[A-List] US Imperialism: Iran

["Annewilliamson" <Annewilliamson@xxxxxxx>]

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                            S T R A T F O R

                    THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY

                        http://www.stratfor.com
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            20 December 2002


Stratfor retired spies speak:

War in Iraq: What's at Stake for Iran?

Summary

Should the United States win a war against Iraq, Washington would
gain tremendous military and economic leverage over Iran. Fearing
that his country would become the United States' next target,
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appears to be opting for
secret cooperation with Washington against Iraq -- a way of
gaining Iran time to beef up its own military forces in hopes of
warding off a future U.S. attack. However, a U.S. victory against
Iraq could render a push against Iran unnecessary: If Washington
gains control of Iraq's oil pumps, then the resulting economic
damage would make regime change in Tehran a strong possibility.

Analysis

This piece, the fourth in Stratfor's occasional "Iraq War Stakes"
series, examines what is at stake for Iran in a U.S. war against
Iraq, Tehran's stance toward this war and what actions likely
will stem from that position.

Officials in Tehran oppose U.S. war plans because they fear Iran
would become Washington's next target after Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein is toppled. Having secured Iraq and its oil, Washington
would gain tremendous leverage over Iran, both militarily and
economically. Faced with their hardest choice since the Islamic
revolution, Iranian elites are deeply divided over what policy to
pursue concerning the war. Fearing the United States'
overwhelming military might -- and with Iran's sovereignty at
stake in the aftermath of such a war -- Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei apparently is opting for secret cooperation with
Washington. Though he probably does not believe this will stave
off a confrontation between Tehran and Washington, it could be a
way of winning time to beef up Iranian military forces before the
Islamic Republic is squarely in U.S. crosshairs.

However, a victory over Iraq could render a U.S. attack against
Iran unnecessary: For Washington, being able to pump Iraqi oil at
will would create a crisis in Iran that carries strong prospects
for regime change.

What Is at Stake for Iran

The United States and Iran have been at loggerheads since the
Islamic revolution in 1979, but they have not come close to
military confrontation since the end of the hostage crisis at the
U.S. Embassy in Tehran. And following the Gulf War, with Baghdad
no longer able to pose a serious threat to Iran and Washington
too busy trying to finish the job in Iraq, Iran was relatively
secure from external threats. Though a domestic struggle
continues between reformers and conservatives, Tehran has been
rising steadily as an important power in both the Middle East and
Central Asia. But an allied victory over Iraq and the presence of
U.S. forces and military administration there would change Iran's
situation overnight and forever.

Officials in Tehran mainly fear that their country would become
Washington's next target once Baghdad is subdued. In the event of
a U.S. victory over Iraq, U.S. troops and allies would encircle
Iran. Militarily, U.S. forces stationed in Iraq would be in a
position to launch a massive ground attack against Iran. Powerful
strikes by strategic bombers and cruise missiles, with major
combat support from U.S. Navy forces in the Persian and Ormuz
gulfs, also would be possible, as would operations by U.S.
aircraft and Special Forces based in Afghanistan and Central
Asia. Iran probably would stand no chance against such assaults,
but even if it did -- Iran is a large and difficult target --
leaders in Iran are well-aware that the presence of U.S. forces
in Baghdad would leave Iran dangerously vulnerable.

Regardless of whether Iran and the United States face off
militarily in the future, U.S. control over Iraq's oil -- a
highly probable consequence of military victory -- could ruin the
Iranian economy and, consequently, destroy the current regime in
Tehran. To aid the struggling U.S. economy, Washington would
encourage U.S. energy companies to pump Iraq's oil in increasing
quantities -- thus reducing the global price for crude. The
Iranian economy probably could not withstand a sustained decline
that touches the realm of $14 per barrel -- a level the U.S.
Department of Energy has said is possible. If that were to
happen, it would bankrupt the Iranian energy sector and drag down
the rest of the economy as well -- creating a social and
political crisis that would dwarf the student protests currently
under way in the Islamic Republic. The widespread unrest might
lead to the fall of the regime in Tehran.

Even in the event of a lesser economic crisis, the U.S. presence
in Iraq -- which by necessity would be powerful -- could
encourage political opposition in Iran. Washington particularly
would encourage and support the pro-U.S. liberal faction in its
pursuit of a "targeted democracy" policy toward Tehran. The Bush
administration publicly stated in August that it would like to
see a regime change in Tehran -- and officials there have every
reason to believe that once Hussein is toppled Washington will
use its newly expanded influence and territorial access in the
region to aid a push by emigrants and the domestic opposition to
topple the ayatollahs.

