[A-List] The changing faces of Central Asia

["Mark Jones" <markjones011@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Asia Times
October 4, 2002
The changing faces of Central Asia
By M K Bhadrakumar
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service
for
over 29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan
(1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).

On October 6, 2001, the first contingent of American military forces landed
in Uzbekistan. After some 2,500 years, a foreign military had quartered in
Inner Asia - Alexander's epic quest for the mystery of India took him to the
region in 4th century BC.

Official US pronouncements emphasize "significant areas of continuity" in
American policy in post-Soviet Central Asia. The US has spent nearly US$5.5
billion in Central Asia and the Caucasus by way of assistance since then,
which adds up to policy commitment.

Central Asia is no longer a backwater of US strategic interests; this year
several countries in the region became frontline states in the struggle
against terrorism. To quote Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group,
Central Asia's rating touched "A-priority".

It is interesting to look at where the rating stood previously. A defining
moment can be found in September 1997 when a company of American troops
parachuted into Uzbekistan after a non-stop flight across the Atlantic in a
supreme demonstration of military capability never before known in military
history.

When this exercise was held, the Taliban had not yet appeared anywhere near
the Amu Darya river in Uzbekistan; it was at a time when American oil
company
Unocal was signing up the Taliban for a trans-Afghan gas and oil pipeline
from the Caspian Sea leading to the Indian Ocean; and it was also at a time
when the American diplomatic thrust was that the Taliban were a homespun
Afghan phenomenon; and when political Islam was yet to blow across the
Fergana Valley of Central Asia.

A Taliban threat was certainly not a factor in the American policy
calculations of the mid-1990s. When Kabul fell to the Taliban in 1996, the
US
State Department reacted mildly; Unocal expressed optimism about
developments, with Chris Taggart, the US oil giant's executive vice
president, telling the media that the company was making "non-cash bonus
payments" to the Taliban.

In the mid-1990s, the American strategic community had begun to seriously
debate the need to take a "forward policy" in Central Asia. A candid
elucidation is available in a 1997 paper authored by Lieutenant-General
William E Odom, former director of the National Security Agency. Odom's
analysis is pertinent since, being a soldier, he spoke straight, and
secondly, he previously held a key position in the US security
establishment.

He acknowledged that the Central Asian states were not showing "alarming
tendencies" as they were turning toward the Western industrial world rather
than to the Islamic world; second, they had not been overwhelmed by Islamic
radicalism; and, third, they had withstood Russian domination.

Odom argued that, nonetheless, Central Asia constituted a strategic zone of
extraordinary importance to the US as it provided a "security context" for
sustaining Western economic interdependence and prosperity. Three sets of
realities impacted: first, the oil and gas reserves of the region; second,
the obstacles posed by political and military conditions in that region to
"bringing this energy to the global market"; and, finally, the region's
traditional role as an arena for rival powers.

Odom wrote, "There is indeed a new 'Great Game' emerging, but the analogies
with the old game are not the best guides to understanding the new one. In
the 19th century, British and Russian interests in the area were more
imagined than real. Today the interests are real and the number of players
is
larger."

Odom identified American interests as: (a) cutting Russian monopoly over the
export of "Azeri and Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas"; (b) promoting multiple
pipelines for evacuation of the energy, "some not transiting Russian
territory at all"; (c) watching for a possible clash of interests between
Russia and China in Central Asia (which "should not necessarily disturb US
interests" but holds interesting possibilities); (d) watching for a
similarly
possible clash of interests between Turkey and Russia; (e) ensuring that
"Islamic religious and cultural revival which is in progress in Central Asia
is not countered with oppressive policies which would only pave the way for
Islamic radicalism; (f) responding to Central Asian states' "desperate"
keenness for engagement with the West ("this opportunity will not last for
ever").

Odom stressed that the US could queer the pitch of Russia's domestic affairs
through a forceful policy in Central Asia. The "reactionary" or
"neo-imperialist" forces within Russia, which sought to restore Russian
hegemony over its "lost colonies", also happen to be the forces attempting
to
stifle Russia's nascent democracy. If they were countered in the Central
Asian theater, that would only strengthen the "Russian liberal reform
circles". Therefore, "the fate of Russian democracy will in part hinge on
developments in Central Asia and the Caucasus".

