[A-List] Canada & Ukraine

["Jim Yarker" <sjy_estrien@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Agent orange: Our secret role in Ukraine
Mark MacKinnon. The Globe and Mail. Toronto, Ont.: Apr 14, 2007. pg. F.1

MARK MacKINNON unearths evidence that Canada isn't always diplomacy's Walter 
Mitty

Andrew Robinson is unassuming and bookish, the sort of man who seems better 
suited to the cocktail circuit than to toppling governments. But on the 
streets of Kiev, he is revered by some as a revolutionary.

The bespectacled Mr. Robinson, 60, now teaches international affairs at 
Carleton University, but in 2004, during the wild and dramatic Orange 
Revolution, he was Canada's ambassador to Ukraine and played a key role in 
events that changed the country forever.

"Andrew Robinson is a hero of the revolution," Vladislav Kaskiv says with a 
smile, using a term the old Soviet Union reserved for the Bolshevik leaders 
of 1917.

Mr. Kaskiv would know. As head of Pora, a radical youth group that occupied 
central Kiev for five weeks in the winter of 2004, he played a bigger part 
in the uprising than almost anyone other than its leader, Viktor Yushchenko, 
and his firebrand deputy, Yulia Tymoshenko.

Pora was just a gleam in his eye when Mr. Kaskiv, then 31, met Mr. Robinson 
in the spring of 2004, just months after another youth group, Kmara, had 
helped to overthrow Eduard Shevardnadze in the former Soviet republic of 
Georgia. Mr. Robinson recalls being "very impressed" by the would-be 
revolutionary and made a decision uncharacteristic of Canadian foreign 
policy: He gave $30,000 (U.S.) to Pora through a special embassy fund. The 
first money Pora received, it "was there . . . right when the movement 
started," Mr. Kaskiv recalls.

Today, little orange remains on the streets of Kiev. The country is once 
again in the midst of a political crisis, and even the souvenir stalls near 
Independence Square can't flog the paraphernalia that was once visible 
everywhere.

"The orange is popular only with foreigners," says vendor Viktoria 
Biloshtan. "Here, orange has lost its credibility. "

It's a far cry from just 2½ years ago, when orange was the colour of hope 
and optimism -- and Canada was at the centre of the action.

The embassy's bold decision to back Pora -- Mr. Kaskiv says he spent the 
money on "infrastructure" and training -- was just one way in which Canada's 
government, as well as its vast Ukrainian diaspora, intervened in Ukraine's 
disputed 2004 election.

All told, the embassy spent a half-million dollars promoting "fair 
elections" in a country that shares no border with Canada and is a 
negligible trading partner. And Mr. Robinson acknowledges the effort helped 
the pro-Western Mr. Yushchenko to prevail over Moscow-backed Viktor 
Yanukovich.

The United States also played a leading role, as it came to see the 
Ukrainian election standoff as a major battle in a new cold war that it was 
fighting with a resurgent Kremlin for influence across Moscow's old empire. 
The Bush administration was particularly keen to see a pro-Western figure as 
president to ensure control over a key pipeline running from Odessa on the 
Black Sea to Brody on the Polish border.

The outgoing president, Leonid Kuchma, had recently reversed the flow so the 
pipeline carried Russian crude south instead of helping U.S. producers in 
the Caspian Sea region ship their product to Europe.

Even though U.S. investment in the uprising eventually surpassed Canada's, 
Mr. Robinson says the Canadian role "was really quite significant and 
deserves to be known."

Beginning in January, 2004 -- soon after the success of the Rose Revolution 
in Georgia -- he began to organize secret monthly meetings of Western 
ambassadors, presiding over what he called "donor co-ordination" sessions 
among 28 countries interested in seeing Mr. Yushchenko succeed. Eventually, 
he acted as the group's spokesman and became a prominent critic of the 
Kuchma government's heavy-handed media control.

Canada also invested in a controversial exit poll, carried out on election 
day by Ukraine's Razumkov Centre and other groups, that contradicted the 
official results showing Mr. Yanukovich had won. Thirty months later, 
Razumkov director Yuriy Yakimenko maintains the poll was impartial and 
scientific -- but also boasts that it brought Yushchenko supporters into the 
streets.

