[A-List] EU integration struggles: Franco-German axis

["Michael Keaney" <michael.keaney@xxxxxx>]

Don't be taken in by this Franco-German love-in

Paris and Berlin have put aside their differences - for now, anyway

Martin Woollacott
Friday January 17, 2003
The Guardian

The rest of Europe has always been ambivalent about Franco-German
cooperation, complaining of drift when the two countries have not been close
and of being bossed around when they are strongly aligned. Le Monde noted
this perennial fact in commending the agreement this week between Paris and
Berlin on constitutional proposals for the EU, which may be followed soon by
proposals for parallel social legislation in the two countries and a degree
of integration in defence policy.

The paper concluded that France and Germany must now proceed with tact in
urging these ideas on their partners. But are these ideas genuinely
coherent? The problem of Franco-German cooperation for Europe has usually
been not a seamless unity between the two nations but a divergence of
interests covered over by rhetoric and temporary deals. That is as true now
as it has ever been.

France and Germany have merely postponed their differences over the proper
shape of the EU by agreeing to combine one change that would strengthen the
Europe of the Nations which France favours and another that would favour the
federal Europe which Germany espouses. Their differences over agricultural
and environmental policy were similarly put off into the future by the
bargain last October in which Germany set aside for some years its hopes for
a reformed European agriculture. Their differences over Iraq are deep, and
over defence policy in general deeper still. But, as in the past and despite
these problems, what is shaping their relationship is political need.

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder is, at the moment, the weakest political leader
in Europe, his recent victory in general elections and his commanding
performance during the emergency caused by widespread flooding a distant
memory. He is down because the economy is down, with unemployment topping 4
million and investment falling. Public sector strikes have been averted but
at a high cost, suggesting that in time further tax increases will follow
those that have already plunged him to the bottom of the polls. These show
his party 30% behind the opposition Christian Democrats, and the result in
important elections next month in Lower Saxony could mean that the Christian
Democrats will have the decisive say in the Upper House, a further
humiliation and a further problem for the chancellor.

Jacques Chirac, by contrast, is a strong leader, even if his comfortable
position is attributable to an unexpected political accident rather than to
his own merits. In these circumstances, his instinct has been to take
advantage of the shifting fortunes of his counterparts in other countries,
especially in Germany and Britain. His position on Iraq is as pivotal as
that of Britain, while he has been able to take the lead in the relationship
with Germany in a way that would have been inconceivable a year or two ago.

Schröder needs something to be going on internationally which restores some
of his dignity, reminds people that he is an important head of state, and
distracts them at least a little from his difficulties at home. That cannot
come from the US, because of the estrangement following his refusal, during
the election campaign, to allow Germany to join in what he called the risky
adventure of war with Iraq, nor from Britain. In any case, the credit he has
for his stand on Iraq with a certain section of the German population, and
with his coalition partner, the Green party, is an asset he could not afford
to hazard.

So the turn to France was natural, especially as the 40th anniversary of the
Franco-German friendship treaty of 1963 signed by Charles de Gaulle and
Konrad Adenauer falls on January 22. It was always going to be marked both
by ceremonies and by new agreements and arrangements designed to show that
the friendship flourishes.

Yet it is not so long ago that most people believed that reunited Germany
was bound to become the senior partner in the Franco-German relationship, if
indeed it allowed that relationship to continue in anything like the old
form. For a decade, Europe waited for Germany's new weight to come fully
down on the scales, and it has yet to happen, which does not of course mean
that it will not happen in time. Indeed, it can be argued that it will and
it should. The Iraq crisis has had the effect of slowing the process by
which Germany was becoming a more forceful international actor and a
"normal" military power, although it has not stopped it, as deployments to
the Balkans and Afghanistan have shown.

To put recent events into perspective, it is worth recalling that the treaty
De Gaulle and Adenauer signed papered over differences more radical than
those of today. The general had by 1963 failed to win over Adenauer to
policies that would have stripped the European community and Nato of much of
their substance.

Both De Gaulle and Adenauer worried about the US, but their anxieties went
in different directions. The general worried about American dominance, while
the chancellor feared that Germany might suffer the consequences of an
abdication of US power in Europe through a deal with the Soviet Union that
would unify but neutralise his country. De Gaulle and Adenauer also worried
about European institutions, but again for different reasons. The general
thought them too strong and argued for their abolition or reduction, while
the chancellor judged them too weak and wished them to be strengthened.

The American historian William Hitchcock, in his excellent new account of
Europe since 1945, quotes Adenauer as saying: "I have completely lost
confidence in General de Gaulle." By the time the friendship treaty was
signed, Hitchcock writes, "Adenauer had in fact derailed De Gaulle's 'Europe
of Nations.'"

Something of this old tension remains. In dilute form, the differences on
the organisation of Europe are still there. In security matters, the French
impulse to challenge US power in normal times but to fall in behind it in
moments of great emergency represents another continuity. Beneath the
differences in French and American military thinking there are some
similarities. Recent discussions in the French parliament on the five-year
plan for the armed forces show attitudes and ideas closer to the US than to
those of Germany. And, in terms of deployable military strength, Britain
remains the only obvious serious partner for France in any integration of
European armed forces. Germany, where increased spending on military forces
is even less likely now than it was before the present economic troubles
overwhelmed Schröder, is much less suitable.

Europe's problems as it tries to reorganise itself politically at a time of
international crisis over Iraq and perplexity over future relations with the
US are not likely to be made worse or better by truly concerted
Franco-German policies. Germany and France, as always, agree on a few
things, and disagree on many others. The working out of these disagreements
is enormously important to the future of Europe, but it is precisely that
working out which has been once again postponed.

· The Struggle for Europe, William Hitchcock (Profile Books)