of China, the miniature

socialism of Albania, the bearded socialism of Cuba, the Sandinista socialism
of
Nicaragua, etc. Woe betide those who contested the objective, scientific and
unquestionable character of these fabricated realities. Until the day these
systems
collapsed. People thought they had seen but had seen nothing! Were lessons
drawn
from this? It would seem not! With a smile slung over their shoulder, people
today
again go off "to do revolutionary Chiapas" in convoys organised by fellow
travellers
of the Zapatistas. On a well-signed route, people have to agree to see only
what
they have to see and to believe in the leader's words. The irrefutable
argument hasn't
changed one iota: because the imperialist forces are threatening and the
people are
defence-less, we can only put our trust in commanders. In a world in crisis
the
demands for the future are revised downwards! People make themselves the
advocates of realism - they give in to the essential and side with new
oppressive
projects.

The groups of revolutionary tourists, seduced by the exoticism of the unique
Indian
culture 1, are incapable of giving out any information or direct account of
what is
happening in the Mexican countryside: about the occupations, the forms of
organisation chosen by the peasants in struggle, their objectives and
political
perspectives. They are also incapable of expressing the slightest critical
element
which could enable us to deepen our knowledge of the avant-garde organisation
running the armed struggle.

Was it simply the evocation of Zapata's name and the memory of a "Mexico Above

the Volcano" which was enough to mobilise people? How come they can throw
themselves naively in support of a movement which is a vehicle for the values
of
ethnic identity and patriotism, which are nowadays at the heart of the most
barbaric
tendencies in the world? Those who have more radical pretensions about the
world
can only justify their solidarity with this Zapatista army of national
liberation in the
name of the tactics of circumstance. It's in this way that, in the name of
tactical
support, people consider as acceptable for others what is unacceptable for
themselves!

Rather than let the charms of the balaclavaed Saviour lull us to sleep,
wouldn't it
have been better to analyse what is new in this type of old organisation?

2.

The totalitarian character of Mayan and Incan societies no longer needs to be
demonstrated. Despite that, the myth of an idyllic Indian community has a long
life.
This myth is partly nourished by the idea that people hold about community. As
if the
community form of pre-capitalist societies somehow prevented a very structured

hierarchy, centralised power and barbaric forms of work exploitation. Among
the
Mayas, for example - including the territory comprising Chiapas today - the
overwork of the peasants was intended to maintain a minority of aristocrats
and
priests who formed the ruling class of these city-states. 2 To speak of "local

traditions of democratic decision-making" and to present the rules which
governed
them as forms of primitive democracy is to keep silent about the authority of
the
elders and chiefs which depended on a central theocracy to enforce orders and
to
defend their interests, Decision-making concerning the essential questions of
material
life escaped the members of this community, and the values on which social
cohesion
was rooted were submission to authority, On this subject, it's enough to refer
to the
Aztec discourse which spread the norms and principles which were meant to
guide
social life: "Be loving, grateful, respectful, be frightened, look with fear,
be
submissive, do what your mother's heart desires, and your father's too,
because its
his merit, his gift; because service, submission, deference are their due...
Humiliate
yourself, bow down, lower your head, bend down!!" 3 A study of the conquest
has
made it possible for someone to put forward the following hypothesis
concerning,
"the ease with which the Spaniards won military victories over the
"structured"
empires rather than over the tribes, which were not confined by State forms.
This
can easily be explained. The inhabitants of an empire like the Incas' were
already
used to the 'corvées' (forced statutory labour) for the Emperor or for the
Temples of
the Sun and of the Moon. The transfer - from Emperor to the Spanish
encomendero
- certainly wasn't carried out peacefully; but it was possible even if it
meant using
violence. On the other hand, with the free populations without any State
framework,
it wasn't possible for violence to be enough: war became a massacre and the
survivors were reduced to slavery." 4

