[A-List] UK state: Northern Ireland

["Michael Keaney" <michael.keaney@xxxxxx>]

Private Eye

No. 1097, 9 - 22 January 2004

Just hours after Eye 1095 went to press with its article about the delay in
publication of the Barron report and the refusal of senior ministry of
defence official Peter Maynard to give evidence to Barron, the Irish
government made the report's findings public.

Although the former Irish supreme court judge Henry Barron concluded that
"evidence was insufficient to suggest that the British government or senior
members of the security forces were in any way involved in the bombing", he
also stated that it was "neither fanciful nor absurd" to infer that members
of the security forces in Northern Ireland had assisted the loyalist
paramilitaries in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings: "The report finds it is
likely that members of the RUC and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) either
participated in, or were aware of preparations for, the bombings."

In particular Barron singled out the evidence of former RUC sergeant John
Weir who named specific police colleagues among those who had "either
participated in, or were aware of preparations for, the bombings" (see Eyes
824 and 1067), and also of former army information officer Colin Wallace who
made similar allegations of collusion. There was also a quick sideswipe for
the British government whose lack of cooperation (Eyes 1071 and 1095),
Barron felt, had served to hamper "the scope of the report".

-----

Ireland: Barron report confirms British collusion in 1974 Dublin bombings
By Steve James
World Socialist Web Site
23 December 2003

The Irish government has approved the publication of a report into the
origins of bomb attacks in Dublin and Monaghan in 1974. Thirty-three people
were killed in the atrocity, the single most bloody event in the entire
period of the "Troubles" in Ireland, and the lives of hundreds more were
marred by injuries to themselves, friends and family members.

The report, prepared by former Irish Supreme Court judge Henry Barron, runs
to some 448 pages and gives considerable insight into the attacks and the
failed investigation by the Irish police. No one has ever been convicted of
the attacks.

The report's central focus is to examine what role was played by various
British security and intelligence services in the bombings and the extent to
which subsequent Irish governments have covered this over. In the end the
report makes many extremely damning points but does not draw the conclusions
which the factual and circumstantial evidence supports.

On May 17, 1974, two car bombs exploded in Parnell Street, South Leinster
Street, and Talbot Street in the centre of Dublin. They detonated
simultaneously, at 5.28 p.m., and were timed and placed to cause the maximum
level of casualties and disruption, while leaving escape roads free for the
attackers. Some hours later a fourth bomb, apparently intended to divert
police and security forces from individuals trying to cross back from the
Irish Republic into Northern Ireland, exploded in the border town of
Monaghan. Twenty-seven people were killed in Dublin and six in Monaghan. It
was assumed that both attacks had been carried out by pro-British loyalists
paramilitaries, operating out of Northern Ireland.

Loyalist opposition to Sunningdale

The attack took place at a time of unprecedented tension in the North,
during a loyalist revolt against a power sharing agreement being implemented
by the British government with support from Ulster Unionist Party leader
Brian Faulkner and the Irish government. The Sunningdale Agreement was
similar to the Good Friday Agreement that was eventually reached in 1998,
but it did not have the support of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or a
majority of unionists. An executive jointly run by the Ulster Unionist
Party, the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party, and the Alliance
Party took office in January 1974 and elicited threats from hard-line
unionists to consider "alternatives to democracy."

Sunningdale was rejected by the Ulster Unionist Council just four days after
it met and Faulkner was forced to resign as UUP leader and set up a new
party, the Unionist Party.

Stormont was also opposed by an organisation called the Ulster Workers
Council (UWC), which drew together the main unionist parties including the
UUP and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of Ian Paisley, the loyalist
paramilitary groups and sections of Protestant workers. Following the
election of a minority Labour government in February, the UWC drew up plans
for civil disobedience and a general strike to bring down the new executive
and the Sunningdale Agreement. Within a fortnight of the strike commencing,
on May 15, 1974, with power supplies and essential services collapsing,
Faulkner and the executive resigned.

Barron's report points out the alarm in loyalist circles following the new
minority Labour government's decision to remove Sinn Fein from the list of
banned organisations. It notes the allegation that elements within the
British security forces in Northern Ireland were intent on destabilising the
executive in preference for their favoured option of a purely military
solution against the IRA.

British involvement?

Given the degree to which loyalist paramilitary groups were closely
affiliated with the Protestant-dominated Royal Ulster Constabulary and the
Ulster Defence Regiment, and the fact that they were riddled with British
agents, the central question hanging over the Dublin and Monaghan atrocities
is this:

Did the British government or sections of its intelligence services carry
out, plan, or provide other support for bombings in the capital city of
another nation intended to destabilise its government and wreck the already
beleaguered Sunningdale Agreement?

Barron makes clear that the investigation by the Garda Siochana, the Irish
police force, compromised from its inception, was made impossible for
political reasons.

