Re: [A-List] How to Avoid Oil Wars, Terrorism, and Economic Collapse

[Richard Menec <menecraj@xxxxxxx>]

Dear Bill,

Thank you for your various forwards on peak oil and the coming crisis.  As
socialists and concerned citizens of the world, I think it is incumbent on
us all to not only prepare for, but to take advantage of the inevitable
looming economic, social, and political crises that are bound to result.  To
this end I would like to propose the following:
    - that everyone on this list, if possible, initiate an Oil Peak
Emergency Citizens Action Committee (OPEC Action Committee) in their city,
region, or neighbourhood.
    - that the purpose of these Committees, since mainstream media outlets
and governments
are failing pathetically at this, be to:
    1. educate and inform the citizenry as to the inevitability of peak oil;
    2. to try and alleviate the madness that will surely result (start
learning to walk and ride your bicycles, people!) by *planning* for it;
    3. plan for human-powered transportation, by urging local governments to
begin setting aside entire lanes of our extensive road networks for
bicycles, etc.;
    4. lobby for changing city bylaws to again allow for the raising of
livestock, poultry, etc., within city limits;
    5. lobbying city and provincial or state governments to turn all usable,
arable land into community gardens;
    6. changing building codes to ensure that all existing housing is
retro-fitted to take advantage of at least passive
solar energy and that this be made mandatory on any new housing (ridge
lines, for instance, running east-west to allow for solar panels);
    7. building electric light-rail transit in areas that are overflowing
with hydroelectric power (like my own province of Manitoba);
    8. phasing out gas furnaces and replacing them with electric baseboard
heaters, with individual thermostats in every
room, to conserve on electricity;
    9. share resources and ideas with other OPEC Committees; etc., etc.
    10. creation of government or citizen-run nurseries to grow large
quantities of fruit trees and to develop new hybrids for different climates,
and replacing pesticide-laden grass with mini-orchards in every backyard;
etc., etc.

all the good things,
Richard Menec, Winnipeg


----- Original Message -----
From: "Bill Totten" <shimogamo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "A-List" <a-list@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Monday, August 01, 2005 4:05 PM
Subject: [A-List] How to Avoid Oil Wars, Terrorism, and Economic Collapse


> by Richard Heinberg
>
> Museletter No 160 (August 2005)
>
>
> By now most well-informed people are aware that global oil production may
soon
> reach its all-time peak, and that the consequences will likely be severe.
>
> Already many important oil-producing nations (such as the United States,
> Indonesia, and Iran) and some whole regions (such as the North Sea) are
past
> their production maximums. With nearly every passing year another country
> reaches a production plateau or begins its terminal decline.
>
> Meanwhile global rates of oil discovery have been falling since the early
1960s,
> as has been confirmed by ExxonMobil. All of the 100 or so supergiant
fields that
> are collectively responsible for about half of current world production
were
> discovered in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. No fields of comparable
size
> have been found since then; instead, exploration during recent years has
turned
> up only much smaller fields that deplete relatively quickly. The result is
that
> today only one new barrel of oil is being discovered for every four that
are
> extracted and used.
>
> World leaders are hampered in their ability to assess the situation by a
lack of
> consistent data. Proven petroleum reserve figures look reassuring: the
world has
> roughly a trillion barrels yet to produce, perhaps more; indeed, official
> reserves figures have never been higher. However, circumstantial evidence
> suggests that some of the largest producing nations have inflated their
reserves
> figures for political reasons. Meanwhile oil companies routinely (and
> legitimately) report reserve growth for fields discovered decades ago. In
> addition, reserves figures are often muddied by the inclusion of
> non-conventional petroleum resources, such oil sands - which do need to be
taken
> into account, but in a separate category, as their rates of extraction are
> limited by factors different from those that constrain the production of
> conventional crude. As a consequence of all of these practices, oil
reserves
> data tend to give an impression of expansion and plenty, while discovery
and
> depletion data do the opposite.
>
> This apparent conflict in the data invites dispute among experts as to
when the
> global oil peak is likely to occur. Some analysts say that the world is
> virtually at its peak of production now; others contend that the event can
be
> delayed for two decades or more through enhanced investment in
exploration, the
> adoption of new extraction technologies, and the substitution of
> non-conventional petroleum sources (oil sands, natural gas condensates,
and
> heavy oil) for conventional crude.