These people, after having been first enslaved by the bureaucratic empires,
then by
the European colonisers, were crushed by the capitalist machine. B. Traven -
whom
people like to quote in connection with the Chiapas revolt 5 - wrote pages
full of
fury about their humiliation. Once amongst them, he must have remembered what
he
wrote during the German revolution, "Is there even just one of your chiefs who
has
any aim other than to rule over you or to use you to dominate others?" 6. A
lot of
indigenous people, having been expelled from their communal lands, became
proletarians, submitting to the violence of waged work commodity relations.
Those
who, nowadays, present themselves as the armed representatives of the 'Indian
communities' never forget to patriotically proclaim their attachment to the
ideals of
Mexican Independence! And yet we know that these ideals have occupied a
special
historical moment in the transformation of the indigenous population into poor

peasants and into landless proletarians. Those who made up the largest part of
the
Zapatista army during the Mexican evolution came from the State of Orelos,
"virtually the only southern State where capitalist relations of production
ruled
evenywhere".7 If it was their attachment to the aspirations of a past Indian
communal life that had stirred up their revolt, it also explains their
inability to go
further in their emancipation. These peasants were deeply rooted in their land
and in
their traditions. Above all, they fought for the restoration of the
expropriated
communal lands and for the right to own an individual plot of land. For those
looking
for an historical truth beyond the legend, it seems that "the Zapatista
movement is not
socialist, nor even progressive in the sense of wanting to revolutionarily
transform the
whole of Mexico... It is only "revolutionary" insofar as it was a response to
the
aspirations of a communal Indian past...It neither supposes nor proposes an y
kind
of break." Or, if you prefer: "The traditionalism of the Zapatista movement is
the
basis for its solitude and its isolation and, above all, its inconsequence,
its ambiguities
and its profound contradictions. And it's this originality that allowed it to
survive, at
the same time legitimising its inability to develop in a dynamic manner
towards its
self-transformation and to really leave its regionalised 'ghetto'." 8 Besides,
it's
significant that, in the same epoch, the government successfully managed to
achieve
a temporary pacification of the insurgent Yacquis by promising their chiefs to
return
the communal lands and to construct churches... 9 With the revolution brought
to an
end, capitalism's expansion hastened the destruction of traditional forms of
Indian
community by integrating most at their members into the "community of
capital". In
Chiapas, for example the, already in the 1940s, a lot of communities survived
from
the waged work of the Indians employed in the coffee plantations. The
ancestral
values, which remained rooted in their material survival, are, for the most
part, the
values of submission. On the other hand, revolts which carried elements of
social
emancipation with them always developed from situations of proletarianisation.
In
Mexico, the nature of recent struggles has equally been transformed by modern
currents which cross Third World societies: land evictions, social exclusion,
migration, proletarianisation. The revolt in Chiapas is a part of it, and to
persist in
presenting it as an Indian revolt can only limit the political importance of
the actions
of those who participate in it. 11

3.

The revolts of poor peasants and occupations are phenomena endemic to Latin
American societies. To understand the nature of revolt in Chiapas it's
necessary to
quickly recap the specifics of this area and its place in the evolution of the
social
tensions of Mexico.

>From the end of the 50s numerous lndian peasants, evicted from their
individual
plots of land (ejidos), spontaneously started to emigrate to Chiapas. The
government, later on, encouraged the movement of 'expulsados' by inciting them
to
settle in the forests: "Socially, the lacondonian frontier was a safety valve
- an area
situated far from the centre of power and where the potentially explosive
indigenous
and peasant masses from deep Mexico could be put to work. If you want, it was
a
natural reserve for the poorest of the poor." 12 In just a few years, the
arrival of
these "pioneers of the agrarian southern frontier" had turned the social
structure of
Chiapas upside down. 13 The decomposition of the ancient Indian communities
went side by side with the creation of a new poor peasantry, composing a mixed

population (Maya and non-Maya Indians and half-castes).

