[A-List] Towards East Asian Community - II

["Sabri Oncu" <soncu@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

THE KOREA HERALD
December 12, 2005, Monday

What might be expected of East Asia Summit?; At inaugural meeting, leaders
are likely to focus on establishing confidence and comfort among themselves

By Yun Gyong-woo
Assistant Professor, Dept. of International Area Studies of Kookmin
University 

Leaders from 16 East Asian countries including a few invited from outside
the region will gather in the Malaysian city of Kuala Lumpur for the
inaugural session of the East Asia Summit on Dec. 14 - the day after the
traditional ASEAN Plus Three meetings. Participants comprise the 10 ASEAN
members, South Korea, China and Japan, as well as Australia, New Zealand and
India. Amid the growing volume of intra-regional trade and the strengthening
linkages within the East Asian region, major players of the region have come
together for the explicit purposes of furthering their integration and
creating momentum for community-building. The East Asian Summit, with a
broader range of nations represented than in the ASEAN Plus Three, would be
the most appropriate stage to discuss an East Asian Community (EAC), in part
to ensure open and transparent cooperation in the future regional bloc on
economic, environmental and antiterrorism efforts, as well as other areas. 

New agendas are unlikely to emerge during the summit meeting, as most have
already been discussed by the involved parties. The meeting is likely to
focus on trade issues, such as reducing tariffs and other trade barriers,
but the talks are expected to cover cooperation issues on other fronts, such
as energy, avian influenza and counter-terrorism. On the surface,
participants will avidly discuss regional commercial links, free trade pacts
and Asia's need to develop a regional economic bloc that can match the EU or
NAFTA. However, just beneath the surface is unfolding what may be called the
biggest "diplomatic game" in the 21st century.

East Asia today is facing complex strategic security challenges. The EAS
would thus provide an appropriate theater to stage the increasing rivalry
between China and the United States in Asia. One of the most significant
features of the EAS is that it was reserved for Asians and a chosen few,
with the United States - the world's largest economy - excluded. The
superpower was deliberately left out in the new regional groupings by China.
Still hurting from the lack of an invitation to the summit, the United
States warns against the formation of an economic bloc centering on China.
Concerns from the United States may further escalate if its relations with
China sour. Japan, wary of China's rapid economic rise and military buildup,
voices similar concerns. Rivalry between Asia's two largest economies,
already rampant and obvious, could heighten over the strategic future of the
United States in the region.

As the United States failed to receive an invitation to the summit, Japan
lobbied vigorously to include Australia and India to act as a counterweight
for keeping China in check. This notable split between Japanese and Chinese
policymakers poses problems in concluding the discussion during the first
EAS Summit. Japan is most likely to try to keep the system loose while
seeking to secure a spot for the United States, one of its most essential
allies.

Recently, India has burst into the spotlight as a potential balancing power
against China. India may certainly play this part as it boasts the
second-largest population in the world and the third largest economy in the
new East Asian grouping. This emerging market is also bent on avoiding
becoming a 'second-class member' of the EAC. At the same time, the ASEAN
countries, concerned with reining in China, also claim a steering role at
the EAS. These countries also have ties with the United States that they
must consider. Out of the eight democracies attending the Summit, five,
including Australia, Japan and the Philippines, are formal treaty allies of
the United States. India and Singapore have significant defense
relationships with the United States, while Australia has firmly stated that
it will refrain from signing anything that disrupts its defense relationship
with the United States. China, meanwhile, has no formal allies within the
EAS. Despite its absence, the influence of the United States in the Asian
region will still be palpable during the summit. More often than not, the
politics of national interests will likely be one of the major obstacles
hampering the success of the EAS in its efforts to broaden regional
cooperation. The rivalry between China and others is not the only factor
that could slow or complicate the process of regional cooperation. Unlike
other more successful blocs, such as the European Union, members of the EAS
fail to share political values. The EU, for instance, has reached an
advanced level of harmony in parliamentary democracy combined with free
markets and advanced social-welfare systems. By contrast, the EAS
participants include democracies, communist-capitalist hybrids, countries
still undergoing the process of democratization, and even those struggling
under military dictatorship.

And then there are the yawning gaps in national income. The richest
countries in the EAS is about 100 times more prosperous than the poorest
ones in terms of purchasing power parity. The ratio in the EU is about 10 to
1. Given that vast inequality, one of the hottest topics is labor mobility.
Territorial disputes also abound and the threat of military conflict hovers
fitfully over parts of the region. The persisting division between Japan and
its neighbors over the Japanese prime minister's frequent visits to honor
"war heroes" is making it more difficult to determine a solid agenda for the
EAS.

Even a three-way meeting between foreign ministers of South Korea, China and
Japan, a feature of the ASEAN Plus Three meetings since 1999, is also
unlikely in Kuala Lumpur. The rifts between Japan and its neighbors are
weighing on efforts to broaden regional co-operation.

Hopefully, the EAS can overcome these political complications and serve as a
stepping stone to a NAFTA-type free-trade area and/or an East Asian
Community modeled on the European community. The EAS is not a replacement
for other regional bodies, such as the APEC, ARF, ASEAN Plus Three and a
host of functional organizations. Nor can we see the summit as an
"ASEAN+3+3" arrangement. Rather, the EAS can complement these arrangements
by providing an avenue for member countries to cooperate on various levels.
The ASEAN members have had almost four decades of institutional experience
in promoting regional reconciliation, but this privilege has not been
extended to the Northeast Asian members of the EAS. The relations among the
Northeast Asian countries have largely been confined to bilateral ties and
the multilateral forum like the Six Party Talks. Countries such as Australia
and India require time to establish confident ties with their counterparts
in Northeast and Southeast Asia. Since the EAS is at a stage where it has
yet to establish precedents to follow, it is required to set down procedural
conventions. The best analogy for the EAS at this time would be to become a
venue for its members to gather for discussions over common concerns.
Especially at the initial stage of summitry, it is much more desirable that
the ESA focus attention and energy on establishing a level of confidence and
comfort among all its members.

It would be impossible to tackle all of these tasks in the first meeting.
The inaugural is an opportunity for East Asian leaders to advocate and
encourage progress on various issues so they are more efficiently pursued
within existing frameworks. When this process has been completed, EAS
members can move on to build on functional cooperation in various fields.
Then, they can adopt a thematic and problem-oriented approach to regional
challenges by participating in extensive functional or technical cooperation
on various issues. Confidence-building is a time-consuming objective for the
EAS that can be achieved depending on what different layers of functional
cooperation can be added at various stages.

In a nutshell, the first EAS Summit should be a confidence and
comfort-building exercise. It may be too early to conclude whether the EAS
would be a central feature of all extant forms of East Asian regionalism, a
future venue for substantive cooperation, or something else. The success of
the first EAS might depend on the meeting itself. The outcome of the summit
would hinge mostly on the attitude of the members.