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[A-List] Macro---> Micro--->Macro
- To: The A-List <a-list@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: [A-List] Macro---> Micro--->Macro
- From: Omahkohkiaayo_ipoyi <omahkohkiaayo@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2007 19:11:43 -0800 (PST)
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Any experienced pilot will tell you that it is nothing short of a miracle
that aircraft are not crashing and running into each other all over the
world given the: massive traffic loads versus limited and broken Air
Traffic Control systems for handling them; states of repair/maintenance of
current aircraft; profit and survival imperatives of airlines about to go
under; experience levels and workloads of currrent pilots; etc.
Especially during takeoffs and landings, but really at all times, aircraft
only remaining flying under control, often at very high or very low speeds
with no margins for error, if four opposing forces--lift versus gravity and
thrust versus drag--are kept in balance by delicate movements around three
axes in time and space---longitudinal(roll, ailerons), lateral(pitch,
horizontal stabilizer) and vertical (yaw, rudder). All of this is being
done while getting and receiving clearances and/or monitoring other traffic
on the radio, assessing and reacting to meterological conditons
particularly winds, fuel and weight management, monitoring and assessing
all aircraft systems and troubleshooting early, navigating on the ground
and in the air, monitoring passenger welfare, etc and all of this is going
on in increasingly overextended, fragile and interdependent air traffic,
maintenance and scheduling-operational environments.
Then add the fact that all pilots must do currency biannuals every two
years, and, on the airlines, captains do, every six-months, full simulator
checkrides with all sorts of unusual maneuvers and conditions thrown in, a
three-hour oral exam on all of the aircraft's sytems and procedures, with
no second chance if failed--it is all over on that airline. For copilots,
it is a checkride every year. Then add the fact that many of the
experienced military pilots are staying in because the conditions of work,
pay and retirement are nothing like the past.
And finally add all the normal "macro" stuff (contradictions, trends etc)
that gets "trickled down" to the "micro" and into the cockpit of an
aircraft flown by an overworked, far too casual for the risks and
responsibilities at hand, spring-loaded-into-the-pissed-off-position,
crew... and I am afraid a lot more of this is ahead.
Pilots in Ky. Crash Violated Rules
The tail of Comair Flight 5191 lies among trees at left after the plane
crashed in a field during take off less then a mile from the runway at the
Blue Grass Airport in Lexington, Ky., in this Sunday, Aug.
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
WASHINGTON - In the minutes before the crash of a commuter jet that took
off from the wrong runway, the pilots discussed their families, their dogs
and other job opportunities, and the airline said Wednesday that part of
the conversation violated a federal rule against extraneous cockpit
chatter.
The National Transportation Safety Board released a transcript Wednesday of
the cockpit recording aboard Comair Flight 5191. The recording also showed
that one of the pilots noted something was amiss when he looked down the
Lexington, Ky., airstrip and said it looked "weird" because it had no
lights.
The transcript was the first public disclosure of the pilots' conversations
during the ill-fated flight, which killed 49 people in the deadliest
American aviation disaster in five years.
The transcript revealed that the flight crew "did not follow Comair's
general cockpit procedures," Comair spokeswoman Kate Marx said. "It is
unclear what role, if any, this played in the accident, so it would be
premature to determine that."
In 1981, the Federal Aviation Administration adopted a so-called "sterile
cockpit rule" that forbids, among other things, extraneous conversation
during taxi, takeoff and landing.
As the pilots went through preflight procedures, Capt. Jeffrey Clay talked
about his young children having colds, and co-pilot James Polehinke
discussed his four dogs. The two men also talked about pay and working
conditions, even as the controller occasionally interrupted to provide
instructions.
"How old are they?" Polehinke asked six minutes before the crash.
"Three months and two years old," Clay answered.
"That's a nice range, age range," Polehinke said.
Marx said Comair does not believe those statements violated the rule
because they were made prior to taxi. But a later conversation about a
fellow pilot was a violation, she said.
FAA spokeswoman Laura Brown said the sterile cockpit policy prohibits
"engaging in non-essential conversations within the cockpit."
Peter Goelz, former managing director at NTSB, said a little extraneous
conversation among pilots is not unusual, but the extent of the chatter
between the Comair crew was rare.
"I think that when the human factors experts at the NTSB analyze the
transcripts, they will identify this extraneous conversation as a
contributing factor," Goelz said.
The plane took off Aug. 27 in the dark from a runway that was too short for
a passenger jet. The plane struggled to get into the air and went down in
flames.
Polehinke was the lone survivor, losing a leg and suffering brain damage.
He has told relatives he remembers nothing about that morning.
According to federal investigators, Clay taxied the plane onto the wrong
runway at Lexington's Blue Grass Airport before Polehinke took over the
controls for takeoff.
Polehinke said: "I'll take us to Atlanta." Clay responded, "Sure."
Polehinke said the runway looked "weird with no lights," according to the
transcript. The captain responded, "Yeah." The last intelligible word on
the recording is the captain saying "Whoa" just a second before impact.
An engineering report also released Wednesday concluded the pilots never
tried to abort the takeoff or realized they were on the wrong runway.
Sixteen of the passengers suffered smoke inhalation, indicating they
survived the initial impact, the NTSB said. Other passengers sustained
internal and brain injuries, broken bones, severed limbs and burns.
In a statement, Comair said: "We recognize the investigation is a long and
difficult process for the families, especially when announcements - such as
today's - receive intense public scrutiny. Our desire is to learn as much
as we can in order to prevent these kinds of accidents from happening
again."
Numerous lawsuits have been filed accusing Comair of negligence. However,
the airline has sued the airport and the Federal Aviation Administration,
contending they are partially responsible.
A week before the crash, the taxiways at Blue Grass were altered as part of
a construction project, but the maps and charts used in the cockpits of
Comair and other airlines were not updated. The FAA did notify airlines of
the changes through a separate announcement.
The transcripts and other documents were also the first time federal
officials identified Christopher Damron as the lone air traffic controller
on duty in the tower at the time of the crash.
The jet was supposed to take off from the 7,000-foot main runway, called
runway 22, but instead used 3,500-foot runway 26, which is meant only for
smaller planes.
The NTSB has said Damron cleared the jet for takeoff, then turned away to
do administrative work and did not see the plane turn down the wrong
runway.
According to documents released Wednesday, Damron initially told
investigators he watched the plane move onto runway 22. Later he changed
his account to explain he just saw it on the taxiway leading to runway 22.
After finishing his administrative work, Damron "heard a crash and saw a
fireball west of the airport," the NTSB said.
Damron was initially placed on leave after the crash but returned to work
late last year. A call to his Lexington home went unanswered Wednesday.
As they prepared for takeoff, Polehinke asked, "What runway?" and inquired
about runway 24 - which does not exist. Clay immediately responded, "It's
22."
Louise Roselle, one of the attorneys representing victims' families, said
the pilots' conversation about searching for other jobs reinforces one of
the central issues in the lawsuits related to the crash.
"It reinforces how Comair has been treating its pilots," Roselle said.
---
Associated Press writer Brett Barrouquere in Louisville, Ky., contributed
to this report.
____________________________________________________________________________________
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- Thread context:
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- [A-List] Macro---> Micro--->Macro,
Omahkohkiaayo_ipoyi Thu 18 Jan 2007, 03:10 GMT
- [A-List] ANDY STERN STATEMENT ON IRAQ WAR,
Charles Brown Wed 17 Jan 2007, 19:41 GMT
- [A-List] (Fwd) New book: A Political Programme for the WSF?,
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