As with all capitalist land distribution, this was done in an unequal manner.
The
newcomers were given the poorest lands, situated in the mountains and they
never
had access to the fertile valleys. The conditions for the appearance of new
social
antagonisms were created, and the "safety valve" was transformed into a time
bomb.
Thus, at the beginning of the 70s, "the old communities, apparently
structured,
started to show the effects of an intensive internal process of social
differentiation
which was eating into their mechanisms of cohesion and self-defence. Peasants
with
neither land nor work started to be concentrated into the miserable suburbs
(of the
towns of Chiapas). At the beginning of the 80s the amount of people available
for
work doubled whilst, at the same time, the scorched earth policy of the
government
of Rios Montt in Guatemala, forced onto Chiapas more than 80,000 Mayan
refugees who were fleeing the neighbouring country, and who came in addition
to the
reserve army of labour on the Mexican side of the border. The ancient system
of
buying and selling for the reproduction of the workforce was thus dislocated,
without
being replaced by a new system capable of absorbing a growing mass of
agricultural
workers on the dole. Despair and crisis had begun to show the most perverse
effects." 14

In Mexico, the poor peasantry has always shown a strong attachment to the
private
ownership of land. This attitude can be explained by the Indians' aspirations
towards
a past community and by the heritage of the Mexican revolution. In Chiapas,
more
particularly, the content of the demands of the peasants' struggles, never
went
beyond the framework of capitalist social relations. The political
organisations which
developed in the mountains of South-East Mexico, made the idea of individual
land
ownership a component part of their reformist nature.

4.

In October 1968, the Mexican government, astounded by the enormity of an
unprecedented student movement, massacre some 300 demonstrators in the Square
of the Three-Cultures in Mexico City. At the same time, a vicious repression
falls
upon the organisations of the extreme left. Following these tragic events, the
Maoist
Marxist-Leninist group 'Politica Popular' decide to leave the student milieu
to
concentrate its activities on the "mass of the people". So it establishes
itself in the
towns in the northern part of the country, where, due to the drift from the
land, large
areas of shanty-towns exist - a favourable terrain for militant leftists. The
aim is to
create "red bases": a network of organisations which are to cover all spheres
of
social life and, eventually, be able to control these poor areas. Tactics are
borrowed
from the leftist tendencies of the Chinese cultural revolution: the direction
of the
political organisation was never to come out into the open, its decisions
always being
presented as the result of consultation with the masses, expressed in
committees and
in assemblies. It is the classic project of enclosing and manipulating masses
of people
by an avant-garde authoritarian organisation masking itself with the demagogic

discourse of democracy from the base. Whilst organising their "political work"
on
this terrain, the Mexican Maoists inevitably come to meet the older militants
the
progressive priests from the liberation theology tendency. Being in
competition for
control of the same masses, Maoists and priests rapidly reach an
understanding.
>From their miraculous co-operation 'torreonism' (from the name of the big
northern
town) results - the Mexican model for "work on the masses"15 In the middle of
the
70s the Mexican government, worried by the success of this tendency, begin a
savage repression in the course of which a lot of militants are murdered.
Again, the
directors of the organisation revise its positions: the 'Masses Line', which
puts the
emphasis on political work in the urban areas, is replaced by the 'Proletarian
Line',
giving priority to their implantation amongst the poor peasantry. In fact, the
adoption
of this new line meant, fob the Mexican Maoists, moving away towards areas
where
they thought they were less exposed to repression: it was their 'Long March'.
This
was a troubled time in the life of the group, characterised by a whole
succession of
failures at 'implantation', of breaks, of resignations, and of internal
settlings of scores.
16

So it is not before the end of the 70s that the first "brigades" of the
-Maoist
avant-garde arrive in Chiapas, where they again meet their 'fellow travellers'
of the
progressive church, already well-settled in the poor peasant communities. The
alliance between these two organisations is constructed around the idea of an
'Indigenous Church', based on the principle of the autonomy of dioceses and on
the
quality of these base militants in their evangelical tasks and in their
celebration of the
Mass. The Dominicans, who were the majority in Chiapas, subscribed to this
idea as
it allowed them to carry out their "work on the soul", whilst the Maoists used
it as a
means of infiltrating the communities and of creating cadres from the base.
The
insistence on the uniqueness of Indian culture by these avant-gardes can be
explained, above all, by the role played by this 'Indigenous Church' during
its work
of 'implantation'.

