http://www.marxist.com/lessons-nicaragua-part-two-2.htm
Nicaragua: Lessons of a country that did not finish its revolution ÃÂÃÂÃÂ
Part
Two
By Claudio Villas
Friday, 18 January 2008
Reform or Revolution: The nature of the state
Thousands of working class men and women took advantage of the victory of
the Nicaraguan revolution in 1979 to immediately demand better pay and
conditions and also payment of wages lost during the revolutionary
strike.
The bourgeoisie were preparing to take advantage of the new political era
inaugurated by the Sandinistas for their own ends, when it had in fact
been
the people who had kicked Somoza out of the country.
The problem was that, unlike in Russia during the 1905 and 1917
revolutions,
in Nicaragua during these revolutionary months no independent organs of
workers' power were set up in the cities. Therefore the power vacuum
after
the revolutionary victory was filled by the FSLN guerrillas and the
representatives of the urban bourgeoisie.
Instead of basing the new power on assemblies and workers' and peasants'
committees (genuine workers' democracy), the new state structure was
based
on the hierarchical model of the guerrilla army - like in the Cuban
revolution. From a Marxist point of view the problem with this
organisational model is that it does not allow the participation of the
masses in the decision-making process, in the election and recall of the
leaders and so on. In other words, it does not allow for genuine control
of
the state and the state apparatus. The strong point of workers' democracy
compared to other kinds of regimes thrown up by different revolutions is
the
democratic mechanisms to counteract bureaucratisation.
Lenin explained that some conditions had to exist in a revolution in
order
to have power held by the people. Lenin never talked about "popular
power"
in general. In his writings such as State and Revolution , April Thesis
and
The impending catastrophe and how to fight it, the Bolshevik leader
developed Karl Marx's theory under the light of revolutionary experience.
The working class cannot use the bourgeois state apparatus to rule. The
bourgeois military, parliamentary, legal and ideological institutions are
tailor-made for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie - it is the main
instrument used by the bourgeois class to rule over the working class and
other oppressed layers of society. The bourgeois state is not fit for
"popular power" because it is designed precisely to stop any genuine
popular
participation.
What is needed to overcome the bourgeoisie and end their economic,
political
and military rule is to establish new and genuinely popular structures
based
on the natural forms of organisation of the working class in struggle:
1) All the power in the cities must be in the hands of revolutionary
committees elected by all the revolutionary population mobilised in the
wards, and districts...
All the power in the factories, companies, media and so on must be under
the
control of committees elected by revolutionary workers' assemblies in
each
sector.
All the power of the state must rest under the general command of the
revolution which should be elected, accountable and recallable by
committees
of workers and peasants in order to exclude the bourgeoisie from
political
power. No to the bourgeois parliament, no to the bourgeois government, no
to
the bourgeois courts.
All delegates or representatives must be elected and recallable at any
moment by the rank and file that voted them. Not a single official in the
new state must get wages superior to the average earnings of a worker.
This
is the way to fight bureaucracy.
2) There must be popular militias based on the working class and the poor
peasantry to replace the traditional army that is kept isolated from the
population by the walls of the barracks.
The officers must be elected and recallable by the ranks of the militias
and
controlled by peasants' and workers' revolutionary committees in the
countryside and the wards in the cities.
Arms must be under the control of the revolutionary committees elected in
the wards, villages and factories. Soldiers must coordinate their
committees
with them.
3) Nationalisation of the most important industries and the multinational
companies under workers' control. There must be no compensation to the
former owners. Only the small shareholders that genuinely need it, should
be
compensated.
Nationalisation of the banks, insurance companies and construction
companies. Private and foreign banks must be merged into a single
revolutionary central bank under the control of the workers' state.
Control of foreign trade and collectivisation of the big landowners'
estates.
What was the situation in Nicaragua after the revolution? Both the
Sandinista and non-Sandinista civil servants began to earn 6 and 7 times
more than ordinary workers in a situation where 50% of the labour force
was
unemployed. The managers of private industry carried on earning an
average
of 20 to 25 times more than the workers. Banks with no currency reserves
and
that were bankrupt were nationalised. The government assumed the debt of
private companies. The private banks suffered losses of 1800 million
dollars
caused by the debts of such companies. Only companies that belonged to
the
Somoza family were nationalised (these represented 25% of the Nicaraguan
economy). These companies had been completely abandoned and ruined by the
Somoza family. Payments of interest on the foreign debt were not
suspended,
nor was the Somozista foreign debt repudiated. The workers were excluded
from any possibility of controlling the major economic decisions.
