[A-List] A State of Emergency: Comparing Syria and Egypt

["Yoshie Furuhashi" <critical.montages@xxxxxxxxx>]

<http://www.dailystaregypt.com/printerfriendly.aspx?ArticleID=14139>
A State of Emergency: Comparing Syria and Egypt

By Afshin Shahi
First Published 6/2/2008

For some reason, there is a popular assumption that within the
boundaries of Middle Eastern politics, every internal factor is
related to an external one.

Although such popular assumptions only attempt to provide simple
answers to complicated questions, the Syrian government persistently
traces a pattern of relations between external factors and the
internal political conditions in the country. Over the last four
decades, what has been perceived as the external threat from Israel
has been the prime justification for reshaping the domestic political
mechanism in Syria.

The state of war with a country that Damascus does not recognize as a
legitimate state has deeply affected the political dynamics of Syria.
Accordingly, the country has been under a "state of emergency" since
1963. In theory, a state of emergency is declared when the state has
to suspend its normal functions in order to respond to extraordinary
incidents such as war, civil unrest or natural disasters. Often, the
drastic measures that are taken by the state in such cases have
significant implications for civil society. In that light, in Syria
the activities of civic agencies have been largely suspended and a
meaningful public participation has been denied in order to enable the
body of central decision making to address the "problems" effectively.

However, the intensity of the state of emergency and its side effects
has been part of every day life for over four decades now. In
accordance to that, for about 45 years the rulers have securitized all
possible dimensions of political life in order to legitimize
extraordinary means to "respond" to a perceived threat.

Yet foreign policy for domestic political consumption is nothing new
in the region. Time after time states have used the notion of national
security to maintain authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. For
example, except for an 18-month break in 1980, Egypt has been living
under an emergency law since 1967. The Law was imposed during the Six
Day War with Israel. But the peace treaty with the Jewish State did
not immune Egyptians from living under an ongoing state of war. The
law was forcefully re-imposed following the assassination of President
Sadat in 1981. The domestic political conditions have been
significantly affected by this law and there is no sign of possible
termination for this so-called "emergency situation."

Ironically the Egyptian parliament recently extended a decades-old
state of emergency by two more years, despite  previous promises that
the law would be replaced by new anti-terror legislation.

Similarly in Syria the notion of national security has been on top of
the agenda at the expense of public accountability for many decades.
Despite the original slogan of the Ba'ath Party, which is "Unity,
Freedom and Socialism," there is little tangible political freedom in
Syria, particularly when it comes to scrutinizing the president and
the security-oriented agencies which influence major decisions in the
country. There are multiple security services operating independently
of each other to maintain the stability of the Ba'athist regime. Such
a political framework enabled former President Hafiz El-Assad to
maintain his power for about 30 years. Apart from the so-called
"Damascus Spring," a relatively  short period of relaxation after his
death, everything has remained generally the same under the rule of
his son Bashar.

Now after many indecisive years of "no war, no peace" it seems that
Syria is reconsidering its relations with Israel, a move which may
finally bring an end to the historic antagonism between the two
states. Although, the bilateral negotiations are complex, the demands
seem to be straightforward.  It is as obvious as the fact that in
return for the Golan Heights, Israel would not expect anything less
than peace.

Nevertheless, for Syria peace with Israel is not only a matter of
reshaping  foreign policy, it is an external transition with possible
internal implications. In other words, Syrian attempts to shift
foreign policy towards Israel may have an affect on Syrian domestic
political conditions. Hence, one can question whether the Syrian
internal political climate will remain the same in the absence of the
external threat from Israel. Can Syria maintain the securitized
political climate without an external enemy?

Although there are no definite answers to such complex questions, it
is more than likely that Syria will follow the same route as Egypt,
that is, the securitized monopoly over power will remain the same even
without an ideological enemy such as Israel.

Although, the "state of war" has been the main justification for the
lack of accountability, there will be no guarantee that peace can pave
the way for more political transparency in Syria. It is very unlikely
to expect that peace with Israel can coincide with the termination of
the "state of emergency." Although officially the state of war with
Israel might end, the existing security-oriented conditions will
remain the same.

Israel may no longer appear as the external threat, but there will be
a shift of attention from the threat of the Jewish State to the
homegrown opposition.

The Syrian opposition consists of Muslim Brotherhood members, Kurds,
liberals and communists. However, they are ideologically incompatible
and often they unilaterally pursue their own agenda. The only
political objective that they may have in common is to overthrow the
existing order in Damascus. Some measures have been taken by some of
the prominent dissidents such as former Vice-President Abdul Halim
Khaddam to unite the opposition. But still the dissenting parties and
movements either outside or inside remain fragmented. For that reason,
they cannot constitute collective opposition against the government of
Bashar El-Assad.

Thus despite the weak nature of the opposition the securitized climate
will remain the same and no unorthodox voice will be tolerated in the
name of "national security."

Although, the external threat from Israel has served the consolidation
of authoritarianism, the state machinery will persistently excuse the
ongoing emergency law even in the absence of the unfriendly Jewish
State.

As in the case of Egypt, the political by-products of the state of war
will persist in Syria even at the time of peace.

Afshin Shahiis a Cairo-based British Iranian PhD candidate of
political philosophy specialized in Middle East affairs.