>
> However, there is little or no disagreement that a series of production
peaks is
> now within sight - first, for conventional non-OPEC oil; then for
conventional
> oil globally; and finally for all global conventional and non-conventional
> petroleum sources combined.
>
> Moreover, even though there may be dispute as to the timing of these
events, it
> is becoming widely acknowledged that the world peak in all combined
petroleum
> sources will have significant global economic consequences. Mitigation
efforts
> will require many years of work and trillions of dollars in investment.
Even if
> optimistic forecasts of the timing of the global production peak turn out
to be
> accurate, the world is facing an historic change that is unprecedented in
scope
> and depth of impact.
>
> Due to systemic dependence on oil for transportation, agriculture, and the
> production of plastics and chemicals, every sector of every society will
be
> affected. Efforts will be needed to create alternative sources of energy,
to
> reduce demand for oil through heightened energy efficiency, and to
redesign
> entire systems (including cities) to operate with less petroleum.
>
> These efforts will be challenging enough in the context of a stable
economic
> environment. However, if prices for oil become extremely volatile,
mitigation
> programs could be undermined. While high but stable prices would encourage
> conservation and investment in alternatives, prices that repeatedly
skyrocket
> and then plummet could devastate entire economies and discourage long-term
> investment. Actual shortages of oil - of which price shocks would be only
a
> symptom - would be even more devastating. The worst impacts would be
suffered by
> those nations, and those aspects of national economies, that could not
obtain
> oil at any price affordable to them. Supply interruptions would likely
occur
> with greater frequency and for increasing lengths of time as global oil
> production gradually waned.
>
> Efforts to plan a long-term energy transition would be frustrated, in both
> importing and exporting countries. Meanwhile the perception among
importers that
> exporting nations were profiteering would foment animosities and an
escalating
> likelihood of international conflict.
>
> In short, the global peak in oil production is likely to lead to economic
chaos
> and extreme geopolitical tensions, raising the spectres of war,
revolution,
> terrorism, and even famine, unless nations adopt some method of
cooperatively
> reducing their reliance on oil.
>
>
> A Plan for Global Powerdown
>
> The Oil Depletion Protocol provides a way forward (the text appears at the
end
> of this article). It was drafted by the Association for the Study of Peak
Oil;
> however, the source of the document is of little importance - only its
substance
> is of interest. While it is merely a suggested outline and will require
fleshing
> out and detailed negotiation, the Protocol is inherently simple. As will
be
> clear from the Discussion below, it would be unnecessary for all nations
to
> ratify the Protocol in order for it to have a beneficial effect; if even
one
> nation adopts it, that nation will be benefited. However, if a substantial
> number of nations sign on this will create a platform for international
economic
> stability and cooperation.
>
> The Protocol will be presented at several important international
conferences
> attended by world leaders in late 2005. Efforts will also be made to
publicize
> and communicate it to the general public. It is hoped that a few
courageous
> politicians in each country will understand its importance and bring it
before
> their governing bodies for consideration and adoption.
>
>
> How Would It Work?
>
> The idea of the Protocol is inherently straightforward: oil importing
nations
> would agree to reduce their imports by an agreed-upon yearly percentage
(the
> World Oil Depletion Rate), while exporting countries would agree to reduce
their
> rate of exports by their national Depletion Rate.
>
> The concept of the Depletion Rate is perhaps the most challenging
technical
> aspect of the Protocol, yet even it is easy to grasp given a little
thought.
> Clearly, each country has a finite endowment of oil from nature; thus,
when the
> first barrel has been extracted, there is accordingly one less left for
the
> future. What is left for the future consists of two elements: first, how
much
> remains in known oilfields, termed Remaining Reserves; and second, how
much
> remains to be found in the future (termed Yet-to-Find). How much is
Yet-to-Find
> may be reasonably estimated by extrapolating the discovery trend of the
past.
> The Depletion Rate equals the total yet-to-produce divided by the yearly
amount
> currently being extracted.
>
>
> Let us explore a few examples:
>
> Norway is a country that reports exceptionally accurate reserve estimates.