The Somozista state machinery and its armed body (the National Guard)
were
swept away by the revolution. The leadership of the FSLN stepped into
this
vacuum. These same leaders months before taking power had brokered the
creation of a National Reconstruction Junta (JNR) with the national and
international bourgeoisie from Costa Rica and Venezuela. Months before
there
were frenetic activities that involved agreements, meetings and
negotiations
abroad between the FSLN leaders, representatives of the Nicaraguan
bourgeoisie and the bourgeois governments of Costa Rica, Panama,
Venezuela
and Mexico.
General Omar Torrijos
The main goal pursued by everybody (including the FSLN) was to negotiate
the
nature of the new state after the overthrow of Somoza and avoid a
situation
where the Nicaraguan masses could cast off the chains of capitalism.
General
Omar Torrijos from Panama sent his National Guard to coordinate the FSLN
actions. The aim was to ensure a bourgeois and bureaucratic structure of
the
new army and give logistical support and troops to the final offensive of
the Sandinistas. The popular militias formed during the struggle were
disbanded by the Sandinista central command. The Sandinistas bent under
the
pressure of the national and international bourgeoisie.
The setting up of revolutionary popular militias always terrifies the
ruling
class because these can be sued to destroy the repressive apparatus of
the
bourgeois state. This happened then and will happen in all revolutions.
The
disarming of the people appeared to be a priority to establish "bourgeois
democratic credibility" of the National Reconstruction government led by
the
Sandinistas.
On July 27, a week after the taking of Managua the Sandinista army chief
Humberto Ortega announced the integration of the popular militias into
the
new regular army following the advice of the Panama National Guard. Years
earlier this body had been trained by US officers and the CIA. He also
created the Sandinista Police (PNS) in order to remove public order tasks
from the Sandinista Defence Committees (CDS).
The distribution of land is key to the success of all revolutions. The
revolution had initially encouraged the poor peasants and rural workers
to
take over the land. The JNR stopped them and they even used the newly
created Sandinista Police to persuade the peasants not to occupy the
land.
To make things crystal clear: the Minister for Agrarian Reform intervened
and ordered that nobody could take over landed estates even if they were
misused, because the Ministry of Agrarian Reform would provide land at
the
appropriate time.
On July 31, Sandinista Wheelock stated, "We do not want to allow
radicalism,
we are realists". In 1981 the Minister for Planning, Xavier Gorostiaga,
recognised that "very few people are aware of the fact that 80% of
agricultural production is in the hands of the private sector, as is as
75%
of the industrial sector". The private sector controlled 72% of cotton
production, 53% of coffee, 58% of cattle production, 51% of sugar, while
the
200,000 peasants owned only 14% of the land. It would be true to say that
by
this stage many peasants and agricultural labourers realised that the
FSLN
leadership was acting as a brake on the revolution.
The Sandinista leadership ruled the country together with the treacherous
national bourgeoisie during the first months of the revolution. However,
the
economic crisis continued to get worse. But the bourgeoisie, by now
reassured that the FSLN leadership had halted the revolution, left the
economic problems for the Sandinistas to sort out. The first move of the
FSLN in the National Reconstruction government (made up of just 5 people)
was to install a State Council. This was a bourgeois-democratic body made
up
of 33 members in which all the social, political and trade union forces
that
accepted the Sandinista leadership were represented. In 1984, this
parliament was transformed into the Nicaraguan National Assembly, by now
a
bourgeois parliament with a leftwing majority.
In this manner, the FSLN leadership preserved the traditional parliament
and
government structures of the capitalist state. Executive power was
concentrated in the hands of the National Directorate which was chaired
by
the President of the Republic. In 1984 in a few days more than 80% of the
population over the age of 16 registered on the electoral register. The
election results revealed the huge support of the masses for the FSLN.
