[A-List] Iraq: Spyspeak, Defenders' warplans

["annewilliamson" <annewilliamson@xxxxxxx>]

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STRATFOR'S GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
http://www.stratfor.com
11 March 2003

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Today's Featured Analysis

War Plan: Iraq

Introduction

Unlike the United States, Iraq has a single, primary war aim:
regime survival. Its secondary aim is to maintain the territorial
integrity of Iraq; however, territorial loss is acceptable if it
permits regime survival.

The primary means for achieving Iraq's goals are diplomatic --
war avoidance. At the same time, there has been a limit to the
price that Iraq is willing to pay for war avoidance. The one
thing Baghdad has not been willing to do is permit a complete
search and destruction of all sites involved in the production
and storage of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. This is
true for two reasons.

First, it has, as a national priority, the preservation of those
capabilities.

Second, the Iraqi regime has understood that capitulation to
weapons inspections would inevitably undermine its own
sovereignty. Baghdad viewed any surrender of sovereignty as
constituting a threat to regime survival. Leaders saw external
intrusions as having malign intentions. The regime also saw its
own authority as inherently fragile. Submitting to a full
inspection would, in Baghdad's view, destroy the regime.
Therefore, in choosing between capitulation to inspections and
war, Baghdad was choosing between certain regime collapse and
possible regime collapse. War was not desirable, but it was the
alternative that provided the higher probability of survival.

>From the regime's point of view, a war in which territory is lost
but the regime survives is both preferable and possible. Indeed,
Baghdad sees politico-military strategies that permit both regime
survival and the recovery of any lost territory. Over the long
term, officials believe that it is possible that a war with the
United States and its allies would enhance Iraq's power in the
region.

The strategic prism through which Iraq views a war with the
United States is what it sees as the recent history of U.S.
combat in the Islamic world. The Iraqis look at four cases:
Beirut, Somalia, Desert Storm and Afghanistan. Their view is that
in each case, the United States failed to achieve its strategic
objectives because of an inability to sustain casualties. In
Beirut and Somalia, the United States withdrew after taking
relatively light casualties. In Desert Storm, having recaptured
Kuwait, the United States declined further combat that would be
inherent in a thrust toward Baghdad because it feared increased
casualties. In Afghanistan, the United States has occupied and
garrisoned the cities and a select number of other bases, but
since Operation Anaconda, it has carefully avoided major unit
engagements in order to prevent casualties. Thus, the U.S.
response to casualties or the threat of casualties has been
withdrawal, cease-fire or severe force protection measures that
limit the ability of forces to control terrain. Regardless of
whether this view of the United States is accurate, it is the
view that shapes Iraq's actions.

In addition to this analysis of U.S. military weakness, Iraq's
view of the international situation is that extended combat will
impose political costs on the United States and its allies --
diplomatically and in terms of domestic politics --that will
compel the United States to accept a cease-fire and possibly even
withdraw in favor of U.N. peacekeeping forces if the war is
prolonged, and if it is coupled with special operations attacks
by Iraqi or allied paramilitaries beyond Iraqi borders. Thus, an
extended war will create heavy pressure on the British government
to press for a cease-fire, while intense attacks on civilian
targets in countries hosting coalition forces in the region, or
in countries actively engaged in combat, would create the
domestic conditions for a political resolution that would include
regime preservation.

This is the reasoning that has led Baghdad to choose war over
peace. It is critical to understand that the regime does not
believe that its defeat is inevitable. It is impossible to gauge
the extent to which the regime is confident of success or its
military forces and public. However, it is clear that the regime
regards the chance of success as sufficiently greater than zero
as to make capitulation irrational.

General Strategy

It follows from this that the Iraqi army has two strategic goals:

1. Extend the war as long as possible.
2. Inflict as many casualties as possible without incurring the
collapse of Iraqi resistance.

Outside of Iraq, Baghdad has a single goal: to inflict sufficient
pain on the relatively unenthusiastic populations of regional
host countries and combatants so as to create unbearable pressure
on their governments. The strategies will be different. In the
Middle East, the targets will be hostile governments; outside the
region, populations. Now, it is unclear whether Iraq has the
capability to carry out a campaign of this sort on any broad
scale, or whether potential allies do. However, it is logical
that Iraq will use what resources it has to strike back as well
as it can.

