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[A-List] Turkey: political crisis



Turkey: The ugly duckling
By K Gajendra Singh
Asia Times, December 19 2002

"It's all right to be born into a duck family if you aren't a swan."
- Turkish journalist Ferai Tinc, recalling Hans Christian Andersen's "The
Ugly Duckling"

Turkey's November parliamentary elections, which gave a two-thirds majority
to the Islamic-based Justice and Development Party (AKP), might yet prove to
be a blessing in disguise after all. And for all - Turkey, Europe and the
West.

If two secular parties had succeeded in crossing the 10 percent threshold
needed to have representation in parliament, which they narrowly missed,
with 34 percent of the total votes, the AKP would have been forced to form a
coalition government, like its parent Welfare Party in 1996, leaving room
for maneuver and confusion both at home and abroad. The Welfare-led
government was forced to resign by the armed forces in 1997.

But as it turned out, Christian Europe was forced to decide on Turkey's
possible entry into the European Union against a backdrop of the massive AKP
majority government in Ankara, and in the face of a full frontal and
vigorous charge led by the AKP's undisputed leader, Recip Tayyip Erdogan,
and new Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, assisted by Turkish President Ahmet
Sezer, a former head of Turkey's Constitutional Court.

They left no stone unturned, for everyone to see, in seeking an early date
for talks on Turkey's accession to the EU, preferably by the end of 2003, or
early 2004, and well before the 10 new countries, now admitted, were
scheduled to become members formally.

But a firm EU leadership, while trying to humor the Turkish leaders at last
week's Copenhagen summit and at their capitals earlier, agreed only to
discuss a date for accession at the end of 2004. In announcing the decision
on December 12, Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the current EU
president, said that only if the EU leadership decided in December 2004 that
Turkey had fulfilled formal criteria for all candidate states as set out in
a 1993 document, "then we will open accession negotiations with Turkey".

When asked when the negotiations would begin, Rasmussen appeared to grope
for the right words. "Well, it's a very clear message," he said. "The answer
to that, well, you ask me, when. It is a good question and the answer is
very clear. As soon as possible. Because we stick to principle. We stick to
principle that Turkey can get a date for the start of accession negotiations
when Turkey fulfills the political criteria."

Gul reacted angrily, accusing the EU of discrimination. "This means our
efforts are not appreciated and there is a prejudice against us," he said.
Erdogan, for his part, accused the EU of double standards and behaving like
a "Christian club".

Yet there was no disguising the rebuff to the efforts by the Turks, as well
as those of the British and the energetic US lobbying, which served largely
to infuriate many Europeans. Jacques Chirac, the French president, was
singled out for furious criticism by the Turks. He had been angered by
Ankara's aggressive lobbying, described by a senior EU figure as
"blackmail". "It's not enough to respect European law," Chirac was quoted as
saying, "You also have to be polite and civilized." Gul retorted that it was
the French president who was doing "the real blackmailing".

"What the Americans fail to understand is the difference between a military
alliance like Nato and the EU," a senior EU official said. "What we have to
do is to persuade European consumers that they should be happy to have a
Turkish head of the food standards agency. The EU is not about foreign
policy but domestic issues."

Nicole Fontaine, the French industry minister, said, "It's certainly not up
to the president of the United States to interfere in something so important
and which mainly concerns Europe." British Prime Minister Tony Blair warned
that French and German resistance to delay the start of negotiations would
prove a strategic error in Europe's dealings with Islam. Later, putting a
spin on the agreement, he said that it was a "huge step forward". He
admitted that Turkey would have liked an earlier date, but added, "For 40
years, Turkey has been waiting for a firm date, and this is a firm date."
Foreign Minister Jack Straw added that the UK government "wanted to see a
democratic market economy Muslim country coming into the European Union".

But the Turkish attitude had irritated even friendly diplomats. "They have
snatched defeat from the jaws of victory," said one diplomatic source. "This
kind of thing does not make it any easier to argue their case." Italian
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi confirmed that Ankara's pre-summit lobbying
may have worked against it. "There has been strong pressure from Turkey,
which many didn't like." German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer took
exception to Gul's strong language at the summit. But he added that the
December 2004 date on which Turkey's membership chances would be judged "was
a real breakthrough".

European parliament president Pat Cox said, "Turkey has won a political
victory at the Copenhagen summit. You should celebrate this instead of
considering it a defeat." Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson said, "The
2004 decision we took for Turkey proves that Turks will be a EU member,
because you deserve it." While EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana said,
"We have made Turkey feel relieved. This decision showed that there can't be
a Europe without Turkey."

Sources said that the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Finland were
least keen on an early membership date. Against considerable lobbying from
the US, with Britain, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain favoring Turkey,
France and Germany took a firm line, dashing Turkish hopes.