The hypocrisy of US imperialists had no limits even from a
bourgeois-democratic point of view. They used the same old method of
denouncing "repression in Nicaragua".
Nicaragua was the most democratic state in Central America
CDN (National Democratic Coordination) leader Arturo Cruz participated
alongside other people in the first phases of the Sandinista government.
A
few months later he went over to the side of the Contra and denounced the
1984 elections as anti-democratic. (Have we not seen such examples also
today in Venezuela?). The bourgeoisie never completely accepted the
Sandinista government because it was not "theirs" and they could not rely
on
it to rule the country as they wished. The Sandinistas tried to reach an
agreement with the bourgeoisie, to no avail. Believing in the myth of the
"progressive bourgeoisie", the Sandinistas gave these elements a lot of
room
to manoeuvre, above all in the economic field.
After the victory of the 1979 revolution, the FSLN led the development of
the new trade unions in the Sandinista CST (confederation of unions),
which
was the result of the merger of the two trade union federations
controlled
by the Stalinists. These "communist" trade union leaders enthusiastically
accepted the task of holding back workers' struggles and the social
pressure
of the unemployed workers. The Agricultural Workers' Associations (ATC),
the
Youth Movement (MJS) and the CDS, which were established at ward level
like
the Cuban Committees in Defence of the Revolution (CDR), were also
centralised. The problem was that none of these organisations held real
power and all were transformed into mechanisms to implement the decisions
from the top down.
"The mixed economy" ÃÂÃÂÃÂ a death trap (and a warning to Venezuela)
The FSLN immediately decided that the economy had to remain mixed. They
gave
no room for any debate among peasants and workers on major affairs of the
revolution. The Sandinista leader and Government minister Jaime Wheelock
stated on August 21 1979 to the French newspaper Le Monde that he boldly
opposed "...all of those that want to accelerate the evolution of the
regime
in Nicaragua". Another Sandinista leader, and Home Affairs Minister,
Tomas
Borge, behaved in a similar manner.
Commander Humberto Ortega stated that, "national reconstruction must
serve
to reach a superior phase of political and social development. If we did
not
have this phase we could not have in Nicaragua a future liberal
democratic
society or any other kind of society [...] We state that [national
reconstruction] is a phase of the popular-democratic revolution" (
Granma,
September 2 1979).
Imperialism could breath a sigh of relief as the immediate danger seemed
to
have been removed. And in order to make sure that the revolution did not
divert from the bourgeois path a lot of well-respected social-democratic
leaders landed in Managua Airport. Felipe Gonzalez from the Spanish PSOE,
the French "socialists", Mario Soares from the Portuguese Socialist
Party,
the Swedish and Belgian social democracy, the German SPD, the reformist
leaders of the Italian PCI all went to Nicaragua to offer their services.
The international social-democracy organised the raising of loans in
Europe
to help Nicaragua to service its foreign debt. This was a great example
of
"reformist internationalism" at the services of the big capitalists. Very
soon the OAS (Organisation of American States) recognised the regime and
after this came money from Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama and Europe. Food
and drugs were shipped from the US.
Weeks after Somoza had fled the country, imperialism had clearly
understood
what was behind the business-friendly messages issued by the FSLN
recognising that this was a weakness they could exploit. Jimmy Carter
said
on September 11, 1979: "I am satisfied with the Nicaraguan government",
while the Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced the very
next day to the newspaper El Espectador de Bogota: "The Jimmy Carter
government asked the Congress for a grant of 11 million for Nicaragua to
reinforce the pluralist and moderate policies of its new revolutionary
government. The outlook of the government, as has been revealed in its
initial policies, has been moderate and pluralist and neither Marxist nor
Cuban." And on October 29 1979 the ghost of the UN showed up with a
resolution appealing for economic solidarity with Nicaragua.
As we explained at the beginning of this document, the revolution
achieved
great successes in the social fields. However, unlike the Cuban
Revolution,
a large part of the economy was left in the hands of the multinational
companies (like the American colossus General Mills and Exxon, at that
time
the second biggest in the world) and the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie.
