[A-List] Bigots and history

["Jim Yarker" <sjy_estrien@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Al-Ahram Weekly Online : Located at: 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/830/op3.htm

Bigots and history
Neo-cons, orientalists and Zionists gathered recently in Israel to confirm 
their fantasies about history, people and politics. Azmi Bishara responds

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The seventh annual Herzliya Conference, held in the Herzliya 
Interdisciplinary Centre, featured a rarefied blend of neo-conservatives and 
old-guard conservatives who have preserved their "unbounded vitality and 
eternal youthfulness", as one might hear in the plug for one of our video 
clip starlets these days. How it warmed the heart to see assembled together 
in a single conference such illustrious figures as the eternal orientalist 
Bernard Lewis, the permanently startled Shimon Peres, the notorious Richard 
Perle and, of the same clique, former CIA director James Woolsey.

Where else in the world could you come across these sorts of people and 
other leeches upon this part of the world underneath one roof? It could only 
be in Israel, of course, which has become one of the major centres for 
provoking the clash of civilisations and cultures, and for glorifying 
"Western civilisation", in which Israel so unreservedly situates itself, in 
spite of the "Third Worldness" and corruption that pervade its mass culture 
and the mindset of its politicians. Israel has made itself a forum for 
economic liberalism and the politics of globalisation (to be read as 
Americanisation), without self-criticism inside the conference hall and 
without demonstrations outside. Herzliya, after all, is not Vancouver where 
people are mad enough to protest against this type of conference. It is 
located on the most extreme and most extremist fringe of Western colonialist 
culture; it is, according to Zionism's self- definition, the West's 
"spearhead against Eastern barbarianism," as that Zionist hero, Osishkin, 
put it in order to win the British over to the Zionist enterprise.

Lewis, in his lecture, attempted to summarise Arab history since the 
Napoleonic invasion in -- as is the want of the totally arrogant or 
consummately wise -- a handful of terse sentences. For 200 years, the rulers 
of the Middle East played one great power against the other. But the 
collapse of the Soviet Union brought an end to that era. Now outside powers 
are not as interested in the region as they were before. This meant a going 
back, a reversion to older patterns. The primary identity of Middle Eastern 
countries is religious, not national or ethnic. It is always Muslims against 
the rest, and their task is to bring Islam to all mankind. They succeeded in 
two major attempts, when they conquered Andalusia and, later, under the 
Ottoman Empire. Today they are preparing themselves for the third attempt. 
But there has been another major development since the end of the "Bonaparte 
phase". This is the increased rivalry between the Sunnis and Shia -- the 
"Protestants" and "Catholics" of the Middle East.

And some accuse the Arabs of mixing fact with their oriental flights of 
fancy! But Lewis is a respected Princeton professor and a world-renowned 
orientalist whose works have not only had an impact on the media but on such 
scholars as Huntington. So, imagine the miles he had to traverse in order to 
be able to offer this potted history, which illustrates the mood and values 
of the culture that prevails among all those political luminaries that 
converged upon Herzliya, as though it were the capital of the Middle East.

Because "outside powers are not as interested in the region as they were 
before," the US has sent troops to Iraq and is gearing up for Iran. 
Condoleezza Rice is busily giving the peace process its latest "tune-up" and 
the Zionist sympathiser Javier Solana is dropping by every two weeks or so, 
via Israeli television, to reassure Israelis that "we don't meddle in the 
decisions of our friends in the government of Israel. We will support what 
you decide. But we advise you to be wary of Syria's intentions for peace. 
Syria, first, has to demonstrate the sincerity of its intentions in Lebanon 
and in Iraq and in not providing a base for Palestinian terrorism... And, in 
Palestine, a Palestinian unity government is not enough; Hamas has to accept 
the conditions of the Quartet." In Herzliya, Jose-Maria Aznar called upon 
the EU to set into motion an initiative to include Israel into NATO, Woolsey 
declared that Israel couldn't negotiate with those who wanted to annihilate 
it, and the whole crew counselled the Lebanese government to show no 
flexibility towards the majority opinion in Lebanon and furnished ample 
evidence of their intent to bring down the majority government in Palestine. 
Yes, Bernard Lewis must be right: the world has completely lost interest in 
the Middle East since the collapse of the Soviet order.

