[A-List] Russia: foreign policy opportunism

["Michael Keaney" <michael.keaney@xxxxxx>]

Putin and the growing trans-Atlantic rift
By Ehsan Ahrari
Asia Times, February 25 2003

As the rift between countries of "old Europe" and the United States over the
latter's impending invasion of Iraq continues to widen, President Vladimir
Putin of Russia is in the process of determining his courses of action. In a
dispatch from Moscow, New York Times reporter Michael Wines describes an
interesting dilemma facing Putin. Wines writes, "For Mr Putin, the question
is now whether he can keep the Atlantic rift from swallowing his dream of a
Russia anchored in the West - or, better yet, exploit the schism to speed up
the process." At least for now, one of the choices for Russia is not about
exploiting the trans-Atlantic schism, for it has definitely decided to
become an integral part of the West. At the same time, Russia also enjoys
the luxury of siding either with Europe or the US and still come out a
winner.

It has taken two presidents - Boris Yeltsin and now Putin - for Russians to
realize that the aspirations of their country to re-emerge as a superpower
are not likely to materialize any time soon. It was a bitter pill for
Yeltsin to swallow, for he belonged to an earlier generation that could not
imagine any role for his homeland other than that of a superpower. The
younger Putin is more of a pragmatist. He seems to have accepted, for now,
the role of Russia as a "second banana", or, worse yet, "one of the many
second bananas". More to the point, he seems to have made the choice of
siding with the West, since therein lies the promise of Russia's integration
into the global economy, a path that might enable his country to achieve its
aspirations of re-emerging as a superpower.

On this point, former US president Bill Clinton has definitely acted as a
visionary. During his two terms in office, he was always sensitive about not
leaving Russia to wallow in the misery of losing its power and prestige -
characteristics of being a superpower - and ensuring that all sorts of
economic assistance was provided for that country in its very arduous
endeavors to build, from scratch, a viable market economy.

The ultimate proof of the correctness of Clinton's approach toward Russia
stemmed from the fact that George W Bush in essence continued the same
approach. But Bush's decision not to change his predecessor's policy toward
Russia could not have been successful without Putin's resolve to continue
the sage line of his own predecessor, Yeltsin, to cooperate with the US and
the West.

The September 11, 2001, terrorists attacks on the US proved to be another
reason for further cementing that cooperation. Now, Russia could brutalize
its own homegrown Chechen militants without fear of being chastised by the
US. After all, the chief purpose of Operation Enduring Freedom was to
eradicate or capture the perpetrators of terrorist acts against the United
States. In the process of this cooperation, the US still got the better end
of the deal; it acquired a number of military basing facilities in Central
Asia, which is traditionally regarded as Russia's back yard. Even now, the
US appears to be in no hurry to pull out of its Central Asian military
bases, much to Russia's chagrin.

When Bush decided to shift the focus of his global war on terrorism from
Afghanistan to invading Iraq, Russia found itself opposing the move. For the
United States, the objective in Iraq has always been "regime change", even
though it went through a lot of zigging and zagging about it. For Russia -
as was also true for France, Germany and other countries of "old Europe" -
the main issue was ensuring that Iraq no longer possessed weapons of mass
destruction. It is only since January or so that the US has clarified its
purpose by adopting an acutely militant rhetoric and by continuing a massive
buildup of its forces around Iraq. Now it is clear more than ever before
that the real US objective all along has been to topple Saddam Hussein from
power.

On the Iraq issue, as he did prior to the US military action against
Afghanistan, Putin is calculating his country's advantages in determining
his choices. This time, however, Putin is likely to adopt a more nuanced
approach than he did in the past. That approach seems to be following along
the lines: Don't jump in the fray between the US and "old" Europe regarding
Iraq. Calculate all the available options, and consider the payoffs related
to each option. Even after committing yourself to one option, leave enough
hedge room to abandon that particular option in favor of another.

The Bush administration, continuing to monitor closely the Russian
maneuvering on the Iraq issue, has initiated its own maneuvering of
"preparing to label several Chechen militant groups as terrorist
organizations", and by "pointedly" accusing Iraq "of ties to Chechen rebels
involved in terrorism". Undoubtedly, the purpose underlying such a strategic
choreography is to signal that Iraq under Saddam is not really a friend of
Russia.