After that, hundreds of Ukrainian Canadians travelled to Ukraine and spread 
out across the country to watch over the deciding third round of elections. 
Despite their proclaimed neutrality, many arrived at Kiev's Boryspil Airport 
decked out in the opposition's signature orange. Since then, some of the 
Ukrainian Canadians who have now made the "old country" their home sometimes 
call the uprising the "Canadian Revolution."

The key to Canada's intervention was Boris Wrzesnewskyj, a Liberal MP of 
Ukrainian descent who had the ear of then-prime minister Paul Martin. His 
sister, Ruslana, is close to Mr. Yushchenko's wife, Katerina Chumachenko -- 
a pipeline that ensured Canada, first to recognize Ukraine's independence in 
1991, once more led the international community .

"Canada had a lot of influence in soft ways that are difficult to quantify," 
Mr. Wrzesnewskyj says. "Behind the scenes, we played quite a significant 
role."

He and Conservative MP Peter Goldring were observers for the Nov. 21 second 
round of elections, and made headlines by condemning flaws at polling 
stations. Two days later, as the protests on Independence Square were 
growing, Mr. Wrzesnewskyj made Canada's sympathies clear.

"It's quite clear to me that Viktor Yushchenko is, in fact, president of 
Ukraine," he shouted from the stage the opposition had erected on 
Independence Square. Elated, the crowd responded with a cheer and chants of 
"CA-NA-DA." The next day, Canadian flags started appearing amid the sea of 
orange.

Unknown to the crowd, Mr. Wrzesnewskyj had already played a giant role in 
ensuring the disputed election would be rerun. While observing the Oct. 31 
first round of voting, the MP for Etobicoke Centre had met Yaroslav 
Davydovych, deputy head of Ukraine's Central Elections Commission

When Mr. Wrzesnewskyj started listing all the violations he had seen, Mr. 
Davydovych signalled that the room was bugged. So Mr. Wrzesnewskyj wrote his 
mobile phone number on a piece of paper, and several hours later, Mr. 
Davydovych called and asked to meet under a pine tree near his offices, 
already being fortified in anticipation of unrest. Inside, the vote counting 
was finished, but no official results had been announced. Expecting fraud, 
the opposition was poised.

As night fell, the two men stood under the tree not speaking, until "I told 
him that in these historic circumstances, when good people do the right 
thing, I can make sure that Canada will guarantee them safety," Mr. 
Wrzesnewskyj recalls. "A big smile broke out on his face and he told me that 
Yushchenko had won the first round."

After consulting Karl Littler, deputy chief of staff to Mr. Martin, Mr. 
Wrzesnewskyj promised Mr. Davydovych and his family safe passage to Canada 
should publicizing the true results put his life in danger.

The election commission eventually released results showing Mr. Yushchenko 
had indeed narrowly won the first poll, bringing about a second-round 
showdown with Mr. Yanukovich. Three weeks later, Mr. Davydovych was to play 
a fateful role, refusing to sign off on tainted official results showing Mr. 
Yanukovich had won the rematch.

As the crowds poured into the streets to protest, Mr. Davydovych's act of 
defiance emboldened others in the electoral commission and judicial system 
to refuse orders to certify Mr. Yanukovich as president. Instead, the Nov. 
21 election was annulled and a rerun ordered for Dec. 26. Mr. Wrzesnewskyj 
says Mr. Davydovych made his call knowing his family would be safe in Canada 
if things turned against him.

Mr. Wrzesnewskyj also invested some of his own fortune, funding election 
observation missions to Ukraine through the University of Alberta with 
$250,000 from his family foundation. He opened his spacious apartment in 
central Kiev so those sleeping in tents could get an occasional shower.

Perhaps most important, he acted as an conduit between Mr. Martin and Mr. 
Yushchenko, whom he had introduced in Canada several years earlier, and 
persuaded the prime minister to read a dramatic statement in the House of 
Commons condemning Russia's meddling in Ukraine.

In the end, the millions in Western money invested in the Orange Revolution 
was a pittance compared with the $600-million Russia is said to have poured 
into the Yanukovich campaign through Gazprom, the state-controlled energy 
giant. But the Western cash was far better spent and had a dramatic effect 
on the streets of Kiev.