He suggests, too, of course, that nothing ever changes under our scorching 
sun, that Muslims are forever their immutable selves, that to Arabs all 
other affiliations pale next to their religious ones, and that it was, 
therefore, only natural that, once they no longer had big powers to play off 
against each other, they would inevitably revert to their pre-Napoleonic 
religious squabbling. And who are we to challenge this perspicacious 
insight? Even so, in the same Herzliya week, Sunni and Shia clergymen 
gathered in a dialogue conference in which they effectively resolved to 
"nationalise" Sunni and Shia affiliations. These affiliations should be 
linked to national identities, they said, and Shia religious and political 
leaders should commit themselves to not pushing the Shia affiliation upon 
"Sunni countries" and Sunni leaders should make a similar commitment towards 
"Shia countries". Apparently, national and ethnic affiliations have come a 
much longer way than Lewis imagines. Instead of the adherents of different 
Islamic doctrines, or Muslim "Protestants" and "Christians", at each other's 
throats, religious rivalries have been subordinated to other rival 
interests. In other words, religious affiliations have become tools in the 
service of antagonisms that are cast as national rivalries, because these 
affiliations sidestep the problem of creating a sovereign nation founded 
upon the concept of citizenship, because the separation of religion from 
citizenship and public affairs or even retaining religion as a public 
concern within the framework of a multi-cultural and multi-denominational 
nation or state is being kept out of the picture. Lewis is wrong if he 
cannot see that what appears to be religious conflict is, in fact, an 
instrument for furthering other brands of interests, attitudes and identity 
politics.

When some of us, out of despair, disparage the fighting beneath sectarian 
banners, our intent is a far remove from Lewis's. He sees the resurfacing of 
Muslim or Islamic atavistic traits whereas we use such terms as the 
"Sultanate" and "Mameluke kingdoms" to characterise the current 
disintegration and fragmentation of contemporary Arab states. It is our way 
of sounding the alarm, of urging caution, of crying out. The crusader state, 
in its heyday, succeeded marvellously in turning brother ruler against 
brother ruler and conquering its neighbouring statelets, even without the 
advantages of state-of-the-art technological superiority and nuclear might. 
Indeed, they used very much the same instruments of war that the Arabs had 
and they didn't even enjoy the degree of social and scientific advancement 
the Arabs had attained at the time. And they certainly didn't have to 
convene a Herzliya conference. Their ally was the fragmented structure of 
the surrounding statelets and their mutual rivalries and suspicions. These 
are the historical circumstances that we cite metaphorically in order to 
warn of the consequences of failing to build a nation founded upon the 
concept of citizenship.

Believe it or not, this metaphor is closer to present day realities than 
Bernard Lewis's theories. The Arabs have made some progress since the Middle 
Ages -- some considerable progress: Israel can't keep them down or even 
preserve itself without technological superiority and other forms of 
superiority, unlike the crusader state which lasted for some 200 years 
without these advantages. But the unresolved problem of nationalism, Israel, 
and the failure to build a democratic civil state are definitely among the 
foremost factors to have stalled this progress. Meanwhile, the folks at 
Herzliya have their own theories to expound on the Arab condition, because 
they approach it from a different mindset altogether.

To better understand what I'm getting at, I suggest you read Shimon Peres's 
amazing Herzliya lecture. Even Peres, himself, seemed amazed, amazed at 
himself and at scientific and economic progress, all of which he managed to 
lump together when he observed proudly that he "looked so good" for his age 
because he was an optimistic type of person and he was optimistic about the 
power of science and economy. Peres also had certain people to thank for his 
optimism. He expressed his gratitude to Ahmadinejad whose exaggerations and 
extremism unified the world behind Israel. And he expressed his gratitude to 
Hassan Nasrallah who eulogised Israel by saying, "what country, having lost 
one soldier, ceaselessly searches for him. Even if he was killed, it won't 
stop searching for his corpse," and who praised the democracy that enabled 
Israel to "learn a lesson".

