[A-List] US Imperialism: Spyspeak - Let the Show Begin!

["annewilliamson" <annewilliamson@xxxxxxx>]

The "commercialization" of the war has begun in earnst. -A.

=================================================================

STRATFOR'S GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
http://www.stratfor.com
10 March 2003

=================================================================


Iraq War Plans: The Eve of Battle

This week, Stratfor brings you a systematic overview of the war-
fighting realities and options of both Iraqi and coalition
forces. Part 1 of this five-part series explores the physical
environment that will constitute the battle space of this war.
Installments to follow will concern Iraqi forces and strategies,
coalition forces and strategies, war-fighting scenarios and the
strategic consequences of the war.

Introduction
In early September 2002, Stratfor published a war plan series in
which we laid out four possible U.S. strategies for invading
Iraq. The war aims listed at that time consisted of:

1. Replacing Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's regime with one
compatible with U.S. interests.

2. Maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq so that it
remains a counterweight to Iran, and so that nationalist
ambitions by ethnic Kurds in northern Iraq do not disrupt U.S.-
Turkish relations.

3. Eliminating the threat of weapons of mass destruction by
having total direct access to all of Iraq.

4. Changing the perception of American effectiveness in the
Islamic world.

5. Destroying collaboration between Iraq and al Qaeda.

6. Minimizing U.S. casualties.

We since have added a seventh war goal, which is to create bases
within Iraq for future power projection in the region.

At the time our original series was published, we laid out four
broad options for war plans:

1. Operation Desert Stun: a sudden, overwhelming attack on the
center, using airpower and Special Forces in order to force a
rapid conclusion to the war.

2. Operation Desert Slice: a sequential attack on the various
regions of Iraq designed to segment and stabilize the
countryside, leaving Saddam Hussein isolated in Baghdad.

3. Operation Desert Storm II: a multidivisional armored and
mechanized attack on Baghdad.

4. Operation Desert Thunder: an extended air campaign designed to
cripple Iraq militarily and economically.

It appears to us, at this point, that the final war plan consists
of a combination of the first three options. To be more precise,
we expect to see a segmented but very tightly sequenced war --
for which the goal is rapid victory and in which the operational
plan will unfold dynamically during the campaign, depending on
political events in Baghdad and the behavior of the Iraqi
military.

The war will begin with an intense air campaign, with the intent
not only to paralyze the Iraqi armed forces and government but to
force an early capitulation or coup in Baghdad. If that does not
succeed, rapid ground operations will ensue, designed to increase
pressure on Baghdad -- and hopefully stimulate capitulation or
political evolutions -- as well as to test the capabilities of
the Iraqi army. This phase, the length of which will be
determined by events, will consist of regional engagements. If
the Iraqi army shows capability and resilience, the campaign will
segue into Operation Desert Storm II, a multidivisional assault
on Iraq. This sequencing will be tight, moving from phase to
phase in days or even hours.

We do not expect a set campaign in which the evolution of the war
is governed by rigid operational orders. Rather, we expect a
dynamic campaign in which operations shift according to events on
the battlefield or in Baghdad. The principle will be extremely
rapid production of operational orders at all levels, in response
to intelligence on Iraqi performance.

Two fundamental assumptions are built into this war -- one of
them by the United States, the other by Iraq:

1. U.S. assumption: The Iraqi army is not minimally competent.
Based upon its performance during Desert Storm and the subsequent
deterioration of its numbers, equipment, training and morale, an
early collapse of the Iraqi army is likely. Thus, the totality of
the war plan will not have to be executed, and war termination
might occur prior to entry into a full, multidivisional
engagement.

2. Iraqi assumption: The U.S. military is not prepared to take
extensive casualties. Judging from its performance in Lebanon,
Somalia, Kuwait and Afghanistan, the United States -- if it
encounters sustained opposition -- either will withdraw, accept a
cease-fire or halt and build fixed installations.

These two assumptions shape the war plans of each side and will
be tested in this campaign.