Re: [A-List] The War After Iraq - Is it better for a prince to be loved or feared?

["Tariq Mahmood" <zaogir@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Ralph Johansen is fully justified to have his view about the situation
arising out of the US current policies since George Bush took control of
white house. He in his attempt to quote Machiaveli, however, forgets to
analyse the difference between 'fear' and 'hatred'. Hate also is a passion
and a very strong one. It compels people into acion more than fear may.
Things that the US fear and try to undo are primarily due to the increasing
hatred against her, especially among the Muslim masses. What the US may well
be advised to do is to analyse the roots of the this hatred, try to
eliminate them instead of stoking it further. The hate generated problems
for the US will continue in intensity and a situation will arrive when she
will be unable to turn the hatred into fear that may intimidate the hostile
forces.

The US is not only the sole super power in the world today but also the
country that is defying all international norms, laws and protocols. There
was a time when she was looked upto by many. She was the unchallenged leader
of the White, Christian West that was obliged and indebted to by Europe for
her help in defeating Fascism and  helping in rebuilding the Europe
destroyed dyring WW II. The same beneficiaries are not only not loyal but do
not hide their fears of her bellicosity. In fact Europe is fast sudering
along English Channel in affinity towards the US.

Among the Third World the US is following unfriendly policies towards all
but has singled out the Muslim World as her primary enemy. She finds within
it an unbending spine while all the rest have succumbed to her wishes,
Europe, Russia, China and Japan even the United Nations.

Presently her faithful allies are the leadership in the Muslim World who act
as a screen between the riled up Muslim masses and American interests. The
non-representive, oppressive and the indigenous only in their colour of skin
rulers get protection from their own people by the US.

The current US policies will dis-employ these rulers who may be replaced by
less compromising persons. After all the US even having the stomach for
fighting and the will to lay lives cannot, in the long run out-fight the
sheer difference in numbers, millions even tens of millions will not be able
to stand up against billions. Latest technology however, perfect that be has
had to be operated by human hands.

Two factors more operative presently are time and demography. Both are not
on the side of the US. The Western civilisation has become demographically
non productive. Population of many nations in Europe is dwindling. It needs
each human female to produce a minimum of 2.1 children in her life time in
order to maintain the national population at the present level. In Germany a
female produces 0.9 children and fewer in Norway. On the agregate population
of Europe, more so of Russia is thining fast. This is further worsened by
the racist attitude of the Whiteman refusing to assimilate coloured people
from other continents who culturally and in level of material development
are different and 'inferior'.

The Atlantic Civilisation has bargained their faith for development in
science and technology. The tremendous amassing of knowledge since the
Rennaisance could only be made possible by they renouncing the restricting
Christian dogmas. The western civilisation is devoid of the internally
guiding spirituality and has become a victim of duality of values. The
western mind is continually being suppressed by the diversity of standards
that they allow to themselves vis-a-vis to others. Already intellectuals
imbued with correct knowledge are rebelling against this hypocricy that they
cannot afford to live with. Such scholars who at the institutions of
learning are passing these seeds of doubt to the younger generation. The
recent upheaval among the students and youth in Europe is an indictor in the
same direction.

The US stands on the most unfirm ground in case of her continued support she
lends to Israel. While the Zionist state makes it more and more imbarrasing
for her to support, which she still does. In this pursuit of her the US has
made a mockery of the entity that continue to call itself the United
Nations. One of her organisation, UNSC  has among her members the five
victors of the previous war and who have sowed the seeds for future wars in
the armistice at end of WW II that the vanquished nations were forced to
sign.

The Allies of the Great War have convinced themselves that the losers of the
War have been sufficiently un-nerved into submission and acceptance of their
present destiny at the hands of the Big Five. It is hard to assume that
Japanese will ever forget and least forgive Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Big
Five whose primary responsibility in the UNSC is to ensure peace in the
world undertake 95% of all the world trade in weapons of war.

