Re: [A-List] US military: who's in charge?

["bon moun" <sherrynstan@xxxxxxx>]

This is a pretty feeble admission of the failure of Operation Anaconda, but
the fact that it has been made at all hints at the gravity of that failure.
The military establishment was stung again.  Rummy's called someone onto
the carpet, then hired this "braintrust" to figure out how those nasty wogs
gave him the slip.

This piece continues to demonstrate another fundamental failure; the
failure to recognize the limitations, and even liabilities, of higher
levels of organizational and technological complexity within a single
system.  In fact, this tendency to consolidate all the eggs in one basket -
which has been driven by the sometimes contradictory and sometimes
complimentary premises of the two dominant military doctrines (Powell
Doctrine & Full Spectrum Dominance) - is being promoted as the solution to
a strategic dilemma in Afghanistan that is intrinsically insoluble to the
US by military means.

This proposal is to resolve inter-service contradictions, culpable for lack
of efficacy and tactical agility by this account, through further
centralization.  Taking inter-service finger-pointing over the failure of
Operation Anaconda to break the back of Taliban and allied forces as their
point of departure, Noonan and Lewis conclude that a "terra-based"
"tradition" was responsible for the mission failure.  They never question
whether the finger-pointing itself was accurate, and they never relate the
actual or hypothetical future actions to the battlefield situation (I
suppose I'm betraying a terra-bias in calling it that.).  More importantly,
nothing in this essay, which is a textbook example of military-think in the
US, relates the battlefield to its social and political context.  US troops
in Afghanistan were participating in operations that had no overarching
strategic objectives.  In the absence of a coherent political and
geographical entity against which to pose strategic goals, there is no
organizing principle for the development of operational and tactical level
objectives.  Anaconda was an orphan, a campaign in search of a strategy.
Without a strategic objective, there is simply no way to determine what and
where and when the main effort must be - and determination of the main
effort is fundamental in the development of any operations order, at any
level, single-service or joint-service.

Absent a strategic direction, the US in Afghanistan is incapable of seizing
the initiative, which puts them at a disadvantage - strategically,
operationall, and tactically - against all comers... who are busily
restructuring their own relationships right now.

One of the most astonishing characteristics of this essay is the complete
refusal to factor in at whom precisely this "reorganization" will be aimed,
and what are the capacities in the real spatio-temporal universe of the
actual human beings who will operate this Wazoo Hi-tech Armed Force.  The
implicit notion of a one-size-fits-all armed force should be foolish on its
face, but once the authors have us safely ensconced in their little
abstraction, we forget that a finite number of actual Homo sapiens will be
responsible for making this phantasma work.  The incredibly expensive
inefficiency of the US armed forces should already be, but is not
generally, known.    And complex technology on the unpredictable
battlefield can suddenly and disastrously invoke the law of diminishing
returns.

"But this is in no way an attempt to dismiss the challenges of geography or
minimize the unique strengths of our service institutions and their
members. To the contrary, it is a way to apply all the right tools at the
right time by approaching three-dimensional operations in a truly unified
and comprehensive manner, while maximizing effectiveness by allowing the
core competencies of our forces to act as combat multipliers buttressing
one another."

Someone paid these twits a lot of money to come up with this drivel, and it
is worthy of an Alan Sokal spoof.

