[A-List] Bush banks on Pyrrhic victory

["Mark Jones" <markjones011@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Tisdall gloomy conclusons are written less apocalyptically than my own talk
of WW3 but spring from the same logic. Mark

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If passed, America's tough resolution on Iraq could be so damaging that only
al-Qaida may be said to have scored a victory, says Simon Tisdall

Thursday October 24, 2002

The Bush administration's battle to secure a tough new UN security council
resolution on Iraq is approaching a climax. The word from the White House is
that after over a month of discussions, it's time to wrap it up.
Having been presented with the "final" US draft, the council is expected to
meet again this weekend. US diplomats are adamant that their government,
having toned down some of the draft's provisions, is unwilling to make
further concessions to critics led by France and Russia.

One of three outcomes is possible in this high-stakes game of diplomatic
poker; all are potentially hugely damaging on a wide range of fronts. That
consideration prompts a more basic question about the wisdom of President
George Bush's approach.

One possible outcome is that the UN will pass the resolution. On this
scenario, permanent members such as France, Russia and China, despite their
deep-seated misgivings, will reluctantly abstain rather than use their veto
powers. But the US will still gain the required nine or more votes in favour
from the council's total 15 members.

In theory, such a victory would satisfy the administration. It would
certainly come as a great relief to the British government, which has backed
Washington and helped frame the draft. Prime minister Tony Blair urged Bush
to take the Iraq issue to the UN and seek its backing for any future action.

On the other hand, hardliners within the administration may view such
success with mixed feelings. They do not believe for a minute that resumed
weapons inspections (which will follow a UN agreement) will eradicate the
threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction.

The hawks fear that inspections will simply allow Saddam to gain time and
that, as in the past, he will find ways to thwart the inspectors and
bamboozle the international community. An inspection and report-back period
lasting up to 135 days, as envisaged in the resolution, could seriously
disrupt the Pentagon's timetable and regional preparations for military
action.

A second possible outcome is that the draft resolution is put to a vote and
is vetoed by either France or Russia, or both, or otherwise fails to attract
the crucial nine votes in favour.

The third possibility is that, realising that it lacks sufficient support,
the US decides not to force a vote at all and ends the discussion.

Bush and his officials have already made crystal clear what will happen if
either of the above outcomes result. The US, they say, is prepared to go it
alone and take all necessary measures, including military action, in pursuit
of its national security interest. They will try to assemble a "coalition of
the willing". And they will condemn the UN for its inability to stand up for
itself and enforce its own, previous Iraq resolutions. This, they will say,
indicates a fundamental lack of backbone.

It can thus plainly be seen why any of these three possible conclusions to
the current UN debate are potentially damaging.

If the resolution as drafted is passed, and an inspection process resumes,
parties to all three sides of the dispute may immediately begin to undermine
it. France and Russia will continue to express the opinion that the
resolution amounts to a "green light" for war and that its terms make it
almost certain that Iraq will be unable to comply.

They will continue to argue that the UN should have been able to consider
and vote on the issue again, if and when Iraq's non-compliance is asserted.
As permanent council members, they may even try to ensure that that the UN
does get a second bite. They will not support Bush's coalition and their
example may lead others to follow suit. This may be particularly true of
Arab countries that supported the Paris-Moscow stance. Iraq will try to
exploit these divisions.

The administration hawks meanwhile will be looking for any chance to halt
the inspection process and declare Saddam to be formally in "material
breach" of his obligations, in defiance of the international community.

Since Iraq has to accept the resolution unconditionally within seven days of
its passage, and declare a full inventory of the weapons it says it does not
possess within 30 days, the hardliners may not have to wait long.

The inspection conditions, meanwhile, are so onerous and inflexible that
even if the inspections recommence, it may be only be a matter of time
before the process breaks down. For example, US and British warplanes
continue to engage in almost daily exchanges with the Iraqi military in the
northern and southern no-fly zones, where inspections are to take place.
Such incidents, which may become entangled with efforts to provide security
for the UN, have explosive potential.

Lastly, the Iraqis - who have consistently insisted that there was no need
at all for a new UN resolution - may decide to reject it outright. Or, more
likely, they will ostensibly go along with the new inspection regime while
trying to ensure that it does not succeed and appealing for solidarity
against US "imperialism".

This may all be thought bad enough. But the damage caused by the possible
vetoing of the US resolution, or its withdrawal, will be even greater.

A US decision to go ahead anyway means that war may be considered a
certainty. That in turn will face people like Blair with an agonising
decision. It is no exaggeration to say that, given the state of British
public and Labour party opinion, his support for US unilateral action could
bring down his government. And much worse, in the longer term, the UN will
have been perhaps fatally weakened.

A precedent will have been set, to all intents and purposes, that suggests
that a member state, if it feels strongly enough about a given issue, can go
ahead with pre-emptive military action without UN authority. That undermines
the UN charter and international law and the system of collective
responsibility and collective self-defence that has been in place (and fully
supported by previous US administrations) since 1945. It is a recipe for
chaos in international affairs.

Perhaps there is yet a way out of this impasse but it is hard to see where
it lies. And thus do these uniformly gloomy alternative outcomes raise a
basic question about Bush's approach.

It is too late now, apparently, but Bush would surely have been better
advised to put forward a resolution that could have commanded broad,
positive international support. It may have taken a little longer. But the
US would almost certainly have got what it wanted in the end, backed by firm
international support.

Instead - by its aggressive and hasty approach and because of its previous,
well-documented disdain for collective international policy-making,
international treaties and consensual political action - the administration
has divided its friends, alienated and undermined traditional allies, and
now finds that its policies and motives (however well justified they seem to
be) are widely distrusted.

This only strengthens America's enemies, the foremost among whom is not
Saddam but the many-headed terrorists of al-Qaida and their global
followers.

It may be safely assumed that these thugs are observing the ructions at the
UN with enormous pleasure.

Note to readers: To all the many hundreds of readers who have emailed me
concerning my recent columns on Iraq I would like to say thank you. I
apologise for not replying to all of you but please do keep writing. ST.

Email
simon.tisdall@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx