[A-List] China: Israeli arms links

["Michael Keaney" <michael.keaney@xxxxxx>]

Israel's role in China's new warplane
By David Isenberg
Asia Times, December 4 2002

The recent unveiling (sort of) of China's first domestically designed (sort
of) fighter jet was the culmination of a long saga of international
military-hardware wheeling and dealing that has seen US-designed or -funded
high-tech weaponry fall into the hands of potential military rivals.

The showpiece of many years' work, dating back to the late 1980s, recently
happened - albeit unobserved - when China confirmed the existence of, but
did not unveil, the Jian-10 fighter jet. It had been reported that the J-10
(F-10 being the export version, using North Atlantic Treaty Organization
designation) would be shown in public for the first time during the fourth
China International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition (Airshow China 2002)
held in Zhuhai in southern Guangdong province from November 4-10, but the
plane did not appear.

The J-10 is a multi-role single-engine and single-seat tactical fighter,
with a combat radius of 1,000 kilometers. Although billed as a domestically
produced fighter, in truth the J-10 could not have happened without the help
of other countries, especially Israel.

The program began in the late 1980s and is thought to be based on an Israeli
design. It contains Israeli and Russian avionics, and is powered by Russian
engines.

Chinese engineers developed the J-10 from a single F-16 provided by
Pakistan, and with assistance from Israeli engineers associated with
Israel's US-financed Lavi fighter program, which was canceled in 1987,
according to the Federation of American Scientists website. The Lavi was
based on the US F-16 and built with US$1.3 billion in aid from Washington.

In 1983, when US support for the Lavi commenced, the program was opposed
vigorously by the Defense Department, partly because of re-export concerns.
An early supporter of the Lavi was George Shultz, then secretary of state in
the administration of US president Ronald Reagan. Shultz would later label
his advocacy of the program a "costly mistake".

Only in early 1995 did the US government make public its concerns about
Israel's Lavi-related technology re-exports to China. David Lari, director
general of Israel's Ministry of Defense, acknowledged in an Associated Press
interview that "some technology on aircraft" had been sold to China and that
some Israeli companies may not have "clean hands".

Yet China's acquisition of the Russian Su-27, after China had attempted for
years to develop the J-10 aircraft with equivalent technology to perform
similar functions, is seen by some experts as a sign that China lacks
confidence in its domestic industrial capabilities.

Though it has never been certain precisely what specific technologies and
systems Israel provided, it was reported that the Jian-10's radar and
fire-control system is the Israeli-made ELM-2021 system, which can
simultaneously track six air targets and lock on to the four most
threatening targets for destruction.

In December 1991, US intelligence officials announced that Israel planned to
open a government-coordinated and -sponsored "arms office" in China. Given
what the Israelis had to offer, and what the Chinese needed, it was most
likely that a transfer of avionics and other technologies developed in the
Lavi program would ensue, since there was a void in the Chinese avionics and
fire-control system capability due to the 1989 termination of a US-Chinese
program in response to Tiananmen Square.

China and Israel started collaboration in the early 1980s and full-scale
cooperation was under way officially by 1984. As neither China nor Israel
was capable of developing the propulsion system required by the J-10, in
1991 China acquired the AI31F turbofan engine from Russia for incorporation
into the J-10 fighter. This engine is also used in the Su-27 air-superiority
fighter that Chinese acquired from Russia. As the performance of the AL31F
engine is significantly better than that of the American PW1120 originally
slated for the Lavi, it may be anticipated that the performance of the J-10
will be accordingly enhanced. Built by the Chengdu Aircraft Industrial Corp,
the J-10 attempts to rival current fourth-generation Western fighters. China
has inked a 10-year deal with the Russian engine maker SRPC Salut for 300
Al-31F engines for its J-10 program and will begin production of the jets
next year.

The plane is said to have capabilities similar to the Su-27, the Russian
MiG-29 and the US F-16 fighter jets, but with an estimated cost of less than
$10 million, it could rival other jet makers on the international market.