The
> total produced to-date is 18.5 billion barrels (Gb), and 11.3 Gb remain in
known
> fields, with about 2 left to find, giving a rounded total of 32 Gb. It
follows
> that 13.5 Gb are left to produce. In 2004, 1.07 Gb were extracted, giving
a
> Depletion Rate of 7.4 percent (1.07/13.5). This is a comparatively high
rate,
> typical of an offshore environment.
>
> In the case of the US (considering only the lower 48 states and excluding
> deepwater), the corresponding numbers are: produced to-date, 173 Gb;
Remaining
> Reserves, 24 Gb; Yet-to-Find, 2 Gb - meaning that there are 27 Gb left.
Annual
> production in 2004 was 1.3 Gb, giving a Depletion Rate of 4.6 percent
(1.3/27).
>
> For the world as a whole, 944 Gb have been produced; 772 remain in known
fields;
> and an estimated 134 Gb is Yet-to-Find, meaning that 906 Gb are left.
Production
> of conventional oil in 2004 was 24 Gb, so the Depletion Rate is 2.59
percent
> (24/906).
>
> These estimates exclude non-conventional oil - oil shales, bitumen (oil
sands),
> extra-heavy oil, heavy oil, deepwater oil, polar oil, and liquids from
gasfield
> plants. Most oil produced to date has been of the conventional variety,
which
> will dominate all supply far into the future, so it makes sense to
concentrate
> on this category.
>
> It must be stressed that current Reserves estimates in the public domain
are
> grossly unreliable, and one of the purposes of the Protocol is to secure
better
> information. The assessed Depletion Rate for each country, and eventually
for
> the World as whole, is subject to revision when better information becomes
> available, but the resulting correction of the Depletion Rate will not be
large,
> probably causing it to vary by less than one percent.
>
> The Depletion Protocol would require importers to reduce their imports by
the
> World Depletion Rate (that is, 2.5 percent) each year in order to put
demand
> into balance with world supply. As stated earlier, exporters would reduce
their
> production according to their national Depletion Rate. Thus Norway would
reduce
> its production by 7.4 percent each year (that country's production is
already
> declining at an even higher rate).
>
> The imposition on the producing countries represents no great burden,
since few
> can now increase their rate of production in any case, and many are
experiencing
> declining production for purely geological reasons, as is the case with
Norway
> and the US. Agreeing to produce less oil would not inhibit exploration
because
> new finds would lower the national Depletion Rate, and thus permit a
higher rate
> of export than would otherwise be the case. The main thrust of the
Protocol
> would be to require importers to cut imports, but the inclusion of
producers in
> the provisions would stimulate greater cooperation between the two
factions. Any
> indigenous production in a country that was a net importer would not be
likely
> to provide that country with an unfair advantage, as production within
most
> importing countries is already declining at a rate higher than the World
> Depletion Rate.
>
> How importers dealt internally with the import restriction would be up to
them
> (though strategies both to obtain supplies of alternative fuels and to
reduce
> demand for oil would doubtless be required). Some might wish to introduce
an
> energy allowance as a form of tradable ration (as will be discussed in
more
> detail below).
>
>
> Discussion of the Protocol
>
> Questions and Possible Objections
>
> The Protocol may at first look like merely a good idea with no real chance
of
> implementation. However, closer inspection suggests that its
implementation will
> benefit nearly all important global stakeholders and that objections
likely to
> be raised to it are easily countered.
>
>
> What if forecasts of a near-term peak in global oil production are wrong?
Won't
> there be a cost to preparing for the oil peak too early?  In practical
terms,
> won't this mean voluntarily choking off economic growth?
>
> Because so much is at stake, it is important that these vital questions be
> addressed not just by partisan participants in the debate over the timing
of the
> oil-production peak (the so-called "oil optimists" and the "oil
pessimists");
> some independent assessment is required of the costs of preparing too soon
> versus the costs of preparing too late.
>
> Fortunately, such an assessment has already been undertaken - "Peaking of
World
> Oil Production: Impacts, Mitigation, & Risk Management", a Report prepared
by
> Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) for the US
Department of
> Energy, released in February 2005, and authored principally by Robert L
Hirsch
> (hereinafter referred to as "the SAIC Report").