Other American and European democracy promotion groups invested in Pora and 
a host of other organizations across Ukraine. The NGOs rallied voters to Mr. 
Yushchenko's side, and Pora was the backbone of the protests that paralyzed 
Kiev until Mr. Yushchenko was sworn in on Jan. 23, 2005. In doing so, Canada 
and other Western countries borrowed from an approach that had already 
worked twice: As well as Georgia's Kmara movement, Pora was modelled on 
Otpor, the youth group that helped to topple Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic 
four years before. Likewise, the West-backed Committee of Ukrainian Voters 
was based on Georgian and Serbian groups.

The similarities between what had happened in Belgrade in 2000, Tbilisi in 
2003 and Kiev in 2004 did not go unnoticed in Moscow, where the uprisings 
were seen not as expressions of popular will, but as peaceful Western-backed 
coups.

The Orange Revolution "was a well-organized street rally which had been 
based on the experience of the Serbian and Georgia revolutions, " says 
Sergei Markov, a Kremlin strategist sent to Kiev in 2004 to aid the 
Yanukovich campaign.

"I call them NGO revolutions -- Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, all of them," and 
their aim was to push back a Russia that had grown more assertive since 
President Vladimir Putin had come to power in 2000.

Erasing the Kremlin's influence certainly motivated the returning expats. 
Most of Canada's million-plus ethnic Ukrainians have roots in western 
Ukraine, which is predominantly Catholic, Ukrainian-speaking and far closer 
to Hungary and Poland than Russia.

So Canada's election-monitoring efforts focused heavily on the east. Mr. 
Wrzesnewskyj secured government funding to send 500 observers, the largest 
official delegation from any country, and another 500 Ukrainian Canadians 
came independently. Even before they landed, they made it plain that their 
goal was not just to monitor an election, but to keep Mr. Yanukovich from 
reaching the presidency.

An e-mail circulated among those monitoring the final vote suggested that 
observers be redeployed at the last minute to catch the Kuchma and 
"Yanu-NO!!-kowych" camp off-guard.

"If we aren't as cleaver (sic) as the Kuchma camp we won't win!!!" read the 
message, signed by Vlodko Derzko. "Don't forget, this isn't a picnic . . . 
for Kuchma it's a war of survival . . . See you on Maidan [Independence 
Square] on the 28th!!! The biggest street party in the world when Yushchenko 
wins."

Mychailo Wynnyckyj served as an observer and admits "we were told not to 
arrive wearing orange, but there was no doubt who everybody was supporting. 
Of the 500 observers supported by the Canadian government, maybe 100 were, 
in their hearts, truly impartial."

Now a sociology professor here at the prestigious Kyiv-Mohilo Academy, Mr. 
Wynnyckyj also lobbied to ensure the international media would be in Kiev -- 
a heavy journalistic presence often cited as a reason force wasn't used.

Despite all this, Mr. Robinson, the former ambassador, and Mr. Kaskiv of 
Pora are among those who argue that the West had a limited impact. No one 
was paid to stand in the streets of Kiev for those five weeks in 2004, and 
the fact that so many did demonstrated how deep the desire for change was. 
All Canada, the U.S. and Europe did was help to provide an outlet for that 
emotion.

But to the victors go the spoils. Viktor Yushchenko was sworn in as 
President, Ms. Tymoshenko became his prime minister, and Mr. Kaskiv was made 
a special presidential adviser. Anatoliy Gritsenko, a former head of 
pollster Razumkov, was made defence minister, responsible for deepening 
Ukraine's co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

And the new government announced its intention to reverse the flow of the 
Odessa-Brody pipeline.

And so far that's about it.

The political marriage of Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Tymoshenko didn't last; in 
just eight months, they discovered that they shared little beyond a desire 
to see the end of Mr. Kuchma. The sky-high popularity Mr. Yushchenko enjoyed 
disappeared just as quickly, as post-revolutionary disenchantment set in.

Despite the promised change, Ukraine today is much like it was in 2004, a 
charming country plagued by economic problems that force scientists to drive 
taxi cabs and keep the villages around the rapidly growing capital mired in 
poverty.