U.S. victory in Iraq also potentially could set in motion
enormous protests by religious and ethnic minorities in Iran.
These factions never have been happy with the native Shiites'
stranglehold on power -- whether under the Shah or the clerical
regime. U.S. forces amassing from Iraq and Afghanistan could
become a catalyst for restive peoples and tribes across Iran: the
Azeris, Kurds and Arabs in the west and Zahedanies and Balochis
in the fiercely independent southeastern province of Sistan-o-
Baluchestan. This province is home to 70 percent of Iran's Sunni
population and long has been the main support base for the
Mujahideen-i-Khalq organization -- which the Asia Times has
labeled the strongest group among those conducting armed
resistance to the current regime.

If these or other minorities rose up with support from foreign
powers, they would endanger not only the clerical regime but also
the territorial integrity of Iran and its existence as a nation-
state.

Following a U.S. victory over Baghdad, Iran's international
influence would be severely diminished and its strategic
positions threatened. U.S. forces could split and isolate
Washington's other main concerns in the region: Iran and Saudi
Arabia. Any attempted cooperation between them against the United
States would be complicated; Washington's best strategy would be
to strike or otherwise pressure one while giving the other false
hopes.

Iran will have to forget about the remnants of its influence in
Central Asia if U.S. forces take Baghdad: After such a formidable
display of power, the country's last remaining allies in the
region, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, would be motivated to become
U.S. satellites and foreswear their ties to Tehran.

Finally, Washington would be in a position to reduce Tehran's
influence over Shiites beyond Iran's borders. Having secured
control over Iraqi territory, the United States would have an
excellent opportunity to work with Iraq's Shia clerics -- who
have their own ambitions -- and encourage them to split with
Iranian clerics in attempts to gain influence in the Shiite
realm.

Such a split might affect Hezbollah, the Shiite movement in
Lebanon, by leaving militants confused as to whether their
loyalties should lie with the Iranian or Iraqi clerics. And the
pro-U.S. Iraqi clerics could influence Hezbollah to adopt a more
moderate approach toward Israel. As Iran Daily wrote on Dec. 17,
"The theology center in Najaf (in southern Iraq) is a prominent
regional institution which could be affected and influenced by
the enhanced American presence in the region. The idea of
separation of religion from state can provide America with the
pretext to set up a major rival for the school of theology in Qom
(the main Shiite religious center in Iran). The clergy must be
vigilant and watchful of this point of future developments."

Iran's Position Toward War

However wide the gap between Hussein's secular regime and that of
the Iranian ayatollahs might be, Tehran would much prefer to see
Hussein rather than U.S. forces in power in Baghdad, for one
reason: The US has the potential to destroy Iran, and Hussein
proved himself incapable of doing so during the 1980-88 war.

Iran once needed the United States because Tehran faced immediate
threats from Iraq and Afghanistan's Taliban regime -- but this
was a temporary need, not devoid of the realization that
Washington posed a much bigger, albeit distant, strategic threat.
With the Taliban toppled and Iraq severely weakened, that threat
would loom larger. The Bush administration already has given Iran
second ranking in what it calls the "axis of evil," and
Washington wants Iran to follow its lead in both internal and
external politics.

Tehran is unlikely to do so voluntarily: The era of the Shah,
from 1953 to 1979, and Iran's subservience to British and
occasionally Russian rulers earlier in the 20th century were
exceptions to thousands of years of tradition, when Iran was an
independent regional power with its own projection capabilities.
Iranians fought for centuries with Babylonians, Greeks, Romans,
Byzantines, Arabs, Mongols, Turks and other powers for regional
dominance -- and it is this dominance that Iran strives to
achieve again. Leaders in Tehran know the country can be
destroyed in this power game, but only two contemporary players
are capable of doing so: the United States and Israel, both
strongly aligned against Iran.

This fear of being destroyed by WMD or superior conventional
power adds a sense of urgency to Tehran's efforts to formulate a
policy concerning the war against Iraq. The basis of its position
is that Iran can do nothing to prevent a war against Iraq, so its
focus should be on how to behave before and during the war in
order to minimize the negative ramifications of a U.S. victory.