In short, the Iraqis intend to try to impose a war of attrition
on the United States, under the working assumption that time and
casualties are what Washington can least afford. In addition, the
Iraqis will attempt to execute -- in alliance with available
militant groups if possible -- paramilitary operations against
civilian populations on the broadest possible front.

Iraqi leaders have had extensive experience with U.S. war-
fighting methods, both during the 1990-91 conflict and during the
twelve years since. They have drawn the following lessons:

1. The United States will achieve qualified command of the air
within 24 hours of the outbreak of a high-intensity air war, if
it is not lost prior to this through low-intensity suppression of
enemy air defense (SEAD) strikes. We say "qualified" because, in
Yugoslavia, air defenses remained.
2. The United States will destroy all strategic communications
capabilities within the first hours of the war and degrade
tactical communications rapidly as well.
3. The United States will destroy strategic intelligence
collection and dissemination capabilities within the first few
days of warfare.
4. The United States will detect, attack and decimate any large
ground formations engaged in strategic redeployment after war
initiation. The United States will also detect, attack and
decimate any significant concentrations of Iraqi forces deployed
in flat, open terrain, and many located in mountainous areas.
5. The United States will defeat Iraqi formations engaged on the
ground in open train, particularly in the desert.

>From these insights, Iraqi leaders have developed the following
operational principles:

1. Delay war initiation as long as possible to erode the
political foundation of the coalition and to allow maximum time
for Iraqi war preparations.
2. All strategic deployments of ground forces must be completed
prior to war initiation.
3. Command must devolve to the highest level that can be
maintained under circumstances. This means that some formations
will collapse immediately because they cannot operate under
devolution. However, sufficient forces must be able to survive
devolution in strategic areas.
4. Full advantage must be taken of all terrain and urbanization
features to delay coalition advances and impose the highest
possible casualties upon them.
5. Full advantage must be taken of tactical deception methods to
limit the effects of air power.
6. Chemical weapons must be used in order to inflict casualties,
prevent force concentration, impose time delays and undermine
enemy morale. If such weapons are unavailable, the threat of
these weapons should be used to create all of the above
conditions except casualties.
7. The most capable forces must be strategically deployed in
areas that provide the greatest force multiplication, including
urban areas and mountainous/hill terrain. The goal is to maintain
defensive positions, particularly in cities, forcing the
coalition to attack on disadvantageous terms.
8. Operate in environments where strategic command and control
are unnecessary and in which positional warfare, with only
tactical shifts, is required. In other words, fight where
mobility is not required.
9. Fight in environments where coalition airpower's effectiveness
is mitigated and where armor is at a disadvantage.
10. Create circumstances that will build international pressure
for a cease-fire and domestic anti-war pressure by emphasizing
civilian casualties and carrying out widespread, covert,
paramilitary attacks against as many coalition members as
possible.
11. Use low-tech and environmental capabilities to defeat high-
tech U.S. weapons systems -- for example, taking advantage of
dust storms, creating smoke screens from oil fires, terrain and
urbanization advantages, etc.

In other words, delay the enemy, inflict casualties early, force
battles to take place in urbanized areas and allow forces already
deployed to fight without the need for strategic command,
control, communications or intelligence. Turn the war into a
brawl.

The assumption is that the morale of the coalition can be
attacked effectively. Iraqi leaders are also aware that the
morale of their own forces is questionable. They have tried to
deploy their forces in order to mitigate this consideration. In
order to conduct the kind of war they want, they must themselves
be able to count on the commitment and morale of at least part of
their forces.

Morale is the hardest thing to predict in war. The history of
warfare is riddled with miscalculations of an enemy's morale,
will to fight and training. There are many examples, but none as
a propos as the Israelis' experience with the Egyptians. In 1967,
the Israeli army routed Egyptian forces as thoroughly as any army
could be. Israel assumed that Egyptian morale, will and training
remained relatively unchanged. However, in 1973, the Egyptian
army executed a complex, multi-divisional cross-water assault
under conditions of disciplined secrecy. The Egyptian army of
1973 was not the Egyptian army of 1967. Israel's intelligence
structure clung to the evaluation it formed in 1967 and did not
change it until its forces were engaged.

It has been 12 years since the Gulf War. The general assumption
on the American side is that the Iraqi army has deteriorated over
that time and that the defeat of 1991 in Kuwait can be replicated
in 2003 in the whole of Iraq. This may well be true, but the
answer will not be known until the battle has begun. This much we
do know: The Iraqi government must believe that its forces have
improved. Its leaders know how badly the Iraqi army was defeated
in 1991. They know that a similar defeat in 2003 could mean their
lives and certainly their freedom and fortunes. They have
alternatives, such as complying with weapons inspections or
accepting exile; they have not chosen these. Therefore, they
clearly must believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that their forces
have improved or were not fully tested in 1991.