Today, it is not easy to establish a clear and straight line from the
organisation
developing during this 'implantation' period to the birth of the EZLN. But
what's for
sure is the existence of this link. After a lapse of time other Maoist groups
arrived in
Chiapas. Marcos himself would have been among one of the last "brigades"17. A
lot
of militants and political leaders disappeared as a result of the merciless
repression
carried out by the army and mercenaries employed by landowners, as for the
survivors,they had to revise some of their conceptions depending on local
conditions. Finally, we know that the basic tactics and principles of the
leftist
Maoists began to reappear in the peasant struggles: the constant resort to
assemblies
as a means of hiding and protecting the political chiefs.

The Mexican Maoists - like their Peruvian counterparts in The Shining Path
-had, in
their own way, criticised the Guevarist idea of foco. They had understood that

political 'implantation' would be doomed to failure if it were only the result
of actions
taken by a small group parachuted into very closed Indian communities hostile
to all
those coming from the outside. From the beginning, they proclaimed the
uniqueness
of Indian culture, for tactical reasons. The small groups of militants must
have
integrated themselves into the communities by using, amongst other things,
their links
with the 'indigenous church'. In a second phase, the political organisation
adapted its
conceptions of leadership to the new historical conditions, characterised by
the
breakdown of rural communities and by the proletarianisation of Indian
peasants.
The creation of peasant union organisations was part of this second phase. In
1991
the "Independent Alliance of Emiliano Zapata peasants" transformed itself into
a
national organisation, an event representing a fundamental political leap. The
work of
creating a 'mass base' was then accomplished and the 'regionalist' conceptions
-
claimed by the self-sufficient Indian communities and defended by the
'Indigenous
Church' - had been superceded. The time for armed action had arrived. In
effect,
and according, to this model, the creation of military organisation was to be
the final
phase of the long political work of 'implantation'18 amongst the population.
Today,
the Zapatista army, stemming from these 'mass' organisations, is only one of
the
Organisation's structures; it is its visible part! The texts of the EZLN and
Marcos'
declarations often refer to this question. The success of the Zapatista
organisation is
explained, to a great extent, by the political intelligence of its militants,
who proved
themselves during this long period of 'implantation'.

The revolt in Chiapas can't be separated from the general deterioration of the

situation. At the beginning of the 90s the whole of Mexico was shaken by a
succession of social movements. The integration of the local economy into the
North
American economic sphere accelerated transformations which had been going on
for
years: in particular, the industrialisation of agricultural production and,
beneath that,
the collapse of agricultural subsistence. The pauperisation of the small
peasants
increases and brings about revolts and powerful mobilisations. At the same
time, the
mass of young people have no access to land and can no longer find work in the

towns. Is it necessary to recall that 60% of the population of Chiapas today
are less
than 20 years old? It's them who are going to swell the ranks of the
Organisation.
"Today the Zapatista army is mainly composed of this mass of modern young
marginals, speaking several languages and having an experience of waged work.
Their make-up has little connection to the isolated Indian that one imagines."
19

The originality of the EZLN is its notable ability to adapt to a situation
borne out of
the collapse of State capitalism and of the end of the division of the world
into two
blocs. It is the first avant-gardist guerilla movement to try to find a way of
operating
in the era of the 'New World Order'. Its Marxist-Leninist cadres have never
criticised the exploitative content of the systems which collapsed. They have
simply
acknowledged the disappearance of that which remains, for them, socialism:
"The
Soviet Union is finished - there is no longer any socialist (sic) camp; in
Nicaragua the
elections were lost; in Guatemala, peace was signed; in Salvador, peace is
discussed, Cuba is isolated, nobody wants to hear anyone speaking about armed
struggle, let alone socialism; from now on, every-one's against revolution,
even if it
isn't socialist." 20 So, what's left for those Marxist-Leninists who have lost
their
bases of support, if not their attachment to a backward anti-imperialist
patriotism,
their eulogy to some national event, and their respect for parliamentary
democracy.
The EZLN is the first guerrilla movement of the post-communist period, a
bureaucracy which has its democratic demagogy as unsold stock.