Iranian Elites Divided Over War

Facing one of their toughest dilemmas since the Islamic
revolution, Iranian elites are deeply divided over what policy to
pursue toward the U.S. war. Their trouble is compounded by the
bitter, ongoing power struggle between hard-line conservatives
and reformists -- an exhaustive war of attrition to which there
is no end in sight. Calls for unity to ward off a post-war threat
so far have fallen on deaf years, such as this Dec. 17 plea from
Iran Daily: "Come what may, our officials and the elite need to
abandon many of their unnecessary political tussles and focus on
ways to sustain and promote national interests."

The policy divisions concerning the war are deeper and more
complicated than simply a hardline-liberal split. If Iran's
politics were portrayed as a pie chart, two major segments would
be struggling against U.S. policies while two others would be
trying to appease Washington. Ironically, each camp contains some
who the West would label "conservatives" and others who would be
seen as "liberals."

In a case of strange bedfellows, some conservative clerics headed
by former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and pro-U.S. radical
reformist forces -- including student leaders within the country
and emigrants now based in the West -- both promote cooperation
with Washington concerning Iraq. The radical reformists do so
openly, but the group led by Rafsanjani has had to hide its
intentions so that the millions of Iranians who disapprove of
U.S. policies do not see it as capitulating to Washington.

Although the radical reformists' pro-U.S. motives are clear, the
reasons behind Rafsanjani's stance are more complex. On the
surface, he appears to have recognized that attempts to block
U.S. plans for the region are futile. But Stratfor sources in
Iran say Rafsanjani has extensive business interests that would
be strongly boosted by an improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations.
Notably, sources claim that Rafsanjani and U.S. Vice President
Dick Cheney have some common business interests in the energy
sector. And some of Rafsanjani's associates seem to care more for
business concerns than for Iran's national interests: Russian Web
publication centrasia.ru wrote in October that Mekhdi Safari and
Gholamreza Shafei, Iran's former and current ambassadors to
Russia, have made their business dealings -- including those in
the pharmaceuticals trade -- a top priority.

Iran is not a communist but capitalist country, making it logical
that some Iranian elites are weary of the limitations on personal
enrichment imposed by Islamic capitalism as practiced in Iran. To
put it bluntly, greed helps the upper classes embrace
globalization and open market policies -- sometimes to the point
of Westernizing their nations and becoming U.S. junior allies.
When such people and groups comprise a majority of a nation's
elite, counter-revolutions occur. This is exactly what happened
in the former Soviet Union, when the elite classes decided to
stop hiding their riches, to openly display them and to increase
them manifold -- all of which was impossible under socialism --
and Russia began to turn toward capitalism.

Arguing against the U.S. war plans are many Iranian reformists,
led by President Mohammed Khatami. This group rejects U.S.
globalization and market policies, which they feel widen the gap
between a handful of rich and hordes of poor -- a gap that
already is wide in Iran -- and accordingly reject Washington's
policies toward Iraq, Iran and the Middle East. Khatami preaches
a foreign policy known as the "dialogue of civilizations." In
this dialogue, there is no place for one superpower to dominate
all other powers, nor for Iran to become a satellite of a foreign
power. Thus, though he is known as a leading reformer, Khatami
strongly opposes U.S. goals in the region. This is why Washington
ceased its endorsement of his leadership last summer and declared
support for regime change in Iran, regardless of whether Khatami
or his conservative opponents should be in power.

Though foreign policy is the realm of Supreme Leader Khamenei,
Khatami is also active in this area and has become known for his
criticism of U.S. policies, especially those concerning Iraq. As
an exception within the Iranian elite, Khatami believes a U.S.
attack on Baghdad can be prevented if as many nations as possible
combine their diplomatic, political and possibly economic
efforts. He is calling for a conference between the European
Union and the countries that neighbor Iraq to explore ways to
thwart the war drive.

The second group seeking to check Washington's war plans is
Iran's ultra-conservative clerics, including many from the
Guardian Council and Islamic Revolutionary Guards. Diplomatic
sources in Iran say this group would support joining forces with
arch-enemy Iraq to repulse a U.S. attack on Baghdad, employing
military action on all possible fronts. The clerics' proposals,
which have been reported to Khamenei, are based on two premises.
First, this group believes the United States has absolutely no
way to win a war against both Iran and Iraq, so a common defense
has high chances of succeeding. Second, they say the U.S. attack
on Iraq will be a moment of truth for Tehran: If Iran does not
support Iraq militarily, then it will be destroyed next.