Any date before June 2004 was out of the question as it would have affected
elections to the European parliament. The German Christian Democrat
opposition leader, Edmund Stoiber, is an outspoken critic of Turkish
membership and the ruling Social Democrats feared serious losses in those
elections if Turkey was already a candidate. Chirac was also opposed,
fearing that the next European elections could be hijacked by the French far
right.

Once the verdict was delivered, the French and German duo did not even shake
hands with Erdogan, not even for the cameras. Western leaders will in time
make their own assessments about the AKP and its leadership to formulate
their policies, but the haste, style and clumsy diplomacy shown by the AKP
over admission did not go down well, never mind that it was for consumption
in Turkey to show that the AKP was as keen as any other party to fight for
Turkey's entry into the EU.

The Turkish media expressed deep dismay at the outcome. "Once again, a
broken dream," read a headline in the Cumhuriyet. Later, Gul said, "We did
our best but the negotiation date appeared a little bit delayed. Our road is
clear. We will make reforms for our people, even if there will be EU
membership or not."

Meanwhile, Erdogan added that he was not pleased with the political
decision, but the road map was in favor of Turkey and the journey would
continue. He even denied that he was angry and vowed that Turkey would
continue its reform efforts, with the goal of passing the 2004 review.
"We're not upset, but it could have been a better decision," he said.

But the speaker of the Turkish parliament, Bulent Arinc, one of the most
influential men in the AKP, condemned the decision, while deputy prime
minister Abdullatif Sener said, "The decision was a step forward for Turkey,
and we assess it as a closer approach to the EU. The glass is not half
empty. We need to look at the full half." Such differing views must have
horrified the Turkish Foreign Office and its sedate Euro-leaning mandarins.

President Sezer, who did some canvassing at the NATO summit in Prague
earlier, had concluded that the European leadership was not serious and did
not even attend the Copenhagen summit. His office expressed disappointment
at the decision.

It was a bit of theater of the absurd played around the world; in Turkey,
the US, European capitals and Girne, the capital of Turkish-controlled
Cyprus. Even President George W Bush took time from his war on terror and
plans for a regime change in Iraq to meet with Erdogan and support Turkey's
entry into the EU.

If one looks through the smoke screens, though, the final result was crystal
clear from the very beginning. But it was an education and even amusing to
see the charade unfold, bringing out into the open the attitudes and
positions of the various governments and their compulsions.

Here is a quick summary of Turkey's journey so far to join the EU. Turkey, a
member of NATO since 1952, applied in 1959 and became an associate member of
the European Economic Community, as the EU was then known. In 1970, Turkey
signed an agreement foreseeing Turkey's eventual full membership of the now
renamed European Community (EC). In 1978-79, the EC asked Turkey to apply
for membership along with Greece. Turkey declined, and perhaps missed the
best chance it had ever had. After the military takeover in Ankara in
September 1980, relations with the EC were frozen, but after the
parliamentary elections in 1983 relations resumed.

In 1984, members of the Turkish parliament participated in the Council of
Europe. Under prime minister Turgut Ozal, Turkey applied for full membership
and was registered in 1987. In 1989, the EC accepted eligibility but
deferred assessment of the application. On January 1, 1996, a customs union
with the EU came into force. In December 1997, the EC refused candidate
status. Ankara was angry. In the 1999 elections, leftists and fascist
parties won by big margins. So in December 1999, Ankara was granted
candidate status. In October 2001, Turkey streamlined the constitution
drafted in 1982 under the military regime to fulfill the EU's political
criteria.

To strengthen its case for the vital 2002 Copenhagen summit, the Turkish
parliament passed sweeping constitutional reforms, including the abolition
of the death penalty and the easing of bans on the use of the Kurdish
language, to meet some of the EU's human rights criteria. On December 11,
the Turkish parliament overwhelmingly approved a package of human rights
reforms, including sanctions against torture, but it stopped short of full
ratification pending technical procedures.

Before September 11, 2001, Erdogan would not have even dreamt of visiting
the White House. Prior to the November elections he would have been given a
polite no, but now he is being dined but not wined in Washington. He
addressed think tanks and press conferences in the US capital, capped by a
good meeting with Bush. Later, he met with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.
His whirlwind tour covered 15 European countries.

To an uneasy Christian world, with terrorist attacks spreading, it must have
been a relief and a reassuring sight to see Erdogan in a Western suit,
albeit somewhat crumpled and old fashioned, wanting to join the Christian
club. More so after the October elections in Pakistan, a front line ally of
the US against terrorism, in which Islamic parties led by the fierce-looking
traditionally clad Fazlur Rehman and his ilk made the best ever showing in
Pakistan's history of religious parties. Their pro-Taliban coalition, the
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, won on an anti-US manifesto. It has already formed
a government in North West Frontier Province and is in a coalition in
Balochistan. It will play an important role in Pakistan's politics.

