[A-List] US imperialism: serving multiple interests?

["Michael Keaney" <michael011@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

The last thing the Middle East's main players want is US troops to leave
Iraq

Across the region, ordinary people want the Americans out. But from
Israel to al-Qaida, political groups and states have other ideas

Hussein Agha
Wednesday April 25, 2007
The Guardian

Overt political debate in the Middle East is hostile to the American
occupation of Iraq and dominated by calls for it to end sooner rather
than later. No less a figure than King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia,
arguably the United States' closest Arab ally, has declared the
occupation of Iraq "illegal" and "illegitimate". Real intentions,
however, are different. States and local political groups might not
admit it - because of public opinion - but they do not want to see the
back of the Americans. Not yet.

For this there is a simple reason: while the US can no longer
successfully manipulate regional actors to carry out its plans, regional
actors have learned to use the US presence to promote their own
objectives. Quietly and against the deeply held wishes of their
populations, they have managed to keep the Americans engaged with the
hope of some elusive victory.

The so-called axis of moderate Arab states - comprising Saudi Arabia,
Egypt and Jordan - dreads an early US withdrawal. First, because it
would be widely interpreted as an American defeat, which would weaken
these pro-American regimes while both energising and radicalising their
populations.

Second, if the US leaves, the emergence of a Shia regime in Iraq - in
itself an offensive prospect to them - would only be a matter of time.
Facing Arab antipathy, this regime would be likely to look eastward and
forge close ties with its Iranian co-religionists. In the view of most
Arabs, this would present a formidable challenge, setting in motion a
series of dangerous events - an Iranian-Iraqi alliance; political and
material support from Arab countries being offered to disgruntled Iraqi
Sunni groups; retaliation by Iraqi forces; and the threat of broader
regional involvement.

Third, a US departure risks triggering Iraq's partition. As some Arabs
see it, the occupation is what holds the country together. So long as
coalition forces are deployed, a full-blown breakup can be avoided.

In contrast, with the Americans gone, the odds of partition would
increase dramatically, presenting a threat to the integrity and security
of regional states. Exacerbating dormant, and in some cases not so
dormant, secessionist tendencies would be one concern. Perhaps more
worrying would be the ensuing challenge to the legitimacy of the
fundamental tenets of nationhood, state, and national borders.

Paradoxically, the competing axis of so-called rogue states made up of
Syria and Iran also wants the US to stay. So long as America remains
mired in Iraq's quicksand, they think, it will be difficult for it to
embark on a similar adventure nearby. This is true not only politically
- the quagmire standing as a stark reminder of the invasion's failure -
but also militarily: US capabilities will remain stretched for as long
as the occupation continues.

Moreover, American forces in Iraq present relatively soft targets for
retaliation in case Iran or Syria is attacked. In short, whether or not
Syria and Iran are correct in their calculations, the occupation of Iraq
is seen as the most effective insurance policy against a possible US
attack against them.

For Turkey, America's presence ensures that the national aspirations of
Iraq's Kurds will not metamorphose into a fully fledged independent
state, a strict red line for Ankara, which has its own irredentist
Kurdish problem. By containing Kurdish ambitions, the US diminishes the
probability of a costly and uncertain Turkish military campaign to
thwart them. Nor is Turkey attracted to the prospect of an Iraqi Shia
state allied to Iran and tolerant of Kurdish aspirations - an outcome it
hopes the occupation will make less likely.

For Israel too, an American withdrawal could spell disaster. Already,
nothing has dented Israeli deterrence more than America's performance in
Iraq - an inspiration to Israel's Arab foes that even the mightiest can
be brought to heel. An early withdrawal, coming in the wake of last
summer's Lebanon war, could put Israel in a dangerous position, handing
a victory to Iran - the latest putative threat to Israel's existence -
and providing a boost to Syria which may be considering military options
to recover the Golan Heights.

There are risks for the smaller Gulf states too. With their large Shia
communities and heavy dependence on American protection, they would be
threatened by an early US departure from Iraq. In Bahrain, home to an
unhappy Shia majority, the fallout could be imminent.

Inside Iraq, this is a period of consolidation for most political
groups. They are building up their political and military capabilities,
cultivating and forging alliances, clarifying political objectives and
preparing for impending challenges. It is not the moment for all-out
confrontation. No group has the confidence or capacity decisively to
confront rivals within its own community or across communal lines.
Equally, no party is genuinely interested in a serious process of
national reconciliation when they feel they can improve their position
later on. A continued American presence is consistent with both concerns
- it can keep clashes manageable and be used to postpone the need for
serious political engagement.

Shias in government would like the US to stay long enough for them to
tighten their grip on the levers of state power and build a loyal
military. Those Shias who are not in power would like them to stay long
enough to avoid a premature showdown with their rivals. Militant Shia
groups can simultaneously blame the occupation forces for their
community's plight and attack them to mobilise further support.
Pro-Iranian Shias, meanwhile, retaliate against anti-Iranian US moves
with attacks on Americans in Iraq.

Al-Qaida and its affiliates arguably benefit most from the occupation.
They established themselves, brought in recruits, sustained operations
against the Americans and expanded. The last thing they want is for the
Americans to leave and deny them targets and motivation for new members.
Other Sunni armed groups need the Americans for similar reasons and for
protection against Shias. For Sunni politicians, the occupation prevents
a total Shia takeover of state institutions and helps increase their
influence.

Of all ethnic groups, the Kurds have made best use of the Americans.
Protected by the US from their powerful and ruthless historical foes,
Arab and Turk, they have built quasi-independent institutions and
prospered amid relative security. They have no reason to want this
situation to end.

In common with neighbouring states, Iraqi Shias, Sunnis and Kurds are
united in being able to use the Americans' presence to pursue separate
and often conflicting political agendas. The grand disconnect in the
region is between the political sentiments of ordinary people, which are
overwhelmingly for an end to occupation, and the political calculations
of leaders, which emphasise the benefits of using the Americans and
consequently of extending their stay - at least for the time being.

In this grim picture, the Americans appear the least sure and most
confused. With unattainable objectives, wobbly plans, changing tactics,
shifting alliances and ever-increasing casualties, it is not clear any
longer what they want or how they are going to achieve it. By setting
themselves up to be manipulated, they give credence to an old Arab
saying: the magic has taken over the magician.

· Hussein Agha is a senior associate member of St Antony's College,
Oxford 


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