[A-List] US imperialism: Hugo Young on Iraq

["Michael Keaney" <michael.keaney@xxxxxx>]

Bush now seems to accept that this must be a UN war

An attack on Iraq is likely, but may still be months away

Hugo Young in New York
Tuesday November 19, 2002
The Guardian

Some people here think war with Iraq is close. They range beyond the
civilians at the top of the Pentagon. They want a war, and they have a case.
Saddam Hussein is already in breach of numerous UN demands, and is certain,
they believe, to multiply his breaches, starting on December 8, when he is
required to produce a full declaration of his mass-destruction assets and
will certainly not do so. At the next stage, when inspections get fully
under way, there will be more breaches. The war party envisages an early
hearing at the White House, at which President Bush is persuaded, over the
head of Secretary of State Powell, that the US cannot afford to be jerked
around for further weeks by Russians, French and Mexicans at the UN, and
must not wait to attack.

There's a precedent for the precipitate action that would follow. In
December 1998, Bill Clinton launched bombing raids on Iraq at the very
moment the UN security council was meeting to discuss what to do about
Saddam. Mr Bush, the case goes, has stronger unilateralist instincts than
Clinton, and is surrounded by officials who nurture them. An attack will
happen soon, early 2003 at the latest, without UN support if necessary.

I think this quite unlikely. Conversations inside the Bush administration
and at the UN begin to produce the shape of the more probable scenario.
Among other things this will force European (and indeed American)
anti-warriors to think more seriously about their position than Bush has
given them the luxury of doing so far.

It's always possible Saddam will be very stupid, and orchestrate
provocations nobody can ignore, but what most American officials are
preparing for is a long game. For example, the December 8 declaration could
declare several hundred thousand documents purporting to be the history of
chemical-agent production in Iraq. They wouldn't be what the UN wants, but
the inspectors would need to study them. Many possible Iraqi responses,
evasive but not blatantly in breach, have been thought about and docketed.
The pattern of obstruction will need to be conclusive before war starts.

This is because Bush has become, in effect, an internationalist. His own
inner demons used, of course, to be different. Their message was, and
implicitly still is, voiced by Vice-President Cheney, a rigid opponent of
any UN involvement. But from the moment in September when Bush opted for the
UN route, the need for international support became rooted deep in his
strategy. His election victory, touted as a hawkish moment, gives him more
strength to wait for it to build.

The main reason he wants it is to be found not in the war so much as the
victory that follows. A senior UN official contrasted for me a victory
gained by America alone, leaving the US to carry the entire burden of Arab
hatred as it struggled alone to hold Iraq together, with a victory under the
collective UN banner, in which many states share the material and moral
responsibility for what the world decided to do. "Bush will go a long way to
build that alliance," the official said.

His chances of doing so via the UN are better than they were. The US spent
eight weeks fending off the demand, from France and Russia mainly, that
there must be a second resolution before further Iraqi infractions are
formally converted into a casus belli. They won that one. But Washington
agreed to return for a security council discussion, in terms so clear that a
Clinton-style pre-emptive strike would be seen, by faithful Britain as much
as anyone, as an intolerable betrayal.

However, the chances of a second resolution being voluntarily proposed by
the US or Britain are quite high, since the chances of it being passed are
improving. France, having righteously defended the UN process for eight
weeks, now sees its Iraqi contracts being broken and is losing interest in
blocking further action. China, distant from the scene, is more interested
in bilateral relations with the US than defending Saddam. An isolated Russia
would be reluctant to cast a veto. With the permanent five on side, a simple
security council majority would be enough for war. Ensuring it is a task on
which the diplomats are now embarked.

This doesn't alter the difficulties of agreeing when Iraq should be deemed
conclusively in violation. As the inspectors go in, the speculative nits are
being interminably picked on the 24-hour TV news programmes here. That could
go on for months, and the war party will get more contemptuously rowdy. My
impression, though, is that for both military and diplomatic reasons
Washington will be patient. The armaments need to be in place. Most of all,
the allies need to agree. An official at the national security council
startled me by volunteering that six months could pass before anything
happened. I now see why he may be right.

I draw three conclusions from this trip. The first is that, in the delicate
matter of deciding when enough has been enough, Prime Minister Blair will
have a crucial, perhaps decisive, voice. Bush desperately needs Blair, and
Blair desperately needs the UN. If Blair cannot agree that Saddam has yet
insulted the world order enough to justify war, Bush's hand may be
temporarily stayed.

Second, the probability of war at some stage is high, verging on certain.
The inspection process may yield its own peace dividends. Saddam is already
less secure than he was, as witness his referendum and the prisoner
releases. Perhaps Mr Blix will destabilise him further, simply by being
there, and with the power to take willing witnesses out of Iraq to a new
life in exchange for testimony. But don't bet on it. The US/UN demands will
be unrelenting. Short of the assassin's bullet - regarded longingly in
Washington - war will be the only way to meet them.

But thirdly, this does look more like being a UN war. Saddam's chances of
splitting the security council are receding. France, having insured the
system against US unilateralism, is now as keen as anyone to see the back of
the monster. There may not be many more forces than American, British and
French in the field and the air, but time and palpably serious intent are
producing deals with Iraq's neighbours - Turkey, perhaps even Iran - that
begin to close the trap.

A UN war doesn't destroy the arguments against any war at all. The hazards
of bio-chemical retaliation will remain. The death of innocent civilian
Iraqis will be a brutal certainty. What kind of post-war Iraq, a subject of
Polyanna-ish optimism in the Bush administration, is a question that should
dog all regime-changers. Al-Qaida will feed. But the issue now, if I'm
right, is not the simple one of American superpowerdom and whether Blair
should be tailgating in its wake. It is whether, by internationalising the
Iraqi conflict, Bush and Blair, with Chirac and Putin in acquiescence, will
make the world a safer place. Unless one is to say the UN, from being
anathema to the US, has become her tool, the case has strengthened, and
needs more than ranting to defeat it.