[A-List] Reflections of President Fidel Castro: Deliberate lies, strange deaths and aggression to the world economy

[Macdonald Stainsby <mstainsby@xxxxxxxxx>]

  Reflections of President Fidel Castro

Deliberate lies, strange deaths and aggression to the world economy

IN one of my reflections I made reference to gold bars deposited in the 
basements of the Twin Towers.  This time the subject is quite a bit more 
complicated and hard to believe.  Almost four decades ago scientists 
living in the United States discovered the Internet, the same way that 
Albert Einstein, born in Germany, discovered in his own time the formula 
to measure atomic energy.

Einstein was a great scientist and humanist.  He contradicted Newton’s 
laws of physics, held sacred until then.  However, apples continued to 
fall due to the laws of gravity that had been defined by Newton.  These 
were two different ways of observing and interpreting nature, with very 
little information on this in Newton’s day.  I remember what I read more 
than 50 years ago about the famous theory of relativity elaborated by 
Einstein: energy is equal to mass times the speed of light, called C, 
squared: E=MC2.  The United States money existed and the resources 
necessary for such expensive research.  The political climate resulting 
from the generalized hatred against the brutalities of Nazism in the 
richest and most productive nation in the world destroyed by the war, 
transformed that fabulous energy into bombs that were dropped over the 
defenseless populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, causing hundreds of 
thousands of deaths and a similar number of people who were exposed to 
radiation and subsequently died in the following years.

A clear example of the use of science and technology with the same 
hegemonic goals is described in an article written by the former 
official of United States National Security, Gus W. Weiss; it originally 
appeared in the magazine Studies in Intelligence, in 1996, even though 
it was more widely distributed in 2002 under the title of Deceiving the 
Soviets.  There, Weiss claims the idea of sending the USSR software that 
they needed for their industries, but already contaminated, with the aim 
of making that country’s economy collapse.

According to notes taken from Chapter 17 of the book At the Abyss: An 
Insider’s History of the Cold War, by Thomas C. Reed, former Secretary 
of the United States Air Force, Leonid Brezhnev told a group of senior 
Party officials in 1972: “We Communists have to string along with the 
capitalists for a while.  We need their credits, their agriculture and 
their technology.  But we are going to continue massive military 
programs, and by the mid-1980s we will be in a position to return to an 
aggressive foreign policy designed to gain the upper hand with the 
West.” This information was confirmed by the Defense Department in 
hearings before the House Committee on Banking and Currency in 1974.

In the early ‘70s the Nixon’s government advanced the idea of détente. 
Henry Kissinger hoped that “over time, trade and investment may leaven 
the autarkic tendencies of the Soviet system”, he considered that 
détente might “invite gradual association of the Soviet economy with the 
world economy, and foster a degree of interdependence that adds an 
element of stability to the political relations”.

Reagan tended to ignore Kissinger’s theories about détente and to take 
President Brezhnev’s word, but all doubts were removed on July 19, 1981 
when the new U.S. President met with President Francois Mitterand, of 
France, at the economic G-7 summit in Ottawa.  In a conversation off to 
the side, Mitterand informed Reagan about the success his intelligence 
services had in recruiting a KGB agent.  The man belonged to a section 
that was evaluating the achievements of Soviet efforts to acquire 
western technology.  Reagan expressed great interest in Mitterand’s 
delicate revelations and also thanked him for his offer to have the 
material sent to the United States government.

The dossier, under the name of Farewell, reached the CIA in August 1981. 
 It made it quite clear that the Soviets had been spending years 
carrying out their research and development activities.  Given the 
enormous transfer of technology by radar, computers, machine-tools and 
semi-conductors from the United States to the Soviet Union, one could 
say that the Pentagon was in an arms race with itself.

The Farewell Dossier also identified hundreds of case officials, agents 
at their posts and other suppliers of information through the West and 
Japan.  During the first years of détente, the United States and the 
Soviet Union had established working groups in agriculture, civil 
aviation, nuclear energy, oceanography, computers and the environment. 
The aim was to begin to construct "bridges of peace" between the 
superpowers.  The members of the working groups had to exchange visits 
to their centers.

