[A-List] UK state: strategy of tension

["Michael Keaney" <michael.keaney@xxxxxx>]

Ministers develop plan for 'Protect and Survive' film to warn of terror
threat
By Paul Waugh Deputy Political Editor
The Independent, 13 November 2002

A public information film in the style of the 1970s Protect and Survive
campaign is being considered by the Government as part of plans to improve
the country's ability to cope with terrorist attacks.

The Government News Network is understood to be backing the proposal,
although ministers are extremely wary of doing anything which might cause
further alarm among the public. Under the plans, a short film would call for
greater vigilance about suspicious packages and vehicles, as well as
recommend emergency action in the event of any attack.

Screened on all terrestrial television stations and in cinemas, it would be
aimed at preventing widespread panic by offering advice on how to react in
extraordinary circumstances. The film would back up a poster campaign
already being discussed by ministers to increase overall awareness of the
terror threat posed by al-Qa'ida and other groups in the wake of 11
September.

It is bound to revive memories of Protect and Survive, the British
government's 1976 notorious public information film, which offered advice on
how to react to a nuclear attack during the Cold War.

The new film may be based on a recent emergency advice video, Go In, Stay
In, Tune In , which gave the public advice on coping with major accidents
near chemical factories. It would be produced by the Home Office, Cabinet
Office and the National Steering Committee on Warning and Informing the
Public, which brings together central and local government, industry,
emergency services and the media.

Go In, Stay In, Tune In says mass evacuation is not always the best response
to an emergency and the public is often safer staying indoors until given
the all-clear. The new film is likely to repeat such advice in the event of
a poison gas or bomb attack by terrorists, stressing that gridlock caused by
evacuations and jammed phone lines make it much more difficult to respond.
People are safer staying at home and tuning in to local radio and television
bulletins for advice.

Brian Ward, chairman of the Emergency Planning Society, which co-ordinates
contingency planners and 999 services, said he would welcome a film on the
terror threat. "I'm all for alerting the public, not alarming them, and if
done sensitively this would be a good idea."

The Government tried yesterday to calm public fears about terror attacks on
cross-Channel ferries provoked by warnings of a possible threat.

-----

Analysis: The fear, the warnings and how a nation was placed on high alert
The code is black special, the danger clear and present. But how good is our
intelligence network, and how much do we really know?
By Jason Bennetto Crime Correspondent
The Independent, 13 November 2002

Last week, the Home Secretary published what he thought was a carefully
worded, sober assessment of the threat posed by the al-Qa'ida network.

Instead, in a classic Westminster gaffe, an earlier - and racier - draft
copy was handed over to reporters, only for embarrassed officials to ask for
it back 30 minutes later.

The next day, David Blunkett was treated to sensational headlines - based,
of course, on the first document - warning that Islamic fanatics could
attack using nuclear "dirty bombs" and poisonous gas. The blunder
highlighted a dilemma faced by the Government: how much, if any,
intelligence should they share with the public on terrorism issues.

It was a theme that Tony Blair spoke about on Monday, saying he wanted to
warn people without alarming them.

The Prime Minister argued that if he acted upon every piece of raw
intelligence that flowed across the desks of the security services almost
daily, he would constantly have to shut roads, railways, airports, shopping
centres, factories, and military bases.

In a further example of possible scaremongering, the Government was forced
to try to quell fears of an imminent terror attack on cross-Channel ferries
after news emerged that Dover and other ports had been warned to be extra
vigilant. The Home Office Minister John Denham said there had not been any
overall increase in the state of alert and the public did not need to alter
travel plans in response to the advice.

The British intelligence business is a vast, complex piece of machinery,
which according to some is among the best in the world, while others argue
that it is more art than science.

The Security Service, MI5, is the lead agency in providing counter-terrorism
threat assessments, and offers a range of intelligence packages from highly
sensitive information on national security directly to the Prime Minister to
details about organised crime issues to chief constables. Depending on the
sensitivity of the information, the assessments are sent either by hand or
electronically via secure e-mails.

Within MI5, G branch, the international terrorism section, assesses
intelligence coming from abroad. Among the sources of information about
al-Qa'ida and possible terrorist targets are MI6 agents and the
eavesdropping centre, the Government Communications Headquarters in
Cheltenham. GCHQ monitors communications, such as phone calls, between
terrorist suspects.

Information also comes from embassies throughout the world, the American
National Security Agency, the CIA and European security services.

The most sensitive MI5 reports, known as Security Service Reports, are sent
to a limited audience, including Downing Street, cabinet ministers and a
select group of permanent secretaries in the Foreign Office, Ministry of
Defence and Home Office.

Whitehall uses a system of colour codes to warn of the level of threat to
the nation. The highest level is red, used when there is intelligence of an
immediate attack. The second highest level is orange, which is used when
there is knowledge of an imminent attack, but the target is unknown. Since
11 September, the country has been placed on orange alert on several
occasions. "Black special" - the current level - is when the country is
believed to be under threat but there is no intelligence to suggest it is
imminent. The lowest stage is black.

Running in parallel with MI5's work, the Cabinet Office's Joint Intelligence
Committee makes assessments for the Government.