Iraqi Forces and Deployments

The only significant Iraqi military asset is its army; neither
the air force nor the navy will have any strategic effect on the
war. On paper, Iraq has a substantial army. The regular army has
about 285,000 men. The Republican Guard, a superior force, has
125,000. There is a third group called the Special Republican
Guard with about 25,000 members, including reservists who have
already been mobilized. These are the strongest forces and the
most motivated. Iraq also possesses militia and paramilitary
formations of variable value. The fundamental question is whether
they are sufficiently motivated to stand and die in Iraq's
cities.

Thus, the army has a force totaling about 435,000 men. They are
being attacked by a force of about 300,000. The coalition has
many force multipliers, but these 435,000 men -- deployed
defensively in cities and rough terrain -- should also have
compensatory force multipliers. In a city, for example, the
effectiveness of many U.S. weapons will be minimized, while the
defenders' capabilities are multiplied. Therefore, on paper, the
Iraqi army should be formidable, particularly as a heavy infantry
force deployed into fortified cities, rough, fortified terrain
and so forth. The Iraqis clearly assume these forces have some
capability and currently have deployed them roughly as follows:

Iraqi forces are currently deployed in four main areas:

1. In the north near Mosul and Kirkuk, where a multidivisional
force or regular army units, reinforced by some Republican
Guards, are deployed.
2. In blocking positions on the Mosul-Baghdad and Kirkuk-Baghdad
highways.
3. In the Baghdad region, where three Special Republican Guard
brigades are located. They could be joined by additional RG units
that are currently north of the city.
4. In the southern region, where two Republican Guard divisions
and one regular army division are located.

The deployments coincide with the location of major oil fields,
except for the blocking forces and the troops around Baghdad.
There are no major units deployed south of the Euphrates or west
of the Tigris. There is also an extremely thin line of forces
guarding the Euphrates River. Since the likelihood of a major
attack deep into Iraq is declining in the north, strategic
redeployment is taking place, with forces moving south into
positions north of Baghdad.

Phase 1: Resisting the Initial Thrust

The Iraqis know that the American style of war is extremely
mobile and fluid, with direct attacks -- except for pinning
attacks -- less favored than envelopments. They remember the
famous "left hook" of 1991. They are also aware that Iraqi forces
cannot survive in the areas south of the Euphrates. Therefore,
there is an anomaly in their deployment -- there is a major force
in the southeast guarding the oil fields and blocking the roads
through the marshes northward out of Kuwait. There is a force
around Baghdad and a Republican Guard division at Al Kut -- but
the Euphrates River from Baghdad to the Shatt al Arab is
completely unguarded.

>From this deployment south of Baghdad, the following conclusions
must be drawn:

1. The Iraqis assume that the coalition has a primary strategic
requirement to seize the southern oil fields, and they have
deployed forces in order to force the coalition into a direct
attack on two Republican Guard divisions and one regular division
-- in marshy terrain, where maneuver is difficult.
2. Alternatively, if the coalition concludes that the destruction
of the southern force is too costly, the next logical attack --
and one in keeping with U.S. doctrine -- is a thrust out of
western Kuwait, north to the Euphrates on the line from As Samawa
to An Nasariya. There are bridges in both cities, plus a bridge
in between, where Route 12 crosses a canal.

The United States has a third option, which is to move through
the desert to the al Karbala-al Najaf line. This would be a
difficult maneuver, involving a movement of more than 300
kilometers followed by a crossing in a populated area. In
addition, the bridges in the region would have to be seized early
on by special forces or air-mobile troops, and the length of time
these forces would have to hold would be substantially longer
than if the attack were carried out at the As Samawa-An Nasariya
line.

Here too, there would be the expectations of Special Forces-air
mobile seizures of the bridges, coupled with a rapid movement
from western Kuwait. Regardless of whether the bridges were
intact, a traffic jam undoubtedly would occur on the southern
side of the Euphrates. Even with the best traffic control, this
would be the ideal point to release chemical weapons -- either
from unmanned aerial vehicles, multiple rocket-launch systems or
artillery shells. Indeed, a combination of chemical attacks south
of the river and missile attacks from the area west of Basra into
Kuwait could cause chaos. Finally, even if chemical weapons were
not used, the fear of weapons would slow down the crossing
process substantially.

