[A-List] Dispelling myths about Iraqi resistance - Boston Globe December 15 2004

[Ralph Johansen <michele@xxxxxxxx>]

Boston Globe	 December 15, 2004

Why elections won't quell Iraq resistance

By Molly Bingham

The composition of the Iraqi resistance is not what the US administration
has been calling it, and the more it is oversimplified the harder it is to
explain its complexity.

I spent from August 2003 until June this year in Baghdad researching the
resistance. That's obviously not a comprehensive study, but it does provide
a more complete picture of the resistance than the administration's. My
objective is not to romanticize the fighters or their fight, but merely to
better understand what our realistic choices are in Iraq and the Middle
East.

Here are some myths about the Iraqi resistance that need to be dispelled.

+ The resistance only began after months of America "botching" the
occupation.

While three of the fighters I spoke to had waited several months to "join"
the resistance, the bulk of those involved decided within days of the end of
the "ground war" on April 9 that they would fight. Only three had done
voluntary military service, and only one of them was still on active
military duty.

Of the five fighters I spent the most time with, all of them had begun
organizing resistance cells within a week of April 9. They started small
with friends. One man, a teacher, had neither been a member of the Ba'ath
party nor an admirer of Saddam. He started as a guide for foreign fighters
and later looked for a group of like-minded men he could work with. With no
military experience, he soon became a weapons procurer for an ever widening
group of cells.

+ The resistance in Iraq is made up of Ba'athi dead enders, regime
loyalists, common criminals, Islamic extremists, and driven by a vast number
of foreigners with contacts to Al Qaeda.

While there are certainly those elements involved, it is misleading to
describe the resistance in those terms. I met no one who had recently been
released from prison or who knew of any connections with Al Qaeda, and I
only met one foreign fighter. (I would not, however, be surprised if Al
Qaeda or other militant Islamic movements have become active in Iraq since I
left.) I met Shia and Sunnis fighting together, women and men, young and
old. I met people from all economic, social, and educational backgrounds.

The original impetus for almost all of the individuals I spoke to was a
nationalistic one -- the desire to defend their country from occupation, not
to defend Saddam Hussein or his regime.

However, two things should be noted. First, after the capture of Saddam a
year ago, I sensed the growing power of Islam within the fighters. Second,
in the absence of a solid government or civil structure it is not surprising
that a Muslim community would revert to Koranic law, even if only temporary.


+ The Iraqi resistance is a monolithic, tightly organized structure with a
leadership that can be obliterated and a fixed number of fighters who can be
eliminated.

The many levels of violence in Iraq after the US attack on Fallujah last
month reveal the absurdity of this myth. Of the 15 resistance members who
told me about their lives, most were from the same small neighborhood of
Adhamiya in Baghdad, but were not necessarily in the same cell or command
structure. By the end of 2003, these cells had grown while maintaining their
independence. They were no longer carrying out attacks in their own home
turf but were traveling to other areas of the country. The rise in attacks
over the past year has been attributed as reactions to the transfer of power
to the Allawi government in July 2004, or to the elections in January.
However, more likely, it is simply an indication of improved funding,
coordination, and resources.

Attacking Fallujah neither decapitated the resistance nor eliminated its
support. Rather it is a powerful recruiting poster for Iraqis not yet
engaged in the struggle and for foreigners motivated to join what they view
as a Jihad.

+ Nationwide elections will provide Iraq with a legitimate government, and
the violence in the country will subside significantly.

The notion that after elections the resistance will have nothing left to
fight against is untenable. There is no government that can emerge from the
current process that will be viewed as legitimate in their eyes. The
resistance will continue until American influence has disappeared from
Iraq's political system.

The political dead end described above is the fate the resistance has
chosen. They view themselves, and are viewed by others, as Iraqis and
Muslims, declaring their fight to be for their homes, their nation, their
honor, and their faith against the imposition of a political structure by a
foreign nation. Their struggle against us is not much more complicated than
that, and it seems to me that the violence will remain until we are gone.

Molly Bingham, a photographer and writer, is a Nieman Fellow at Harvard
University.


http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2004/12/15/
why_elections_wont_quell_iraq_resistance?mode=PF