5.

Contnl over discussion is one of the aspects of the bureaucratic nature of the
EZLN.
The voices of the rebels of Chiapas are reduced to just one voice, which
speaks and
writes in the name of all the others! 21 Some defend this in the name of art
elitist
conception, explaining that Marcos is an 'artist" and "today's best
Latin-American
writer", the representative "of a handful of very gifted young people". "He
(Marcos)
doesn't speak on their behalf, he transforms his companions into characters in
fables
or short stories. With this flaunted but collective subjectivity, he invents a
new way
of saying "I" which resonates with "we" without substituting himself for it,
an "I" both
open and mutant, which everybody can take as they wish and extend in their own

way." 22 On the contrary, it's particularly worrying that that this aspect has
been
justified by virtually everybody involved in the militant support for this
movement.
More subtle minds assure us that Marcos doesn't speak in the name of the
people,
that he's only a spokesman. But how can we recognise the words of people if we

can only hear Marcos? Only Marcos is able to do it, of course! And so we go
round in a circle. Some loyal enthusiasts, however, feel embarrassed by the
spectacle of this sub-commander and thus try extra-hard to prove that there
is, in
this military organisation "a desire to avoid the danger of caudillismo"23 But
it is
what the sub-commander himself partly desires: "What's new is not the absence
of
caudillo; what is new is the fact that the caudillo hasn't got a face." For
us, this is
even worse! In a world of internet networks and virtual reality, the boss's
anonymity
is not the end of the boss - on the contrary, it's the abstract form of
authority. The
cult of the hero is not superseded - it manifests itself in its pure form.
Modernity is
revealed to us in the form of a caricature of the past: we thought we'd got
rid of
Bolshevik avant-gardism only to find o urselves with the avant-gardism of
Zorro.
The EZLN is managerialism in a democratic balaclava.

However, a careful reading of the prose of the EZLN unveils the existence of a
clear
separation between "us" (the liberation army) and "them" (the masses). In
order to
disperse the slightest doubt, we are told that the organisation consults
tirelessly with
the base: there must be plebiscites, assemblies, referendums. It's a question
of
"democratic political processes", of "new political projects", of "autonomous
democracy for all (sic) levels of Mexican society", of a "new political
synthesis" etc.
On the other hand, when it's a question of going further than these hackneyed
concepts and of being precise about the real content of the power structures,
a
vague formula is the rule. In fact, any clear-sighted observer would, without
difficulty, find behind the haze, the basic principles of leftist Maoism, of
the
"torreonism" of the 70s. The Zapatista organisation conforms to this model:
assemblies for the base, clandestine political committees at the head (the
General
Command to which Marcos is answerable).

Patriotic themes are omnipresent in the EZLN's discourse. An observer who was
sympathetic towards their actions still couldn't help but notice that "Marcos
himself
expresses a fanatical patriotism." 25 Without a doubt, patriotic hysteria was
one of
the defects, reduced to caricature, of leftist Maoism, which later became a
variation
of democratic nationalism. In the present instance, these themes compensate,
through demagogy, for the weakness of their proposals concerning the social
question. Any reference to a project of reorganising production and society is