Returning to the war after Iraq, the US will most likely  position herself
in the country that 'was' Iraq but she may not be dealing with the reformed
Saudis for they would be gone long before Iraq is finished. New leadership
will in quick succession replace the present rulers in Muslim lands, who
have only one agenda common among them, to subserviently submit to the
directions from Washington. Leadership among the Muslims is already
changing. The stymied change in Algeria is followed by the consequences of
election in two countries, Pakistan and Turkey in that many months. The two
countries contain within their frontiers the most virulent Islamic people
ruled by rulers most submissive to the US. The trend continues and if
efforts are made to thwart it, it may assume more violent form.

Conclusion

The western and Muslim civilisations are holding on to two different ends of
a common thread. The West possesses material prowess but no guiding
spirituality whereas the East has the spirit without a containing physical
form. Poet Iqbal said, 'Spirit of the East is in search of its form.' Let
the two, East and West join together to give the world a respite from the
fool hardy contests.

Zaogir
++++++++++++++++
"Ralph Johansen" <michele@xxxxxxxx> wrote:

The War After Iraq - Is it better for a prince to be loved or feared?


 Fwd by Gerry Cavanaugh:

 STRATFOR THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY
The War After Iraq

Summary

For the United States, fighting and winning a war against Iraq has become a
strategic imperative. Although it is true that this war could engender
greater support for al Qaeda among the Islamic masses, the consequences of
not attacking Baghdad -- from Washington's perspective -- could be worse.
But even more important, a victory and U.S. occupation of a conquered Iraq
would reshape the political dynamic in the Middle East. The United States
would be in a position to manipulate the region on an unprecedented scale.

Analysis

The current struggle over the soul of the weapons inspection process in Iraq
must not divert attention from the primary strategic reality: The world's
only superpower has decided that the defeat and displacement of Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein's regime is in its fundamental national interest.
That superpower prefers that its allies and the United Nations concur with
its position, but this preference should not be mistaken for a requirement.

Washington is prepared to wait a reasonable length of time to procure that
support -- particularly since its own military strategy dictates that
operations should not begin until January.
Nevertheless, regardless of the stance the U.N. and U.S. allies have
adopted, there is little doubt that the United States will press forward
and, in all likelihood, will defeat and occupy Iraq.

There are some negative reasons for this. It is no longer politically
possible for the Bush administration to abandon its quest. By this, we do
not mean "politically" in a domestic sense, although that is a
consideration. Of far greater importance are the political consequences the
United States would incur in the Islamic world if it did not carry out its
threats against Iraq.
Many have pointed to the potential consequences of waging a war - - namely
exciting greater support for al Qaeda among the Islamic masses -- but public
debate has neglected to consider the consequences of inaction.

Al Qaeda persistently has argued that the United States is
fundamentally weak. From Beirut in the 1980s to Desert Storm, Somalia and
now the Afghan war, the United States, the argument goes, has failed to act
decisively and conclusively. Unwilling to take casualties, Washington either
has withdrawn under pressure or has refused to take decisive but costly
steps to impose its will. Al Qaeda has argued repeatedly that the United
States should not be feared because, at root, it lacks the will to victory.

Should the United States -- having made Iraq the centerpiece of its
war-making policy since last spring -- decline engagement this time, it
would be another confirmation that, ultimately, the United States lacks the
stomach for war and that increasing the pressure on Washington is a low-risk
enterprise with high potential returns. In other words, at this point, the
political  consequences of failing to act against Iraq might reduce hatred
of the United States somewhat but will increase contempt for it
dramatically.

Machiavelli raised the core question: Is it better for a prince to be loved
or feared? He answered the question simply -- love is a voluntary emotion;
it comes and it goes, but it is very difficult to impose. Moreover, it is an
emotion with unpredictable consequences. Fear, on the other hand, is
involuntary. It can be imposed from the outside, and the behavior of
frightened people is far more predictable. This is the classic political
problem the United States faces today. Washington cannot possibly guarantee
the love of the Islamic world.
Therefore, it cannot guarantee that if it does not attack Iraq, Islamic
hatred for the country will subside. But it is certain that if it does not
attack, fear of the United States will decline. According to this logic, the
United States cannot decline war at this point.

