[A-List] Europe/US rivalry: hardening of US attitudes

["Michael Keaney" <michael.keaney@xxxxxx>]

Gerard Baker is the Financial Times' token Democrat, just as Amity Shlaes
was the token (unspeakably awful) Republican. She has been replaced by
Christopher Caldwell, an editor of the neoconservative rag the Weekly
Standard. Meanwhile, to get an indication of what US politics is like, and
to re-learn the ever-important lesson that the Democrats are worse than
useless, a study of Baker's political trajectory over the last two years
provides a useful guide.

Baker was a partisan backer of Gore, convinced by the economic and foreign
policies of the Clinton administration and therefore the appropriateness of
a fundamental continuity between that and its successor. Gore fitted the
bill perfectly, especially considering the fiscal vandalism likely to be
inflicted by a Bush presidency. With Bush having assumed power, Baker
consistently attacked his economic policies, in particular reserving scorn
for the tax cut. Paul O'Neill was the butt of many good jokes, and the rest
of the administration, Powell aside, came in for a lot of criticism.

Then the twin towers episode occurred, and suddenly Bush's foreign policy
became sacrosanct. Baker has been as partisan a cheerleader of the war party
as any newspaper columnist of record, and while he has returned, more
recently, to criticising Bush's domestic policies, he remains steadfast in
his support of the war on terrorism and the invasion of Iraq. Bush himself
has been described in glowing terms, as "courageous" and "principled". In
addition, his columns have been peppered with complaints about European
anti-Americanism and a general wilful misunderstanding of "America" and/or a
pitiful European abdication of "responsibility".

This recent column ought to be regarded as a good indicator of mainstream
Democratic Party thinking, and a strong signal to Europeans wistfully
imagining a Gore presidency of just how far to the right the centre of
gravity of US politics has moved thanks to the mostly irreversible changes
wrought by Bush. Among those changes is the realisation among its former US
champions that European unity is no longer in the strategic interest of the
US. The one advantage of this sort of thing is that it is brazenly out in
the open for all to see.

-----

America's divided view of European unity
By Gerard Baker
Financial Times, May 8 2003

Europe Day -- May 9 -- never did really catch on in the American
imagination. Almost every day of the year one group or another of
hyphenated-Americans takes time out to celebrate their Irish-American,
Mexican-American, Chinese-American, even their French-American heritage. But
I never once saw a crowd of elegantly tailored, well remunerated
Euro-Americans marching proudly up Fifth Avenue, clasping their Jean Monnet
statuettes, waving their blue and gold flags to the rousing finale of
Beethoven's Ninth.

I suppose it is even less likely now. The euro may be surging these days
but, in the American psyche, the Euro is a seriously devalued figure.

Discerning Americans, though, especially those in powerful parts of
Washington, are starting to take a more nuanced look at the hopeless
Europeans. Instead of an undifferentiated bunch of peaceniks and
handwringers, they see a more variegated picture. And that makes them more
inclined to challenge the established assumption of US diplomacy that
ever-closer European union is an unmitigated good thing.

Since Dwight Eisenhower's presidency, it has been an axiom of US policy that
a strong and united Europe is in America's interests. Economically, US
companies had long preferred integrated European markets, free of national
regulatory, trade and even monetary policy regimes, to grease the wheels of
their global ambitions. Politically, a single European voice (as long as it
was broadly supportive of the US) was easier to deal with than the cacophony
Americans dreaded to hear when they stepped off the plane in Brussels. And
unified European support for what the US was doing elsewhere in the world
was a useful additional tool for American diplomacy.

But with the cold war over, the cracks in the relationship started to show.
As some in Europe began to articulate different sets of goals from those
that had held the alliance together and others clung firmly to cold war
allegiances, it was inevitable that the virtues of a single European view
would become less evident to Americans. Better, surely, to forge connections
with those who would continue to hold firm to US values.

When the Bush administration arrived in Washington, staffed with the top
brass of the First Regiment of Euro Bashers and Doubters, it was widely
believed the days of American encouragement of European integration were
numbered. But, surprisingly, the Euro-believers continued to win the day. In
the very first month of the Bush era, Tony Blair, at the time in full
Euro-friendly mode himself, persuaded the president to give a warm
endorsement, over the objections of the Pentagon, to the fledgling European
Security and Defence Policy.

In other intriguing ways, even as they decried general European wimpishness
and obstructionism, some American conservatives defied easy labelling as
Eurosceptics. Perhaps the most remarkable example was the passionate support
of the Wall Street Journal's editorial page, that temple of conservative
thinking, for European monetary union (admittedly on quirky ideological
grounds to do with monetary policy).

But whatever else the events of the past six months have done, they have
surely encouraged a rethink. Even if the transatlantic brickbats of the last
year are replaced with bouquets and billets-doux, how America views a single
Europe will never be the same again. A Europe united under its traditional
Franco-German leadership would have been a catastrophe for US political and
military ambitions in the last year. Now, as Europe concludes its
deliberations on a constitution and the role of a common foreign and
security policy within it, the US can no longer be a sympathetic observer.

Steven Everts of the pro-integration Centre for European Reform writes in a
recent paper: "America should welcome a European Union security strategy,
even if it will crystallise seom differences with the US on how to respond
to specific problems." This is like saying: "The US should welcome an EU
security strategy even if it means it will flatly oppose what the US is
trying to do." I doubt that, post-Iraq, many Americans see it that way.

It is more likely, say even Euro-friendly officials in Washington, that the
US will regard with more scepticism than usual European attempts to forge a
super-European policy on virtually anything. There is evident admiration in
Washington for Mr Blair, but many are nonplussed by his eagerness to drive
Britain into the eurozone, especially when they hear that the reason for his
enthusiasm is not economic but political.

Even this administration is subtle enough to realise that outright meddling
in intra-European affairs will only bolster those who want to drive Europe
further away from America. But there are alternatives. The decision to ask
Poland last week to play a leading role in Iraq comes precisely from this
school of thought. Expect much more like this -- an exploration of the
possibilities that arise from the new US doctrine that the mission
determines the coalition.

Some European leaders will chafe at this. But before they turn up the
anti-American rhetoric, they should remember the sceptical views of their
own electorates about the value of European federalism. Europe Day never
caught on in Europe either.