Besides identifying agents, the most useful information brought by the 
Dossier consisted of the “shopping list” and its aims in terms of 
acquisition of technology in the coming years. When the Farewell Dossier 
reached Washington, Reagan asked Bill Casey, the CIA Director, to come 
up with a secret operative use for the material.

The production and transportation of oil and gas was one of the Soviet 
priorities. A new trans-Siberian gas pipeline was to carry natural gas 
from the gas fields of Urengoi in Siberia, through Kazakhstan, Russia 
and Eastern Europe towards the western dollar markets. In order to 
automate the operation of valves, compressors and storage installations 
of such an immense enterprise, the Soviets needed sophisticated control 
systems. They bought some of the first computers on the open market, but 
when the authorities of the gas pipeline took off for the United States 
to buy the necessary software, they were turned down. Undaunted, the 
Soviets searched elsewhere; a KGB operative was sent to penetrate a 
Canadian software supplier in an attempt to acquire the necessary codes. 
 The United States intelligence, warned by the agent in the Farewell 
Dossier, answered and manipulated the software before sending it.

Once, in the Soviet Union, computers and software worked in unison and 
they made the gas pipeline work splendidly. But this tranquility was 
misleading.  Inside the software that was operating the gas pipeline, 
there was a Trojan horse, a term used to describe software lines hidden 
in the normal operative system which make that system lose control in 
the future, or whenever it would receive an order from abroad.

In order to affect the dollar profits coming in from the West and the 
domestic Russian economy, the software for the gas pipeline which was to 
operate the pumps, turbines and valves had been programmed to breakdown 
after a prudent interval and reset –that’s how it was described– the 
speeds of the pumps and the valve adjustments so that they would work at 
pressures much higher than those that were suitable for the pipeline’s 
gaskets and welding seams.

“The result was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever 
seen from space. At the White House, we received warning from our 
infrared satellites of some bizarre event out in the middle of Soviet 
nowhere. NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command) feared a 
missile liftoff from a place where no rockets were known to be based. Or 
perhaps it was the detonation of a small nuclear device…They (the 
satellites) had detected no electromagnetic pulse, characteristic of 
nuclear detonations. Before these conflicting indicators could turn into 
an international crisis, Gus Weiss came down the hall to tell his fellow 
NSC staffers not to worry”, affirmed Thomas C. Reed in his book.

The campaign of countermeasures based on Farewell Dossier was an 
economic war.  Even though there were no casualties in terms of lives 
lost because of the gas pipeline explosion, significant damage was made 
to the Soviet economy.

As a grand finale, between 1984 and 1985, the United States and its NATO 
allies put an end to this operation which ended with efficacy the 
capacity of the USSR to capture technology at a time when Moscow was 
caught between a defective economy, on one side, and a US President 
determined to prevail and end the cold war on the other.

In the above cited article by Weiss, it is stated that:

“In 1985, the case took a bizarre turn when information on the Farewell 
Dossier surfaced in France. Mitterand came to suspect that Vetrov had 
all along been a CIA plant set up to test him to see if the material 
would be handed over to the Americans or kept by the French.  Acting on 
this mistaken belief, Mitterand fired the chief of the French service, 
Yves Bonnet.”

Gus W. Weiss is the one who claimed, as already said, the evil plan to 
have the defective software taken to the USSR, when the United States 
had the Farewell Dossier in its possession. He died on November 25, 2003 
at the age of 72. The Washington Post did not report his death until 
December 7, that is, 12 days later.  They said that Weiss “had fallen” 
from his apartment building, the Watergate, in Washington, and that a 
forensic doctor from the US capital had declared his death a “suicide”. 
His hometown newspaper, the Nashville Tennessean, published the death 
notice a week after the Washington Post and advised that at that time 
all they were able to say was that “the circumstances surrounding his 
death have not yet been confirmed.”