The Bush administration's own estimation is that, sooner or later, Putin
will come around to the US views regarding the issue of regime change in
Iraq. Putin would not necessarily disagree with such an assessment. The most
important part of his choice is that he wants to leave the door open so that
if something happens to the United States, he can return to cooperating with
Europe. Being in a win-win position might turn out to be the best bargain
for Vladimir Putin.

Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent
strategic analyst.

-----

Russia plays its economic card over Iraq
By Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Kara-Murza
Financial Times: February 24 2003

Despite Russia's reminder to the US last week that it could still use its UN
Security Council veto against military action in Iraq, Moscow's stance has
generally been more conciliatory than that adopted by Paris. This may appear
surprising given Russia's record of supporting Baghdad, and its opposition
to UN and Nato military intervention against Serbia in 1999.

Yet there is a simple explanation. While Russia's relations with Serbia are
characterised by long-standing feelings of ethnic, religious and cultural
proximity, as well as the pursuit of geopolitical interests in the Balkans,
Russia's attitude towards Iraq is pragmatic. To be more precise: its
interests are economic. By recognising those interests as legitimate, and by
making clear they could be furthered by the removal of the Ba'athist
dictatorship, the Anglo-American coalition could win over Russian support.

The first and perhaps easiest issue to resolve is Iraq's $8bn debt to
Russia. Needless to say, Moscow wants its money back, yet repayment is out
of the question while the UN sanctions regime remains in place. There is,
however, another way: the US-UK coalition could recognise Iraq's foreign
debts and guarantee their repayment by the post-Saddam regime.

The second issue for the Kremlin is Russian business interests. Since Iraq's
infrastructure is mostly Russian-built, it is only natural to expect Russian
businesses to have an interest in renovating and rebuilding it. More
important for Russian business is oil. Since the late 1990s, Russian
companies have signed a dozen contracts with the Iraqi state, worth $600m a
year in profits. Yet all these remain frozen as a result of the sanctions
regime. Moscow has a clear stake in the reopening of Iraq's economy - with
or without Saddam Hussein - provided Iraqi obligations towards Russian
businesses are honoured, something the regime has conspicuously failed to do
in recent weeks.

The final issue is more complex. Russia's budget revenues depend heavily on
oil exports. So with oil prices currently at around $32 a barrel the country
is enjoying a period of economic growth. But if the opening up of Iraqi oil
reserves leads to a dramatic fall in the price of crude, Russia will
struggle to meet its budgetary obligations on education, health, defence and
pensions, as well as to service its foreign debts. The last sustained period
of low oil prices, between January and August 1998 (when the average price
was $15.3 a barrel), resulted in Russia's financial meltdown.

Of course, oil prices cannot be guaranteed by western capitals. Yet western
leaders should recognise the sensitivity of this question for Russia and
find realistic ways of reassuring Moscow over its fears of a sudden and
profound fall in the price of oil.

If the Americans and British can reassure Moscow that a future Iraqi regime
will not be prejudicial to Russian economic interests, they will be better
placed to secure its acquiescence. In any case, this would be much better
than trying to "buy off" the Kremlin with a blank cheque over Chechnya. That
kind of deal would aggravate the situation in the region and reinforce the
already worrying authoritarian tendencies within the present Russian
leadership.

Regime change in Iraq now looks inevitable. Few people will be sorry to see
the end of one of the most brutal totalitarian regimes in history. Yet there
should be a word of warning about future Iraqi political structures. With
stability and predictability as the west's overriding priorities for the
Gulf region, the last thing post-Saddam Hussein Iraq needs is a puppet
administration, hand-picked by Washington. A regime that fails to command
respect from Iraq's fractured communities could prove disastrously unstable.

Unfortunately, because of the tyrannical nature of Mr Hussein's regime,
there are no political dissidents inside Iraq who could be regarded as
potential future leaders. The only viable option is to seek accommodation
with the more "moderate" voices within the present regime, however morally
questionable that may sound.

Noises from the diplomatic corridors of Moscow suggest Russian acquiescence
is up for grabs. If Washington can persuade the Kremlin that Russian debts
will be repaid and contracts honoured in a stable post-Saddam Hussein Iraq,
Russia is unlikely to stand in America's way.

The writers are leader of Russia's liberal SPS party and its London
representative respectively