>
> The SAIC Report concludes that substantial mitigation of the economic,
social,
> and political impacts of Peak Oil can come only from efforts both to
increase
> energy supplies from alternative sources and to reduce demand for oil.
With
> regard to the claim that efficiency measures will be enough to forestall
dire
> impacts, Hirsch and coauthors note that, "While greater end-use efficiency
is
> essential, increased efficiency alone will be neither sufficient nor
timely
> enough to solve the problem. Production of large amounts of substitute
liquid
> fuels will be required." Further, "Mitigation will require a minimum of a
decade
> of intense, expensive effort, because the scale of liquid fuels mitigation
is
> inherently extremely large". Hirsch and coauthors also point out that "The
> problems associated with world oil production peaking will not be
temporary, and
> past 'energy crisis' experience will provide relatively little guidance".
>
> The SAIC Report agrees that mitigation efforts undertaken too soon would
exact a
> cost on society. However, it concludes that, "If peaking is imminent,
failure to
> initiate timely mitigation could be extremely damaging. Prudent risk
management
> requires the planning and implementation of mitigation well before
peaking.
> Early mitigation will almost certainly be less expensive than delayed
mitigation."
>
>
> What if the pessimists are right and the world is at its peak of oil
production
> now?  In that case, is it too late to implement the Depletion Protocol?
>
> If the world reaches the peak of production within the next two years
there will
> be too little time to undertake major mitigation efforts prior to the
event, and
> therefore there are likely to be severe economic, social, and political
impacts,
> as outlined in the SAIC Report.
>
> However, in that case the need for the Protocol should quickly and widely
become
> apparent. While all nations will suffer from higher prices and shortages,
only a
> cooperative system of national and international quotas will avert the
even more
> extreme economic and geopolitical crises that would otherwise ensue.
>
>
> Why can't the market take care of the problem?  Won't high prices
stimulate more
> exploration and the development of alternatives?  Wouldn't interference
with
> market mechanisms be harmful?
>
> The SAIC Report's authors dismiss the claim that the market will solve any
> shortage problems arising from global oil production peak, with higher oil
> prices stimulating investments in alternative energy sources, more
efficient
> cars, and so on. Price signals warn only of immediate scarcity. However,
the
> mitigation efforts needed in order to prepare for the global oil
production peak
> and thus to head off shortages and price spikes must be undertaken many
years in
> advance of the event. Hirsch and coauthors maintain that, "Intervention by
> governments will be required, because the economic and social implications
of
> oil peaking would otherwise be chaotic. The experiences of the 1970s and
1980s
> offer important guides as to government actions that are desirable and
those
> that are undesirable, but the process will not be easy."
>
> Historically, oil production has often been managed by governments or by
cartels.
> In petroleum's early days, free-market boom-and-bust cycles bankrupted
many
> players (including the "father" of the oil industry, Edwin Drake). Soon
John D
> Rockefeller brought a certain order to the situation through the creation
of the
> Standard Oil Trust (in doing so he squeezed out many competitors and
personally
> profited to an extraordinary degree). This regime came to an end in 1911,
when
> the US Government broke up Standard Oil after prosecution for violation of
> anti-trust laws. Starting in the 1930s, with the US in position to control
> global oil prices, the Texas Railroad Commission capped production levels
in
> order to stabilize the market. After US oil production peaked in 1971 and
that
> nation lost its ability to control global prices, petroleum's center of
gravity
> shifted to the Middle East, and OPEC began mandating production quotas for
its
> members in order to keep prices within a desirable band.
>
> While the management of oil prices globally thus has precedents, the
situation
> in the future will be fundamentally different than heretofore, in that
> previously the problem was too much oil and collapsing prices that offered
> little incentive for exploration. The situation the world will soon face
is that
> of insufficient supply leading to extreme price shocks, price volatility,
and
> acute shortages. Thus a new kind of management scheme will be required.
>
>
> How will adoption of the Protocol affect importers and exporters
differently?
>
> Importers: No one doubts that industrial nations will find it difficult to
> sustain economic growth while using less oil on a yearly basis. Thus the
> voluntary adoption of the Protocol by importers would seem
disadvantageous - a
> "tough sell".
>
> However, it must be recognized that a decline in the availability of oil
is
> inevitable in any case; only the timing of the onset of decline is
uncertain.