The economic plan of the Sandinistas known as "Fight Plan" stated: "We
opposed the policy of regulation of the participation in the development
of
our country by foreign capital, other states and private companies, in
the
context of a mixed economy which offers room for the work of both sectors
of
popular and private property that will be interested in the national
development". In other words, the "Fight Plan" accepted imperialist
control
of very important sectors of the economy.
The Sandinistas did not hand back full political power to the
bourgeoisie,
but they did leave in their hands a crucial weapon to undermine the
conquests of the Nicaraguan Revolution. While the government was
subsidising
the private sector through tax cuts to get its support and collaboration,
the capitalists boycotted the economy and supported the Contras!
The public sector represented 14% of GNP in 1977 but it had grown to 41%
by
1980 after some expropriations had been carried out, mainly property of
the
Somoza family. Nonetheless, six years after the revolution (in 1985) the
country was only using 60% of its productive capacity. In 1981 the
interest
on the foreign debt was consuming 40% of the country's revenues from
exports. The narrowness of the productive base of a country as small as
Nicaragua, which had fewer inhabitants than Caracas or Havana, meant that
to
stimulate genuine development what was required was a truly revolutionary
initiative such as the expulsion of the bourgeoisie, and the
establishment
of a Socialist Federation with Cuba. Unfortunately, Moscow played a
negative
role in all this. It considered the Nicaraguan revolution an internal
affair
of the Sandinistas and approved with no reservations the economic
policies
of the FSLN. Havana, still heavily dependent on Moscow, went along with
this
policy.
The role of Moscow and Havana
Central to the defeat of the Nicaraguan revolution was the lack of
understanding of the nature of the bourgeoisie on the part of the
Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN). The Moscow bureaucracy, that was
responsible for the tragic decline, and eventual fall, of the USSR was
happy
to leave things as they were. They made no real effort to stop the
process
of defeat in Nicaragua. Even trade between Moscow and Managua was very
limited. Moscow did not want problems with US imperialists in Central and
Latin America and was following a policy of diplomatic "peaceful
coexistence" with the US, something which Che Guevara had criticised
bitterly in the past. They did nothing to help the revolutionary
movements
in Latin America.
Why? Because the Soviet bureaucracy feared revolution in any part of the
world. Successful revolutions would have upset the international balance
of
forces. It would have upset their idea of peaceful coexistence between
their
sphere of influence and that of imperialism. The Moscow bureaucracy
claimed
to be communist, socialist, etc. but in reality it did not want to see
genuine socialism at home or abroad. The Moscow government in reality
detested Che Guevara and even in the case of Cuba had not supported the
radicalisation of the revolution. In 1960, two years after Castro's
coming
to power, the Soviet bureaucracy was forced to accept the eradication of
capitalism in Cuba as a fait accompli. However, what they did do was to
do
their best to stop the revolution from expanding to the rest of the
continent.
In 1979 and 1980, to their credit, the Cuban government called for a
campaign of solidarity with Nicaragua. They addressed all capitalist
countries of Latin America and the world, even the US, but strangely
enough
not China or the USSR. Cuba even discouraged Nicaragua from associating
economically with the Soviet bloc. This was in reality a form of pressure
on
the Sandinistas to maintain their alliance with the democratic bourgeois
governments in Central America and the Caribbean instead of with the
USSR.
On January 11, 1985 Fidel Castro declared in Barricada, the central organ
of
the FSLN:
"Yesterday we had the chance to listen to the speech of comrade Daniel
Ortega and I have to congratulate him. He has been serious and
responsible.
He has explained the aims of the Sandinista Front in every sector: a
mixed
economy, political pluralism and legislated foreign investment [...] I
know
that in your conception there is room for a mixed economy. You can have a
capitalist economy. What you are not, without any doubt, going to have is
a
government serving the interests of the capitalists."
What Comandante Fidel Castro then did not say was that a government
cannot
serve the interests of the working class and at the same time grant
imperialism a free hand in the national economy. Meanwhile, as all those
speeches were taking place, the youth and militant workers of Nicaragua
were
marching through the streets of Managua to strengthen the
anti-imperialist
resistance shouting: They shall not pass!
