[A-List] Stratfor claims US forces aim to withdraw to permanentbases after June 30

["James Daly" <james.irldaly@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Original:  Marxmail -- Fred Feldman ffeldman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Stratfor claims US forces aim to withdraw to permanent bases after
June 30

A retreat like this, pulling back from Iraq in order to threaten and
control other countries while accepting that Iraq will descend into
"chaos and anarchy" by US standards, seems like wishful thinking on
Stratfor's part.  How effectively the US could challenge Syria, Saudi
Arabia, and Iraq if all the US can do is coexist with a massively
anti-occupation presence in Iraq which, under these circumstances,
might produce an anti-occupation government?  How would the
deployments keep the "dual power" situation which Stratfor sees in the
Baghdad area, for example, from being resolved against the US side.

Strategies of building permanent military bases in countries like the
Philippines, Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia, and so on have always required
a degree of stability of the countries concerned.  Declining stability
forced Washington to give up its openly permanent bases in Saudi
Arabia.


Raw US military power is very great, and already has to affect the
course of countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, but if the US
military has to retreat from most of Iraq, the effectiveness of that
threat will be  somewhat more eroded -- particularly the effectiveness
of the threat to remove other governments from power. If all the US
can offer as an alternative is "chaos and anarchy," they will be far
less attractive to any section of the population than the prospect of
occupation was in Iraq. The proposed retreat, while not ending the
occupation, is unlikely to really end the present war and will
erode -- although far frome eliminating -- the fear inspired by the US
military.

I believe Stratfor's approach is distorted by its interpretation of
the US operations in Iraq as primarily a chapter in an overall war in
Al Qaeda.  From this standpoint, the fight to control the land, the
air and water routes, and the resources of the Middle East are a
tactic derived from the primary need to destroy the terrorist threat
to the United States.  In actual fact, the conflict with Al Qaeda and
similar groups is derived tactically from the need to control the
land, people, and resources of the Middle East and South Asia.

>From this standpoint, the tactical shift reported and obviously
recommended by Stratfor would constitute a partial retreat to a
weakened position and could lead to more difficulties rather than
less. For instance, a large deployment of US forces in Kurdistan could
make antigovernment forces there more aggressive in opposition to
their presence, as well as heightening conflict with the Iraqi Arabs
to the south. I suspect no such retreat can take place very soon,
including after June 30. Fred Feldman







Stratfor

U.S. Forces in Iraq: Disengaging To Engage

May 14, 2004   1404 GMT




Summary

Washington is re-evaluating U.S. deployments in Iraq in an attempt to
match its resources to its goals. The effort will conclude with a
massive in-country redeployment that will divorce U.S. troops from the
day-to-day grind of fighting in Iraq.

Analysis

The war in Iraq is not going as Washington had planned, and pacifying
the country is unlikely to be an option for a very long time. We
suspect -- and we see some indications -- that, despite putting a
brave face on the situation in Iraq, the Bush administration has
finally recognized this and is in the process of rethinking its
strategy. Washington must know that if U.S. policy in Iraq does not
change, it will hinder long-term U.S. goals in the Middle East.

Prior to the invasion, Stratfor laid out the underlying reasons for
the U.S. war in Iraq. First, the Bush administration went in with a
strategic goal: to acquire projection capabilities from within Iraq
that would allow Washington to pressure the entire Middle East, from
Iran to Saudi Arabia to Egypt. This would be impossible if U.S. troops
were bogged down in a guerrilla war with no end in sight.

Second, due to the insurgency and the fast-approaching U.S. elections,
the Bush administration must quickly mitigate military and political
damage in Iraq. At the same time, Washington must not abandon its
broader goals in the Middle East. The prospects for the administration
would be grim if U.S. forces continued to engage guerrillas through
2004.

Also, continued human losses will play an important role in the
elections. Moving troops out of harm's way could help the
administration escape significant military, economic and political
damage.

