A-list
mailing list archive

Other Periods  | Other mailing lists  | Search  ]

Date:  [ Previous  | Next  ]      Thread:  [ Previous  | Next  ]      Index:  [ Author  | Date  | Thread  ]

Re: [A-List] The coming savage downturn



The subprime market is a part of the Mortgage Backed Security (MBS) market which has gone through significant changes in recent years by trends to understate risks through the rise of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), relaxed credits and lending standards and loan mitigation practices. Non agencies , not guaranteed by the government or government sponsored entities (GSE), now account for the majority of MBS issued.

Financial market components are all interconnected so that vertical contagion will cause even so-called investment grade rated CDOs to face substantial losses if home prices depreciate sharply for long periods.

Structural changes in US debt and securtitization system have occurred in the origination and servicing of mortgages, such as zero down payment, cash-out financing, home equity loans, private mortgage insurance, permissive appraisal rules, lower underwriting standards, increases in speculative investors (flippers), loss mitigation disincentives and run-away subprime markets. Add to these problems is new complexity of securitization and lack of transparency that increase difficulty in accurately assessing value. No one truly and confidently know the extend of the problem because the data is both unavailable and obscure.

Subprime has gone from 5% of all originations to over 20%, with over one third being interest only loans. In 2005, subprime mortgages reached over $625 billion compared to a mere $35 billion in 1994. It began as a desirable democratization of credit to increase home ownership, but in recent years, the growth of subprime has concentrated on speculative and high income borrowers. The subprime growth has been driven by increased liquidity on the one hand and increase risk appetite on the part of investors for mortgage backed products on the other. Yet despite all financial innovations, house hold income has risen far slower than asset prices. And income is the most fundamental building block in structured finance. In 2005, conforming securitization increased from 60% to 80% and non-conforming securitization increased from 35 to 60%. Non depository lenders found increased access to securitization, and lender of all sorts began moving such loan off their balance sheets. This turned all lenders into credit creating machines through evolving access to securitization. In 2006, 38% of all subprime mortgages were for 100% of the purchase price of the homes. Liars loan with no documentation grew to 45% of subprime loans.

In 2005, 70% of MBS purchased by CDOs was below AAA rating. Only 10% of a typical MBS financing structure is made up of lower-tier (junior) securities. These low-tier tranches provide the desired credit support for the higher-tier (more senior ) tranches. The entire MBS structure cannot be sold until the lower-tier tranches are sold. Thus even a slight decline in CDO funding of mezzanine MBS investments relative to the total MBS market can have large effects on MBS funding and in turn on consumer mortgage funding. CDOs routinely issue controversial features such as payment in kind (PIK) in order to sustain promised cash flow. A PIK term stipulates that in the event that investors cannot be paid current monthly interest they are promised an increase in the par value of the bond to be paid at maturity. It is an IOU in payment for an IOU.

In 2005, about $1.3 trillion private residential MBS were issued, supported by $130 billion in lower-tier securities. In that year, the CDO market purchased more mezzanine MBS than was actually issued. The CDO market adds liquidity to MBS and ABS markets in a highly leverage fashion (90%) by funding lower-tier tranches of MBS. That liquidity is very fragile when high leverage is combined with high volatility. It takes about 6 months for any rise in mortgage defaults to show up investor pricing of MBS instruments.

Slowing demands shrank profit margins and forced subprime lenders to maintain volume by making riskier loans in 2005 and 2006. Such risks manifested in further lower margins and profits, evidenced by several exits by major players and significantly higher loss provisions by those who remained. Defaults in the mortgage pool will accumulate to levels that will threaten rated mezzanine residential MBS. Given the high proportion of CDO investments in mezzanine residential MBS, default will hit CDO performance, but with a delay due to the fact that CDO ratings changes considerably lag RMBS and ABS changes due to opacity between markets.

Forest fires are set by lighted cigarettes.

Henry C.K. Liu Michael Keaney wrote:

Investors who buy the low risk traunches (and sometimes these are held
by the investor who either can't sell because of the risk or maintains
because of the high rate of return) MAY be in for disappointment, but I
seriously doubt that there will be a "savage downturn" in the AAA
market.

****

Perhaps it all depends on how you define AAA...