On a practical level, key forensic evidence was simply washed away by the
Dublin fire department. In any event, the Garda was in a poor position to
investigate forensically. While Northern Ireland's Department of Industrial
and Forensic Science was probably in advance of comparable facilities
anywhere else in the world, the Garda did not even have a dedicated forensic
science department until 1975. Beyond eyewitness accounts, and a cog wheel
thought to come from a timer, little information was collected from the
scene. The Barron Inquiry stumbled across some of the forensic material in
an unmarked cupboard.

More seriously, some of the most pertinent debris was sent to Belfast for
analysis and simply disappeared. Barron comments that "it is now impossible
to reconstruct an unbroken chain for custody for the debris which was sent
to Belfast for forensic examination." However, he disagrees with the
suggestion, made by journalist Frank Doherty, that the debris may
unwittingly have been handed over to the very British officers later
suspected of planning the bombings.

>From the eyewitness reports a list of potential suspects was gathered,
photographs of some of whom were handed over by the RUC. One man in
particular, David Alexander Mulholland, was identified. The RUC apparently
informed the Garda that Mulholland was unlikely to say anything, but the
Garda never even made a request to interview him. Other important leads were
given even less attention.

On September 11, 1974, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson informed Irish
Taoiseach Liam Cosgrave that internment orders had been signed and "the
perpetrators of the Dublin bomb outrages had been picked up and were now
detained, but it was impossible to get evidence to try them in ordinary
courts."

No information on these individuals was ever passed to Dublin, nor, Barron
suggests, did the Dublin government, or the Garda or Irish Intelligence ever
request it.
Barron suggests this may have been due to fears held by the Irish government
of reciprocal demands being made by the RUC to question suspected IRA
supporters in the Republic. Allowing these would have further exposed an
Irish government already under internal criticism for its prostration before
the British military occupation and its inability to alleviate the
sufferings of the minority Catholic population in the North. None of the
members of the Irish cabinet of the day mentioned any efforts to assist the
Garda to Barron's Inquiry, nor are there any references to the bombings in
contemporary cabinet minutes.

Denied government backing the Garda investigation soon died a death, and
efforts appear to have been made to lose all trace of it. Despite meticulous
record keeping in other areas, astonishingly the Department of Justice files
on the Dublin bombings are "missing in their entirety" and no records were
provided to Barron by the department. Barron's assessment-"there was no
single reason why the investigation ended"-is an evasion. The investigation
failed primarily because it was politically suppressed by leading figures in
the Irish government of Liam Cosgrave.

"Hidden Hand"

There matters rested until 1993 when a Yorkshire TV documentary, "Hidden
Hand," was broadcast. Its principal researcher was journalist Joe Tiernan,
whose team spent most of a year investigating the bombings. "Hidden Hand"
named four additional suspects-Billy Hanna, Harris Boyle, "the Jackal" later
named as Robin Jackson of the Ulster Volunteer Force and Robert McConnell, a
part-time Ulster Defence Regiment man suspected of being in the UVF. All
were from the Portadown area. Others suspected of involvement were from
Belfast.

The programme asserted that the complexity of the attack and the
characteristics of the explosions indicated training and planning beyond the
capacity of loyalist forces acting unaided and strongly implied that the
security forces in the North had likely helped the attackers. Pointing to a
covert unit of the British Army in Castledillon, the programme makers
suggested that the attack had been allowed to happen in order to protect
British Army agents in the UVF. The allegations revolved around Army Captain
Robert Nairac. "Hidden Hand" stated that McConnell, Boyle and "the Jackal"
were controlled by Nairac. Hanna, meanwhile, was allegedly run separately by
the British Army from Lisburn and 3 Brigade HQ in Lurgan.

The programme rekindled interest in resolving the unanswered questions
around the attacks, particularly amongst relatives and friends of the
victims. A group was formed, Justice for the Forgotten, whose campaign for
an independent and full public inquiry was central to Justice Liam Hamilton'
s 1999 appointment by the Irish government, with minimal funding, to conduct
further investigations. Hamilton was succeeded by Barron, whose own report
is described as an "interim" work.

Barron scrutinises "Hidden Hand" and although he finds some discrepancies he
largely accepts the evidence of two of the main interviewees-convicted
killer John Weir, a former RUC officer in Armagh's Special Patrol Group
(SPG), and Colin Wallace, a former information and covert psychological
operations officer in the army's Information Policy Unit. Barron is less
convinced, but does not fully dismiss, evidence from Fred Holroyd-a former
army captain and military intelligence officer.

Weir was convicted in 1980 for the murder of a William Streathern following
the arrest of another Armagh SPG member for abduction. In "Hidden Hand" and
subsequent interviews, Weir explained that he had become part of a group of
police who had decided to launch attacks on Catholics. He noted that senior
RUC officers were aware of their activities and made no efforts to stop
them.

Weir alleges that members of the all Protestant SPG group and local UVF
members had together carried out numerous bombings and assassinations,
including-in addition to William Streathern's killing-the Dublin and
Monaghan bombs, the murders of IRA member John Francis Green, John Farmer,
Colm McCartney, three members of the Reavey family and RUC Sergeant Joseph
Campbell.

Barron rejects attacks made on Weir by the RUC and concludes that his
allegations into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings "must be treated with the
utmost seriousness."