> Experimenting with command
> By Michael P Noonan and Mark R Lewis
>
> (Posted with permission from Foreign Policy Research Institute)
>
> Asia Times: November 13 2002
>
> As the saying goes, "The more things change, the more they stay the
same." A
> perfect example of this has been US combat operations in Afghanistan.
While
> stories (and photographs) heralded an era where special operations
personnel
> could call in precision-guided munitions from horseback, this close work
> between ground and air forces seems to be the exception rather than the
> rule.
>
> Indications of this have recently surfaced in the comments of army
> Major-General Franklin L Hagenbeck, the commander of the 10th Mountain
> Division and the on-the-scene commander for last spring's Operation
Anaconda
> offensive in Afghanistan. In an interview for the army's Field Artillery
> journal, the general hinted that operational effectiveness was limited
> because close air support (particularly from the air force) was hindered
by
> over-reliance on precision-guided munitions, difficulty in hitting
non-fixed
> targets and strict targeting procedures.
>
> Understandably, some in the air force countered that the army's
last-minute
> attempt at coordination and unrealistic requirements for close air
support
> assets effectively hamstrung the air force before the mission even began.
> Are these troubles merely the result of a lack of widespread expertise on
> the part of senior commanders who cannot plan and coordinate joint
> operations properly, or are there organizational and cultural reasons why
> certain elements of the military cannot work well together?
>
> This essay argues that longstanding traditions of American war-making are
> largely responsible and that changes in organizational structures are
> necessary to wage modern war. Furthermore, as the Defense Department
pursues
> transformation, such reorganization is imperative to build the foundation
> upon which all other transformation initiatives are based.
>
> Segmented warfare
> Throughout most of its history the United States has practiced what can
be
> termed "segmented warfare". Each service had a distinct role and operated
> nearly independently: the navy laid claim to blue-water operations, the
> Marine Corps developed itself into an expeditionary force, and the army
> focused on large-scale ground warfare. With the relatively late arrival
of
> the air force, that service built its doctrine around the belief that
> bombers could collapse the enemy's will as they collapsed his cities, and
> thus strategic airpower trumped the other services, relegating them to
> operations on the periphery.
>
> As recently as World War II, many, if not most, of the battles were
either
> primarily land (the European campaign), primarily maritime (the Pacific
> campaign), or primarily air (the Battle of Britain or the strategic
bombing
> of Germany's industrial centers). Historically, therefore, military
> campaigns conducted along the lines of the separate services are
> understandable.
>
> Two changes, however, have affected the way US forces fight. First,
> technology now allows the services to communicate and share information
> quickly, enabling them to work more closely together. This, combined with
> advances in munitions, has the potential to create a synergy among the
> services and yield greater combat power in smaller force packages than
ever
> before. Secondly, as Max Boot recently pointed out in his book The Savage
> Wars of Peace, the bulk of our conflicts have proven to be relatively
small
> (but operationally complex) wars - with or without strategic
consequences -
> that by their nature require the United States to employ military power
with
> exacting precision.
>
> Even as changes in the strategic context began to drive the need for more
> precise applications of combat power, bureaucratic struggles over
budgetary
> divisions, contradictory advice, and operational inefficiencies within
the
> Department of Defense brought about calls for "jointness". The passage of
> the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986 (and subsequent legislation
> dealing with special operations forces) sought to change the way the
> department did business. This legislation came about largely because
> inter-service rivalry had hindered military effectiveness in operations
such
> as the Iranian hostage rescue attempt (1979) and the invasion of Grenada
> (1983).
>
> At its core, the legislation empowered regional combatant commanders with
> command and control responsibility for their geographic area,
strengthened
> the role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and made joint
> assignments a prerequisite for officers to be selected for general or
flag
> rank. The logic was simple enough: a strengthened warfighting chain of
> command staffed by officers experienced in working with their
counterparts
> from the other services would increase the operational effectiveness of
the
> US military writ large. Reality, however, often trumps logic.
>
> The invasion of Panama (1989) and the Persian Gulf War (1990-91) were
> largely held up as exemplars of joint operations following the passage of
> Goldwater-Nichols legislation. In reality, these conflicts were conducted
> along service lines. The Marines operated in their sectors, the army in
> other areas, and special operations forces in yet other areas. Similarly,
> aviation from all four services generally had its own areas of
> responsibility, with the air force usually preferring to "go downtown" to
> attack strategic targets in pursuit of air-war specific objectives.
> Organizational barriers continue to suboptimize the use of our forces,
> limiting our ability to inflict damage on our enemies to something less
than
> the sum of the means available, even after 16 years of the jointness
> Goldwater-Nichols was to promote.
>
> Functional warfare
> If the United States handily won those conflicts, then why is true joint
> warfighting important? Principally, the answer is because the
coordinated,
> complementary use of cross-service capabilities in the majority of
> circumstances allows for the most efficient use of force. No longer
easily
> segregated into land, maritime or air conflicts, the localized and
intense
> "small wars" nature of US military engagement of the past decade,
combined
> with the smaller base of troops and equipment from which to draw
> capabilities, means that the services must work more closely together to
> produce a synergistic effort.
>
> The challenge today is that a majority of officers can talk "joint" but
> still think "service". What is joint doctrine in name actually reinforces
> the service-centric nature of our operations. At the most basic level,
