RE: [A-List] Total casualties well above 9% - over 25, 000 - Editor and Publisher Nov 25, 2004

["Craven, Jim" <JCraven@xxxxxxxxx>]

Stan Goff wrote:

This is the crux of it.

Aside from geostrategy, one of the main goals of this invasion was to
'shock and awe' the world with a demonstration of US military
invincibility.  Instead, the rest of the world is now alert to the fact
that the mighty one bleeds.  In a system where the basis of power is a
monetary game of chicken and a military bluff, having the military bluff
called is more than a little significant.  Abazaid has been engaging in
loose talk about nuclear strikes... either an attempt to escalate the
bluff, or an expression of exasperation.

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Response Jim C: This is dead on and the real motives behind "Shock and
Awe" can be found in the 1992 document "Defense Policy Guidance" and
"Rebuilding America's Defenses
http://newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf which are
almost carbon copies of the infamous "Hossbach Memorandum" of
September,1939 which detailed the German nazi doctrines of "Lebensraum",
self-asserted immunity from any kind of international law, geostrategies
for a "unipolar world" and the concept of Blitzkrieg (Shock and Awe) not
only as an instrument for tactical military purposes to overwhelm
enemies and reduce potential casualties, but, more importantly, as an
instrument for deterring and any potential adversaries (military,
political, economic or ideological) or coalitions attempting to limit
U.S. superpower "unipolar" hegemony in the future. 

Main Points in 1992 "Defense Policy Guidance":

* The number one objective of U.S. post-Cold War political and military
strategy should be preventing the emergence of a rival superpower.

"Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This
is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy
and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from
dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control,
be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western
Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and
Southwest Asia.

"There are three additional aspects to this objective: First the U.S
must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order
that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they
need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to
protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we
must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial
nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to
overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must
maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even
aspiring to a larger regional or global role."

* Another major U.S. objective should be to safeguard U.S. interests and
promote American values.

According to the draft document, the U.S. should aim "to address sources
of regional conflict and instability in such a way as to promote
increasing respect for international law, limit international violence,
and encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open
economic systems."

The draft outlines several scenarios in which U.S. interests could be
threatened by regional conflict: "access to vital raw materials,
primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missiles, threats to U.S. citizens from terrorism or
regional or local conflict, and threats to U.S. society from narcotics
trafficking."

The draft relies on seven scenarios in potential trouble spots to make
its argument -- with the primary case studies being Iraq and North
Korea.

 
* If necessary, the United States must be prepared to take unilateral
action. 

There is no mention in the draft document of taking collective action
through the United Nations.

The document states that coalitions "hold considerable promise for
promoting collective action," but it also states the U.S. "should expect
future coalitions to be ad hoc assemblies" formed to deal with a
particular crisis and which may not outlive the resolution of the
crisis.

The document states that what is most important is "the sense that the
world order is ultimately backed by the U.S." and that "the United
States should be postured to act independently when collective action
cannot be orchestrated" or in a crisis that calls for quick response.

Jim Craven