Re: [A-List] Is the U.S.-Turkey Alliance at an End?

[Michael Hudson <michael.hudson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Sabri, what is your own reading of this situation in Turkey? Since the
Hudson Inst. was sold out to the neocons, neither I nor my former colleagues
have had much to do with it.
    Michael Hudson


On 4/29/07 1:31 AM, "Sabri Oncu" <sabri_oncu@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Is the U.S.-Turkey Alliance at an End?
> 
> By Rajan Menon and S. Enders Wimbush
> Special to washingtonpost.com's Think Tank Town
> Tuesday, April 24, 2007; 12:00 AM
> 
> Turkey and the United States are approaching a critical strategic crossroad
> that will determine both the shape and the content of their relationship for
> the foreseeable future. The pressures forcing change on this long-standing
> alliance -- which has endured since the Truman Doctrine in 1947 -- are
> powerful. Neither Turkish nor American policymakers seem to grasp the emerging
> reality that this important friendship is fast eroding; alternatively, they
> have concluded that the alliance has run its course and are prepared to let it
> go. Neither side is taking serious remedial measures to recalibrate a vibrant
> friendship that has served both countries well for more than half a century.
> The consequences for both sides of a failure to make necessary course
> corrections will be significant.
> 
> The war in Iraq is the most immediate bone of contention driving Turkey and
> the
> U.S. apart, but it is not the only driver. Since Turkey denied use of its
> bases
> to initiate a second American front in Iraq in the run-up to the 2003
> invasion,
> the prevailing perception across the Turkish political spectrum -- including
> in
> the all-important military and political elite -- is that Washington is
> seeking
> to punish Turkey. For its part, Washington has made its feeling of betrayal
> clear to the Turks and to the world. Political miscalculations, articulated
> via
> hyperbolic political theater on both sides, might have dissipated under
> different circumstances, but this has not happened.
> 
> Instead, the Iraq war has put new energy into the third rail of Turkish
> politics: the Kurdish question. Ankara fears not only that the American-led
> intervention cannot hold Iraq together, but that it is a powerful stimulant
> for
> its breakup, which will result in an independent Kurdish entity in northern
> Iraq, bordering Turkey's Kurdish population. Turkey's experience fighting
> Kurdish separatists and terrorists is long, bitter and bloody. Consequently,
> there is no resonance at any point on Turkey's political spectrum, or even in
> private discussions, for allowing something resembling a Kurdish state to
> emerge on the ruins of broken Iraq.
> 
> To the contrary, in the last few days, Turkey's military leaders acknowledged
> that they are seriously contemplating finally intervening with their own
> powerful military in northern Iraq to eliminate this possibility, regardless
> of
> the presence of American troops there or elsewhere in the country. Recent
> reports suggest that this decision is already before Turkey's parliament, and
> that it has strong popular support.
> 
> Anti-Americanism in Turkey, fueled by the continuing chaos in Iraq and the
> decisions that led to that imbroglio, is running at unprecedented levels, as
> opinion polls have graphically documented in recent months. Nearly 80 percent
> of Turks view the United States as a problem, including being a direct threat
> to Turkey's national security.
> 
> Iraq is the immediate irritant, but Turkey's search for a more comprehensive
> identity has been underway since at least the end of the Cold War. Turkey has
> been slowly redefining its strategic identity since the early 1980s, an
> evolution to which official Washington has been stunningly silent. Decades of
> Turkish secularism and an obsessive pro-Western orientation -- always somewhat
> artificial -- are being adjusted to reflect the realities of Turkey's new
> strategic position and objectives. Today many Turks understand that it is
> essential to create a more organic equilibrium in Turkey's relationships with
> the Muslim world, with Eurasia -- particularly with Russia and the emerging
> Eurasian power China -- and formalize Turkey's relationship with the West,
> emblemized by Turkey's current efforts to join the European Union. A new
> generation of Turkish strategists sees Turkey as a major player across the
> Islamic world and as a major Eurasian actor -- with or without the United
> States -- while still keeping a strong foothold in the West.