> planning procedures and operational concepts fundamentally constrain
> regional combatant commanders to think in terms of land, maritime or air
> conflicts. Indeed, combatant commanders assign subordinate commanders on
> this sort of "terra-based" distinction, as joint force land, maritime,
and
> air component commanders, even though emerging crises are not so easily
> compartmentalized. For instance, a joint force land component commander
is
> responsible for "the proper employment of ... land forces; planning and
> coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational
missions."
> Are army forces launched from a navy ship in support of air force bombers
> dropping precision-strike munitions a land, maritime, or air operation?
>
> That the answer is not so clear is no surprise, nor is it a surprise that
> such uncertainty can drive organizational confusion as well. The result
can
> be organizational stovepipes where a ground commander may well have to
send
> his request for air support up the ground forces chain of command several
> echelons to the "terra-based" component commander level. There, the
request
> can move horizontally to the air component commander, and back down the
air
> component command structure to the operational level air commander, who
will
> actually plan and fly the mission.
>
> With this in mind, it should be readily apparent why problems such as the
> close air support difficulties in Afghanistan occur. Because the
components
> are split by the medium in which they operate, commanders in one
component
> rarely interact with their counterparts in peacetime, and since the
military
> insists on waiting until a crisis emerges before it forms ad hoc joint
> organizations to fight the developing battle, tactical and
operational-level
> commanders rarely have the opportunity to develop the deep expertise in
> joint operations that modern contingencies require. In the case of
Operation
> Anaconda, it is not clear that the conventional ground forces understood
how
> the air forces plan and operate. The result: ineffective coordination
> between air and ground forces hampered the mission.
>
> How can this problem be resolved? One way would be to put liaisons from
each
> of the services into the planning cells of the other components. But that
> happens today, and we still see these sorts of coordination problems.
> Clearly, the development of standing joint task forces where land,
maritime,
> and air component forces come together during peacetime to train and
develop
> the habitual relationships required to successfully prosecute complex
joint
> operations is another option - and one already under scrutiny by the
Defense
> Department. That could develop more competent joint units, but would not
> necessarily remove the organizational barriers that hamper the combatant
> commanders.
>
> The answer advanced here requires a transformational approach to smashing
> the existing paradigm of terra-based commands to produce a breakthrough
> solution. Why does the department retain ground, maritime and air
component
> commands when modern operations do not lend themselves to such a neat
> compartmentalization? Component commands defined along mission-oriented
> functional requirements are what is required.
>
> Today, when joint doctrine refers to "functional component commands", it
is
> speaking of the medium in which the force operates. But with
> mission-oriented functional component commands, combatant commanders
could
> draw from the unique strengths of the individual services to group
> complementary capabilities under a structure organized to support the
> operational architecture. For instance, one way to achieve this would be
to
> establish a command structure organized along strike, security, support
and
> information operations commands. In this example:
>
> * The joint force strike component commander would have responsibility
for
> those assets - ground, maritime and air - required to conduct offensive
> operations against enemy forces;
> * The joint force security component commander might be responsible for
the
> protection of the forces and lines of communication, as well as
host-nation
> security;
> * The joint force support component commander would be responsible for
> providing for the logistical, maintenance and transportation needs of the
> theater; and
> * The joint force information operations component commander could be
> responsible for providing information systems such as intelligence,
> surveillance and reconnaissance functions, civil-military operations,
public
> relations and psychological operations, while simultaneously targeting
enemy
> information systems.
>
> This is just an example, but the point is that in this way the services
(and
> defense agencies) would provide assets to these commanders much as they
do
> today, but each commander would have comprehensive responsibility for a
> functional - instead of environmental - slice of the battlefield.
>
> Conclusion
> Under the functional component command system proposed here, the
> on-the-scene commander would have a more holistic view of his operational
> area and a better appreciation of how to apply his finite resources to
best
> accomplish the missions assigned because most battle spaces no longer
need
> to be constrained by land, maritime, or air compartmentalization.
>
> Critics of this approach may claim that the very core competencies of the
> services and the expertise needed to plan and coordinate such
capabilities
> would not be feasible under such a joint system. But this is in no way an
> attempt to dismiss the challenges of geography or minimize the unique
> strengths of our service institutions and their members. To the contrary,
it
> is a way to apply all the right tools at the right time by approaching
> three-dimensional operations in a truly unified and comprehensive manner,
> while maximizing effectiveness by allowing the core competencies of our
> forces to act as combat multipliers buttressing one another.
>
> Will such reorganization from segmented, terra-based commands to a
> mission-oriented functional approach eliminate all the challenges in the
> conduct of military operations? Of course not - Clausewitzian friction
and
> fog will always have a place on the battlefield. But the reorganization
> described here could eliminate seams that currently inhibit the
capabilities
> of our forces and it ought to be the subject of future experimentation
> within the Department of Defense.
>
> Michael P Noonan is a research fellow on US defense policy and deputy
> director of the Program on National Security at the Foreign Policy
Research
> Institute. Mark R Lewis is a defense policy analyst for a federally
funded
> research and development center.
>
>
>
>