[A-List] A Moony view of "A Russian view of the war"

[Jim Farmelant <farmelantj@xxxxxxxx>]

A Russian view of the war
By Martin Sieff
UPI Senior News Analyst

WASHINGTON, March 31 (UPI) -- Testimony to the tactical excellence of the

U.S. armed forces in Iraq -- and a shrewd assessment of the unexpectedly
formidable enemy they are striving to overcome -- is emerging from a
remarkable source: Russian military intelligence, or GRU.

Daily assessments of developments in the war from Russian journalists and

military analysts are being posted on the Internet daily at the
IRAQWAR.RU
Web site, or analytical center. The reports are described as being based
on
"Russian military intelligence reports" and contain alleged Russian
intelligence intercepts of radio communications between U.S. and other
coalition forces in Iraq.

While the factual reports based on these claimed intercepts cannot be
independently verified, and may possibly contain deliberate
disinformation,
the analytical assessments the performance of U.S. forces and the
opposition

facing them is based on much material also clearly reported by U.S. and
other
sources and verified by the Pentagon. And it is shrewd and of a high --
and
thought-provoking -- order.

First, as different columns of coalition troops are again reported
closing
in
on Baghdad, the reports give high marks to the tactical performances of
the
U.S. forces and their remarkable ability, already displayed to adapt to
radically different tactical problems from those they had been briefed
and
trained to expect.

"In general, the U.S. soldiers showed sufficiently high combat
resilience,"
a
March 28 report posted on the Web site concluded. "Even in the extremely
difficult weather conditions the troops maintained control structure and
adequately interpreted the situation."

And despite the entirely unanticipated sustained high levels of fierce
resistance in cities throughout Iraq, "Combat spirit remained high. The
majority of troops remained confident in their abilities, while
maintaining
belief in the superiority of their weapons and maintaining reasonable
confidence in the way the war was being fought."

Ad the same analysis also acknowledged, "despite the sand storms, the
terrain
favors the coalition actions by allowing it to employ their entire
arsenal
of
weapons at the greatest possible range, which makes it difficult for the
Iraqis to conduct combat operations outside of populated areas."

Also, "The main strong side of the coalition forces was the wide
availability
of modern reconnaissance and communications systems that allowed to
detect
the enemy at long ranges and to quickly suppress the enemy with
well-coordinated actions of different types with different forces."

The Russian analysts also had some shrewd assessments about both the
strength
and weakness of the Iraqi forces putting up such an unexpectedly stiff
fight

against the coalition forces. In particular, they list a number of
tactical
and organizational strengths that we in UPI Analysis have been alone in
predicting in the American media.

"Among the strong sides of their of the Iraqi troops are their excellent
knowledge of the terrain, high quality of defensive engineering work,
their
ability to conceal their main attack forces and their resilience and
determination in defense. The Iraqis have shown good organization in
their
command and communications structures as well as decisive and
well-planned
strategy."

What is striking about this Russian assessment is that it confirms the
assessments of the handful of Western journalists who covered the highly
successful Iraqi defensive operations against vastly numerically superior

Iranian forces during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. In other words, the
Iraqis
were not suddenly showing some supernatural capabilities they had never
been

capable of before. The tactical skills that have been taking U.S. war
planners and troops by surprise over the past two weeks have been a
documented characteristic of the ordinary Iraqi army -- and not just its
elite Republican Guard units -- for the past 20 years.

But the Russian report also documents the Iraqis' newly found skills at
conducting guerrilla operations behind coalition lines. And this is an
entirely new -- and from the coalition point of view, extremely unwelcome

development that had no precedent in either the Iran-Iraq War or the 1991

Gulf War.

"Commanders of the -- Iraqi -- special operations forces are making good
use

of the available troops and weapons to conduct operations behind the
front
lines of the enemy. They use concealment, cunning and imagination," the
report said.

But some things have not changed for the better, especially from the
Soviet
training and military doctrine that has shaped the Iraqi army for the
past 4

1/2 decades.

The Russian analysts also observed: "Among the drawbacks of the Iraqi
forces

is the bureaucratic inflexibility of their command, when all decisions
are
made only at the highest levels. Their top commanders also tend to stick
to
standard 'template' maneuvers and there is insufficient coordination
among
the different type of forces."

Impressive strengths and unexpected -- or all too familiar -- weaknesses
of
both U.S. forces and their foes alike. It should not come as a surprise
to
readers of these analyses. For most wars are filled with such
complexities,
ironies and reversals of fortune. As we have noted before, the "walk in
the
park," minor, "gunboat-type" conflicts that the United States conducted
so
often and so easily over the past 20 years give a misleading impression
of
the real nature of war.

It is messy and unpredictable even for the best-run campaigns and the
most
highly trained, brave and best-equipped armies -- just as the Russian
analysts have observed.



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