[A-List] UK state: Iraq misgivings

["Michael Keaney" <michael.keaney@xxxxxx>]

A remarkable feature of the months leading up to the war has been the
succession of moderate Tories and otherwise "sensible" types, alongside
retired military and even presently employed military spokespersons, who
have all expressed grave doubts about the wisdom of Tone'n'Shrub's Execrable
Adventure. This author is well qualified to add his voice to this growing
chorus, and indicates just how deeply many within the UK state apparatus
doubt the whole rationale. As well they might -- their preferred
Europe-bound trajectory is now, for the foreseeable future, derailed.

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This pyrrhic victory on the Tigris

The outcome was never in doubt. But the aftermath looks ominous

David Clark
Friday April 11, 2003
The Guardian

When Henry Kissinger asked Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai whether he
thought the French Revolution had been a success, he replied that it was
"too early to tell". What was meant half-jokingly then is certainly true of
Operation Iraqi Freedom today.

The gloating of those who backed the war has already started, led, as usual,
by the Sun (the same Sun that predicted the first war without civilian
casualties and now carries pictures of that wretched, limbless child). But
it is based, quite knowingly, on a false premise. If there is one thing that
united the pro- and anti-war parties, it was the belief that Iraq would be
defeated. In the end, our expectations were confounded only to the extent
that the stiffest opposition was encountered in the south, whereas Baghdad
was entered with comparative ease.

In any case, the squabble over who got it right about the course of the war
is largely irrelevant. The more apocalyptic warnings about the battle of
Baghdad turned out to be false. But just because some doom-mongers were
proved wrong, it does not logically follow that the warmongers have been
proved right. Remember, we were not promised regime removal; we were
promised regime change, with the assurance that Saddam Hussein would be
succeeded by something altogether more benign. This was always going to be
the difficult bit.

The jubilant reaction of some Iraqis to the regime's collapse has come as a
relief after the very mixed response coalition troops received in the
Shia-dominated south. Yet the anecdotal evidence reveals a more
disconcerting picture. It is worth noting that the residents of Saddam City
were singing the praises of Allah, not George Bush.

B esides, if we recall the British army's deployment to Northern Ireland in
1969 we should also reflect on how quickly the residents of west Belfast
switched from making tea for the troops to throwing petrol bombs at them.
The timescale in which coalition forces will be deemed to have outstayed
their welcome is likely to be significantly shorter than the one the
Pentagon has in mind.

Equally worrying has been the willingness of Iraqi troops to continue to
fight and die against the most insane odds, even after their command and
control structures have been smashed. There is no regime any more, yet the
fighting continues. Most of Iraq's forces have not surrendered or been
captured, but have simply faded away, taking their weapons. It is possible
that there may not even be a definitive end-point to this war and that we
are set to witness the sort of protracted low-intensity conflict with which
we have become all too familiar.

Those who have promised to transform Iraq into Switzer land-on-the-Euphrates
seem to forget that Saddam was a product of his country's violent and bloody
past, not its cause. Of all the analogies that have been offered to explain
what might lie ahead, it is the example of the Lebanon that must therefore
strike greatest fear into the hearts of British and American policy makers.
The spate of suicide bombings provides one indication that the coalition's
victory might give way to the same explosive cocktail of political
factionalism, religious extremism and foreign occupation that resulted in
hundreds of American deaths and a hasty withdrawal from Beirut 20 years ago.

The repercussions of this war will not be confined within Iraq's borders.
The idea of an international community based on multilateral rules and
institutions lies in ruins as the prospect of a world dominated by the
hegemonic preferences of a solitary power hoves into view. The real tragedy
will not lie in the imposition of American authority on an unwilling world
as much as in the embittered response of those who refuse to submit to it.

The Arab world has been inflamed by this war and will draw the conclusion
that since American power cannot be confronted on its own terms, it must be
dealt with asymmetrically. Like the young Catholics who signed up to fight
for the IRA after Bloody Sunday, young men from Cairo to Amman will now beat
a path to the door of anyone able to provide them with the means to hit
back. As of today, that door is Osama bin Laden's. The dividing line between
Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism, once so clear, has become even
more dangerously blurred as a result of our actions.

None of this is inevitable. But there is precious little evidence to suggest
that the White House is interested in taking the sort of steps needed to
prevent it. Bush may agree to the publication of the road map for a Middle
East peace settlement, but he has no intention of taking the journey. He
talks about a democratic Iraq, but his first priority is a compliant Iraq.

Unless I am wrong, and I hope that I am, it will become increasingly
difficult for Tony Blair to claim that the demise of Saddam Hussein is a
victory in anything more than the most pyrrhic sense of the term.

· David Clark is a former foreign office special adviser