For these reasons, the current strategy is untenable. Even if Muqtada
al-Sadr's forces, the Sunni guerrillas and the foreign jihadists were
brought under some degree of control, the United States does not
want -- and it has no interest in -- policing Iraq, day in and day
out. The U.S. goal is to be able to pressure Iraq's neighbors, not to
babysit the Iraqis.

There are really only three options that would allow the United States
to avoid getting bogged down in Iraq. The first -- to withdraw
completely -- is unrealistic. Not only would it be an embarrassment,
it would be a strategic failure of mammoth proportions. That leaves
CENTCOM arguing internally about the two other options, both of which
involve redeploying forces within Iraq.

One, the enclave strategy, would leave U.S. forces stationed at a
smattering of bases around Iraq, very close to the cities. In such a
scenario, the forces would stay in their enclaves, but would
frequently engage militants and participate in the guerrilla war. The
other option is a complete geographic redistribution. This would pull
U.S. forces out of all Iraqi cities and redeploy them to major bases
in largely unpopulated portions of the country, effectively ending
U.S. participation in putting down the insurgency.

The enclave strategy -- according to Stratfor sources within
CENTCOM -- originally had the greatest support from within the Bush
administration. But the Army repeatedly mentioned that it hated the
idea. Enclaves might remove U.S. forces from the day-to-day grind of
patrolling Iraq, but would make them vulnerable to artillery attack
and they would have to respond to major nearby uprisings. Supplying a
network of enclaves would be a logistical nightmare -- not to mention
that convoys would be constant, inviting targets. The Army also
rejects the idea because the only time U.S. forces would leave the
enclaves would be to engage in urban guerrilla warfare, a type of
combat the Army tries to avoid at all costs.

The redeployment strategy has the advantage of keeping the troops much
safer and more readily supplied. Most U.S. forces would be in the
relatively calm Kurdish north, or to the west and south of the
Euphrates. Supplies could easily be carted in from Turkey or Kuwait,
and the United States could focus on what it originally came to Iraq
to do: pressure Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The downside is that
U.S. forces would have to leave Iraq in the not-even-remotely capable
hands of the nascent native security forces. The country could descend
into chaos and anarchy.

Even now, Stratfor sources doing contracting work for U.S. commanders
in Iraq say there is a dangerous dual-power situation in Iraq,
particularly in Baghdad, where the United States controls only the
Green Zone, and guerrillas and criminal gangs have the run of the rest
of the city. Sources say U.S. tanks patrolling the capital do not
translate into control, and local police have a helpless, hands-off
attitude -- and those are only the ones who are not members of
guerrilla or criminal bands.

Our sources indicate that the specific locations of future bases are
already being discussed, although it is far from certain what their
size will be or even if the enclave or partial withdrawal strategy
will be adopted. What they do know is that bases will be positioned
with cross-border strikes -- as much as operational security -- in
mind.

A base in Al-Basra province (south of Basra) would threaten Saudi
Arabia and Iran. A military facility close to the border between An
Najaf and Al Muthanna provinces, located away from Shiite shrines in
southern Iraq, could project into Saudi Arabia. Another in the western
part of Al-Anbar province could target Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Three
other bases would be built in the western and central parts of Anbar
and Ninawa provinces west of Mosul, near Syria. The enclaves close to
Baghdad and Kirkuk and on the border between Maysan and Wasit
provinces would keep Iran in check and serve as a main reaction force
to quell anti-U.S. movements. A majority of the bases also would
protect the major oil fields and pipelines.

After June 30, when it becomes clear that no real power transfer has
taken place and U.S. forces withdraw to several defensible bases,
security in the rest of the country could very well become a
nightmare. Washington must choose between pursuing military victory in
Iraq at any cost -- a risky proposition -- and focusing troops on the
wider goal of regional force projection. Neither mission is likely to
succeed if the administration tries to pursue them simultaneously.

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