Before dying, he left some unpublished notes titled “The Farewell 
Dossier”: the strategic deception and the economic war in the Cold War.

Weiss had graduated from Vanderbilt University. He had postgraduate 
degrees from Harvard and New York University.

His work for the government concentrated on matters of National 
Security, intelligence organizations and concerns dealing with the 
transfer of technology to Communist countries. He worked with the CIA, 
the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board and with the Signals Intelligence 
Committee of the Intelligence Board of the United States.

He was decorated with the CIA Medal of Merit and the “Cipher” Medal from 
the National Security Council. The French gave him the “Légion 
d’Honneur” in 1975.

He had no surviving relatives.

Weiss had declared himself to be against the war in Iraq a short while 
before his “suicide”.  It is interesting to note that 18 days before 
Weiss’ death, another Bush government analyst also committed suicide 
–John J. Kokal (58 years old) on November 7, 2003. This man leapt to his 
death from an office in the State Department where he worked.  Kokal was 
an intelligence analyst for the Department of State in matters dealing 
with Iraq.

It is recorded in already published documents that Mikhail Gorbachev 
became furious when arrests and deportations of Soviet agents began in 
various countries, since he was unaware that the contents of the 
Farewell Dossier were in the hands of the main heads of NATO 
governments. In a meeting of the Politburo on October 22, 1986, called 
to inform colleagues about the Reykjavik Summit, he alleged that the 
Americans were “acting very discourteously and behaving like bandits”. 
Even though he showed a complacent face to the public, privately 
Gorbachev would refer to Reagan as “a liar”.

During the final days of the Soviet Union, the Secretary General of the 
Communist Party of the USSR had to work blind.  Gorbachev had no idea 
about what was happening in the laboratories and high technology 
industries in the United States; he was totally unaware that Soviet 
laboratories and industries had been compromised and to what point.

The White House pragmatists were also blind about these occurrences.

 President Ronald Reagan played his trump card:  Star Wars/The 
Strategic Defense Initiative. He knew that the Soviets could not compete 
in that league, because they couldn’t suspect that their electronics 
industry was infected with virus and Trojan horses placed there by the 
United States intelligence community.

The former British Prime Minister, in her memoirs, published by an 
important English publisher in 1993 under the title of Margaret 
Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, states that the whole Reagan plan 
related to Star Wars and the intent to make the Soviet Union collapse 
economically was the most brilliant plan of that administration, and it 
lead definitively to the collapse of socialism in Europe.

In Chapter XVI of her book, she explains the participation of her 
government in the Strategic Defense Initiative.

To carry that out, in Thatcher’s opinion, was Reagan’s “most important 
decision”, and it “was to prove central to the West’s victory in the 
Cold War”. It “imposed more economic tension and greater austerity” on 
Soviet society, and finally, its “technological and financial 
implications for the USSR were devastating”.

Under the subtitle of “Reassessing the Soviet Union”, she describes a 
series of concepts whose essence is contained in the paragraphs taken 
literally from that long passage, where she records the brutal plot.

“As 1983 drew on, the Soviets must have begun to realize that their game 
of manipulation and intimidation would soon be up.  European governments 
were not prepared to fall into the trap opened by the Soviet proposal of 
a ’nuclear-free zone’ for Europe.  Preparations for the development of 
Cruise and Pershing missiles went ahead.  In March President Reagan 
announced American plans for a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), whose 
technological and financial implications for the USSR were devastating.”

“…I had no doubt about the rightness of his commitment to press ahead 
with the program.  Looking back, it is now clear to me that Ronald 
Reagan’s original decision on SDI was the single most important of his 
presidency”.

“In formulating our approach to SDI, there were four distinct elements 
which I bore in mind.  The first was the science itself.  The American 
aim in SDI was to develop a new and much more effective defense against 
ballistic missiles.”

