[A-List] EU integration struggles: French assertiveness

["Michael Keaney" <michael.keaney@xxxxxx>]

Chirac struggles to hold back Europe
By Anand Menon
Financial Times: October 29 2002

For many observers, this weekend's French-inspired coup over European Union
farm subsidies represented a triumph for Jacques Chirac. The French
president is portrayed assuming the mantle of his predecessor, Charles de
Gaulle, by getting Europe to do exactly what he wants.

However, Mr Chirac's "success" must be viewed within the context of a France
that is rapidly losing its dominance in Europe. Only too well aware of its
declining influence, Paris has resorted to petty and cynical manoeuvring.
The agreement to preserve the common agricultural policy, of which France is
the largest beneficiary, is as much a means of saving face as of saving
cash.
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Playing the Gaullist card goes down well in France, but in the EU French
influence can no longer be exercised through a mixture of posturing and
bullying
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Paris has always played a leading role in shaping European integration. If
France wanted something - the CAP, monetary union with the Germans - it got
it. And if France objected to something - as de Gaulle did to plans to
increase the European Commission's powers - it generally did not happen.

France been successful in an archetypically French way. When confronted with
unpalatable institutional reform plans in the mid-1960s, the General simply
withdrew French representatives to the European Community, effectively
bringing it to a halt until his demands were met. He would have been proud
of the bravado and obduracy exhibited recently by his Gaullist successor.

Yet there are profound differences between what France is doing now and what
de Gaulle did some 35 years ago. Then, in a European Community of six
members, in which a Germany haunted by memories of the war kept a
deliberately low profile, leadership was bound to emanate from Paris. With
the Germans as their faithful allies, the French set about building a strong
Europe with weak institutions. French leaders were happy in the knowledge
that, ultimately, they would be able to shape its development and would not
be tied into institutional structures capable of telling France what to do.

This is no longer the case. In a European Union of 25 countries, it is more
difficult to contain a Germany that not only is far more assertive but also
will possess, in the new member states, natural allies on many issues.
Enlargement threatens France's share of the CAP cake. It also challenges
French aspirations to make Europe an effective counterweight to the US. Many
of the accession countries are extremely wary of any foreign policy scheme
that may put the transatlantic alliance in danger.

A larger Union will become a more cumbersome entity. In procedural terms, it
is hard to imagine how an enlarged EU can function without institutions that
are significantly strengthened: the Commission simply does not at present
enjoy the resources to police a single market of 25 states and
decision-making will be extraordinarily difficult in a Council almost twice
its current size.

French influence, therefore, can no longer be exercised through a mixture of
posturing and bullying. An enlarged EU will be one in which alliance
building, negotiation and compromise are crucial. And, if it is to function
well, it will be one in which strong institutions, notably the Commission
and the Court, are necessary antecedents to an effective Europe. Paris will
have to rethink its attitude towards supranational institutions and its own
reluctance to comply with their strictures.

Playing the Gaullist card in foreign affairs generally goes down well in
France, as its current president knows only too well. Yet the French are
getting their history wrong. For it is Margaret Thatcher's policies of the
late 1980s, and not de Gaulle's of the 1960s, that are the most appropriate
analogy for what is happening today.

Unlike during her first and second terms, when she determinedly won
Britain's budget rebate, Mrs Thatcher's hostile attitude towards European
integration during her third term was based on a feeling of increasing
isolation and impotence. The single market that she had done so much to
create was being, as she saw it, threatened by French attempts to impose
stricter social regulation. Despite her opposition, her partners pressed
ahead with plans for monetary union. And Britain could do little but watch.

This is precisely how Paris feels now. And the lesson of history does not
provide great comfort. It is true Mr Chirac does not face the threat of the
kind of palace coup that ultimately ousted the Iron Lady. Yet Mrs Thatcher's
policies led to Britain's being marginalised in the EU - not something the
French would enjoy.

To be sure, Mr Chirac won a victory of sorts in Brussels. He cajoled a weak
German chancellor, lacking a clear vision of the future of Europe, into
accepting a deal that will hurt, not help Germany. Yet the president was
acting from a position of weakness rather than strength. To equate the farm
deal either with renewed French leadership in Europe or with a rebirth of
the Franco-German axis is to misunderstand how much Europe has changed.

The writer is director of the European Research Institute at the University
of Birmingham