Obviously, one of the prime missions of coalition aircraft will
be the location and destruction of any weapons platform capable
of launching chemical weapons. However, the Iraqis have learned
from the Serbian experience in Kosovo that it is possible to
engage in effective deception practices in order to confuse and
defeat U.S. air strikes. Camouflage, dummy replicas and
attraction practices combined could render suppression strikes
ineffective. Even if the systems were destroyed after they
launched, the damage would be done.

Inflicting some casualties at the Euphrates crossings is
absolutely essential. The forces in Baghdad are the best troops
available, but all forces crumble if there is a sense of
hopelessness. The sense of coalition invincibility must be
shattered if Iraq hopes to stage a fight in Baghdad. The
Euphrates crossings are the most vulnerable points for the
coalition. They will, of course, counter with air-mobile
operations designed to force any systems out of range. But it
will be the task of scattered Iraqi units in the area to resist
and strike. If they can, the Iraqi chances improve substantially.

Phase II: Refugees Before Baghdad

Coalition forces will be presented with two challenges in
approaching Baghdad. The first of these are the water barriers
throughout the region; the second, the large population. As the
Poles learned in World War II, the German management of refugees
could make maneuver impossible. Iraq's ability to force a sudden,
mass movement of civilian populations in the already populous and
urbanized areas south of Baghdad could make the last 150
kilometers of advance nightmarishly slow and dangerous, as Iraqi
guerrillas mingle in the crowds and strike. U.S. officials
already have said they will not take captive any Iraqi soldier
who doesn't resist -- a sign that the United States is dreading
the task of managing POWs in the midst of war. A refugee
situation would be worse. An envelopment through the lakes would
not solve the U.S. problem.

The obvious solution for the United States will be air-mobile
operations. However, this wouldn't solve the problem in this
area, where there are few Iraqi forces to engage. Air-mobile
operations would not solve the problem of follow-on forces
linking up -- they would still have to pass through urbanized,
riverine terrain.

If Iraq's plan at the Euphrates is to cause first casualties, the
strategy in the second phase is to impose time costs on the
coalition. If the roads are clogged with refugees driven by Iraqi
forces, the period of time between the Euphrates crossing and
reaching Baghdad -- assuming a movement reduced to 40 kilometers
a day -- could take four days or possibly more.

Phase III: Baghdad

Baghdad is a city of 5 million surrounded by dense suburbs. It is
bisected by the Tigris, flanked on the east by the Nahr Diyala
and in the west by the Euphrates. It is surrounded on all sides
by numerous water courses of various sizes. The Iraqis are
fortifying the city. Of great note are deep and wide ditches,
plumbed to oil or propane tanks, that are being dug to the south
and north of the city. There is every indication that the Iraqis
intend to fight a critical, if not definitive, battle in Baghdad.

At this moment, only three Iraqi brigades are stationed in
Baghdad itself; however, they are the elite Special Republican
Guard. They could be reinforced by several other Republican Guard
divisions close to Baghdad if the Iraqis choose. However, the
SRG, at about 25,000, represents a formidable force in and of
itself.

The United States has three options with Baghdad, should
resistance occur.

1. Assault.
2. Lay siege.
3. Contain and then bypass the city.

The United States does not want 5 million refugees pouring out of
the city, as that would paralyze coalition mobility. Therefore,
U.S. forces must devise some sort of containment plan. From the
Iraqi standpoint, any containment plan would achieve two of its
own purposes. Militarily, it would tie coalition forces down and
either halt the offensive or diminish the enemy's striking power
and increase the time needed to bypass Iraq. Politically, any
siege or containment of this sort, even if it did not involve
artillery and aerial bombardment, would disrupt the flow of food
and other supplies into the city, disrupt other critical services
and create a severe humanitarian crisis. A city of this size
cannot be isolated for very long without this happening. That
would suit Iraqi intentions perfectly, because it would, in their
minds, split the coalition, undermine international tolerance for
the attack and undermine domestic support for the war in the
United States and Britain.