Iran's War Plan in Action

All eyes are now on Khamenei. He is keeping his options open,
including the one proposed by ultra-conservatives, but he appears
to be leaning toward tacit cooperation with Washington. Stratfor
has written about secret talks between U.S. delegations, probably
led by Cheney on some occasions, and Rafsanjani-led Iranians in
Cyprus and other locations. Sources also told Stratfor that such
negotiations, especially after they were leaked to media, could
not have taken place without at least tacit approval by Khamenei.

Although Iran continues publicly to oppose military action
against Iraq, we believe that negotiations between Washington and
Tehran continue behind the scenes, with Khamenei's blessing.
These negotiations would involve more than Iran's approval of
U.S. war plans; Washington would seek its active support as well.
This would explain a series of vehement denials by Iran that
mysteriously cropped up at times when the media carried no
reports or speculation about such talks. For example, Iranian
Navy Commander Rear-Adm. Abbas Mohtaj has denied any talks with
the United States, while noting that Iran would "never let any
country use its territorial waters to wage a war on another
country."

Iranian diplomatic sources tell Stratfor that Tehran already has
agreed to let the United States use its bases, and to provide
other aid if the United Nations authorizes military action.
Should Washington take a unilateral route to Baghdad, the only
agreement so far is that Iran would allow rescue missions for
U.S. pilots whose planes were downed by Iraqi forces.

The talks apparently are difficult. Washington is unlikely to
commit itself to anything but moderating its tough "axis of evil"
rhetoric concerning Iran. Negotiations also could be complicated
by two other factors: First, Washington feels it has the upper
hand and that Tehran has no choice but to cooperate, and second,
hawks within the Bush administration -- particularly Deputy
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, sources say -- strongly object
to any talks with Iran other than demands that it join the war
coalition.

The talks are not problem-free from Tehran's perspective either.
Iranian leaders often break off contact because of what they
perceive as U.S. unfairness. At the moment, there is anger over
U.S. intelligence leaks to the press that Iran secretly is
building two nuclear facilities -- sites that potentially could
be used to make nuclear weapons. Officials in Tehran are
especially angry because the reports about the plants have
continued even after International Atomic Energy Agency chief
Mohamed ElBaradei disputed U.S. claims, saying the agency long
has been aware of the facilities and that Iran invited IAEA
officials to visit them. Tehran claims that a pro-Israeli faction
in Washington has been organizing "provocations in the media" to
kill the current talks and facilitate a U.S. attack on Iran,
following the war with Iraq.

Moreover, there might be motivational differences between
Rafsanjani, who likely is leading the Iranian delegation, and
Khamenei, who probably tacitly has authorized the talks.
Rafsanjani appears content with vague promises that the United
States will not attack Iran in the future if Tehran supports its
war against Iraq. Khamenei wants much more -- likely some
guarantees that U.S. forces never will attack Iran, that the
country will be crossed off the "axis of evil" listing and
acknowledgement of Iran's special interests in Iraq's Shiite
regions.

Khamenei still could present firm opposition to the U.S. war if
he recognizes that support will gain him nothing in return. But
his current policies are just fine by Washington -- and by the
time Khamenei realizes there are no significant rewards in store
for Tehran, which is likely the case, it will be too late to save
his regime. The government might collapse either because of
direct confrontation with the United States or a domestic
counter-revolution encouraged and supported by Washington.

Conclusion

Fearing the overwhelming military power of the United States --
and with Iran's sovereignty at stake in the aftermath of a war --
Khamenei appears to be leaning toward secret cooperation with
Washington against Iraq. The United States would need and use
this assistance for the duration of the Iraq war. But the
impending conflict might only delay a confrontation between
Washington and Tehran, not prevent it, unless the clerical regime
falls.

Khamenei probably does not believe Iran can avoid confrontation
with the United States, but he will strive to gain time in which
to beef up the nation's defenses against a subsequent U.S.
attack. Ultimately, however, a victory in Iraq might make any
attack on Iran unnecessary: If Washington gains control of Iraq's
oil pumps, then the resulting economic damage would make regime
change in Tehran a strong possibility.
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