Thus, in an era of growing confrontation between Islam and Christianity, led
on one side by the elusive Osama bin Laden, his al-Qaeda and its clones in
the Islamic world and Bush on the other, the efforts of Erdogan to exchange
views with Western leaders should lead to a better understanding.

In 1994, when Gul was spokesman for foreign affairs for the Welfare Party,
he had said, "Turkey should not join the European Union, we have said this
from the beginning. Look at a European city, and then look at Istanbul. It's
not a Christian city."

A few years ago, Erdogan recited a poem that included the verses, "Minarets
are our bayonets, domes are our helmets, mosques are our barracks, believers
are our soldiers." For this, he was jailed and subsequently debarred from
contesting the November elections for having a criminal record. Should the
constitution be amended, though, he would be able to stand for elections, at
the earliest in February.

The AKP, by embracing the EU cause, is working to further undermine the
secular parties, which have traditionally worked for Europe and NATO. Most
Turkish businessmen want Turkey in the EU. The majority of the electorate in
general identifies Europe with more jobs, prosperity, and the freedom to
travel and work in the continent.

The US, with Turkey's critical importance in its strategic algebra in
general and immediate support for plans for a regime change in Iraq, gave
its maximum support to Turkey. From the isolated comforts of plush media or
think tank premises, Muslim American writers recommend to the Christian EU
that it should let in Muslim secular Turkey in a grand gesture of Christian
Muslim synthesis. This did not fool the Europeans, nor does it fool Muslims
who remain opposed to US policy.

For the UK, apart from toeing the US line, Turkey's admission would be more
in line with its perception of how the EU should evolve into a federation of
states and not what France and Germany want - a more unitary body. Also, the
English, whose empire was built from the East India Company, would not miss
a chance for a commercial deal.

Hoping for a contract for Istanbul's third bridge across the Bosporus, which
was never built, then-premier Margaret Thatcher even claimed to Turkey's
prime minister Turgut Ozal in the 1980s that "I am an Ozalist". In India,
whenever an air force jet trainer deal or some other purchase is under
consideration, the British leaders sing a more favorable tune on Kashmir,
but soon revert to the old song of neutrality or favoring Pakistan. So Tony
Blair's efforts and the spin that Turkey after 40 years has a deal is aimed
to win some brownie points with the Turks.

The unitary political systems in France and Turkey are quite similar, but
the French give more importance to culture. It was elder statesman and
former president Giscard D'Estaing, now working on a conceptual framework
for the EU, who stated the French view earlier (and perhaps that of many
others), that Turkey is not in Europe, its culture is different and Turkey's
entry would end the EU. At a media conference in Copenhagen, when a Turkish
journalist rather rudely enquired if he was sorry for his stand, Giscard
replied that he had nothing more to add to his earlier view. It must be
remembered that France has 3 million Muslim Arabs from its former colonies
in Maghreb. But their borders end in the sands of the Sahara, unlike
Turkey's, which lead to states like Syria, Iraq and Iran.

Germany's relationship with Turkey is much more historical and complex,
beginning from the time when Ottoman janissaries twice reached the gates of
Vienna in the 16th century. Turks and Germans fought for control of East
Europe and the Balkans and both ruled over it. When the Ottoman Empire
started declining, to counter superior European arms and military training,
the Ottomans relied on German assistance, which influence still abides in
the mental make up of the Turkish armed forces. The Turkish and German
disciplinary view of life also converges. So it was natural that Turks
allied with the Germans in World War I, after which the Ottoman empire was
finally unraveled. There was great internal pressure on Turkish president
Ismet Inonu to join Hitler in World War II, but before dying in 1938, Kemal
Ataturk had warned Inonu not to go against the strongest Western power, ie
England.

Under Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, the Turks could not get west
of the gates of Vienna, but under his namesake Suleiman Demiral (seven times
prime minister of Turkey from the early 1960s until he retired as president
in 2000), a new relationship developed with Turks emigrating to meet the
needs of Germany's fast expanding economy in the 1960s. They now number over
3 million, out of which nearly a quarter are Kurds. Most of them came from
poor and backward east and south Turkey. They now face the hostility of
pro-Christian parties following the end of the economic boom, but most of
the hybrid Turks, ill at ease in Germany and in Turkey, have preferred to
stay on in Germany.

The Kurdish organizations are very active in Germany and the AKP and its
parents, like the Welfare Party, easily collect huge funds and recruit
supporters as Turkish politics are echoed in Germany, especially Turkish
Kurdish rivalries.

