[A-List] Indonesia: Suharto legacy

["Michael Keaney" <michael.keaney@xxxxxx>]

Indonesia: Defending Islam against itself
By Bill Guerin
Asia Times, October 9 2002

Al-Habib Muhammad Rizieq bin Hussein Syihab, leader of the pro-Suharto
radical Muslim group FPI (Defenders of Islam), and his storm troopers may,
after two years of apparent immunity from the process of law and order, be
about to be brought to account.

Police over the weekend arrested 13 members of the FPI after violent attacks
on several of the capital's nightspots by an estimated 600 members. A
discotheque was stoned and the equipment at two late-night pool bars
destroyed.

Although the FPI has been consistently vandalizing and looting such
entertainment venues for at least two years, there have never before been
any arrests.

There is no evidence yet that the pivotal arrests and police action are
related to the palpable nervousness here about the effect this domestic
violence has on the image of Indonesia as seen by the outside world.

FPI aggression and violence in numerous attacks on places deemed to be
"immoral", including nightclubs and restaurants, radical Islamic groups
continuously voicing resentment toward perceived threats to Islam, "sweeps"
for US nationals in Central Java, and other such incidents have had an as
yet uncalculated effect on tourism and foreign investment.

A visibly angry national police chief General Da'i Bachtiar confined his
public comments to warning anyone or any group against taking the law into
their own hands. "I remind all groups, whoever they are, to respect the law,
and the law can only be implemented by institutions or officials empowered
to do so. Anyone else should not take the law into their hands, because that
is a violation of the laws," Bachtiar warned.

Reining in the FPI will be no easy task. The movement was founded in 1998
and is said to be funded by rich anti-reformist generals intent on
protecting the vested interests of the elite.

It is, though, a dangerous fallacy to say that political parties or members
of the old Suharto crowd intent on destabilizing the capital and the country
manipulate the FPI or to dismiss them as "Rent-a-Jihad", fanatics for hire
by the police and the military.

The New Order government under Suharto always restricted the political rise
of Islam for the same reasons as the first president of Indonesia, Sukarno.

Realizing the potentially explosive force of a highly politicized Islam,
especially at a time when Islamic fundamentalism was radicalizing politics
from North Africa to Malaysia, Suharto foresaw a danger that the emergence
of a politically dominant Islam would cleave Indonesian political society
along religious lines.

Thus the national ideology, Pancasila, was to be the glue that held this
large nation together. But is this glue still sticky enough?

It is hardly surprising, given the political turmoil since Suharto stepped
down, that Islamic movements have seized the opportunity to be seen and be
heard. The two largest Islamic groups, the 35-million-strong Nahdlatul Ulama
(NU), whence PPP originated, and the Muhammadiyah with some 28 million
members, neutered during the Suharto era, quickly regained their manhood and
achieved a new and substantial political stature.

NU chairman Abdurrahman Wahid formed the National Awakening Party (PKB), and
his most bitter foe, Muhammadiyah leader Amien Rais, founded the National
Mandate Party (PAN).

For the first time in more than 30 years Muslim parties are represented in
the Indonesian parliament, and are now conscious of their strength. Does
this mean that Indonesia could become a Muslim theocratic state in the
future, like Iran or Pakistan?

The Islam-based United Development Party (PPP), authorized by Suharto to
represent all Islamic political factions, had a full makeover and broke its
links with the establishment. Vice President Hamzah Haz, who was adamantly
against Megawati Sukarnoputri becoming president in October 1999, heads the
PPP, which, with another Islamic party, the Crescent Star Party (PBB), has
long been campaigning for the revival of the Jakarta Charter. This calls for
the adoption of syari'ah (Islamic law) for Muslims, and needs an amendment
to Article 29 of the constitution which was rejected by the MPR at its
annual session in August.

A keystone of the FPI demands is also reformation of Islam by imposing
Islamic law in Indonesia, in an attempt to appeal to fellow Muslim citizens.
They strive for publicity, however bad, to make up for the fact that they
are extremely small in numbers, though they claim to have thousands of
"warriors" ready to take up arms as it were.

Most of their followers are from the lower strata of society, poorly
educated and usually unemployed.

Wielding vicious homemade spears everywhere they went, the FPI forces of
repression were earlier ill-received by a reformation movement determined to
fight. Nowadays though, when these white-robed "warriors" go on the march,
most civilians get out of the way.

Just prior to the latest attacks, the hardliners toured Central Jakarta in a
convoy of vehicles, bawling and screaming aggression, and even the police
admitted they were unable to stem the violence because they were
outnumbered.

Although some 80 percent of Indonesia's 215 million people Indonesia are
Muslim, the vast majority are moderates. According to Indonesian Ulemas
Council (MUI) chairman Amidhan, Muslim hardliners make up only 1 percent of
the country's population.

Asked whether FPI was a competitor to the mainstream Islamic groups,
Al-Habib admitted, "NU is wiser, more polite and softer. Muhammadiyah is
critical, intellectual. FPI is more physical, we fight immorality. NU plants
the seeds of the paddy, because it has the seeds. FPI doesn't have the
seeds, we only have the sickle. Our job is to clean up the mice, the pests
that ruin the paddy. It's just a division of labor. There is no competition
between us."

Syafi'i Ma'arif, chairman of Muhammadiyah, however, has frequently warned
that mainstream Islamic groups need to stay close to their members and
listen to their aspirations, so that the voice of the "silent majority" of
mainstream Muslims is heard, at least in the background.