“This concept of defense rested on the ability to attack incoming 
ballistic missiles at all stages of their flight, from the boost phase 
when the missile and all its warheads and decoys were together –the best 
moment– right up to the point of re-entry of the earth’s atmosphere on 
its way to the target.”

“The second element to be considered was the existing international 
agreements limiting the deployment of weapons in space and ABM systems. 
 The 1972 ABM Treaty, as amended by a 1974 Protocol, allowed the United 
States and the Soviet Union to deploy one static ABM system with up to 
one hundred launchers in defense either of either an Inter-Continental 
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silo field or the national capital.”

“The Foreign Office of the Ministry of Defense always sought to urge the 
narrowest possible interpretation, which the Americans --rightly in my 
view-- believed would have meant that SDI was stillborn. I always tried 
to steer away from this phraseology and made it clear in private and 
public that research on whether a system was viable could not be said to 
have been completed until it had been successfully tested. Underneath 
the jargon, this apparently technical point was really a matter of 
straight common sense. But it was to become the issue dividing the 
United States and the USSR at the Reykjavik summit and so assumed great 
importance.

“The third element in the calculation was the relative strength of the 
two sides in Ballistic Missile Defense. Only the Soviet Union possessed 
a working ABM system (known as GALOSH) around Moscow, which they were 
currently up-grading.  The Americans had never had an equivalent system”.

“Also the Soviets were further advanced in anti-satellite weapons. There 
was, therefore, a strong argument that the Soviets had already acquired 
an unacceptable advantage in this whole area.

“The fourth element was the implications of SDI for deterrence. I 
started off with a good deal of sympathy for the thinking behind the ABM 
Treaty. This was the most sophisticated and effective the defense 
against nuclear missiles, the greater the pressure to seek hugely 
expensive advances in nuclear weapons technology. I was always a 
believer in a slightly qualified version of the doctrine known as MAD- 
’mutually assured destruction’. The threat of (what I preferred to call) 
‘unacceptable destruction' which would follow from a nuclear exchange 
was such that nuclear weapons were an effective deterrent against not 
just nuclear but also conventional war.”

“But I soon began to see that SDI would strengthen not weaken the 
nuclear deterrent. Unlike President Reagan and some other members of his 
Administration I never believed that SDI could offer one hundred percent 
protection, but it would allow sufficient United States missiles to 
survive a first strike by the Soviets.”

“It was the subject of SDI which dominated my talks with President 
Reagan and members of his Administration when I went to Camp David on 
Saturday 22 December 1984 to brief the Americans on my earlier talks 
with Mr. Gorbachev. This was the first occasion on which I had heard 
President Reagan speaking about SDI. He did so with passion. He was at 
his most idealistic. He stressed that SDI would be a defensive system 
and that it was not his intention to obtain for the United States a 
unilateral advantage. Indeed, he said that if SDI succeeded he would be 
ready to internationalize it so that it was at the service of all 
countries, and that he told Mr. Gromyko as much. He reaffirmed his 
long-term goal of getting rid of nuclear weapons entirely.

“These remarks made me nervous. I was horrified to think that the United 
States would be prepared to throw away a hard-won lead in technology by 
making it internationally available.”

“What I heard, now that we got down to discussion of the likely reality 
rather than the grand vision, was reassuring. President Reagan did not 
pretend that they yet knew where the research could finally lead. But he 
emphasized that --in addition to his earlier arguments in favor of SDI-- 
keeping up with the United States would impose an economic strain on the 
Soviet Union. He argued that there had to be a practical limit as to how 
far the Soviet Union could push their people down the road of austerity.”

“I now jotted down, while talking to National Security Adviser Bud 
McFarlane, the four points which seemed to me to be crucial.

“My officials then filled in the details. The President and I agreed a 
text which set out the policy.