In March 1997, despite official denials from Israeli officials, the US
Office of Naval Intelligence in its unclassified "Worldwide Challenges to
Naval Strike Warfare" restated more strongly than it had the previous year
its belief that US-derived technology from the canceled Israeli Lavi fighter
was being used on China's new F-10 fighter. It said, "The design has been
undertaken with substantial direct external assistance, primarily from
Israel and Russia, with indirect assistance through access to US
technologies." In fact, according to the annual intelligence report, "the
F-10 is a single-seat, light multi-role fighter based heavily on the
canceled Israeli Lavi program".

Until it was canceled in 1987, much of Lavi technological development was
paid for by the United States. Ironically, the potential capability of F-10
fighters was cited by both the US Navy and Air Force as one of the future
threats justifying the expenditure of billions on new tactical aircraft,
such as the F-22, F/A-18F, and Joint Strike Fighter. The fact that possibly
US-derived technology provided by an ally might be contributing to that
potential threat is a delicate subject.

However, this is not the first time accusations of illegal technology have
been made. A March 1992 report by State Department inspector general Sherman
Funk, "Report of Audit: Department of State Defense Trade Controls", states
that alleged Israeli violations of US laws and regulations "cited and
supported by reliable intelligence information show a systematic and growing
pattern of unauthorized transfers ... dating back to about 1983".

In the summer of 2000, the Washington Times reported that a memo circulating
inside the Pentagon's Defense Threat Reduction Agency told analysts they no
longer had to gain input from the Defense Intelligence Agency before
deciding whether controlled technology should be transferred to Israel. The
DIA had compiled evidence that Israel had violated US export regulations by
transferring missile, laser and aircraft technology to China.

Subsequently, when Israel tried to sell the Phalcon to India, the US
government demanded that Israel limit arms exports. Israel was told that it
must inform the US of all weapons transfers to 27 nations regarded as
"countries of concern" such as China, India and Yugoslavia.

"Israel ranks second only to Russia as a weapons-system provider to China
and as a conduit for sophisticated military technology, followed by France
and Germany," stated a report this year by the US-China Security Review
Commission, a panel established by Congress to examine security and economic
relations between the two countries. "Recent upgrades in target acquisition
and fire control, probably provided by Israeli weapons specialists, have
enhanced the capabilities of the older guided missile destroyers and
frigates" in the Chinese navy's inventory, it said.

The commission cited Israel as a supplier to Beijing of radar systems,
optical and telecommunications equipment, drones and flight simulators.

Arms exports have not only played a crucial role in offsetting Israel's
trade imbalance but have also performed a key role in furthering its
diplomatic efforts. The sale of arms and technology has become one of the
most effective techniques to furthering Israeli goals overseas. The quiet
ties with China and India and the growing alliance with Turkey in the 1980s
and the 1990s are good examples of strong links based on such cooperation.

The J-10 is hardly the only result of Israeli-Chinese military cooperation.
For example, the Chinese F-8, the same type of plane that collided with the
US reconnaissance plane last year, is armed with Israeli Python-3 missiles.
The Python, adapted from the US ALM-9L Sidewinder missile, has a high degree
of US technology. Ironically for Israel, China apparently sold its version
of Python-3, called the PL-8, to Iraq.

And, as was widely publicized, Israel was set to sell China the Phalcon, an
airborne early-warning radar system, until it was forced by the United
States to cancel the deal. The US Central Intelligence Agency also believed
Israel was marketing its STAR cruise missile in China. The STAR incorporates
sensitive US technology.

And former US officials report that both Israel and the Dutch company Delft
made unauthorized sales of US thermal-imaging tank sights to, among others,
China. The sights were installed on China's 69 MOD-2 tanks, some of which
were sold to Iraq. The United States acquired physical evidence of this
transfer after these tanks were used against US marines in the 1991 Gulf
War.