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[A-List] US Spies say EU will cave on Iraq



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                            S T R A T F O R

                    THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY

                        http://www.stratfor.com
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            06 November 2002

THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT - FULL TEXT FOR MEMBERS ONLY

  -> ON OUR WEBSITE TODAY FOR MEMBERS ONLY:

      * U.S. Election Results Make Iraq War All But Inevitable
      http://www.stratfor.biz/Story.neo?storyId=207391

      * Despite Taiwan's Renewed Fears, China Not a Threat Right Now
      http://www.stratfor.biz/Story.neo?storyId=207388

      * U.S. Interest Rate Cut Addresses Future, Not Current,
Problems
      http://www.stratfor.biz/Story.neo?storyId=207387

      * War Diary: Tuesday, Nov. 5, 2002
      http://www.stratfor.biz/Story.neo?storyId=207378
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U.S. Election Results Make Iraq War All But Inevitable

Summary

The powerful showing by Republicans in the Nov. 5 U.S. mid-term
elections highlights the chasm between U.S. and European public
opinion over Iraq. And though European leaders may hold the final
option for avoiding a war in their hands, paradoxically, the
strength of European public opposition to war will keep them from
using it. In more ways than one, an attack on Iraq is now
inevitable, and a further deterioration in trans-Atlantic
relations is likely.

Analysis

The Republican Party scored an impressive victory in the U.S.
mid-term elections Nov. 5, strengthening its hold on the House of
Representatives and, more significantly, capturing control of the
Senate from the Democrats. The magnitude of the victory --
especially coming in a mid-term election and during a time of
economic uncertainty -- can be explained only by the tremendous
popularity of U.S. President George W. Bush.

The GOP jumped on Bush's broad back, and he carried it to
victory. Perhaps more than anything, the election demonstrated
the strength of U.S. public support for his administration's
policies on national security, including plans to confront Iraq.

By strengthening Bush, the election virtually ensures a war with
Iraq. It's possible that a full capitulation by Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein could help him avoid a military conflict with
Washington, but for that to happen, European leaders would have
to side firmly and publicly with the United States in order to
isolate Hussein.

Ironically, the European public could block any final chance for
a peaceful resolution, as they won't stand for their leaders
moving closer to Bush, especially now that the president is
stronger. So without such a public pro-U.S. stance by Europe,
Iraq will continue to scheme, and the United States will continue
to move forward toward war.

The American voters spoke Nov. 5, and the message was that they
care more about national security than about any other issue,
including the economy. The election showed that, by and large,
Americans trust Bush and the Republicans to better handle their
security, and the results will be perceived in Washington and
overseas as a domestic green light for action against Iraq.

American popular support for Bush and his policies contrasts
sharply with public opinion in Europe. Bush is held in wide
contempt across much of Europe, as is the administration's
foreign policy. But it's not just about the president. More
fundamentally, Europeans have much different views than Americans
on the need for immediate action against international threats.

Consider a recent study by the Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations and the German Marshall Fund of the United States,
cited in the November issue of Foreign Policy magazine. In that
study, which compared opinions in six European countries to those
in the United States, Europeans and Americans ranked the severity
of global threats quite differently.

Whereas more than 90 percent of Americans saw the threat posed by
international terrorism as critical, less than 65 percent of
Europeans held the same opinion. The numbers were similar
regarding the threat posed by Iraq and weapons of mass
destruction (85 percent to 58 percent), the Israeli-Arab conflict
(67 to 42 percent) and Islamic fundamentalism (61 to 49 percent).
Europeans generally feel more secure than do Americans, and thus
less supportive of pre-emptive action.

Pragmatically, European leaders realize that Washington is not
backing down and that it would be in their best interests to get
a seat at the table. That helps explain why France is quietly
helping the United States by allowing the establishment of a U.S.
Joint Task Force base in Djibouti, an area dominated by the
French.

However, Paris still is not backing down publicly on the wording
of a U.N. Security Council resolution over Iraq. Despite France's
significant economic interests in Iraq and the practical reasons
to play ball with the United States, Paris is constrained by
public opinion and can't openly stand with the White House.

The gap in U.S.-European public opinion will widen further as
Europeans ponder a domestically unencumbered White House. The
European public will increase pressure on its leaders to more
forcefully constrain the United States on Iraq, even though such
opposition is not going to derail the train. So paradoxically,
public opposition in Europe to a unified stand against Iraq could
scuttle the last chance to avoid a war.

At this point, there is really only one option for avoiding war
in Iraq, and it involves some kind of voluntary regime change by
Hussein. Though highly unlikely, that is not out of the question
if Hussein, a consummate survivor, runs completely out of
options.

Until now Hussein has continued to cling to the hope that Europe,
together with the Saudis, could save his skin by stalling the
United States. If Europe turns publicly against him and brings
Saudi Arabia with it, Hussein could be left feeling helpless and
totally isolated. At that point, European leaders together with
the Saudis might be able to convince Hussein and/or his immediate
circle that a negotiated regime change is the only way to
survive.

Hussein might finally consider voluntary exile -- something he
refused in 1991 -- and war could be averted. But boxed in by
public opinion, European leaders likely won't make the public
stand with the United States needed to put enough pressure on
Hussein.

Though Washington and Europe will end up on the same side over
Iraq when the shooting starts, the process of getting there could
do some serious damage to the trans-Atlantic relationship. One
need only look at the serious deterioration in the American-
German friendship as an example. With their publics increasingly
far apart over Iraq, political leaders on both sides of the
Atlantic could be pulled apart too.
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