“The main section of my statement reads:

“I told the President of my firm conviction that the SDI research 
program should go ahead. Research is, of course, permitted under 
existing US/Soviet treaties; and we, of course, know that the Russians 
already have their research program and, in the US view, have already 
gone beyond research. We agreed on four points: (1) the US, and western, 
aim was not to achieve superiority, but to maintain balance, taking 
account of Soviet developments; (2) SDI-related deployment would, in 
view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiation; (3) the 
overall aim is to enhance, not undercut, deterrence; (4) East-West 
negotiation should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of 
offensive systems on both sides. This will be the purpose of the resumed 
US-Soviet negotiations on arms control, which warmly welcome.

 “I subsequently learnt that George Schultz thought that I had secured 
too great a concession on the American’s part in the wording; but in 
fact it gave them and us a clear and defensible line and helped reassure 
the European members of NATO. A good day’s work.”

Later on, under the subtitle of “Visit to Washington: February 1985”, 
Margaret Thatcher states:

“I again visited Washington in February 1985. Arms talks between the 
Americans and the Soviet Union had now resumed, but SDI remained a 
source of contention. I was to address a joint meeting of Congress on 
the morning of Wednesday 20 February and I brought with me from London 
as a gift a bronze statue of Winston Churchill, who had also many years 
before been honored with such an invitation. I worked especially hard on 
this speech. I would use the Autocue for its delivery. I knew that 
Congress would have seen the 'Great Communicator’ himself delivering 
faultless speeches and I would have a discriminating audience. So I 
resolved to practice speaking the text until I had got every intonation 
and emphasis right. (Speaking to Autocue, I should add, is a totally 
different technique to speaking from notes.) In fact, I borrowed 
President Reagan’s own Autocue and had it brought back to the British 
Embassy where I was staying. Harvey Thomas, who accompanied me, fixed it 
up and, ignoring any jetlag, I practiced until 4 a.m. I did not go to 
bed, beginning the new working day with my usual black coffee and 
vitamin pills, then gave television interviews from 6:45 a.m., had my 
hair done and was ready at 10:30 to leave from the Capitol. I used my 
speech, which ranged widely over international issues, to give strong 
support for SDI. I had a terrific reception.”

“The following month (March 1985) saw the death of Mr. Chernenko and, 
with remarkably little delay, the succession of Mr. Gorbachev to the 
Soviet leadership. Once again I attended a Moscow funeral: the weather 
was, if anything, even colder than at Yuri Andropov’s. Mr. Gorbachev had 
a large number of foreign dignitaries to see. But I had almost an hour's 
talk with him that evening in St. Katherine’s Hall in the Kremlin. The 
atmosphere was more formal than at Chequers (the official country 
residence of British prime ministers since 1921) and the silent, 
sardonic presence of Mr. Gromyko did not help. But I was able to explain 
them the implications of the policy I had agreed with President Reagan 
the previously December at Camp David. It was clear that SDI was now the 
main preoccupation of the Soviets in arms control.”

 “Mr. Gorbachev brought, as we had expected, a new style to the Soviet 
Government. He spoke openly of the terrible state of the Soviet economy, 
though at this stage he was still relying on the methods associated with 
Mr. Andropov’s drive for greater efficiency rather than radical reform. 
An example of this was the draconian measures he took against 
alcoholism. As the year wore on, however, there was no evidence of 
improvement in conditions in the Soviet Union.  Indeed, as our new –and 
first class– ambassador to Moscow, Brian Cartledge, who had been my 
foreign affairs private secretary when I first became Prime Minister, 
pointed out in one of his first dispatches, it was a matter of, 'jam 
tomorrow and, meanwhile, no vodka today'.”

“A distinct chill entered into Britain’s relations with the Soviet Union 
as a result of expulsions authorized of Soviet officials who had been 
spying.”

“In November President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev had their first meeting 
in Geneva. Not much of substance came out of it --the Soviets insisted 
on linking cuts in strategic nuclear weapons to an end to SDI research-- 
but a good personal rapport quickly developed between the two leaders. 
But he was not, which I found not at all surprising. For Ronald Reagan 
had had plenty of practice in his early years as President of the Screen 
Actors Guild in dealing with hard-headed trade union negotiation, and no 
one was more hard-headed than Mr. Gorbachev.”