> Without a structured agreement in place to limit imports, nations will be
> inclined to put off preparations for the energy transition until prices
soar, at
> which time such a transition will become far more difficult because of the
> ensuing chaotic economic conditions. With the Protocol in place, importers
will
> be able to count on stable prices and can then more easily undertake the
> difficult but necessary process of planning for a future with less oil.
>
> Poor importing countries may object that by using less petroleum they will
have
> to forego conventional economic development. However, further development
that
> is based on the use of petroleum will merely create structural dependency
on a
> depleting resource. Without the Protocol, these nations will be
financially bled
> by high and volatile prices. With the Protocol in place and with prices
> stabilized, these nations will be able to afford to import the oil they
> absolutely need; meanwhile they will have every incentive to develop their
> economies in a way that is not petroleum-dependent.
>
> Exporters: Economies that are based primarily on income from the
extraction and
> export of natural resources often tend to give rise to governments that
are more
> responsive to the interests of powerful foreign resource buyers than they
are to
> the needs of their own citizens. Thus it is in the interest of
> resource-exporting countries to develop indigenous industries in order to
> diversify their economies.
>
> Countries that depend primarily on income from oil exports will need to
wean
> themselves from this dependence eventually in any case, as their oilfields
are
> depleted; the Protocol provides them a means of making the transition in a
way
> that will allow for long-term planning.
>
> Without the Protocol, smaller exporting nations will likely be at the
mercy of
> militarily powerful importers. The Protocol will provide a means of
minimizing
> external political interference in these nations' affairs. As a result,
much
> international tension and conflict, including the threat of terrorism, can
be
> minimized - which will be a help also to the wealthy importers.
>
>
> How will the oil companies be affected?
>
> Without the Protocol, the oil companies may enjoy record revenues - for a
time.
> But they will be demonized for profiting from the misery of the rest of
society;
> meanwhile, they will be hampered in their operations by the
destabilization of
> national economies resulting from wildly gyrating oil prices. As noted
earlier,
> the Standard Oil Trust, the Texas Railroad Commission, and OPEC all
provided
> production-rationing mechanisms that brought order out of what would
otherwise
> have been chaotic situations. The oil companies (sometimes reluctantly)
accepted
> these mechanisms, recognizing that a stable economic environment was more
> important to them in the long run than the opportunity to make momentary
> windfall profits.
>
> With the Protocol, the oil companies will remain profitable, they will
have the
> incentive to undertake further exploration, and they will be able to plan
for
> decades ahead. They will also be motivated to become more generalized
energy
> companies (rather than remaining merely oil companies) and thus to invest
in the
> development of alternative energy sources.
>
> There is already evidence that the oil companies are concerned about a
public
> backlash as gasoline prices soar: ChevronTexaco has initiated an expensive
> public-relations campaign titled "Will You Join Us?", featuring a web site
> (www.willyoujoinus.com) and expensive newspaper ads informing readers that
"the
> era of easy oil is over" and asking for public discussion on the issue.
The Oil
> Depletion Protocol will provide more long-term security for the petroleum
> industry than any PR campaign ever could, and at no cost.
>
>
> Won't both importers and exporters be tempted to cheat?  How would the
Protocol
> be enforced?
>
> The Protocol will require a system for monitoring production, exports, and
> imports - which cannot be hidden to a large degree in any case.
Enforcement will
> require the establishment of a Secretariat for adjudication of disputes
and
> claims, and a system of economic penalties to be negotiated by the
agreeing
> nations.
>
>
> How can nations adjust internally to having less oil?
>
> Withdrawal from oil dependency will be an immense challenge that will
require
> cooperation and compromise on everyone's part. Efforts will be needed both
to
> create supplies of alternative fuels and to reduce the demand for oil.
>
> The latter task will be much easier if systems are designed to make it in
> individuals' interest not only to reduce their own oil dependency but also
to
> persuade others to reduce theirs. One such system for creating collective
> motivation and cooperation consists of Domestic Tradable Quotas, or DTQs.
>
> DTQs can be used to ration all hydrocarbon energy sources (in order to
reduce
> greenhouse gas emissions) or specific fuels such as oil. For the sake of
> discussion, let us assume the use of DTQs for petroleum only, as a way of
> implementing the Depletion Protocol within nations.