For instance, Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan, after being expelled
from Syria, was looking for asylum and was arrested in Rome on a warrant
issued at Germany's behest. But Germany, afraid of repercussions at home,
dared not extradite Ocalan. So for left of center politicians like
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Turkish support and votes are very important.
But they would be happier if the problem did not become bigger, which it
would with Turkey inside the EU. With free travel, many millions of Turkey's
70 million population could seek new pastures. In the EU, only a now united
Germany has a larger population.

But in spite of Turkish recriminations against Germany, skilled Turks
returning home helped Ozal carry out the industrialization of Turkey. On the
other hand, there are nearly 15,000 Turks in German universities, according
to a recent report. And there are 40,000 Turkish-owned businesses, mostly
shops and restaurants, in which billions of dollars are invested and which
employ over 125,000 people, including many Germans.

Erdogan's time as a mayor of Istanbul gave him only limited exposure to the
world of diplomacy and negotiations. As part of prime minister Necmettin
Erbakan's cabinet in 1996-97, Gul had more exposure, but the sensitive
ministries of foreign affairs, defense and interior were held by the
coalition partner, the True Path Party. Western leaders and their diplomats
shied away from meeting Welfare ministers. But even at home, the AKP
leadership has to learn how to deal with the Pashas, as the top military
brass is called in Turkey. The Pashas have already instructed Gul at their
first briefing about the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism.

The Turkish Chief of General Staff is next in state protocol after the
president and the prime minister, but has perhaps more real power. The armed
forces exercise their influence through regular monthly meetings of the
highest policy-making National Security Council, dominated by them (it was
the model for President General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan). Every year,
military officers who are suspected of any Islamic tendencies or connections
are expelled from the armed forces. Islamist leader Erbakan, when he was
prime minister in 1996-97, had to swallow and sign such a decree. According
to EU political norms, the armed forces have no role in political decision
making, except in an advisory capacity.

While the self-styled custodians of secularism in Turkey guard the
constitution, such a role itself will remain a great hindrance for Turkey in
gaining entry into the EU. But without the armed forces, one can guess the
state and health of democracy and secularism, with such examples as Pakistan
and Algeria.

Lacking experience and young, carried away by a massive unexpected victory
and warm diplomatic receptions abroad, Erdogan and his colleagues are
already making mistakes, such as the wife of the AKP's parliament speaker
covering her head in a scarf.

Erdogan claims that his daughter studies in US because there is freedom to
wear scarves. AKP leaders are unwisely raising such matters in public too
early. Erdogan made a faux pas by linking Turkey's entry into the EU with a
solution to the Cyprus problem and the use of NATO assets by the EU's rapid
defense force without clearing it with the Foreign Ministry and the armed
forces.

He also had to backpedal on his embracing a Belgium-like solution for the
intractable Cyprus problem, which was also shot down by the Foreign Ministry
and the armed forces. As expected, a solution to the Cyprus problem,
necessary for its entry into the EU, could not be found before the end of
the summit in Copenhagen. The Greek and Turkish sides signed a letter of
intent to continue negotiating under UN auspices and to undertake to reach
an accord by March 2003.

It may be true that Erdogan had a successful tenure as mayor of Istanbul,
partly because of corrupt and inefficient predecessors or their parties. But
many a time the celebrations of his achievement smacked of an election
campaign. But running a big country going through a crippling economic
crisis and with a decimated political opposition waiting to trip the new
regime will need the utmost care, caution and finesse.

In 1994, US-educated prime minister Tansu Ciller, with a PhD in economics,
attempted real and serious economic reforms. She had become prime minister
in spite of opposition from her godfather, party chief Demirel, who had
moved over to the presidency. So, led by Demirel and assisted by others, her
bold reform measures were thwarted. So was her attempt to even look at a
solution to the Kurdish problem by the armed forces. The Kurdish conflict
must have cost Turkey over $100 billion since 1984, and is perhaps a major
cause of the current economic malaise. The bureaucracy appointed by other
political parties will be sullen, if not hostile. The West will wait and
watch, but it is doubtful whether it will really promote a resurgent AKP.

The Copenhagen summit statement said, "Turkey is a candidate state destined
to join the union." This writer had argued that full membership will remain
a dream and that at the Copenhagen summit "EU politicians will go through
many contortions and make soothing noises, but visa-free entry to Turks and
freedom to work in EU countries is out of question, and the AKP might
attempt to drive a hard bargain and consolidate its position".

And now this writer would wager that whatever a secular Turkey, but with its
99 percent Muslim population, might do, accession to Christian fortress EU
is unlikely to happen for a long time. Even when Turkey deserves it. While
wishing success to Turkey, this writer would happily lose the bet.

K Gajendra Singh, Indian ambassador (retired), served as ambassador to
Turkey from August 1992 to April 1996. Prior to that, he served terms as
ambassador to Jordan, Romania and Senegal.






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