[A-List] US imperialism: NATO

["Michael Keaney" <michael.keaney@xxxxxx>]

New York Times
February 25, 2003
NATO: The Inside Story
By MICHAEL R. GORDON

WASHINGTON - NATO ambassadors gathered for a final showdown over Iraq on
Feb. 16, the alliance's secretary general, Lord Robertson, held a secret
trump card.

The NATO chief was ready to authorize the dispatch of Awacs planes and
Patriot antimissile batteries to help protect Turkey even if Belgium, the
lone holdout, failed to drop its objections, NATO diplomats say.

Such a move would have been an abrupt departure from NATO's time-honored
tradition of operating only on the basis of consensus. But with the strong
backing of the United States and Britain, Lord Robertson would have asserted
that the alliance had the legal authority to take action to protect its air
space even without the approval from all its members.

As it happened, this extraordinary step turned out to be unnecessary when
Belgium finally yielded during a marathon session that ended shortly before
midnight on Feb. 16. The alliance's mission to bolster Turkey's defense was
approved and NATO's Awacs are scheduled to be flying missions over Turkey by
Thursday.

But NATO diplomats report that Lord Robertson was not bluffing. Worried that
the alliance's credibility would be threatened if it did not act, NATO's
staff developed the maneuver as a last ditch way to break the deadlock.

Significantly, Lord Robertson and R. Nicholas Burns, the American ambassador
to NATO, told Belgium's representatives of their plan to have NATO go ahead
with or without Belgium's support. Belgium would be isolated diplomatically
if it failed to go along and its dissent would have no practical effect.

Using NATO's term for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen. James L.
Jones, a NATO official said, "If Belgium had not agreed Robertson would have
delegated authority to Saceur to send Awacs and Patriots under his own
authority to protect alliance air space."

Critics of Lord Robertson complain that he was too confrontational in trying
to forge a NATO decision. But his defenders say inaction would have damaged
the Western alliance far more.

In Washington, the Bush administration has nothing but admiration for how
the Scottish-born former British labor leader and defense minister played
his hand. Three days after Belgium acquiesced, Lord Robertson arrived at the
White House. Upon entering the Oval Office for a meeting with President
Bush, the president led the Americans in the room in a standing ovation for
the NATO chief. The president, one official recalled, lauded Lord Robertson
as a "conquering hero."

Some NATO traditionalists, however, are surprised at the lengths Lord
Robertson and the Bush administration went to win the debate.

Acting without unanimity from NATO "would have been precedent-setting," said
Stanley R. Sloan, a NATO expert and visiting scholar at Middlebury College.
"If one country is still standing aside from the consensus and is not
willing to go along the NATO rule is nothing happens."

The groundwork for the debate that would turn NATO inside out began in early
December, when Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz stopped briefly in
Brussels on his way back from Turkey, and told the allies that the United
States planned to ask for NATO's help.

Mr. Wolfowitz indicated that the United States wanted the alliance to send
Awacs airborne radar planes, Patriots antimissile systems and chemical and
biological defensive equipment to Turkey to help protect it from a possible
attack from Iraq, its neighbor to the south. The aim was to make the Turkish
government feel more secure in allowing American forces to open a northern
front in its invasion to topple Saddam Hussein.

There were other things the United States wanted. The Bush administration,
for example, wanted NATO to facilitate the American military buildup in the
Persian Gulf by taking over duties normally performed by American troops,
like patrols in the Mediterranean and guarding United States military bases
in Europe and the Middle East.

Mr. Wolfowitz also wanted NATO nations to pick up the slack in the Balkans
should any allied forces be shifted from there to aid in a war with Iraq. He
also wanted NATO to help with peacekeeping in Iraq and in destroying weapons
of mass destruction after a war.

In mid-January, Ambassador Burns formally asked the 19-member NATO alliance
to begin contingency planning to carry out the requests. Some of the steps
were quietly put into effect - some were set aside.

But France, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg argued that any move to begin
planning for a defense of Turkey and to fulfill other of the United States
requests would put NATO ahead of the game. The United Nations was expected
to hear from its weapons inspectors and further United Nations debate was
necessary, in their view. Luxembourg later dropped its opposition, shrinking
the ranks of dissenters to France, Germany and Belgium.

The alliance, however, was still deadlocked and as the debate dragged on
Lord Robertson sought to end it by invoking the "silence procedure." In
effect, a program of NATO aid for Turkey would be charted and other steps
planned so long as members raised no objection.

But France, Germany and Belgium would not go along silently. Turkey, for its
part, responded by calling for consultations under Article IV of the NATO
treaty, the procedure a nation uses when it feels its security is
threatened.

With tensions rising, Lord Robertson told the three dissenters in a meeting
that they were undermining the credibility of the alliance and ordered that
his comments be sent to the heads of state of all 19 NATO members.

Seeking to find a way out, the NATO staff came up with its novel option to
sent Awacs planes to Turkey without a consensus. The Awacs would be part of
an integrated NATO air defense of Turkey that also included Patriot
batteries supplied by the Dutch.

With time running out, it was decided to shift the debate to NATO's defense
planning committee, where France is not a member. France is part of NATO's
political arm but not its military wing. The calculation was that Germany,
which had already agreed to provide the missiles for the Dutch Patriot
launchers, would no longer resist. To insure this, the request was narrowed
to the defense of Turkey.

When the committee met on Sunday, Feb. 16, Germany made clear that it would
not oppose it. That left Belgium, whose government is a pastiche of
coalitions that is sensitive to growing opposition to the war.

The deliberations went on for 13 hours as Belgium sought to ensure that NATO
would not swing into action without the approval of the Security Council and
would seek a peaceful solution of the Iraq crisis, demands that were
unacceptable to the United States and its supporters.

At one point, Belgium's ambassador said he had a take-it-or-leave-it
compromise for the alliance. That angered other diplomats who felt that the
lone dissenter should not be dictating to rest of the members.

Britain's NATO ambassador, Sir Emyr Jones Parry, accused Belgium of engaging
in "village politics," according to NATO officials. That was an allusion to
the domestic considerations that were driving Belgium's policy.

Lord Robertson, for his part, noted that NATO had other options, a pointed
reference to the option to send the Awacs despite Belgium's opposition.

After some final wordsmithing, Belgium relented. While NATO officials were
prepared to act without consensus they were plainly relieved that they did
not have to go that far. There were some hard feelings but at least NATO had
demonstrated it could act.

"The alliance has been damaged but it is not broken," Lord Robertson said in
an interview. "We got a decision."