>
> First, a national Petroleum Budget would be drawn up, based on the
nation's
> indigenous production and oil imports as mandated by the Oil Depletion
Protocol.
> A segment of the Petroleum Budget would then be issued as an unconditional
> entitlement to all adults and divided equally among them; the remainder
would be
> auctioned to industry, commercial users, and government. The units could
then be
> bought and sold, so that users unable to cope with their ration could
increase
> it, while others who kept their fuel consumption low could sell and trade
their
> Petro-units on the national market. All transactions would be carried out
> electronically, using technologies and systems already in place for direct
debit
> systems and credit cards.
>
> When consumers (citizens, businesses, or the government) made purchases of
fuel,
> they would surrender their quota to the energy retailer, accessing their
quota
> account by (for instance) using their Petro-card or direct debit. The
retailer
> would then surrender the carbon units when buying energy from the
wholesaler.
> Finally, the primary energy provider would surrender units back to the
National
> Register when the company pumped or imported the oil. This closes the
loop.
>
> All purchases of petroleum would be made with Petro-units, whether the oil
were
> used as fuel or as feedstock for plastics or chemicals. So long as the
petroleum
> remained fuel, Petro-units would have to be passed back up the line,
starting
> with the end user. However, if the petroleum were incorporated as
feedstock into
> the manufacturing of a product (such as plastics), the manufacturer would
simply
> add the cost of the Petro-units into the cost of the product. Thus, in the
case
> of feedstocks, the manufacturer of goods would be the presumed end user.
>
> Purchasers not having any Petro-units to offer at point of sale - foreign
> visitors, people who had forgotten their card or cashed-in all their quota
as
> soon as they received it - would buy a quota at point of purchase, then
> immediately surrender it in exchange for fuel, but would pay a cost
penalty for
> this (that is, the bid-and-offer spread quoted by the market).
>
> DTQs place everyone in the same boat: households, industry, and government
would
> have to work together, facing the same Petroleum Budget, and trading on
the same
> market for Petro-units. Everyone would have a stake in the system. All
would
> have the sense that their own efforts at conservation were not being
wasted by
> the energy profligacy of others, and that the system was fair.
>
> Moreover, DTQs are guaranteed to be effective, because the only fuel that
could
> be purchased would be fuel within the Budget. The Budget would set a long
> time-horizon so that people would have the motivation and information they
> needed to take action in the present to achieve drastic reductions in oil
use
> over a twenty-year timeframe.
>
>
> What if only a few nations sign on?  Won't the Protocol be ineffectual if
a few
> large exporters or importers refuse to do so?
>
> At first it might seem that those nations not adopting the Protocol would
> achieve an advantage. However, any temporary benefit would be purchased at
the
> expense of later economic calamity. As discussed in the SAIC Report,
nations
> that embark on the energy transition sooner will be much better off than
those
> procrastinating.
>
>
> What about natural gas and coal - should there be similar protocols for
these?
> Might countries simply burn more coal to make up for having less oil?
>
> The Oil Depletion Protocol will not preclude other agreements aimed at
reducing
> fossil fuel usage in order to avoid impacts to the global climate, but it
will
> be more ambitious in its reduction trajectory than the Kyoto Protocol or
the
> Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate. If nations'
> experience with the Oil Depletion Protocol is positive, this will provide
> motivation for the forging of similar agreements covering these other
fossil
> fuels.
>
>
> How can the process of adopting the Oil Depletion Protocol begin?
>
> A program to win implementation of the Protocol must focus on educating
both the
> general public and top-level decision-makers.
>
> Adoption of the Protocol will require that a few policy makers champion it
and
> bring it before their national parliament or congress. If even one country
> adopts the Protocol, this will help to open a global discussion.
>
> At the same time, it is important that citizens understand the issues and
what
> is at stake, as pressure on elected officials from below will help focus
the
> latter's attention on the matter.
>
> In the near future, a program will be underway to obtain endorsements of
the
> Protocol from prominent organizations and individuals. This article is
part of a
> preliminary effort to inform the public of both the Peak Oil issue and the
Oil
> Depletion Protocol. Please help by copying this article and sending it to
family,
> friends, colleagues, the media, and elected officials. This may be our
last,
> best opportunity to avert resource wars, terrorism, and economic collapse
as we
> enter the second half of the Age of Oil.
