[A-List] Russia: biding time with US

["Michael Keaney" <michael.keaney@xxxxxx>]

Putin's tacit strategic agenda
By Ehsan Ahrari
Asia Times, December 4 2002

Russia's President Vladimir Putin is clearly showing his frustration with
the growing political influence of the United States and its military
presence that now reaches the Russian borders with three Baltic States -
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, along with Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and
Romania - invited to join NATO on November 21. But Russia is determined to
make the best of a seemingly not very pleasant situation stemming from the
intermittent expansion of that alliance, and still seeks avenues to maximize
its advantage. It is a tricky maneuver, but Putin is getting very good at
it.

To no one's surprise, President George W Bush has adopted a pattern of
single-mindedly pursuing America's strategic interests through NATO, yet
making sure that it is done by minimizing Russia's irritation and agony,
and, more to the point, by keeping Moscow fully engaged. Former president
Bill Clinton did exactly that throughout his presidency.

Two Russian presidents, Boris Yeltsin and now Putin, have had little choice
but to swallow the bitter pill of accepting the reality of NATO's growing
membership. But they have behaved differently. Yeltsin went through tirades
in expressing frustrations to Clinton, yet making sure that the latter
understood that Russia was trying its best not to act as a sore loser.
Clinton, in turn, rebutted almost all arguments that Yeltsin presented, but
also made sure that Yeltsin's ego was appropriately massaged in the process.

In the grand chess game of power politics - as Yeltsin knew in previous
years, as Putin does now - Russia may no longer be a declining power, since
it already hit rock bottom when the Soviet Union imploded, but it still has
ways to go before it becomes a rising power. Putin continues to express his
skepticism regarding NATO expansion (what Igor Ivanov, Russia's foreign
minister, describes as that alliance's "mechanical expansion"), but said
that Moscow was not ruling out closer Russia-NATO ties.

Putin is fully aware of the fact that the United States' star continues to
rise. While begrudgingly accepting the ascending American power and
prestige, Putin is driven by a very elaborate and shrewd agenda, which
contains the following elements.

First, he is ensuring that Washington perceives his country as an ally on
the issue of fighting transnational terrorism. Toward that end, he has
sought to legitimize his government's handling of the hostage crisis of
October 23 when a group of Chechens took over a theater in Moscow. Russia
decided to use fentanyl - a potent opium-based narcotic - before its special
forces conducted an assault. The result was as horrible as it was
embarrassing. It caused 115 deaths, including all the hostage-takers. Bush
was only too eager to oblige. He pointed out that the responsibility for
those deaths should be firmly placed on the hostage-takers, and not on the
Russian government.

Second, Putin wanted more than mere acquiescence. He was clearly interested
in widening the scope of the war on terrorism by seeking a general Western
acceptance of his repeated assertions that the Chechen separatists and
transnational terrorism are intertwined. In the aftermath of the October 23
tragedy, no European leader was sticking his neck out by appearing to be
endorsing the Russian brutality in ending it. But Prime Minister Tony Blair
of Great Britain lived up to the European characterization of him as George
Bush's poodle and stated, "A deadly mixture of religious and political
fanaticism is being used." He went on to link the Chechen hostage-taking to
the terrorist attacks in Bali, and the murder of an American diplomat in
Jordan.

The Russian media are also determined to help Putin link the Chechen
struggle for independence with global terrorism, and by underscoring the
commonality of this threat to Washington and Moscow. Izvestia depicted it as
a part of "war of civilizations". Nezavisimeya Gazeta called it a "logical
and integral part of the link in the chain of recent world events stretching
from New York to Indonesia and Israel" and called for an "immediate
military-police-political alliance with the United States and Britain. Just
as we did in 1941."

Third, Putin, while still opposing a potential unilateral military action
against Iraq in the event that Saddam Hussein resorts to delaying tactics
during the UN inspection of his country's weapons of mass destruction
facilities, has supported Bush's demands for unfettered inspection. In turn,
Bush promised that Russia's interests related to Iraq would not be
jeopardized. Considering the fact that Iraq owes Russia billions of dollars
in debt, Putin's trepidations about the implications of a "regime change" in
Iraq for Russia are quite legitimate.

Finally, Putin took the opportunity of Bush's short visit to Russia and the
presence of the international media to fulminate about the Saudi and
Pakistani role in the global war on terrorism, a controversial topic from
the point of view of the United States. He said, "Now, where has Osama bin
Laden taken refuge? They say 'somewhere between Afghanistan and Pakistan',
thereby implying some sort of knowledge, if not involvement, of the
Pakistani government." He also reminded the American president that 14 out
of 19 terrorists of the September 11 attacks on the US were Saudi citizens.
Together, references to America's important Muslim friends also complement
the Russian twirling related to "civilizational war" and its endeavors to
underscore the linkages between bin Ladin's al-Qaeda and the Chechen
separatists.

It should be understood that Russia is desperate to contain, if not
exterminate, the fighting spirit of the Chechen separatists. The September
11 terrorist attacks have conveniently placed the Chechen question in a very
positive frame from Russia's viewpoint. But it also knows that American
predilections for human rights and rights of self-determination are too
intrinsic and powerful to be set aside for long, even in the name of
fighting terrorism. Thus, Russia must look for a permanent basis of support,
recognizing that the US support related to the Chechen conflict will still
witness its own ebb and flow.

As Russia envisions it, the Chechen question is only the tip of a larger
Muslim iceberg. Other Muslim states of the Russian federation are watching
with rapt attention the unfolding of the Chechen drama. If Chechnya ends up
winning its highly coveted freedom, other Muslim states (with a total
reported Muslim population of between 16 million to 20 million) might start
their own struggle to be free of that federation, a union in the making of
which they had no say. What happens then? The Russian leadership cannot bear
to think of the answer to that question. That is probably one of the most
crucial reasons why Putin is busy developing his elaborate, but not so
explicit, and intricate strategic agenda of cooperation with the United
States.

Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent
strategic analyst.