> 
> American policy makers continue to mouth platitudes to the effect that Turkey
> is a model democratic secular Islamic state, a misplaced accolade most Turks
> find highly insulting. They view themselves rather differently, and more
> broadly: as a crucial ally in the struggle against terrorism; as a critical
> security nexus atop an arc extending from Israel to Central Asia, a zone of
> actual or potential upheaval and war; as a guarantor of essential water-borne
> commerce, particularly hydrocarbons; as a frontline state against a
> potentially
> nuclear-armed Iran; and as a corridor for the strategically important
> Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.
> 
> Turks have always assumed that their cooperation is key to a durable
> settlement
> in Iraq. Most are astonished and aggrieved that the American debate on how to
> fix the Iraq mess, and the policies of the George W. Bush administration in
> particular, fail to reflect either Turkey's frontline position or the
> consequences of American failure in Iraq on Turkey's immediate and longer-term
> security interests. America, they feel, has taken Turkey for granted. In this,
> the American media has been complicit, or ignorant. In most pundits'
> discussions of how the Iraq issue might eventually be settled, Turkey is
> almost
> never cited as a critical actor or as the likely recipient of the consequences
> of the action of others, almost as if Iraq might somehow be fixed without
> Turks
> ever noticing or caring.
> 
> The Iraq problem has accelerated a debate in Turkey that likely would have
> taken place anyway. Today, influential Turks, government officials and foreign
> policy experts alike have embarked on a strategic reassessment. Turkey's
> possible reorientation could include building deeper ties with new partners,
> among them Russia -- with whom Turkey is developing deep economic and energy
> ties; China, which is building a strong position throughout Eurasia, including
> in Turkey; Iran -- which is more popular in Turkey today than the United
> States; and Syria. Strategic realignment could wittingly or unwittingly cause
> Turks to abandon their longstanding premise that the United States remains the
> indispensable ally. Turkey's rejection by the EU, an outcome a growing number
> of Turks are coming to acknowledge as likely, will accelerate dynamics within
> Turkey for strategic realignment.
> 
> This need not happen. Turkey's strategic salience to American objectives
> across
> the Middle East and Eurasia has never been greater, especially as Turkey
> re-defines itself to account for a post-Cold War world that presents both
> countries with new challenges, opportunities, and a new range of convergent
> interests. But both sides urgently need to develop a new vision of the
> strategic future, beginning with the looming breakup of Iraq and the strong
> possibility that Turkey will fail to join Europe officially. The latter,
> ironically, might strengthen opportunities for a revivified, redefined
> U.S.-Turkey partnership.
> 
> Both sides need to pay urgent attention to the possibility that the
> U.S.-Turkey
> alliance could be in jeopardy. To this end, they should move to establish
> high-level joint working groups that are tasked with proposing concrete
> measures to safeguard the alliance and to ensure its relevance for the
> post-Cold War world. Turkey must also be made a central partner in fashioning
> a
> political settlement in Iraq and engage in regular consultations and joint
> planning to this end.
> 
> The U.S. must work with both the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in
> northern Iraq and the Turkish leadership to prevent the dispute over the
> oil-rich city of Kirkuk in northern Iraq (contested by the Kurds and by the
> Turkmen, who are supported by Turkey) from precipitating open warfare and
> possible Turkish intervention, which could further undermine America's
> alliance
> with Turkey.
> 
> Finally, bi-lateral, and eventually multilateral steps must be taken to
> fashion
> a "grand bargain" between the KRG and Turkey that includes specific and
> enforceable provisions to assure the KRG that Turkey will not invade Iraqi
> Kurdistan to forestall the possibility of an independent Kurdish state and to
> guarantee Turkey that the KRG will not permit the Kurdish radicals and
> separatists to use northern Iraq as a base of operations against Turkey.
> 
> It is neither in America's interest to "lose" Turkey, nor in Turkey's interest
> to "lose" the United States. But the dynamics that currently dominate this
> historic relationship are leading in this direction.
> 
> Rajan Menon is an Adjunct Fellow at Hudson Institute and the Monroe J.
> Rathbone
> Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University. S. Enders Wimbush
> is
> Director of Hudson Institute's Center for Future Security Strategies. They
> recently published a Hudson Institute monograph entitled, "Is the U.S. Losing
> Turkey?"
> 
> 
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