The latest incidents and the subsequent arrests have attracted little
attention in the foreign media but if the establishment backs off caging the
violent fringe elements, the perceptions will be of a significant political
shift toward a more aggressive groundswell of Islam in Indonesia.

The FPI and other radical groups may not yet have won over disaffected
mainstream Muslims, but unless the weekend arrests signal a crackdown on
their violence, threats and intimidation, the outlook could rapidly
deteriorate.

The real defenders of Islam in Indonesia are the Islamic masses that mainly
belong to the NU and Muhamaddiyah, who see Indonesia as safer within its
traditional plurality. These organizations have consistently warned that the
introduction of Islamic law is not acceptable to the spirit of the national
state of Indonesia.

The NU, for example, speaks for a membership in excess of 30 million and an
unparalleled, grassroots, village-based system of traditional religious
schools or pesantren that covers the whole archipelago.

The modernist Muhammadiyah, on the other hand, is largely
middle-class-based, and its philanthropic success in building universities,
hospitals, orphanages and foundations inspires the loyalty of an equally
important sector of modern Indonesian society.
Together, the two organizations reach out and touch the hearts and souls of
most of Indonesia's "ordinary" Muslims.

The extremists are not acting with the blessing of the NU, the Muhamaddiyah
or the government of Indonesia. With their actions they not only threaten
the image of Islam but also pose a danger to the preservation of Indonesia
as a secular state governed (more or less) in line with the all-inclusive
and tolerant Pancasila ideology.

Though Megawati has been able since September 11, 2001, to juggle support
for the US-led global "war" on terrorism and the sensitivities of the Muslim
majority in Indonesia, this was largely due to senior officers in the
Indonesian military (TNI) holding fast to their predominantly moderate and
secular views so as to avoid alienating the wider Muslim community.

But now the new military paradigm, and the consequent hardline stance on any
protests or disturbances that threaten security or stability, may encourage
once again the use of excessive force in controlling anti-US sentiment. If
US President George W Bush goes ahead and bombs Iraq, the situation on the
ground in Indonesia could deteriorate very quickly and Americans may have to
be withdrawn to safety.

Suharto, like his predecessor Sukarno, feared that fundamentalist Islamic
elements, the "extreme" right, posed as much of a threat to the unity and
security of the state as the communists, the "extreme" left. Unrestrained
Islam was not something Suharto and the military would ever allow.

Later, Abdurrahman Wahid tried hard to move toward separating religion from
the state but found that Islam is too embedded in Indonesian culture to be
taken out of politics.

Mainstream Indonesian Muslims also fear a new secular Indonesia that would
take away the right of their religion to be afforded state protection.

Al-Habib and his radical Islamic FPI, on the other hand, which wishes to see
Indonesia become an Islamic state and is most keen on taking the law into
its own hands to protect Muslim "values", represent a clear and present
danger to Indonesia.

The agenda is clear. Two months after Megawati was sworn in as president
last year, Al-Habib was interviewed by a local media consultancy firm and
had this to say: "When a policy is issued to castrate the rights of FPI, or
oppress Muslim people, we will fight. So, we warn the government not to try
to oppress Muslims. As long as they do not, FPI will have no reasons to act.
But if the government acts against Muslims, then we will take real action!
So, we will watch the behavior of the government. You can say that FPI is
practicing social control towards Megawati's government and the policies it
makes. So we would like to warn the present government under Megawati: Don't
mess with Muslim people or try to oppress them! We will be watching! This is
a warning!"

Though the FPI thugs have waged a relentless campaign of destruction of
property owned by those they say are sinners, to the radicals the sin of the
president is just that of being born a woman. Al-Habib has said FPI will not
recognize a female president and, according to him, under syariah a woman
cannot be president.

The continued violence and unrest in the regions, economic turmoil and the
scrabble for political clout before the elections in 2004, as well as the
general lawlessness, all creates a ripe battlefield for those who abuse the
law and openly defy the authorities in the name of Islam.

There is little of more fundamental importance to Indonesia than the
attainment of religious harmony in these multiracial, secular states, whose
people find their spiritual strength in various religions and live amid such
a diverse cultural tradition.

Religious sensitivities, more often than not, have created havoc in the
community. Religious and sectarian killings in Ambon and the rest of the
Spice Islands have claimed many hundreds of lives.

Islam is a religion of love and peace, and those who resort to destruction
and violence are blackening its image and discrediting its message. The FPI,
however, portrays the religion as a violent and fierce creed, and
demonstrations and violent behavior only tarnish the image of Islam.
Confiscating beer and spirits, smashing nightclub signs, windows, and
security posts, accosting people, shaving the heads of women, and other acts
of intimidation have nothing in common with believers of any faith.

The demonstrators say they are acting on behalf of Islam, so it is fair to
ask how they interpret the Islamic religion, which teaches the virtues of
wisdom, patience and mutual respect, by showing their disrespect for the law
and for the authorities.

They want to show their antipathy toward immoral activities, but they fail
to convince that they are of high morals themselves, or that they have any
respect for the law.

Further adverse publicity and any perception of unrestrained Islamism of the
sort Suharto so carefully caged will set Indonesia even farther back on the
road to economic recovery. Continued weakness in law enforcement against
Muslims who are committing such offenses threatens the growth of even more
Islamic extremism and even a potential economic collapse that would
destabilize the entire region.