Colin Wallace was framed for manslaughter in 1981 by the British judicial
system in reprisal for his exposure of black propaganda used against
non-military and political opponents of army policy and a plot from within
the MI5 intelligence services to bring down the Wilson Labour government. He
also exposed child abuse at the Kincora Boys' Home, demanded it be stopped,
and protested when he realised that the intelligence services were
blackmailing a leading loyalist involved in the abuse to ensure his
assistance in their efforts at manipulating the loyalist gangs.

Wallace's conviction was not quashed until 1996. Barron considers Wallace a
"highly knowledgeable witness" whose analyses and opinions "should also be
treated with seriousness and respect."

Regarding the Dublin attacks, Wallace noted that in his operational role he
sought to manipulate press coverage of individual paramilitary leaders.
During 1973/74 all the individuals mentioned above as likely having been
involved were on an "excluded" list and could not be touched. He told
Justice for the Forgotten that, in his opinion, there is no doubt that
several of the mid-Ulster UVF members were working for RUC Special Branch
and the army. Information from these contacts would have been immediately
circulated around the top brass in the Northern Ireland security forces
following something as serious as the Dublin attacks. Wallace considered
Billy Hanna, Robin Jackson and David Alexander Mulholland as likely to have
been involved and that the cavalier attitude of the attackers, who appear to
have made little effort to disguise their identities or that of their
vehicles, indicated confidence that they would never be called to account.

Fred Holroyd has made numerous damaging allegations and written a book
critical of the British and Irish security services following his dismissal
from his post as a military intelligence officer in 1975, ostensibly on
medical grounds. He believes he was removed from work in Northern Ireland
because of the feud between different branches of British intelligence over
their conduct of the undercover war. Barron points to considerable
discrepancies in his evidence surrounding the level of intelligence
penetration of the loyalist groups, and his alleged involvement in
intelligence contact between the British and Irish intelligence.
Nevertheless, Barron believes Holroyd's claim that the RUC Special Branch
knew more about the Dublin attacks than was passed on to the Garda.

Referring to the recently released findings of the inquiry by metropolitan
Police Commissioner Sir John Stevens into collusion between loyalist
paramilitaries and the British state, Barron notes that his inquiry has
confronted similar obstruction from the British security forces. In contrast
to the Stevens Inquiry report, however, which ran to a mere 3,500 words,
Barron has included considerable detail in his assessment of the collusion
allegations.

British intelligence collusion

Numerous intelligence agencies were at work in Northern Ireland by 1974-the
RUC Special Branch, Army Intelligence, the Special Air Service (SAS) in the
guise of the 14th Intelligence Unit, along with both MI6 and MI5. These
often competing agencies attempted to share some of their intelligence
through a Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence, while all the agencies
reported to their own British based headquarters-all of whom ultimately
reported to various British government ministers. All were running agents.

At the same time, the boundaries between the loyalist paramilitary groups
and state forces such as the RUC and the UDR were very porous, with numerous
individuals holding dual membership. Much of the military and police
hierarchy considered the loyalist paramilitaries as valuable allies.

Barron considers the evidence supporting the view that security forces
directly assisted the Dublin and Monaghan attacks. He claims that the only
source of allegations that an SAS Brigadier and Captain participated in the
attacks came, in 1983, from French journalist Roger Faligot. Barron insists
that his inquiry has found no evidence to support this claim.

More substantial information of collusion by the armed forces centres around
leading loyalist Billy Hanna. He was regularly visited by soldiers, who even
took him fishing. Other reports, from journalist Joe Tiernan, suggested that
he was regularly visited by plainclothes officers. According to Tiernan,
faced with difficult questions in the preparation of an operation, Hanna was
wont to clear his unit's action with his army contacts. By implication, an
operation as huge as the Dublin one could only have been carried out with
approval from above.

Barron rejects the assertion that the complexity of the attacks and the type
of explosive necessarily imply direct practical assistance from the
military. His conclusions are generally weak and conditional, which must
reflect ongoing sensitivities in the Irish political establishment. But he
does find the following:
* That finding that members of the security forces had been involved in the
bombings is "neither fanciful or absurd."

* Although the loyalist groups were capable of the bombing on their own,
"this does not rule out the involvement of individual RUC, UDR or British
Army members.

* A high level cover-up cannot be ruled out, but "it is unlikely that any
such decision would ever have been committed to writing."

* Neither would any written records have been made of advance warnings.

* The security forces in the North knew quickly who carried out the attack
on the basis of good intelligence.

* Some of those suspected had relationships with British intelligence and/or
RUC Special Branch, and therefore information supplied to the Garda was
compromised.

Having made these points, however, he insists that the inference that the
bombings were state sanctioned "is not sufficiently strong. It does not even
follow as a matter of probability. Unless further information comes to hand,
such involvement must remain a suspicion. It is not proven."

Commenting on the report, Margaret Unwin of the Justice for the Forgotten
group said that its publication would strengthen demands for the full public
inquiry as long demanded by the bombs' victims.