The new international scenario and the defeat of the revolution
Despite their treacherous role, it was not the fascist Contra
paramilitaries
that defeated the revolution. Popular resistance had demoralised the
Contra
and they had been cornered by the mid-1980s. The real reason the
revolution
was defeated was to be found in a combination of factors. There was the
fall
in the price of oil and raw materials under the absolute control of the
dictatorship of the multinationals, combined with internal and external
sabotage by the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie who had sold their country out.
Living conditions started to fall shortly after the coming to power of
the
Sandinistas. Inflation reached 400% in 1987 resulting in a black market
that
fed 130,000 people - about 5% of the population. This explains why
workers
started to come out on strike and why a desperate population looted shops
in
Managua. The government replied by banning the right to strike and
declaring
a state of emergency as a response to the constant menace of the US
government headed by Ronald Reagan. The state was forced to spend 40% of
Nicaragua's GNP on weapons to defend the country while the private sector
carried on its boycott campaign.
In addition, the election of Reagan coincided with a new international
situation. Big capital in the United States had changed its view about
the
Latin American situation. They saw that although the dictatorships they
had
previously supported had been overthrown, the capitalist domination of
these
countries had been preserved. This was due of course to the lack of
revolutionary leadership. Towards the end of the 1980s, the puppet
regimes
in El Salvador and Colombia understood that their bloody regimes had to
put
on a democratic mask, behind which the massacre of the working class and
peasants could continue. Added to this was the fact that the Stalinist
regimes were in deep crisis, as was their international influence.
In Europe there was a temporary lull in the struggles of the working
class
and youth and also in the US there was a relative calm on the home front.
In
Asia, the dictatorship in the Philippines had been defeated by the mass
mobilisations but the Maoist and Stalinist two-stage theory meant a clear
revolutionary opportunity had been lost. The new democratic bourgeois
government of Cory Aquino was on very good terms with Reagan. Reactionary
guerrillas in Afghanistan, financed and backed by the US through
Pakistan,
were harassing the Russian Army. The world economy had recovered from
recession and the Reagan administration felt strong enough to take on the
Sandinistas with the paramilitary Contras and their propaganda campaign.
Morale among the Nicaraguan people started to fall rapidly and scepticism
towards the Sandinista government began to creep in. It was only the
imperialist threat that prevented the development of an open left-wing
opposition within the ranks of the Sandinista movement. In 1989 inflation
peaked at an incredible 36,000% and the average person's income was half
of
what it had been in 1977. The situation was becoming desperate and the
government was hanging from a thread. Social spending had been cut and it
hit rock bottom in 1990, a crucial election year.
The collapse of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc at the end of the 1980s
contributed to a further demoralisation of the Sandinista leadership and
it
started to look for solutions by shifting to the right, economically and
politically. As a result, the timid land reforms were suspended and they
buckled under the pressure of private business. Corruption among civil
servants started to become widespread.
Daniel Ortega
Daniel Ortega, president of the Sandinista Front, had lost complete touch
with reality when he declared to L'UnitÃÂÃ , the daily newspaper of the
Italian
Communist Party (PCI) that, "We have kept our promises, we have kept a
mixed
economy as well as economic pluralism. The Swedish model is the model
that
we Nicaraguans look to with interest." (interview with Daniel Ortega
5.5.1989). The problem was that Sweden had a much more powerful state
sector
than Nicaragua and the Swedish bourgeoisie had come onto the scene of
history 300 years earlier. Once again we see that there is no room for
more
rich people . The Sandinistas lost power in the 1990 elections. It was a
vote against hunger and misery, a protest vote against a government of
the
FSLN that lost the elections that day.
The political shortsightedness of the Sandinista leaders today stands
fully
exposed, as we can see in a speech in 2004 by Daniel Ortega, the General
Secretary of the FSLN. In referring to the 1990 elections in which the
USA
poured a mountain of dollars into funding anti-Sandinista propaganda,
Ortega
stated:
"We were entering the most corrupt game with total honesty [...] Apart
from
the good intentions [!] that the people in power [right wing politicians]
may have had in 1990, or in 1996, or the ones we have right now, apart
from
their intentions of trying to do the best for Nicaragua [!!], the truth
is
that they lacked a firm stand in the face of the Nicaraguan people, with
the
Sandinista Front and with which to fight a dignified struggle to save our
interests as a nation, to save our sovereignty, our political and social
sovereignty.