remarkably absent from this discourse. The EZLN wants to be the spokesman for
the poor peasantry, traditionally attached to the land; but nothing is said or
written
either against the right to private property or in favour of expropriations
and
occupations of land. Yet we know that, at the beginning of '95, in Chiapas
State
alone, more than 500 properties were occupied by poor peasants and
sub-proletarians. A certain discrepancy between the Organisation and the
masses
seems to appear...On the other hand, there's no lack of lists of social
"conquests"
obtained by the enactment of revolutionary legalism. On this terrain the
masked
sub-commander is at ease and never fails to enumerate the achievements of the
new
local administration: "We've forbidden the cutting down of trees and we've
established laws for the protection of the forests by prohibiting the hunting
of wild
animals..., as well as forbidding the growing and traffic of drugs, and these
prohibitions have been respected...And we've put an end to prostitution, and
unemployment, as well as begging, have disappeared. And the children have
become acquainted with sweets and toys." 26 Which leaves all those who believe
in
the impossibility of resolving problems without attacking their causes without
a voice.
Since when can we get rid of alcoholism or prostitution by forbidding them?
Since
when has women's participation in military tasks and their pr omotion in the
hierarchy of command represented proof of progress in feminine emancipation?

>From the little we know of the real conditions of the social revolt which is
spreading
in Mexico, it appears, in decisive moments, that Mexican proletarians find
themselves alone in the face of the forces of repression which defend private
property. Those who sympathise with the EZLN want us to absolutely believe
that
the army's existence represents a shield, a self-defensive force for the poor
confronted by the State and the capitalists. That is an elitist argument par
excellence:
weak people need an armed fist capable of defending theme But the reality is
completely different. The EZLN doesn't intervene when confrontations happen
outside the zone which they control militarily. The peasants in revolt are
then shot
with no bother. This is far from the perspective of those armed groups - which
we
have known about elsewhere and in other epochs - whose strategy was to bring
about a response to the repression wherever it was carried out. Because the
EZLN
is not a classical armed group - it's the armed arm of an Organisation which
controls
an area and its population. As long as Mexican proletarians let themselves be
taken
in by the belief in the self-defensive role of the EZLN, they will have to pay
a terrible
price. From this point of view (which is ours'), it can be argued that even
the
existence of the EZLN is a brake on the development of the autonomous capacity

for struggle. The raison d'être of an avant-garde organisation is its ability
to replace
autonomous force by the force of the Party. But we must also recognise that
the
EZLN plays a dual role amongst the sub-proletarian youth who make up its base.
It
channels their revolt into military actions, which are controllable by the
chiefs, and at
the same time gives them a collective identity at a time of heavy social
collapse.

6.

The events of Chiapas are unfolding at a time when capitalism is going through
a
particular historical moment. During the epoch when the world was split into
two
blocs, all the projects of national independence presupposed a submission to
one or
the other of the capitalist powers. However, the aim of the so-called
"liberation"
movements was to break the links of such-and-such a country with American
imperialism. Nationalist ideology identified itself with Marxist-Leninism,
which was
becoming the ideology of the ruling class of the new states-in-formation.
Since the
establishment of the New World Order, borne out of the collapse of the State
capitalist system, the nationalist project can no longer aspire towards such a
rupture.
Any avant-garde organisation must review its tactics and strategies if it's
not to be
condemned to disappear. As well as putting forward nationalist demands, which
exploit the anti-imperialist feelings which are still very much alive in the
countries
dependant on the centres of capitalism, this type of organisation must
integrate itself
into local political life in order to find there alliances within the confines
of the
contradictions at the heart of the ruling classes.

We know that the EZLN's military action in Chiapas was launched at the same
time
as the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Area) came into force - the free trade

agreement between the three countries of North America. This agreement wants
to
create a formal juridical framework, regulating a process which has been on
course
for years: the seizure by the United States of the two border countries -
Canada in
the north and Mexico in the south. Taking into account its weakness, the
consequences for the Mexican economy are very important: the closure of
uncompetitive industrial units, the destruction of traditional agricultural
production
and the pauperisation of the majority of the population. 27 Added to all this
is a
drastic disruption of the ruling class, since the economy is characterised by
powerful
State intervention. The breaking of the bonds, woven over decades, between the

nomenclature of the party-State and the private capitalist class is the order
of the
day. As a result, it's the whole system of nepotism and corruption which is
being
threatened. The decay of the political class - the Institutional Revolutionary
Party
(PRI) - and the decomposition of the bureaucratic control network of civil
society,
are not recent: the student revolt of the 60s and the movements of
self-organisation
following Mexico's earthquake have already shown that. Today we are at the
stage
of rotting putrefaction and the situation is such that there's a bloody
settling of scores
at the very top of the PRI's nomenclature. The neo-liberal tendency demands
the
elimination of the bureaucratic constraints which constitute the basis for the
survival
of the old sections of the PRI. Of course, the alliances between the different

tendencies are far from being made on any clear basis since many of the
partisans of
neo-liberalism also come from the corrupt and speculative sectors of the PRI.
There,
as elsewhere, the members of the State bureaucracy transform themselves into
ferocious defenders of a savage private capit alism.