Uproar forces Moody's into U-turn over banks' ratings By Richard Beales Financial Times: Apr 02, 2007

Moody's, the credit rating agency, has backed down on a new approach to
rating banks after it triggered uproar among investors when introduced
in February.

The U-turn will see "40 or 50" mostly European banks placed on review
for a rating downgrade tomorrow just weeks after it upgraded dozens of
banks.

The move follows protests after the new rating approach, which takes
account of the likelihood of banks being bailed out by governments, led
to banks in countries such as Iceland receiving an unexpected triple-A
rating.

The scale of the ratings upgrades triggered sharp moves in financial
markets and led to questions from analysts and investors over the
validity of the new system.

Research group CreditSights, for example, discussed the changes in a
note entitled "Moody's Makes Aaas of Itself" - referring to the upgrade
of 16 European banks to the agency's top triple-A rating.

Icelandic banks Glitnir, Kaupthing and Landsbanki were among the biggest
surprises, each collecting upgrades of four or five notches to Aaa. Most
analysts at investment banks had expected the ratings to improve by just
one or two notches.

The Icelandic banks are likely to be among those now set to be
downgraded under Moody's "refined" methodology.

However, Christopher Mahoney, chairman of the agency's credit policy
committee, suggested that the earlier upgrades would not be completely
reversed.

"We anticipate that the required adjustments will be modest: themajority
being one notch, withthe remainder being two notches," he said. "In a
few instances, there may be three-notch changes."

Mr Mahoney told the Financial Times that the new approach had been
intended to take account of a long-running "theological discussion" in
the rating industry about how to factor into ratings the possibility
that some banks were unlikely ever to be allowed to fail even if they
appeared financially weak.

But he conceded that the results of Moody's revamp had left ratings
"relatively undifferentiated at the top" of the rating scale. Restoring
some of that differentiation by placing greater emphasis on banks'
intrinsic creditworthiness is the main goal of the revised methodology.

Moody's will hold conference calls on the latest changes to its
methodology today.

****

Top rating proving crucial to structured finance sector
By Saskia Scholtes and Richard Beales in New York
Financial Times: May 17 2007

Booming structured finance markets are pumping out huge volumes of
triple-A rated debt securities even as companies find increasingly that
maintaining the top credit rating is financially inefficient.

Structured products now account for around 99 per cent of the triple-A
credit market, suggesting investors are eager for the higher yields such
products can offer relative to triple-A corporate debt.

The dominance of structured finance also marks the dramatic ascendance
of a market that is heavily reliant on the rating agencies' stamp of
approval.

Jack Malvey, chief global fixed income strategist at Lehman Brothers,
said such securities are attractive for risk-averse investors because
"asset managers can represent that they have not only added yield but
also maintained an overall high quality portfolio".

This is increasingly difficult to achieve with more traditional forms of
debt, he added.

The number of US non-financial companies rated triple-A by Moody's has
declined to just five as developments in financing technology and
capital markets have made a higher degree of leverage - and therefore
lower ratings - more cost-effective for many companies.

This select group has a little less than $20bn of debt.

Meanwhile, the number of different US structured finance issues with the
top rating has mushroomed to more than 37,000, worth almost $5,000bn in
total.

The exponential growth of this market stems from the growth of
structured finance instruments that package portfolios of corporate
bonds, loans or consumer debts such as residential mortgages into new
securities for sale to investors around the globe.

The underlying portfolios often contain debt securities with low ratings
but, using complex structuring techniques, investment banks construct
new securities, some of which can win higher ratings by virtue of
priority access to the underlying cash flows. Buyers for these
securities include US and European pension funds and insurance companies
as well as Asian central banks.

However, Josh Rosner, consultant at investment research firm Graham
Fisher, expressed concern that the role of the rating agencies has
become a "necessary function" of the sale and distribution of such
securities.

He said this was particularly worrying in light of growing market
complexity that precludes many investors from doing their own full
analysis.

"What is clear is that the lack of liquidity, transparency, history and
available data coupled with increasing complexity has made it difficult
for all but the most well funded, well staffed and most sophisticated to
analyse the markets or assets," said Mr Rosner.








Other Periods  | Other mailing lists  | Search  ]