Most Ukrainians are tired of politics, but the intrigue never stops. In 
January, 2006, the Kremlin struck back hard, briefly switching off Ukraine's 
flow of natural gas and forcing Mr. Yushchenko to accept a harsh price hike 
or risk shivering. In the process, the Putin government reminded Ukrainians 
that they still live next to a giant.

The Kremlin denied a political motivation for cutting the gas, but in 
parliamentary elections two months later, Mr. Yanukovich staged an 
improbable comeback, forcing Mr. Yushchenko to make him prime minister.

Since then, the Yanukovich camp has been trying to undo what remains of the 
Orange Revolution. Even though he already has a majority in the 450-seat 
Rada, he has been luring pro-Yushchenko deputies (allegedly using 
multimillion- dollar bribes) into his camp. With 300 seats, he can overrule 
the President, amend the constitution and effectively claw back what the 
revolution took from him.

Two weeks ago, with his back to the wall, Mr. Yushchenko dissolved 
parliament and called fresh elections, a move that caught many Ukrainians 
off-guard and sparked the renewed crisis.

Now there are thousands of Yanukovich supporters camped on Independence 
Square, deliberately mimicking Pora's tactics in what has been dubbed the 
"Blue Revolution," after the colour used by Mr. Yanukovich's Party of 
Regions. Claiming the President had no right to dissolve parliament 
(something the constitution is unclear on), they're demanding that he either 
back down or put his own job on the line as well.

Clearly, this isn't what Ukrainians thought they were getting, and Canada 
thought it was supporting, in 2004. Mr. Robinson now lives in Ottawa but 
keeps a close eye on Kiev, hoping that despite the current unrest what he 
and other Canadians did has put Ukraine on an irreversible course to 
democracy.

"The Orange Revolution is incomplete," he says. "Democracy is something you 
have to struggle for. Ukraine is in a situation where that struggle . . . is 
not over."

Now based in the Middle East, Mark MacKinnon covered Ukraine's Orange 
Revolution while he was The Globe and Mail's correspondent in Moscow. His 
book, The New Cold War: Revolutions, Rigged Elections and Pipeline Politics 
in the Former Soviet Union, is to be published this week by Random House 
Canada.

AS HE DRONED ON . . .

In his new book, Globe and Mail correspondent Mark MacKinnon recalls how he 
came to meet the hero of Ukraine's Orange Revolution:

Vladimir Putin's vision of how to formally restore Russian influence in the 
post- Soviet space began to take shape in May 2003, when he met Ukrainian 
President Leonid Kuchma for a five-day summit in the Crimean resort of 
Yalta. Two months later, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan -- the four 
largest former Soviet republics -- signed a draft deal calling for the 
creation of something innocuously named the Common Economic Space (CES).

The four countries pledged to move toward free trade, joint economic and 
energy policies, a tax and customs union, and co-ordinated talks with 
international bodies such as the World Trade Organization that had 
previously shown more interest in admitting Ukraine or Kazakhstan than 
Russia's still lawless and unpredictable economy; now one would not join 
without the others.

Voting on all matters would be weighted according to the size of the 
countries' economies -- meaning that Russia, which dwarfed the other nations 
in every respect, would effectively be the only one with a say.

Although Kuchma was distrusted and widely disliked by ordinary Ukrainians, 
the same people looked east and admired the way Putin was restoring a sense 
of order in Moscow. Some polls suggested that, were Putin allowed to stand 
in Ukraine's next presidential election, he'd win in a landslide.

The West, though, had not given up on the idea of pulling Ukraine out of 
Moscow's orbit, nor of re-reversing the flow of the Odessa-Brody oil 
pipeline. Their hopes, however, were pinned on the uninspiring former 
central banker Viktor Yushchenko.

When I landed in Kiev shortly after the CES deal was signed, I met 
Yushchenko at the office of his Our Ukraine party in Kiev's bohemian Podil 
neighbourhood.

The CES, he told me, was a threat to Ukraine's sovereignty, giving Russia 
the final say in far too many matters. The next presidential elections, he 
foretold, would be "a good time for Ukraine to choose between East and 
West."

