[A-List] Iraqi and Isreal

["Henry C.K. Liu" <hliu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Friday, April 11, 2003 Ha'aretz

By Aviad Kleinberg

The war in Iraq was more than the first expression of the United States'
readiness to go to war as an empire. It was also a conceptual experiment
that bears profound implications. What the United States

learned from this test - as had already been hinted in the smaller war
fought in Afghanistan - is that it is the master of the world and can
make use of its force almost without interference and without it
exacting a true price, neither in casualties nor in economic or
strategic assets.

The choice of Iraq was no accident. Iraq was not selected because it
posed a strategic threat. Even if it had stocks of chemical weapons, it
is hard to view these as a global danger. There are countries that are
far more dangerous. The reason Iraq was chosen is that it was relatively
weak, because the possibility of getting mired there was small. Hence,
it was ideal for a demonstration of the new Clausewitzian concept of war
as the continuation of diplomacy.

The Americans went into this war without having concrete support.
England is an ally of largely-symbolic significance. The Americans could
have got by without the British. The Russians, the European Union and
the United Nations were all against the war. It turned out that they
were not needed, that their protests were irrelevant, and that their
tails were already wagging, instinctively, to greet the victors.

The threats about the awakening strength of the Muslim world also turned
out to be empty. The Americans had already discovered this in
Afghanistan: You can fight with impunity during the holy month of
Ramadan and without a Muslim coalition. There is no "Muslim world." The
war of civilizations was decided long ago by Coca-Cola and McDonald's -
the John the Baptists of capitalism - and by the savior himself -
Microsoft and the Internet.

The American hesitancy was less of a realistic perception than it was a
late manifestation of the trauma of Vietnam. Not only the Arab regimes
refrained from reacting to the conquest of Baghdad and Karbala, but the
supposedly-fanatic Arab masses also stayed home.

The world has a new sheriff who does not hesitate to use his pistol,
with or without partners, with or without sanction, with or without
justification. The rules have changed. What are the new rules? Well,
this question reminds me of the first time I rented a car. I started to
look over the leasing contract. "Let me save you the time," the clerk
said. "We're always right and you're always wrong."

There is only one country in the world that has not yet fully grasped
the implications of the American invasion of Iraq, and that country is
Israel. From certain points of view, the invasion worked in Israel's
favor. The work of the just is always done by others. Iraq, despite all
the bombastic pronouncements by President Bush, is not a strategic
threat to the United States or to the free world, but it is definitely a
threat to Israel. That threat has been removed, more or less.

However, the invasion of Iraq dramatically lowers Israel's stock as a
strategic asset. And not because Israel is not loyal to Uncle Sam; on
the contrary, it is a most obedient and faithful vassal.

It's just that Israel is not really needed. Israel's great strategic
weight stemmed from its ability to act - or to constitute a potential
threat - in a region in which the United States did not want to
intervene directly. Israel was a regional mini-power through which it
was possible to threaten the Soviet bloc and its satellites, or the Arab
world. Israel preserved American interests.

If American involvement becomes direct, there is no further need for
mediators. The United States does the dirty work itself. Moreover, as I
have argued, American intervention in the Middle East was chosen less
for any salient interest (that is, an economic-strategic interest) and
more because it is easy to carry out.

In the new world, Arab oil is not insignificant, but its significance is
far less than it used to be. From other aspects, the Middle East has
mainly nuisance value.

What will be the significance of the structural reduction in Israel's
status? It will mean that American readiness to go on paying so as to
extricate us from the morass in which we are mired will be diminished.
It is unlikely that the United States will exert increasing pressure on
Israel in order to achieve durable political solutions. The United
States will make do with bad solutions, based on the long-standing
American principle of forging poor settlements the consequences of which
will be paid by others in the future.

Donald Rumsfeld has no inclination to give prizes to Arafat and his
successors. He even likes Ariel Sharon. But the whole thing is starting
to cost too much money. American support will be reduced. The economic
crisis will deepen. Israeli democracy will continue to be eroded. It
won't take much for Israel to become just another Third World country
that solicits help from those willing to be generous.

What conclusion should Israel draw from the war? That it should hurry on
its own to achieve a good settlement that will make it possible to
rehabilitate the economy and start rehabilitating the society and the
state of democracy in the country. In the new world, Israel's major
asset is not military might but genuine membership in the club of the
advanced countries.

(2)  Use of United States Forces Abroad, 1798 - 1993

Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2003 23:56:21 -0700 From: Jeffrey Blankfort
<jab@xxxxxxxxxxxx

This is an extremely valuable resource: the list and description of 234
times that the US troops have gone abroad between 1798 and 1993.

Jeff

http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/foabroad.htm