[A-List] Iraq: The beginning of the endgame

["Sabri Oncu" <soncu@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

This is first of the three articles in today's Financial Times that I found
good to have in the list archives. The below person seems to know what he is
talking about well. He sees two possibilities in Iraq:

1)either a political compromise;
2)or descent into an all-out civil war that may lead to partition,
destabilise the oil-rich Persian Gulf region and reshape the Middle East.  

It feels as if I had seen this movie about a century ago and I find the
first of the above possibilities quite unlikely. 

We will see.

Sabri

++++++++++++++

A strong assembly is vital to stability in Iraq
Financial Times, December 13, 2005 
By Yitzhak Nakash

Less than a year after last January's interim elections that empowered
Iraq's Shia majority and the Kurds, Iraqis will go to the polls again
tomorrow to elect a national assembly, which in turn will appoint a
government for a four-year term. Whereas in January the Sunni minority by
and large boycotted the elections, this time Sunnis are expected to make a
strong showing in an effort to regain some of the power they ceded to the
Shia and Kurds.

These elections mark the beginning of the endgame. Iraqis will either reach
a political compromise or the country will descend into an all-out civil war
that may lead to partition, destabilise the oil-rich Persian Gulf region and
reshape the Middle East. There can be little doubt about the heavy human and
material cost that would be exacted by such an upheaval, its uncertain
political outcome and its adverse impact on relations among Muslims and
between Muslim and western societies. Iraqis, their neighbours and the
US-led coalition countries seem increasingly aware of the dire consequences
of a civil war. 

Iraqis face daunting challenges, not least in building a national military
force capable of defeating the insurgents. Nevertheless, there is a good
chance that they can reach a compromise and agree to keep Iraq unified.

The Shia, who constitute some 60 per cent of the population, are destined to
lead the new Iraq, but they will not be able to impose their will on the
country. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, their most revered leader, has
understood the importance of compromise.

The Kurds, who form roughly 20 per cent, know Turkey, Iran and Syria will
not tolerate an independent Kurdistan for fear of repercussions on their own
restive Kurdish minorities. Iraqi Kurdish leaders will need to communicate
to their constituency that their future lies within a federative Iraqi
state.

Sunnis, who form about 17 per cent, based in central Iraq, would be the big
losers in the event of a civil war that leads to partition. Iraq's
fragmentation would leave them isolated and impoverished with access neither
to the sea nor to the oilfields in the north and south. It is crucial that
Sunnis accept the new political order, embrace constitutional politics and
do not become a political wing of the insurgency.

Iraqis would need to negotiate significant amendments to the constitution
approved last October and isolate the foreign jihadists and die-hard Saddam
Hussein loyalists who are bitterly opposed to the idea of a Shia-led Iraq.
The most divisive issues will be relations between religion and state, the
meaning of federalism and the future of the US-led coalition in the country.

Events since the collapse of the Ba'ath regime have demonstrated the growing
influence of Islam among both Shia and Sunni Arabs. In the absence of a
strong secular middle class, the religious groups are now the most organised
force in central and southern Iraq. Yet secularism remains strong among the
Kurds in the north. Political Islam will be a dominant force in Iraq, but
its influence could be mitigated by the development of a strong national
assembly where Islamists and secularists, Arabs and Kurds will need to reach
compromises on the role of religion in politics and on matters relating to
personal status and women's rights.

How Iraqis define federalism will be critical in determining the character
of post-Ba'ath Iraq. Federalism should not come at the expense of a viable
central government. It should allow a just distribution of oil revenues
among all Iraqis and give Shia, Sunnis and Kurds a degree of religious and
cultural autonomy without compromising either Iraq's political unity or
Baghdad's role as the centre of national politics.

The key institution that ought to emerge out of tomorrow's elections is a
national assembly capable of checking the executive. If ordinary Iraqis can
feel that, through the assembly, they can put pressure on the government to
address their concerns, the political process will gain legitimacy.

For their part, the US-led coalition countries would need to accept the
development of a strong assembly, even if members voted on a timetable for
withdrawal of foreign troops linked to progress in rebuilding Iraq's
political system and its military. Failure to respond to Iraqis' wishes
would lead to greater violence. Success would mean an independent, unified
Iraq with a representative government and a strong legislature - attainable
in a country painfully aware of the further calamities a civil war would
bring.

The writer is director of the Islamic and Middle Eastern studies programme
at Brandeis University. His book Reaching for Power: The Shia in the Modern
Arab World will be published next month