[A-List] The Changing Geopolitical Role of East Asia

[Bill Totten <shimogamo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

by Immanuel Wallerstein

Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University

Commentary Number 143 (August 15 2004)

East Asia is the locus of three countries - China, Korea, and Japan -
which have long and related civilizational heritages. Up to the
nineteenth century, to the extent that these countries were aware of the
existence of the European world, it was a distant, not very interesting,
and not very important part of the world. In the nineteenth century,
this distant world, organized in the form of a capitalist world-economy,
intruded suddenly into East Asia, and forcibly incorporated the region
into the economic and political networks of this capitalist world-
economy. From the point of view of the dominant strata and countries
of that world-system, East Asia was considered merely one more area
to be constructed as a zone producing peripheral products in the axial
division of labor of the world-economy.

Needless to say, East Asians were not happy with this subordinated role
in this world-system into which they had been incorporated. Japan began
early to try to reverse this situation with the Meiji Restoration.
It sought to learn the skills and create the internal institutions
necessary to allow it to transform its role in the worldwide division of
labor in which it now found itself. China began its effort at reversal a
little later with first the Revolution of 1911 and later the Long March
of the Chinese Communist Party. Korea's attempt at reversal was delayed
by the Japanese colonization of Korea, and started only after 1945.

As of the end of the Second World War, all three countries were still
playing a secondary role in the modern world-system. The United States
had now become the hegemonic power of this world-system. It had
overwhelming economic advantage. It was the strongest military power
in the world. Its only serious military and ideological rival was the
Soviet Union. To keep the peace, something advantageous to both powers,
the US and the Soviet Union made a tacit deal, called metaphorically
Yalta. They agreed to divide the world into two segments, and agreed to
keep the boundaries of these two zones intact. They further agreed to go
their separate economic ways (in effect the Soviet Union autonomously
withdrew from the exchanges of the world-economy). And they agreed to
engage in a rhetorical, but rigorously non-violent, struggle called the
Cold War. The function of the rhetoric for each side was less to change
the geopolitical status quo than to preserve it by each thereby keeping
its allies and satellites in line.

The four times the Yalta arrangement was tested - the Berlin Blockade,
the Korean War, the Quemoy-Matsu quarrel, and the Cuba crisis - each
ended in a truce at the line of departure. The Yalta arrangement seemed
to be working well. And then suddenly it got into trouble. Two major
developments undid Yalta and thereby undid US hegemony. The first
was the remarkable economic rise of western Europe and Japan. By the
mid-1960s, the US had lost its economic edge over the productive
enterprises of these two zones. They could not merely compete well with
the US in their home markets, but even in the US market as well as in
the rest of the world. Western Europe and Japan were no longer dependent
economically on the goodwill of the US government. They had become major
economic rivals and therefore might aspire to political autonomy.

The second change was the unwillingness of some major countries in what
had come to be called the Third World, or the South, to accept the
status quo arrangements of Yalta. The first was China in which the
Chinese Communists, defying Stalin, marched on Shanghai and established
their rule. But China was not the only rebel. Cuba, Egypt, Algeria, but
above all Vietnam all challenged the US-dominated world order. In doing
this, they did not have really have the support of the Soviet Union,
which usually limited its role to rhetoric and a little money. But
nonetheless Vietnam, a small country, was able not only to resist the
United States but actually defeat the US in war, an incredible feat that
transformed the world-system.

It was at this point, in the early 1970s, that we can observe the
beginning of the slow but persistent decline in US power, the end of its
true hegemony. The story of the next thirty years, 1970-2000, was the
story of the attempt of the United States to slow down its loss of power
in the world-system. For East Asia, this was a period of enormous
economic growth, first in Japan, then in the so-called four dragons
(South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), and then in mainland
China.

The advent of George W Bush to the White House, and the attack of
September 11 which gave the neo-cons in the Bush administration
the legitimacy to carry out their program of unilateral military
interventionism culminated in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. This
invasion has turned out to be a major fiasco for the US - diplomatically,
politically, economically, and even militarily. The intention of the
neo-cons was to strengthen the US position in the world-system and
restore its hegemony. The result has been exactly the opposite. It has
accelerated Europe's drive for political autonomy. It has quickened the
pace of nuclear proliferation, most notably in North Korea and Iran.
And it has deeply hurt the political and moral credibility of the
United States.

Geopolitically, what we may expect in the next twenty years is the
emergence of both Europe and East Asia on the world scene acting
independently of the United States. But what form will this take in East
Asia? Economic cooperation and coordination between the three countries
is the least of the problems. They are all already strong loci of
capital accumulation and it can be expected that they will become
stronger in the decades to come. Working together, they could probably
become the principal motor of the world-economy. They have everything to
gain by economic integration and very little to lose. They will probably
move in this direction decisively.

The principal difficulties are political. The three countries have
historic grievances with each other which are still very important in
their continuing relationships. Korea still remembers its colonization
by Japan. China still remembers the Japanese occupation of most of the
country in the 1930s and 1940s. And Japanese nationalism is still fueled
by a sense that, over the millennia, they were culturally looked down
upon by China and Korea. The second great political problem is that both
Korea and China are still divided countries, and their reunification
remains a prime and urgent concern. The third great political problem is
the question of the form and extent of military power each will assume,
and in particular the development of nuclear weapons.

If East Asia is to play the economic role that is possible for it, it
must resolve these political problems. Neither China nor Japan will be
able to fulfil its economic potential without the other. And I would add
even China and Japan together cannot do it without Korea. This means
that a major intra-East Asian political negotiation must occur, of the
kind that occurred in western Europe over the last half century. And
this is of course where the uncertainty lies.

Should all three countries be able to put historical grievances behind
them (not really an impossible idea), should Korea and China find the
formulas that will permit political reunification of their countries,
and should the three countries make clear decisions about their military
build-up and perhaps military collaboration, then East Asia will be a
formidable force in world politics in the twenty-first century.

They will then have three major policy decisions to make: (1) how they
relate to the United States; (2) how they relate to the countries in
their near perimeter (specifically, southeast Asia) and in their outer
perimeter (south and southwest Asia); (3) what position they will take
in the North-South struggle in the coming decades. It should be noted
that these are exactly the same issues that are facing Europe in the
coming decades (although the perimeters are different).

For the last fifty years, struggles and debates in the world-system have
been defined and constrained by the United States (and its collusive
pseudo-opponent, the Soviet Union). In the next fifty years, we shall
all find ourselves in a truly multi-polar world. We also shall all
find ourselves in transition from a world-system that is a capitalist
world-economy to some other kind of world-system, as yet undecided and
undefined. East Asia will be a central part of that process, but it will
not be alone.

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These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be
reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the
perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.

Bill Totten     http://www.ashisuto.co.jp/english/