[A-List] US Imperialism: Spyspeak - Geography

["annewilliamson" <annewilliamson@xxxxxxx>]

Iraq War Plan: The Physical Environment
Mar 10, 2003

Terrain

Iraq's geography is defined by its two rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates.
Mesopotamia, the ancient civilization that once thrived in modern-day Iraq
territory, means "land between two rivers." It is these rivers -- and the
tributaries, streams and swamps that they create -- that define the Iraqi
battlefield. Paradoxically, in a region that is thought of in terms of
desert, it is Iraq's riverine structure that will be the most salient
feature of the battlefield.

Both rivers follow a roughly northwest-to-southeasterly course. This bias
defines the battlefield as well: The southernmost river, the Euphrates,
originates from the Buhrayat al Asad, a Syrian lake. It crosses the Iraqi
border at al Saybah, flowing eastward into a lake formed by a dam, and then
southeast, passing about 30 kilometers southwest of Baghdad. It terminates
in the Shatt al Arab, which flows into the Persian Gulf. As it proceeds
toward the Shatt al Arab, the Euphrates generates broad marshlands.

The Tigris originates in the mountains along the Iraqi-Turkish border. It
flows south from Mosul to Baghdad, bisecting the city. It then flows
southeast through Baghdad to al Kut, where it continues east and then curves
south into the Shatt al Arab and the Persian Gulf. It also creates large
swamps along the way, which intensify as the river merges with the Euphrates
into the Shatt al Arab.

A third river, the Nahr Diyala, also has military significance. It
originates in the mountains along the Iran-Iraq border and flows
southwestward, through a dammed lake and toward Baghdad, where it defines
the capital city's eastern limits before flowing into the Tigris.






About 60 kilometers (40 miles) west of Baghdad is a large lake system,
consisting of three separate lakes. The system runs about 250 kilometers
(155 miles) north-south and contains two gaps. The southern gap, almost
directly west of Baghdad, is about 10 kilometers wide; the larger, northern
gap is about 50 kilometers wide. Both gaps contain multiple river obstacles
running both north-to-south and in other directions. Both have roads and
bridges.

The land between the Tigris and Euphrates southeast of Baghdad is flat but
cut by numerous small rivers, streams and canals. The area west of Baghdad,
between the Euphrates and the city, is even more densely riddled with
riverine obstacles, as is the area directly to the north. There is no
approach to Baghdad which is not heavily cut by water routes.

The area between the Saudi border and the Euphrates River is primarily
desert. It presents a variety of surfaces, from sandy to rocky. This desert
runs northwest to southeast from the Syrian and Jordanian border to Kuwait.
This desert, which makes up roughly half of Iraq's terrain, is crossed by a
large number of usable roads. The area between the Tigris and Euphrates
northwest of Baghdad is also desert.

The area north of Baghdad and east and northeast of the Tigris is the other
populated sector of Iraq. The area north of Baghdad to the town of Samarra
is flat and well-watered. Beyond this, a long rocky ridge -- the Jabal
Hamrin -- runs from al Hamansuriya in a long arc to the town of Baji, an arc
of about 150 kilometers. The ridge is 200-400 meters (650-1,300 feet) high.
Beyond this, there is hilly terrain running between the towns of Kirkuk and
Mosul. East and northeast of Kirkuk, the terrain becomes more rugged, with
hills rising to 1,500 meters (5000 feet) and higher. These then culminate in
mountains along both the Turkish and Iranian borders, where the steeps rise
to between 2,000 and higher than 3,000 meters (6,500-10,000 feet).

Population

Iraq's population is extremely uneven in its distribution. The country has a
population of about 22 million people, of whom at least 25 percent live in
Baghdad and an even higher percentage in the Baghdad metropolitan area.
Particularly heavily populated is the Tigris river basin south of Baghdad.
The area from Baghdad to 100 kilometers on either side of the Tigris is as
densely populated as Baghdad proper. The area from As Samawa north along the
east bank of the Euphrates is also fairly populous; indeed, the area
northwest of the line from As Samawa to Al Kut is densely peopled and
intermittently urbanized for about 120 kilometers to Baghdad.

The southern half of the country is relatively uninhabited, as is the
northwestern desert. There are important population concentrations in the
cities of Mosul and Kirkuk in the north and Basra in the south. There are
also important concentrations of non-urbanized mountain dwellers in Arbil
and the northeastern foothills and mountains, and population concentrations
in the southern marshes where the Tigris and Euphrates merge.