>
>
> THE OIL DEPLETION PROTOCOL
>
> WHEREAS the passage of history has recorded an increasing pace of change,
such
> that the demand for energy has grown rapidly in parallel with the world
> population over the past two hundred years since the Industrial
Revolution;
>
> WHEREAS the energy supply required by the population has come mainly from
coal
> and petroleum, having been formed but rarely in the geological past, such
> resources being inevitably subject to depletion;
>
> WHEREAS oil provides ninety percent of transport fuel, essential to trade,
and
> plays a critical role in agriculture, needed to feed the expanding
population;
>
> WHEREAS oil is unevenly distributed on the Planet for well-understood
geological
> reasons, with much being concentrated in five countries, bordering the
Persian
> Gulf;
>
> WHEREAS all the major productive provinces of the World have been
identified
> with the help of advanced technology and growing geological knowledge, it
being
> now evident that discovery reached a peak in the 1960s, despite
technological
> progress, and a diligent search;
>
> WHEREAS the past peak of discovery inevitably leads to a corresponding
peak in
> production during the first decade of the 21st Century, assuming no
radical
> decline in demand;
>
> WHEREAS the onset of the decline of this critical resource affects all
aspects
> of modern life, such having grave political and geopolitical implications;
>
> WHEREAS it is expedient to plan an orderly transition to the new World
> environment of reduced energy supply, making early provisions to avoid the
waste
> of energy, stimulate the entry of substitute energies, and extend the life

of
> the remaining oil;
>
> WHEREAS it is desirable to meet the challenges so arising in a
co-operative and
> equitable manner, such to address related climate change concerns,
economic and
> financial stability and the threats of conflicts for access to critical
> resources.
>
>
> NOW IT IS PROPOSED THAT
>
> 1. A convention of nations shall be called to consider the issue with a
view to
> agreeing an Accord with the following objectives:
>
> a. to avoid profiteering from shortage, such that oil prices may remain in
> reasonable relationship with production cost;
>
> b. to allow poor countries to afford their imports;
>
> c. to avoid destabilising financial flows arising from excessive oil
prices;
>
> d. to encourage consumers to avoid waste;
>
> e. to stimulate the development of alternative energies.
>
>
> 2. Such an Accord shall have the following outline provisions:
>
> a. No country shall produce oil at above its current Depletion Rate, such
being
> defined as annual production as a percentage of the estimated amount left
to
> produce;
>
> b. Each importing country shall reduce its imports to match the current
World
> Depletion Rate, deducting any indigenous production.
>
>
> 3. Detailed provisions shall cover the definition of the several
categories of
> oil, exemptions and qualifications, and the scientific procedures for the
> estimation of Depletion Rate.
>
> 4. The signatory countries shall cooperate in providing information on
their
> reserves, allowing full technical audit, such that the Depletion Rate may
be
> accurately determined.
>
> 5. The signatory countries shall have the right to appeal their assessed
> Depletion Rate in the event of changed circumstances.
>
>
> (Note: the Oil Depletion Protocol has elsewhere been published as "The
Rimini
> Protocol" and "The Uppsala Protocol". All of these documents are
essentially
> identical.)
>
>
> Sources of further information
>
> On Oil Depletion:
> www.globalpublicmedia.com
> www.energybulletin.net
> www.peakoil.net
> www.odac-info.org
>
> On Domestic Tradable Quotas (DTQs):
> www.dtqs.org
>
> On the SAIC Report:
> www.cge.uevora.pt/aspo2005/ abscom/Abstract_Lisbon_Hirsch.pdf
> www.hilltoplancers.org/stories/hirsch0502.pdf
>
> Richard Heinberg is the author of Powerdown - Options and Actions for a
> Post-Carbon World (New Society Publishers 2004). He is a journalist,
educator,
> editor, and lecturer, and a Core Faculty member of New College of
California,
> where he teaches courses on "Energy and Society" and "Culture, Ecology and
> Sustainable Community".
>
> If you wish to republish any of these essays or post them on a web site,
please
> contact rheinberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx for permission.
>
> http://www.museletter.com/archive/160.html
>
> Bill Totten     http://billtotten.blogspot.com/
>
>
>