Re: [A-List] Michael Hudson: Super imperialism

[jenyang <enyang@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Mon, 2 Jun 2003, Michael Keaney wrote:
>
> John goes on the highlight points which find echoes in the writings of other
> contemporary commentators like Chalmers Johnson, whose "Blowback" thesis
> includes the point, reiterated by Hudson, that US Cold War policies included
> the building up of eventual economic rivals which contributed to the
> hollowing out of US manufacturing alongside those of US finance capital.
>

Michael,
My understanding is that Chalmers Johnson's "blowback" thesis revolves
around critique of particular matters of policy and what Johnson regards
as bad or wrong decisions by various U.S. administrations.

The contradictions highlighted by Hudson and Brenner on the other hand
seem to me to refer to somewhat deeper and more fundamental processes.
Here's a crude summary of my own.

In as much as the second world war gave the U.S. economy a huge boost and
was the main factor in overcoming the depression of the 1930's, the end of
the war threatened if not a return to the depression and social strife
round the world, then at least greatly reduced for U.S. capital at home
and abroad:

     One aim common to all groups in the United States was to avoid a
     postwar depression caused by a reduction in public spending. The
     consensus in 1945 was that 60 million jobs were needed for full
     employment. In the absence of effective demand sufficient to create
     these jobs, and of finaces to underwrite their related corporate
     investment, a leftward shift might occur in American politics. This
     explains the national interest in full employment, despite its
     effects on unit labour costs and competitive pricing of U.S.
     products.

     It was agreed that American access to foreign markets was a
     precondition for full employment in the United States. The most
     obvious market was devastated Europe in its reconstruction phase.
     (Hudson, p142)

So while America would depend on its exports to European and Asian states
to avoid another prolonged slump, Europe and Asia were in no condition to
finance these exports on their own (and were threatening to go red
besides). The only solution available to American policy makers at the
time was to finance simultaneously the reconstruction of Asian and
European capitalism and the prosperity of the domestic U.S. economy
through dollar loans to these nations, which (unlike the inter ally war
debts from WWI) were to be repaid by exports of European and Japanese
manufactures to the U.S.

Along with the stimulus provided by military Keynsianism (the Korean war
provided a big boost to Japanese industry in particular), this U.S. policy
of "enlightened imperialism" towards Europe and Japan, was largely
responsible for the long expansion that lasted to the mid 1960's. However,
the very conditions which made for the success of this strategy created
the foundations for the stagnation of capitalism in the 1970's and 1980's:

    U.S. multinational corporations and international bank, aiming to
    expand overseas, needed profitable outlets for their foreign direct
    investment. Domestically based manufacturers, needing to increase
    exports, required fast-growing overseas demand for their goods. An
    imperial U.S. state, bent on "containing communism" and keeping the
    world safe for free enterprise, sought economic success for its allies
    and competitors as the foundation for the political consolidation of
    the post-war capitalist order . . . All these forces thus depended
    upon the economic dynamism of Europe and Japan for the realisation of
    their own goals. (Brenner, The Boom and the Bubble pp 14-15).


In Brenner's words, up to the 1960's, uneven development (his term for the
process where laggards in capitalist development seek to and eventually
succeed in catching up with the economic leaders) provided "a symbiosis,
if a highly conflictual one, of leader and followers, . . .  of hegemon
and hegemonised." (Brenner p. 15).

This positive sum game turned into a zero or even negative sum game as
soon as the laggards Germany and Japan overtook the leader in the key
non-military industries (Arrighi, New Left Review Apr-May 03). The very
success of U.S. post-war strategy in other words, presaged increased
competition and reduced rates of profitability not only for American
capitalism (which ended being hollowed out in the 1980's) but also for
its European and Asian competitors begining around 1968. Coincidentally or
not, this period also marked the begining of the transition from the U.S.
"enlightened imperialism" to the more brazen and parasitic forms that
begun to take form with Nixon's abandonment of the gold standard and his
imposition of the treasury bill standard on U.S. competitors/allies.

One might would say the U.S. enlightened imperialism could only end up
hoised on the petard of its own success.

Anyway, the difference with the "blowback" thesis of Johnson is that the
U.S. could well have chosen not to fund the Hekmatyar and bin Ladens in
the 1980's. The decision eventually taken to fund these groups reflected
in otherwords, a policy choice (albeit one that had unintended and mixed
consequences) rather than an imperative forced on the U.S. government and
capital by objective conditions. On the other hand, the juncture in 1945
threatened a return to a global economic slump with unknown consequences
for the future of capitalism, virtually forcing upon the U.S. the adoption
of some form of "enlightened imperialism" towards Europe and Japan (as
Hudson notes).

Incidentally, my apologies for typos and strange syntax which appear too
often in my posts. Part (not all) of the problem is that i have to use
here a UNIX based text editor -- adequate for programming or mathematical
typesetting but not much else.

J.Enyang