The population distribution has substantial political significance, since
these pockets represent diverse and competitive ethnic groups. The area
around Baghdad is generally populated by Sunni Muslims, a group that
dominates the Iraqi government. However, the southeastern concentration --
including that running south from Baghdad along the Tigris River -- is
predominantly Shiite, a group that generally has had tense relations with
Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's regime.

The northeastern concentrations are predominantly Kurdish -- Sunni Muslims
who are not Arab, and who have had a relatively antagonistic relationship
with the government in Baghdad.

Oil Fields

The locations of Iraqi oil fields are of strategic military significance.
They are significant prizes of war in their own right. In addition, if they
were set on fire as they were in 1991, they would pose a military challenge
to the United States, since smoke and heat would make both reconnaissance
and the use of precision-guided munitions relatively difficult. Thus, the
location of these fields has a material effect on the war.

The most significant oil fields are found directly north of the Kuwaiti
border and running roughly to the Euphrates River, a distance of about 90
kilometers. The two other most significant fields are located in the north,
around Mosul and Kirkuk. The Kirkuk field runs almost 200 kilometers
northwest to southeast through hilly country, which is populated more
heavily in the northwest. The Basra fields run through heavily populated,
marshy terrain that is crisscrossed by a large number of roads.

Weather

In March, the average high temperature in Baghdad is 73 degrees Fahrenheit
(23 degrees Celsius). In April, this rises to 84 degrees (23 C) and in May
to 96 degrees (36 C). Precipitation is infrequent during these months, and
the skies are generally clear or have scattered clouds. Humidity is
extremely low. In the Basra region, temperatures are somewhat higher: The
average high in March is 77 degrees Fahrenheit, rising to 89 degrees in
April and 98 by May.

Temperatures are slightly higher than average this year. The high expected
for March 10 was 81 degrees in Baghdad, with clear skies. Temperatures
should cool somewhat into the seventies during the week, then begin to rise
again next weekend. The weather is expected to be clear, with no
precipitation forecast except for possibly slight showers on March 12. In
the south, temperatures will be rising into the mid-80s during the week,
fall and then rise again over the weekend. By March 17, the expected highs
should reach into the 80s each day.

The weather pattern is complicated by the advent of the Sharqui, an east
wind that gathers dust, with gusts up to 50 miles an hour (80 km/hr). The
Sharqui can generate violent dust storms that rise several thousand feet in
the air. The Sharqui normally peaks in April; dust storms reportedly are
blowing in the south already.

Meanwhile, the moon will be at the first-quarter mark on March 11, rising at
10:59 a.m. local time and setting at 1:53 a.m. the following day. Moonrise
and -set times advance by nearly an hour with each passing day: For example,
moonrise on March 12 is 11:47 a.m. This shift creates windows of darkness
that can be taken into account during planning, regardless of the phase of
the moon.

The moon will reach its fullest point within the current cycle on March
18 -- during which time it will be in the sky from shortly after dark to
6:22 a.m. the following day, providing full illumination.

The Kuwaiti-Iraqi Frontier





The Kuwaiti frontier consists of two parts: the northern and western
borders. The northern border fronts onto the Iraqi oil fields in the west
and marshes in the eastern portion. An advance into this region would be
supported by good roads on a front about 50 kilometers wide. However,
population density and the possibility of oil fires would make the speed of
penetration somewhat questionable. A penetration of about 40 kilometers
brings the attacking force to a cluster of east-west routes along the
southern bank of the Euphrates, making it necessary to capture bridges at al
Nasirya or further west. The north contains swamp. Basra lies to the east
and does not have to be seized in order to carry out operations toward
Baghdad.

The western frontier is about 110 kilometers long. While there are
relatively few roads, they pass through fairly uninhabited, flat desert --
perfect for armored operations. They also provide access to trans-Euphrates
bridges. This line of advance provides an indirect, longer route toward
Baghdad, but one that does not risk the congestion and complexity of a
direct northward attack.

The Turkish-Iraqi Frontier





The Turkish-Iraqi frontier would run just more than 200 kilometers on a
straight line, which it is not. Almost the entire border consists of
mountainous terrain, with peaks in the 2,000-3,000-meter range. No roads
cross these mountains, only occasional trails. It would be impossible to
push a heavy, multidivisional force across this terrain and even more
difficult to supply it.