“During 1986 Mr. Gorbachev showed great subtlety in playing on western 
public opinion by bringing forward tempting, but unacceptable, proposals 
on arms control. Relatively little was said by the Soviets on the link 
between SDI and cuts in nuclear weapons. But they were given no reasons 
to believe that the Americans were prepared to suspend or stop SDI 
research. Late in the year it was agreed that President Reagan and Mr. 
Gorbachev- with their Foreign Ministers- should meet in Reykjavik, 
Iceland, to discuss substantive proposals.”

“It was that you could not ultimately hold back research on SDI any more 
than you could prevent research into new kinds of offensive weapons. We 
had to be the first to get it. Science is unstoppable; it will not be 
stopped for being ignored.”

“In retrospect, the Reykjavik summit on that weekend of 11 and 12 
October (1986) can be seen to have a quite different significance than 
most of the commentators at the time realized. A trap had been prepared 
for the Americans. Ever greater Soviet concessions were made during the 
summit: they agreed for the first time that the British and French 
deterrents should be excluded from the INF negotiations; an that cuts in 
strategic nuclear weapons should leave each side with equal numbers- 
rather than a straight percentage cut, which would have led the Soviets 
well ahead. They also made significant concessions on INF numbers. As 
the summit drew to an end President Reagan was proposing an agreement by 
which the whole arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons- bombers, 
long-range Cruise and ballistic missiles- would be halved within five 
years and the most powerful of these weapons, strategic ballistic 
missiles, eliminated altogether within ten. Mr. Gorbachev was even more 
ambitious: he wanted the elimination of all strategic nuclear weapons by 
the end of the ten-year period.”

“But then suddenly, at the very end, the trap was sprung. President 
Reagan had conceded that during the ten-year period both sides would 
agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, though development and 
testing compatible with the Treaty would be allowed.”

But Reagan suffered a strange amnesia about the triggering of the brutal 
military competition that had been forced on the USSR, with its 
extraordinary economic cost. His famous diary doesn't say one word about 
the Farewell Dossier. In his daily notes which were published this year, 
Ronald Reagan speaks of his sojourn in Montebello, Canada:

“Sunday, July 19 (1981)



“The hotel is a marvelous piece of engineering, totally made up of logs.

“Had a one on one with Chancellor Schmidt. He was really down and in a 
pessimistic mood about the world.

 “Following --met with Pres. Mitterrand-- explained our ec. program and 
that high interest rates were not of our doing.

“Dinner that night was just the 8 of us. The 7 heads of State and the 
Pres. (Thorn) of the European Community. It became a really free 
wheeling discussion of ec. issues, trade etc. due to a suggestion by 
P.M. Thatcher.”

The final result of the great conspiracy against the Soviet Union and 
the crazy expensive arms race that was imposed, when it was mortally 
wounded in an economic sense is described in the introduction of the 
book by Thomas C. Reed, written by George H. W. Bush, the first 
President in the Bush Dynasty, who participated in a very real way in 
World War II.  Literally, he writes:

“The Cold War was a struggle for the very soul of the mankind.  It was a 
struggle for a way of life defined by freedom on one side and repression 
on the other. Already I think we have forgotten what a long and arduous 
struggle it was, and how close to nuclear disaster we came a number of 
times.  The fact that it did not happen is a testimony to the honorable 
men and women, both sides who kept their cool and did what was right—as 
they saw it—in times of crisis.”

 “This conflict between the surviving superpowers of World War II began 
as I came home from that war. In 1948, the year of my graduation from 
Yale, the Soviets tried to cut off Western access to Berlin. That 
blockade led to the formation of NATO, was followed by the first Soviet 
A-bomb test, and turned bloody with the invasion of South Korea. Four 
decades of nuclear confrontation, proxy wars, and economic privation 
followed.”