Keeping 25,000 trained and trusted troops in Baghdad under the
command of Qusai Hussein, President Saddam Hussein's son,
represents economy of force. Any Iraqi forces in Baghdad when
coalition forces arrive will be trapped and lost for future use.
Therefore, keeping the minimum possible force within the capital
is ideal. The force is large enough to inflict substantial
casualties if it can draw coalition forces into close-quarter
combat, and it is sufficiently reliable to maintain control of
Baghdad in a siege environment. All or part of the three
Republican Guard divisions deployed north of Baghdad could
reinforce this force, but for the moment, these units appear to
be prepping for a defense north of Baghdad, rather than moving
into the capital. Uncertainty about the final distribution of
these forces remains.

Ultimately, Iraqi leaders do not believe that Baghdad can be held
- but it can cost the coalition substantial and unacceptable
casualties and/or time delays. That is its purpose. If operations
around Baghdad cost 500 coalition lives and a week's extension of
the war, this will serve Iraq's purpose.

>From the Iraqi point of view, this is the point at which the
coalition might accept or be forced to accept a cease-fire.

Phase IV: Redoubt

Should Baghdad fall, there would appear to us to be a final Iraq
plan, which we have labeled the Redoubt Plan. During the waning
days of World War II, there was a real fear that the Germans,
following the fall of Berlin, would regroup in the southern
mountains in Bavaria and try to preserve the regime there, using
the mountains as fortifications against ground and air attacks.
The plan never materialized: The United States diverted forces
into the German Alps in anticipation of such a strategy.

Three things calls our attention to the potential for such an
action in Iraq, however:

1. Republican Guard divisions have moved into blocking positions
on the two major roads running north from the Baghdad area. Their
deployment, if held, indicates that their purpose is to prevent
the northward evolution of coalition forces after the fall of
Baghdad or in the event that Baghdad is occupied.

2. The bulk of Iraq's military is still located in the north,
with particularly heavy concentrations in the Kirkuk region, in
the foothills east of the Tigris. Those forces will not be able
to strategically redeploy after the war begins; therefore, even
if they are thinned out prior to the war, they represent a
strategic investment in the region.

3. The Iraqis have recently dug fortifications north of the city.
While this might be a move to defend the city from an attack from
the north, such encirclement will be difficult to execute given
distances, roads and terrain. Another explanation, which coheres
with Point 1 above, is that this represents the first line of
defense against attacks northward out of Baghdad, rather than a
defense of Baghdad itself.

The absence of U.S. forces attacking from Turkey -- and the
likelihood that the Turks will limit the extent of their advance
into Iraq -- make this an attractive area for a redoubt.
Coalition forces supplied from Kuwait will be operating at
extreme distances from a logistical point of view. They will also
need to regroup, rest and repair, after the Baghdad campaign. If
the Baghdad situation is handled suitably from an Iraqi
standpoint, coalition forces will have been delayed, attrited and
demoralized. The battle or siege of Baghdad would have created
terrific international pressure, and confidence in a rapid
victory would have evaporated.

If paramilitary attacks against civilian targets in coalition
countries are taking place and confidence in a rapid victory is
gone, the political foundation for an attack northward will
dissolve. Moreover, if -- during the early engagements of the
northern campaign -- further chemical attacks, coupled with
fortification force multipliers, could create substantial
military difficulties. Finally, operations will grow increasingly
difficult as the terrain grows increasingly difficult.

Conclusion

If the Iraqi forces simply collapse and dissolve, there will be
no opportunity to execute this or any other plan. Obviously, all
plans depend on sufficient morale and capability to execute them,
and the coalition will do everything possible to make this
impossible. However, it is clear that the Iraqis believe:

1. That at least some of their forces will resist with some
degree of competence.
2. That the coalition has a very low threshold for time and pain.
3. That a plan can be designed to force the coalition beyond the
pain threshold.

It follows that Iraqi leaders must therefore believe the
following:

1. That the use or threat of use of chemical weapons will slow
the coalition advance and inflict casualties.
2. That terrain and urbanization south of Baghdad will further
slow that advance.
3. That Baghdad will impose either major time penalties or
casualties.
4. That even the fall of Baghdad does not necessarily mean the
loss of the regime.

Clearly, the Iraqis must also believe that air-mobile and
airborne operations will not make this defense impossible, that
their forces can survive intense area bombardment from coalition
aircraft and that at least some paramilitary attacks can be
mounted in at least some coalition countries.

If none of these things are true, or if the coalition's will is
greater than leaders in Baghdad calculate, Iraq will lose the
war. The Iraqi calculus is that enough of these assumptions will
be sufficiently true that the war will terminate in a cease-fire
rather than unconditional surrender.
...................................................................