"But to do this we need a government that operates with flexibility, with
an
open mind and above all, with a sense of dignity and a sense of
sovereignty;
because so far the last thing the governments that we have had, has been
a
sense of dignity and sovereignty. It is painful to say this. It is a
shame
for us to have to say this, but it is the truth. We would like the
current
government to gain prestige by immediately tackling the problems of
production, food, health, the education of our country; then they can say
that they are doing this for the good of Nicaragua." (meeting in Managua,
July 19, 2004).
After such a bitter experience and lacking the compass of Marxist theory,
the top leaders of the Sandinista movement still dream of a "national
progressive bourgeoisie" in a country where half of the population is
unemployed and more than half of the national budget is spent on paying
the
foreign debt. However, the one thing that the right wing politicians did
not
manage to erase was the important tradition of struggle of the Nicaraguan
working class. The struggle of Augusto CÃÂÃÂsar Sandino and of all the
revolutionary martyrs of Nicaragua are a tradition that cannot be buried.
The seeds of revolution will grow again. This time the revolution will
separate the reformists from the revolutionary leaders win the Sandinista
movement.
The revolution returns, on a global scale
The Venezuelan revolution that we are currently experiencing is the fruit
of
a changed international situation. The whole world situation is rebelling
against imperialism. Today on a world scale we have present at the same
time
revolutionary factors that occurred separately in different historical
periods over the last century:
1) The transition from an epoch of protracted development of the
productive
forces on a world scale to a new epoch of global crisis of imperialism
that
has already started (similar to the impasse at the beginnings of the 20
th
Century). This is provoking a very unstable situation in world relations
with the perspective of wars, revolutions and counter-revolutions.
2) The aggressive nature of US imperialism combined with a weakening of
its
power base. The US is both socially and economically fragile and is
having
to open too many international fronts (similar to the period of defeat
during the Vietnam War and the oil crisis of 1973-75).
3) Extreme polarisation of society and the resurgence of revolutionary
struggles throughout Latin America as well as the end of peace and
stability
in the most developed capitalist countries. There is also a heightened
international anti-imperialist awareness.
In this equation there are also new elements that contribute to a
heightened
level of class struggle:
1) The numerical strength of the working class on a global scale and the
huge increase of the abyss between a privileged minority and the
exploited
majority of society.
2) The confidence of the exploited peoples in their own ruling classes in
Asia, Africa and Latin America is diminishing rapidly. These "national
bourgeoisies" have had between 50 and 100 years of so-called independence
to
develop "their" countries and they have failed.
We have entered a decisive epoch of world revolution. Venezuela is in the
vanguard of this process. As in Nicaragua in the past many reformist
"advisers" are seeking to hold the revolution back. They say we must have
a
mixed economy, i.e. a capitalist economy. They say we must slow down the
pace of the revolution; we must involve the "progressive" bourgeoisie.
All
this is very similar to the reformist policies that led to the defeat of
the
Nicaraguan revolution. With the help of revolutionary Marxism, the
working
class will learn from the lessons of the past. They will learn to avoid
the
mistakes that were made in Nicaragua and in other failed revolutions. On
this basis they can achieve victories. They will repeat the victory of
the
Russian revolution and base themselves on the best traditions of genuine
revolutionary Marxism. Our task is to bury capitalism starting with a
Socialist Federation of Venezuela and Cuba and then spreading this to the
whole of Latin America and beyond.
Note 1: The following resources were most useful in preparing this text:
Nicaragua: Reforma o RevoluciÃÂÃÂn by Carlos Vig (BogotÃÂÃÂ 1980), the
document
Nicaragua: due secoli di rivoluzione published in 1987 by the Italian
Marxists of FalceMartello; the pamphlet Cuba: pasado, presente y futuro
published in 2004 by the Spanish Marxists of El Militante and the
official
Website of the FSLN
Note 2: This article is a slightly edited version of a text written in
2004
before the Sandinistas came back into office.
See also:
Nicaragua: Lessons of a country that did not finish its revolution ÃÂÃÂÃÂ
Part
One by Claudio Villas (January 17, 2008)
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