[A-List] UK state: Iraq crisis

["Michael Keaney" <michael.keaney@xxxxxx>]

Spymaster removed a 'key phrase'
DEBORAH SUMMERS, Political Correspondent
The Herald, September 24 2003

THE spymaster who provided Alastair Campbell with a cast-iron defence
against BBC claims that the government "sexed-up" its Iraq dossier
inadvertently revealed yesterday a slight chink in Downing Street's armour.

John Scarlett, chairman of the joint intelligence committee and the man
responsible for drawing up the document on Saddam's weapons of mass
destruction, has always insisted that there was no political pressure from
No 10 to strengthen intelligence to bolster the case for war.

But under intense questioning from Andrew Caldecott QC, counsel for the BBC,
Mr Scarlett told the Hutton inquiry he did remove a key phrase in the
dossier after an eleventh hour appeal from No 10.

"Prompted" by an e-mail from Johnathan Powell, the prime minister's chief of
staff, Mr Scarlett rewrote a section of the dossier considered "a bit of a
problem" by the top Blair aide.

Mr Powell sent his e-mail at 3.45pm on September 19 last year - 45 minutes
after the deadline set by Mr Scarlett for final comments from the agencies
on the draft dossier before it was sent to the printers.

"I think the statement on pg 19 that 'Saddam is prepared to use chemical and
biological weapons if he believes his regime is under threat' is a bit of a
problem," Mr Powell wrote.

"It backs up the Don McIntyre (a political columnist on The Independent)
argument that there is no CBW (chemical and biological weapon) threat and we
will only create one if we attack him. I think you should redraft the
para(graph)."

In the final version of the dossier, published five days later on September
24, the passage was changed to read: "Saddam is willing to use chemical and
biological weapons, including against his own Shia population."

Mr Caldecott asked Mr Scarlett: "The suggestion there is, is it not, that
the dossier should be redrafted to remove the express suggestion that Saddam
Hussein is a defensive threat and to leave the implication that in fact he
is an offensive threat?"

Mr Scarlett replied: "It is to take away the explicit limitations that it is
a defensive threat or defensive point." Mr Caldecott asked: "Do you accept
you can transform a dossier by omission, Mr Scarlett?"

He replied: "Of course it is important what you take out as well as what you
put in."

Mr Scarlett said that when he and the assessments staff drawing up the
dossier had looked again at the passage, they had realised there was no JIC
(joint intelligence committee) assessment on whether the threat from
Saddam's CBW was defensive or offensive.

At the same time, recent intelligence reporting had emphasised that Saddam's
"attachment" to chemical and biological weapons was very much linked to his
perception of Iraq's power in the region.

"The recent intelligence was more complex than that phrase implied. We
concluded that this was not right the way it was phrased. I took that out,"
he said.

"I was exercising my judgment as I was authorised to do."
Mr Scarlett said he had not circulated the change to JIC members and had
been acting under his delegated authority as the JIC chairman.

He said he was also responsible for changing the title of the dossier from
the draft Iraq's Programme for Weapons of Mass Destruction to the final
Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction.

"It was not a suggestion, it was me. I decided it because the title was an
accurate reflection of the contents of the dossier," he said during a series
of heated exchanges with Mr Caldecott.

He rejected any suggestion that Mr Campbell, the prime minister's outgoing
director of communications, had interfered with the intelligence judgments
in the dossier, and said he had simply offered "presentational" advice which
he had asked for.

Mr Caldecott asked: "Knowing Mr Campbell's interest in the latest headlines,
he must have asked you what is the up-to-date position on the JIC
assessments on Iraq?"
Mr Scarlett replied: "Sorry to disappoint you. He didn't. He just didn't."

Mr Caldecott retorted: "He restrained himself, did he?"
Mr Scarlett acknowledged that Mr Campbell had raised the question of the
wording of the controversial claim that some Iraqi weapons could be deployed
within 45 minutes.

However, he insisted that he had simply been pointing out an inconsistency
in the text and not requesting a change.
"There was no influence exercised by Mr Campbell at any stage whatsoever on
the 45-minute point in the drafting of the dossier," he said.

Mr Scarlett said he had not known that two members of the Defence
Intelligence Staff (DIS) had been so concerned about some of the claims in
the dossier - including the 45 minute point - that they had complained
formally to their line managers.

However, he said that Brian Jones, a retired senior scientific analyst who
gave evidence to the inquiry, had not been a member of the DIS section
primarily concerned with the 45-minute intelligence.

He had been aware of some concerns about the claims regarding Iraq's
production of chemical weapons, but said senior DIS management was shown
highly sensitive MI6 intelligence, not generally circulated in the
intelligence community, supporting the dossier.

When DIS had raised no further objections, he had assumed that DIS staff
were satisfied and that they were giving their assent to the dossier under
the normal "silence procedure".