Within the Mexican bourgeoisie there are many who don't wish to conform to the

demands of North American capitalism. We can assume that the military action
of
the EZLN and the anxiety which it has aroused amongst multinational capitalist

circles could have become a stake in the conflict between this tendency and
the
defenders of American interests. The changeover to American control of Mexican

petrol - an operation which came about under the cover of the cancellation of
the
debt - has re-activated these -antagonisms, and exacerbated the nationalist
feelings
of the bourgeoisie.

Mexican Left Social Democracy - regrouped around the Party of Revolutionary
Democracy (PRD) - has also been forced to find a new place on the political
scene.
First of all, this party tried to become allied to the leader-shin of the EZLN
by
offering them their own services: their institutional connections, their
political and
trade union structures and their influence in the media. However, this
alliance didn't
survive the situation's development. The EZLN couldn't allow its actions to be

integrated into the national strategy of the PRD, which it regards as too
compromised with certain sectors of the Mexican bourgeoisie. Their differences

were emphasised after the elections of August '95, which saw the failure of
the PRD
and the powerful rise of the neo-liberal Catholic current of the National
Action Party
(PAN), a new political force which is promising to clean up the State whilst
adapting
it to NAFTA demands. For its part, the EZLN doesn't demand "power", which has
often been underlined as proof of the EZLN's anti-authoritarianism, without
saying
that its leaders know perfectly well that, given the historical situation and
the power
struggles, they can't afford to demand the Dower of the central State. But on
the
other hand, the Zapatistas are in a position to negotiate the representative
power of
the marginalised and excluded layers of the proletariat, a power that they
have
gained because of the sympathy aroused by their actions. The EZLN has become
the new party of the Mexican Left. As for Marcos, confident about his media
charisma, he pre-cents himself more and more as one of the chiefs and displays
in
the press his politicking science. The eruption of the Mexican crisis and its
financial
consequences have destroyed the myth of neo-liberalism's economic miracle
throughout the American-can continent. The American capitalists, believing
only in
making a good deal out of NAFTA, find themselves faced, in Mexico, with a
situation which risks becoming explosive. Furthermore, if there is an
explosion,
they're going to face, on the one hand, the discontent of the immigrant
community in
the USA (not just Mexican, but Hispanic in general) 28and, on the other hand,
the
dangers of the spread of the revolt to other Latin-American countries.
Whatever
happens, the political future of the EZLN won't be separated from the
confrontations
within the ruling class on the question of dependence on American capitalism.
The
activity of the Zapatistas is, from now on, a part of these political stakes.
The major
unknown factor in this scenario of bourgeois politics is the actions of
Mexican
proletarians and their ability to emancipate themselves from the control of
bureaucratic organisations, both ancient (the PRI and the PRD) and modern (the

EZLN). Should they engage in autonomous and independent actions, they will
discover the gap which exists between their class interests and the
nationalist
interests of these parties and organisations. On that day, we shall see the
old
caciques (ancient Indian chiefs) and the new chiefs in balaclavas holding
hands
together. Without a doubt, the "well gifted young people"29 will agree in
rejecting
the "unrealistic" demands of the sub-proletarian youths in revolt. They will
therefore
realise their ambitions, because, as a revolutionary from the epoch of Zapata
remarked, "The cult of the personality can only create followers amongst the
ignorant or those who chase after positions and private incomes." 30

Paris, August 1995 Sylvie Deneuve, Charles Reeve

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