“I was privileged to be President of the United States when it all came 
to an end.  In fall of 1989 the satellite states of Eastern Europe began 
to break free, and mostly peaceful revolution swept through Poland, 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Romania.  When the Berlin Wall fell, we 
knew the end was near.”

“It took another two years to close down the empire of Lenin and Stalin. 
 I received that good news in two telephone calls.  The first came on 
December 8, 1991, when Boris Yeltsin called me from a hunting lodge near 
Brest, in Belarus. Only recently elected President of the Russian 
Republic, Yeltsin had been meeting with Leonid Kravchuk, President of 
Ukraine, and Stanislav Shushchevik, President of Belarus. “Today a very 
important event took place in our country,” Yeltsin said. “I wanted to 
inform you myself before you learned about it from the press” Then he 
told me the news:  The President of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine has 
decided to dissolve the Soviet Union.

“Two weeks later a second call confirmed that the former Soviet Union 
would disappear.  Mikhail Gorbachev contacted me at Camp David on 
Christmas Morning of 1991.  He wished Barbara and me a Merry Christmas, 
and then he went on to sum up what had happened in his country: the 
Soviet Union had ceased to exist.  He had just been on national TV to 
confirm the fact, and he had transferred control of Soviet nuclear 
weapons to the President of Russia. ‘You can have a very quiet Christmas 
evening,’ he said. And so it was over.”

It is recorded in an article published in The New York Times that the 
operation used almost all of the weapons within the CIA's reach 
--psychological warfare, sabotage, economic warfare, strategic 
deception, counterintelligence, cybernetic warfare-- all collaborating 
with the National Security Council, the Pentagon and the FBI.  It 
destroyed the burgeoning Soviet espionage machinery, it damaged the 
economy and destabilized the State in that country.  It was a complete 
success. If the opposite had happened (the Soviets doing it to the 
Americans), it would have been viewed as an act of terrorism.

There is another book which deals with this topic; it is called Legacy 
of Ashes and it has just been published.  On the book’s dust cover we 
can read that: Tim Weiner is a reporter for The New York Times.  He has 
written on American intelligence for twenty years, and won the Pulitzer 
Prize for his work on the secret national security programs.  He has 
traveled to Afghanistan and other nations to investigate CIA covert 
operations firsthand. This is his third book.

Legacy of Ashes is based on more than 50 thousand documents basically 
coming from the very archives of the CIA, and hundreds of interviews 
with veterans of that agency, including ten directors. He reveals to us 
a panorama of the CIA from the days of its creation after World War II, 
going through its battles during the Cold War and the war against 
terrorism begun on September 11, 2001.

The article by Jeremy Allison, published in Rebelión in June 2006, and 
the articles by Rosa Miriam Elizalde which were published this year on 
the September 3 and 10, denounce these events emphasizing the idea of 
one of the founders of free software who pointed out that: “as 
technologies grow more complex, it will be more difficult to detect 
actions of this kind”.

Rosa Miriam published two straightforward opinion articles, each one 
only 5 pages in length.  If she wants to, she could write a book with 
many pages. I remember her well from that day when, a young journalist, 
she nervously asked me, in the middle of a press conference 15 years ago 
no less, whether I thought we could survive the Special Period that had 
befallen us with the demise of the Socialist bloc.

The USSR collapsed with a crash. Since then we have graduated hundreds 
of thousands of young people from the higher levels of education. What 
better ideological weapon do we have than the higher level of 
conscience!  We had it when we were a largely illiterate and 
semi-illiterate people. If you really want to see wild animals, then let 
instincts prevail in the human being.  We could say a lot on this subject.

In the present day, the world is threatened by a devastating economical 
crisis. The United States government is using unimaginable economic 
means to defend a right that violates the sovereignty of all the other 
countries:  to keep on buying raw materials, energy, advanced technology 
industries, the most productive lands and the most modern buildings on 
the face of our planet with paper money.

Fidel Castro Ruz

September 18, 2007.

6:37 p.m.
--
Macdonald Stainsby
Coordinator, http://oilsandstruth.org
--
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