War is the issue; voluntary regime change is not. It is not only important
that Hussein's government fall, it is equally important that the United
States be seen as the instrument of its destruction and the U.S. military
the means of his defeat. Given the logic of its strategy, the United States
must defeat the Iraqi army overwhelmingly and be seen as imposing its will.
It must establish its military credibility decisively and overwhelmingly.

The reasons go beyond transforming the psychology of the Islamic world. The
United States has direct military reasons for needing to defeat Iraq in war.
>From Washington's viewpoint, any outcome must allow the United States to
occupy Iraq with its own military forces. This is not because it needs to
govern Iraq directly, although demonstrating control over a defiant Islamic
country would support its interests. Nor is oil the primary issue, although
this would give the United States some serious bargaining power with allies.
The primary reason is geography.

If we look at a map, Iraq is the most strategic country between the Levant
and the Persian Gulf. It shares borders with Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iran,
Kuwait and, most of all, Saudi Arabia. If the United States were to occupy
Iraq, it would be there by right of conquest. Unlike any other country in
the region, the United States would not have to negotiate with an occupied
Iraq. It would have ample room for deploying air power in the heart of the
region. More important, it would be able to deploy a substantial ground
force capable of bringing pressure to bear within a 360- degree radius.
Within a matter of months, the United States would become the most powerful
military force native to the region.

Consider some of the consequences. For example, the Saudi royal family
currently is caught between two fears: the fear of al Qaeda sympathizers
inside and outside the family and fear of the United States. On the whole,
officials in Riyadh fear al Qaeda sympathizers somewhat more than they fear
the United States. They will attempt to placate the United States, but they
are not prepared to make the kind of fundamental, internal changes needed
to act meaningfully against al Qaeda sympathizers.

With several U.S. armored divisions on the nation's borders, however, the
Saudi calculus must change. When Iraq deployed forces against Saudi Arabia,
Riyadh relied upon the United States to protect its interests. If U.S.
forces deploy on its borders, who will come to Saudi Arabia's aid then?
Riyadh's assumption always has been (1) that the United States, concerned
about Iraq and Iran, could not turn on Saudi Arabia and (2) that the United
States lacked the military means to turn on it. All of that is
true -- unless the United States has occupied Iraq, has control of the
Iranian frontier and perceives Saudi Arabia as a direct threat because it
has failed to control al Qaeda. The Saudi fear factor then would change
dramatically and so, one suspects, would its actions.

Similarly, the threat to Iran from U.S. ground and air forces also has been
extremely limited. Iran's western frontier has been secure since Desert
Storm, and the country has been relatively insulated from U.S. power.
Domestic affairs have developed in relative security from the United States
or any external threat.
If the United States occupies Iraq, the Iranian reality will be
fundamentally changed. This does not mean that Iran will become
pro-American -- quite the contrary, it might retreat into rigidity. But it
will not stay the same.

Following a war in Iraq, the United States would become the defining power
in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. It is difficult to imagine any
coalition of regional nation-states that could emerge either to oust or
control the United States. Even in the event that a tide of anti-Americanism
ripped the region apart, the objective strategic equation would not permit a
coalition of regional forces to mount a substantial challenge to the United
States. To the contrary, Washington would be in a position to manipulate the
region on an unprecedented scale. It also would be able to mount operations
against al Qaeda throughout the region much more effectively than it can
today and, we should add, without requesting permission.

The downside of this strategy is obvious and much-discussed.
Hatred and resentment of the United States will run deep, and this
undoubtedly will generate more recruits for al Qaeda, at least in the short
run. Certainly, al Qaeda will continue its strategy of striking at U.S.
targets where and when it can. If the United States attacks Iraq against
European wishes, the Europeans potentially might withdraw intelligence
collaboration, thus increasing U.S. vulnerability. These are not trivial
concerns, and Washington takes them seriously.