Yushchenko, already by then identified as Ukraine's great democratic hope, 
had the monotone voice of an economics professor. As he droned on about the 
relative benefits and drawbacks of free trade with Russia, I started looking 
around the room, focusing first on the grandfather clock behind his chair, 
then on the gold telescope pointed out the window, then on an oversized 
Fabergé egg in the corner.

I thought to myself that this man couldn't hold the attention of a dinner 
party, let alone convince a nation of famously laid-back Ukrainians to 
follow him. Furthering our absent-minded professor impression, he'd left a 
button undone on his shirt that day, leaving my friend and translator Yuriy 
Shafarenko and me trying not to look at the exposed white belly of Ukraine's 
would-be president.

Faced with a slate of options that included a boring ex-banker, a president 
implicated in murder, a prime minister with a history of violent assault and 
Yulia Tymoshenko, the beautiful and fiery opposition leader who had 
allegedly made her fortune by illegally siphoning Russian gas, I could 
understand why some Ukrainians wanted to see Putin's name on the ballot.

Excerpted from The New Cold War: Revolutions, Rigged Elections and Pipeline 
Politics in the Former Soviet Union, © 2007 Mark MacKinnon. Published by 
Random House Canada. All rights reserved.

---

Le Canada a trempé dans l?organisation du « love in » ukrainien de 2004
Pierre Dubuc
L?aut?courriel
dimanche 22 avril 2007



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Vous vous souvenez de la Révolution orange à l?hiver 2004 lors des élections 
en Ukraine ? Des milliers de manifestants brandissant des drapeaux orange, 
un peu sur le modèle du « love in » de Montréal quelques jours avant le 
référendum de 1995. La référence n?est pas anodine. Des diplomates et des 
politiciens canadiens ont joué un rôle de premier plan dans ces événements 
nous apprend aujourd?hui un article du Globe and Mail (14 avril 2007).

Trois tours pour assurer la victoire de Iouchtchenko

Rappelons d?abord les faits. Après un premier tour de scrutin qui n?avait 
pas fait de gagnant, un deuxième tour donnait 49,42% des voix au pro-russe 
Vikto Ianoukovitch et 46,69% des voix au pro-occidental Viktor Iouchtchenko. 
Mais des sondages à la sortie des bureaux de votation - les fameux « exit 
polls » - indiquaient une avance de 11% pour Iouchtchenko et des 
observateurs étrangers rapportaient des irrégularités et de allégations de 
fraude. Il n?en fallait pas plus pour que Iouchtchenko et ses partisans 
refusent les résultats officiels et organisent des rassemblements de 
protestation à travers le pays.

Le 23 novembre 2004, une manifestation pacifique rassemblant environ un 
demi-million de défenseurs de Iouchtchenko avait lieu sur la place de 
l?Indépendance à Kiev. Malgré le froid et la neige, les manifestants ont 
campé sur place. Ils arboraient des drapeaux de couleur orange, symbole 
principal du mouvement. Ce mouvement de protestation a réussi à provoquer la 
tenue d?un troisième tour de scrutin qui donna finalement la victoire à 
Viktor Iouchtchenko avec 52 % des suffrages. C?était la victoire de ce que 
les médias occidentaux ont appelé la Révolution orange.

L?ex-pouvoir ukrainien, le gouvernement russe ainsi que des groupes 
occidentaux de gauche ont accusé les organisations à l?origine des 
manifestations d?appui à Iouchtchenko d?être largement financées par des 
institutions telles l?Open Society Institute de George Soros, le National 
Democratic Institute, proche du parti démocrate américain et la Freedom 
House, proche du gouvernement américain.

Un demi-million de dollars pour des « élections justes »

L?article du Globe and Mail nous apprend aujourd?hui que le Canada a aussi 
trempé dans cette affaire. Selon le journaliste Mark MacKinnon, 
l?ambassadeur canadien alors en poste à Kiev, Andrew Robinson, a joué un 
rôle prépondérant dans ces événements.