The co-ordination of the UK's counter-terrorism work has been beefed up
since 11 September with the appointment of Sir David Omand as security and
intelligence co-ordinator in the Cabinet Office. Part of his role is to
ensure the right steps are taken to warn the public.

Another development has been the creation of the Police International
Counter-Terrorist Unit, which consists of officers from Special Branch,
Scotland Yard's Anti-Terrorist Branch and MI5. It passes data to regional
Special Branches, which have become increasingly important with the spread
of al-Qa'ida recruitment.

The Metropolitan Police's anti-terrorist squad has been greatly expanded in
the past year and, as well as running its own inquiries against suspects in
the UK, it also works on behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigations.

Since 11 September, the security level at Scotland Yard has remained high,
at level two - with five being the lowest threat. Level one is reserved for
imminent attack. The latest warnings of a threat to the UK, which were made
by the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary, with the support of MI5,
backfired when Mr Blunkett's more inflammatory report was accidentally
published. Days later, Mr Blair was supposed to reinforce his Home
Secretary's comments, but was forced on to the defensive.

The blunder was typical of the reality of how intelligence assessment and
dissemination works, according to one specialist in the field.

Dr Chris Brady, associate dean at the Cass Business School in London and an
intelligence specialist who worked in the military in the Gulf War, said:
"Whatever the standard operational procedures in place, the reality is
intelligence is all about personalities and office politics. The recent
warnings should not be judged on its intelligence value - it is a PR
exercise. This is a pure reaction to the bombing in Bali." Dr Brady believes
the amount of information is too great and often too vague to provide 100
per cent defence against attack.

He said he knew of at least three American intelligence reports that had
said in the months before the 11 September attacks that a plane was likely
to be used to fly into the twin towers in New York.

"The information about possibly threats is always there - it is how you
process the information and act that counts. Analysts are human and they can
get it wrong. They can get it right 99 per cent of the time but you can
still be blown up. At best you limit the damage."

Another intelligence specialist, Dr Magnus Ranstorp, acting director of the
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St Andrews
University, believes the risk of causing alarm is a necessary one.

He said: "Although there does appear to be any specific terrorist threat, it
is the increased volume of intelligence that is causing concern.

"There are exceptional circumstances for the Government to make recent
warnings. We should take it seriously.

"It is to remind us we are facing a clear and present danger from terrorism
and there is a generic threat to all of Europe. It may create alarm, which
is something the Government has to limit, but you cannot escape the fact the
threat is high."

-----

So much alarming talk, so little to help the public adjust to the war on
terror
The Independent, 13 November 2002
Leading Article

The Prime Minister put it very well in his Guildhall speech: "The dilemma is
reconciling warning people with alarming them; taking preventive measures
without destroying normal life."

The evidence of the past week suggests that his Government is still
struggling to strike a sensible balance. A few days ago we witnessed the
Home Office issuing, apparently through a "clerical error", the most vivid
warnings of the threat of attacks on the British transport system, possibly
involving "dirty" nuclear bombs. This was swiftly followed by an apology
about upsetting everyone and a vague injunction for the public to be
generally more vigilant.

That might be explained away as an accident, although how a specific warning
about nuclear attack could find itself so casually in the public domain
remains a most disturbing aspect of the incident.

What is rather less accidental, indeed quite deliberate, was Mr Blair's
alarming rhetoric about unspecified but very real threats: "Barely a day
goes by without some new piece of intelligence coming via our security
services about a threat to UK interests." The effect of his words was simply
to worry many people about terror, perhaps even panicking some, without
giving very much in the way of guidance about what should be done beyond the
usual plea for vigilance.

That would be unsatisfactory enough; by yesterday morning the Home Office
minister John Denham, a naturally reassuring presence, found himself trying
to calm the nerves of the nation and play down the Prime Minister's
warnings.

His task was made all the trickier by the leak of some confusing and
confused intelligence about a possible attack on a British ferry or port
facility. The head of security at Dover remarked that the threat was "not
actually specific to Dover, but Dover as a port was implicit in it", which
is about as clear as things get at the moment.

It all leaves the public with some very mixed messages about the immediacy
and the nature of the terrorist threat they face. We all know that we should
be vigilant, conscious about suspicious bags left unattended and
suspiciously parked cars. What else should we be vigilant about? We became
used to such a mindset during the IRA's long campaign. The British public
are, in fact, comparatively well trained about terrorism. What they are
becoming increasingly confused about is what they can do now.

The Government's task in striking a balance is not an easy one. No one
seriously thinks that every piece of stray intelligence should be published.
As Mr Blair said, if he were to do that he would find himself closing whole
industries on a weekly basis. In America, the new Office of Homeland
Security pioneered a "traffic light" system, a five-level indicator of the
current level of risk. Each level, or "threat condition", designates a set
of suggested measures that organisations are advised to take.

Unfortunately, the colours system soon became ridiculed and disregarded,
although it is a much more systematic approach than the one followed by the
British authorities and, for all its flaws, does offer specific action for
public authorities, companies and individuals.

We could take or leave the colour coding, and we need not go so far as the
"careless talk costs lives"-style campaigns of the Second World War; but the
public desperately want to be treated like grown-ups, and told precisely
what they must do to do their bit on the "home front" in the war against
terror.