But ultimately, Washington appears to believe that the upside of an occupied
Iraq trumps the downside.

1. It is true that al Qaeda recruitment might rise, but al Qaeda does not
have a problem with recruitment now. Not only do its core operations not
require large numbers of operatives, but in fact, they cannot use large
numbers because they depend upon stealth and security, both of which make
large-scale recruitment impossible. It will be difficult to turn intensified
hatred into intensified, effective operations. Random attacks in region
doubtless will increase, but this will be a tolerable price to pay.
Ultimately, al Qaeda already operates at its structural capacity and cannot
capitalize on increased sympathy for its cause.

2. Any government in the region will have to reassess the
fundamental threat it faces. With a U.S. presence in Iraq, Saudi leaders,
for example, will recalculate their interests. A pro-al Qaeda government
would become the target of a very real U.S.regional power. A neutral
government would come under tremendous U.S. pressure, including the threat
of attack. Governments -- and not only that in Saudi Arabia -- would find it
in their interest to suppress the growth of al Qaeda sympathies, in
collaboration
with the United States.

3. European states will not abrogate relations with the United States no
matter what it does in Iraq. Ultimately, al Qaeda and militant Islam are as
much a threat to Europe as to the United States. Ending intelligence
cooperation with the United States would hurt Europe at least as much as
Washington. Moreover, Europe is vulnerable to the United States in a range
of economic areas. A successful operation in Iraq, once concluded, would
create a new reality not only in the region but globally. The Europeans
might accelerate development of an integrated defense policy -- but then
again, even this might not happen.

The U.S. view, therefore, apparently is that a post-war world in which U.S.
forces operating out of Iraq establish a regional sphere of influence --
based on direct military power -- is the foundation for waging a regional
war that will defeat al Qaeda.
The United States does not expect to obliterate either al Qaeda or related
groups, but it does expect to be able to further contain the network's
operations by undermining the foundations of its support and basing in the
region. Washington also would be able to control the regional balance of
power directly, rather than through proxies as it currently must. In effect,
the era in which Washington must negotiate with a state like Qatar in order
to carry out essential operations will end.

What is most interesting here is that, ultimately, it doesn't matter whether
the Bush administration has clearly thought through these consequences. The
fact is that no matter Washington's intent, the conquest of Iraq will have
this outcome.
History frequently is made by people with a clear vision, but sometimes it
is the result of unintended consequences. In the end, history takes you to
the same place. However, in our view, the Bush administration is quite clear
in its own mind about how the region will look after a U.S.-Iraq war. We
suspect that the risks are calculated as well.

1. The United States might get bogged down in a war in Iraq if enemy forces
prove more capable than expected and -- facing high casualties in Baghdad --
Washington might be forced to accept an armistice that would leave it in a
far worse position psychologically and geopolitically than before.

 2. The consequences of U.S. occupation might be the opposite of what is
expected. A broad anti-U.S. coalition could form in the region, and al Qaeda
might use the changed atmosphere to increase its regional influence and to
intensify anti-U.S. operations.

3. European leaders actually might shift from making speeches to supplying
direct military support for Saudi Arabia and other states in the region
against the United States.

4. Prior to an attack, U.S. public opinion might shift massively against a
war, making it impossible for the United States to act. Once again, the
superpower would appear to be all talk, no action.

Officials in Washington believe none of these things will happen.
This view ultimately will prove either correct or incorrect. But in
understanding what is transpiring with Iraq, this must be understood as the
core U.S. perception. It is what drives the United States forward. From
Washington's point of view, this is the clearest path to taking the
initiative away from al Qaeda and reshaping regional power in such a way as
to deny it  effective sanctuary -- even though this strategy undoubtedly
will spawn further hatred of the U S.

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