Il aurait versé dès le printemps 2004 la somme de 30 000 $ US au groupe 
Pora, ce groupe de jeunes radicaux qui a occupé la place centrale de Kiev au 
mois de décembre 2004. C?est du moins ce qu?affirme aujourd?hui Vladislav 
Kaskiv, le leader de ce groupe. « Ce sont les premiers montants d?argent que 
le groupe a reçu. C?est là que tout a commencé », déclare M. Kaskiv au 
journaliste du Globe.

L?argent versé à Pora n?est qu?une des facettes de l?intervention canadienne 
dans les affaires intérieures de l?Ukraine. L?ambassade canadienne aurait 
versé plus d?un demi-million de dollars pour soutenir des « élections justes 
» en Ukraine. Selon l?aveu même de l?ambassadeur Robinson, les montants 
d?argent alloués par le Canada, bien qu?inférieurs à ceux des Etats-Unis, « 
étaient significatifs et méritent d?être connus ».

Dès janvier 2004, peu après la « révolution des roses » en Georgie, 
l?ambassadeur canadien reconnaît avoir organisé des rencontres secrètes 
mensuelles des ambassadeurs de 28 pays occidentaux pour aider à l?élection 
de Viktor Iouchtchenko.

Concrètement, le Canada a investi de l?argent dans l?organisation des fameux 
« exit polls » qui contredisaient les résultats officiels en donnant la 
victoire à Viktor Iouchtchenko et qui ont incité les jeunes à descendre dans 
la rue.

Le Canada, premier pays à reconnaître l?indépendance de l?Ukraine

Outre l?ambassadeur canadien, le joueur clé de l?intervention canadienne 
était Boris Wrzesnewskyj, un député libéral proche du premier ministre Paul 
Martin, dont la soeur était une amie de la femme de Viktor Iouchtchenko. 
Déjà en 1991, Boris Wrzesnewskyj était à l?origine du fait que le Canada ait 
été le premier pays à reconnaître l?indépendance de l?Ukraine.

M. Wrzesnewskyj faisait partie du groupe d?observateurs soi-disant « 
impartiaux » lors du deuxième tour de scrutin et il a fait les manchettes en 
Ukraine en condamnant les fraudes présumées. Deux jours plus tard, il était 
sur une tribune érigée sur la Place de l?Indépendance pour proclamer sa 
conviction que Viktor Iouchtchenko avait gagné. Des drapeaux canadiens sont 
alors apparus parmi la mer de drapeaux oranges.

M. Wrzesnewskyj se vante d?avoir investi 250 000 $ de sa fortune personnelle 
dans l?élection en faisant transiter les fonds par l?intermédiaire de 
l?Université de l?Alberta. Il a parrainé le contingent de 500 observateurs 
venus du Canada à même des fonds fédéraux et de 500 autres Ukrainiens venus 
de façon « indépendante ».

Un de ces observateurs, M. Wynnyckyj, a déclaré au journaliste du Globe : « 
On nous a demandé de ne pas arriver avec des vêtements de couleur orange, 
mais il n?y avait aucun doute sur la partisanerie des observateurs ».

Une intervention canadienne au plus haut niveau

L?implication de M. Wrzesnewskyj ne s?est pas limitée à faire venir du 
Canada des observateurs « impartiaux », à organiser et financer des « exit 
polls » et à dénoncer publiquement la « fraude » de ses adversaires 
pro-russes.

Il raconte au journaliste du Globe qu?il a rencontré dans le plus grand 
secret Yaroslav Davydovych, le président de la Commission électorale 
centrale de l?Ukraine pour lui faire savoir l?importance que les pays 
occidentaux accordaient à une victoire de Viktor Iouchtchenko et que « dans 
de telles circonstances historiques, le Canada pouvait garantir la sécurité 
de M. Davydovych et lui assurer, ainsi que sa famille, un sauf-conduit vers 
le Canada si les événements le forçaient à quitter le pays ».

Quelques jours plus tard, M. Davydovych, défiant les autres membres de la 
Commission électorale, refusait d?introniser M. Ianoukovitch, le candidat 
pro-russe, comme président et ordonnait la tenue d?un second tour qui allait 
donner Iouchtchenko gagnant.

L?aut?courriel n° 230, 22 avril 2007