Of course, Peres couldn't or wouldn't pick up on the other side of these 
remarks. Out of all the Arab political forces these days, the undefeated 
Hizbullah, while certainly no great fan of Israel, has the confidence to 
praise the strong points of its adversary because, by "pure coincidence" it 
was the only power capable of inflicting defeats on Israel. Moreover, this 
party, which demonstrated such superb organisational strengths in battle, is 
also the political force that, in the wake of a highly destructive war, has 
the power to get unprecedented numbers of Lebanese out into the streets in 
peaceful strikes and protest marches as well as the sophistication to 
address these people rationally, in a language that is far removed from the 
fascist and populist harangues used to mobilise certain mass movements in 
Israel, and even in some European countries. But here, the type of mass 
movement that is capable of modern, rational and institutionalised 
organisation and that even by the standards of Herzliya should be entitled 
to govern is regarded as Israel's number one enemy. What Israel prefers is 
happy Mameluke petit states, allied with Israel against other Mameluke petit 
states, or against their own internal adversaries. It wants states capable 
of receiving the Israeli economic and scientific modernising mission with 
open arms, prepared to heed preacher Peres's advice to shun those forces 
that are truly modern in spirit and practice.

What else did Peres say at Herzliya VII? He said that Assad, the son, wants 
to correct the mistakes of his father. But Bashar must realise that the 
question of war and peace with Syria is a triangle that includes the US, and 
that the latter, right now, doesn't want negotiations with Syria because the 
US supports Fouad Al-Siniora's government in Lebanon and because Syria 
provides shelter for Khaled Meshaal and trains terrorist forces to send into 
Iraq. On the other hand, if the Syrians turn to war, "they will encounter 
the triangle, and not just Israel."

Apparently, Peres hadn't attended Lewis's lecture about how little the rest 
of the world cares about this part of the world and Islam's next 
encroachment into the West -- he seemed indifferent to that danger. Rather, 
the impression he left was that Israel did not want peace with Syria, that 
it was preparing for war against Iran and that the Palestinians had better 
be ready to accept much less than what was offered to them at Camp David II. 
On the latter point, he was explicit about what the Palestinians had to 
accept. Israel, he said, has no intention of letting demographic reasons end 
its existence as a Jewish state. It would not go the way of Lebanon, which 
ended as the only Christian state in the region due to the demographic price 
it paid for its mistakes. Israel, in other words, would never accept the 
principle of the Palestinian right to return; as to what "mistakes" the 
Lebanese made, these were left unsaid.

Yes, with or without Bernard Lewis, the analogy to Mameluke petit states is 
very useful in order to grasp the blindness of an Arab order that supported 
the occupation of Iraq, that has no idea what stance to take on the current 
process of partitioning Iraq and on the prospect of an increase in American 
forces there, and that has a strong inclination towards availing itself of 
any mechanism, including fuelling sectarian tensions, in order to keep its 
people mired in backwardness.

And the analogy is particularly apt when it comes to the Arab order's 
stance, or lack thereof, on the attempt to impose Israeli conditions on the 
Palestinians by means of economic blockade, while at the same time calling 
for a Palestinian unity government on the conditions set by the Quartet, 
without making any demands on Israel, as a preliminary for reviving a 
negotiating process aimed at securing Israel's conditions for a settlement. 
This is definitely an Arab order in a muddle and looking for a way out of 
the awkward and embarrassing position that the resolve, perseverance and 
skill of the Lebanese resistance have put it in.

True, Israel's military and technological superiority is essential to its 
survival. However, the gap between Israel and the Arabs is not so much 
created by its superiority as it is by the Arabs' backwardness. At the root 
of this backwardness lie the petit states in which, to borrow from Ibn 
Khaldun, flattery and favouritism are the way to rank and power, rank and 
power are the route to money, and alliance with Israel and any other power 
is the way to forestall the rise of any alternative.