The only possible route for division-sized forces from Turkey into Iraq is
to be found at the juncture of Syria, Iraq and Turkey. There, a small
extension of the Syrian-Iraqi flatlands can be found. This area in Turkey is
about 30 kilometers wide and 20 kilometers deep.

A single, four-lane road crosses from Turkey into Iraq. Two roads feed into
the area: One is virtually on top of the Syrian border, and at some points
it forms the Syrian-Turkish border; the other is a three-lane road through
the mountains to the town of Dyarbakir. There is also a railroad into the
area.

Given that only a single road -- albeit a good one -- crosses the frontier,
there are severe limits on the size of forces that could be supported out of
Turkey. Most of the border is uncrossable by any sizeable unit. It is
conceivable that a single U.S. division could advance into Iraq from Turkey,
although its supply line might have to be supplemented by aircraft landing
at captured airfields in Iraq. Other troops also could be brought in this
way, but any airborne resupply operation can sustain only limited forces. It
is noteworthy, however, that if the attacking forces were to pass through
extreme northeastern Syria, a much more substantial force could be mounted.

Analysis

Unless Syrian territory is used for a U.S. invasion, only a very limited
force can be supported directly out of Turkey. The northern route cannot
constitute the main axis of attack. The main axis of attack must come out of
Kuwait and, if permission is given, Saudi Arabia. The main, initial task
will be crossing the Euphrates River. The western route, through the desert,
provides the optimal environment for large-scale armored attacks. A thrust
directly north may be necessary to secure the oil fields, but given the
terrain, a sustained movement northward would be difficult unless there is
no opposition. The most rapid attack ought to come through the desert.

There are three bridges in the eastern section of the Euphrates: al
Nasiriyah, the Route 12 bridge and As Samawa. A force attacking from the
western Kuwaiti frontier would seek to cross at these points, if only to be
able to attack along both sides of the Euphrates. Another option would be to
cross over bridges further along the river, where U.S. forces would be
taking advantage of unpopulated desert for maneuver. The disadvantage would
be that the crossing would take place in heavily populated areas.

The central problem for the U.S. military will be urbanization and
population density. Regardless of where the crossing takes place, combat
will occur in densely populated areas, with attendant problems of refugees
blocking roads and requirements for humanitarian assistance. Moreover, the
same highly populated areas are crossed by multiple, varied and complex
water courses. Long before Baghdad, invading forces will encounter extremely
difficult conditions.

One possible solution is political. The heavily populated area is also
heavily Shiite and putatively anti-Hussein. If there is a rising in this
region and cooperation with invading forces, the problems might be
mitigated. However, the Shiite population already is voicing displeasure
with U.S. plans for postwar Iraq, so cooperation is not assured. At any
rate, intentions alone will not solve the problems of congestion, delays and
vulnerability in the Euphrates-Tigris basin moving into Baghdad.

There is an option for an envelopment to the west of the city, through the
two gaps between the lakes. A maneuver that extensive, particularly using
armor, would pose significant logistical challenges. Moreover, the gaps are
relatively narrow, and even a light defensive force could delay an attacking
force.

The nature of the terrain and the obstacles clearly call for air-mobile
operations by U.S. forces. The ability to disrupt Iraqi formations prior to
the arrival of armored forces will be critical to the success of U.S.
operations. Since the Iraqis are aware of the presence of the 101st Airborne
in Kuwait, they undoubtedly will use the river/stream barriers to delay
ground forces, while seeking to mitigate the risk from air-mobile operations
to their rear through the use of heavy machine guns and shoulder-fired
anti-aircraft missiles -- both weapons to which helicopters are extremely
vulnerable.

Helicopters also are extremely vulnerable to dust storms. An early Sharqi
would cause serious problems for turbine engines as well as for optical
systems, upon which helicopters depend. The early onset of the Sharqi would
force the attackers to a more limited use of air-mobile operations.

It is now obvious that U.S. commanders do not regard a full moon as a
significant threat to their operations. Alternatively, the political
leadership in Washington -- for diplomatic reasons -- has imposed increased
risk on the military. Given current timing, we can expect daytime
temperatures in the 80s, light clouds, a full moon and only intermittent
dust storms. These conditions should hold for about two weeks, after which
temperatures and the risk of dust storms will rise.





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