An authoritative diplomatic pronouncement of American policy in Central Asia
was an address by the then-deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, on
July
21, 1997. Talbott emphasized in no uncertain terms that Central Asia was
"reaching out to the West"; NATO links constituted "a profound break" for
Central Asian states from Russian domination; developments in Central Asia
would influence Russia's policies; the region "sits on as much as 200
billion
barrels of oil" which mattered "profoundly" to the US; the US would eschew
any trace of "the inevitable and irresistible temptation of the great powers
to play the great game for the price of oil and gas from the Caspian Basin"
but would be watchful of Russian intentions; Russia's integration with the
West would hinge on "the way it [Russia] conducts its relations with its
neighbors".

US policy in the Central Asian region works on six different levels. First,
the promotion of "democracy" in the Central Asian states; second, the
highlighting of human rights issues; third, the nudging of these countries
toward market reforms; fourth, promotion of regional cooperation; fifth,
"'conflict resolution" in intra-Central Asian disputes; sixth, the bringing
of these countries firmly into the matrix of international economic and
financial systems and political and security organizations, such as the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and NATO.

However, US policy goals have proved elusive,and the reasons are not far to
seek. Clearly, Americans underestimated their interlocutors in Central Asian
capitals. The political elites, with an odd exception, were survivors of the
Soviet-era. Kremlin politics of the Soviet era, fraught with Byzantine
intrigues and political skullduggery, was lethal. And anyone who would
survive it would have mastered how to extract the maximum out of any given
situation. Moreover, the elites jealously guarded their new-found
independence from Moscow, though it had come unexpectedly and against their
political instincts. Some even had visions of what constituted governance,
how governance ought to be tempered by their history and traditions. They
definitely understood the "co-relation of forces" and were not easily moved
by alien prescriptions.

>From the US viewpoint, the removal of these "impediments" demanded patient
"cultivation" of the ruling elites. The task demanded groundwork, given that
the terrain had been closed to outside purview for centuries, and remained
outright contradictory. To underline the contradictions, while the Central
Asian ruling elite took to nationalism with deliberation to fill the
ideological vacuum that the collapse of the Soviet state had precipitated,
and while "de-Russification" was as an essential ingredient of the brew of
their nationalism, they felt most at home with Russia in their mindset.

Secondly, it needed a deeper understanding that while Central Asia
encompasses a common security environment, each country has peculiarities
and
compulsions specific to its circumstances, which prompted it to adopt
different approaches. Uzbekistan was on a much higher trajectory of growth
than Tajikistan, which was mired in a civil war. Uzbekistan removed all
traces of the Russian military presence from its soil and quit the
Collective
Security Treaty, while Tajikistan sought Russian protection. Turkmenistan
opted for "positive neutrality" in foreign policy. While Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan are well endowed with resources, the latter took to market
reforms. Even though tiny in size, and lacking in economic resources,
Kyrgyzstan took the lead in democratization. Evidently, what was required in
dealing with countries of such diversity was a common strategy, as well as
flexibility bordering on ad-hocism.

External factors further compounded US diplomacy. Market reforms were not
convincing for these countries from what they saw of the tragedy unfolding
from Russia's "shock therapy". They remained skeptical of the International
Monetary Fund's track record in transition economies. They took great
interest in the East Asian crisis that broke in mid-1997. They listened to
Malaysia's experience. They visited China and witnessed that there could be
variant paths to market reforms and development. They were convinced that
social stability was the bedrock on which nation states must build.

The US had to be watchful of Russian sensitivity to any pronounced Western
ingress into its Central Asian backyard without sufficient reasons.
Relations
with Russia were far too important to be jeopardized. The period 1999-2000
was particularly delicate. The Kosovo war demanded priority (and Russia's
cooperation). The Yeltsin era had drawn to a close. Central Asian affairs
were to be in a state of suspended animation until the "regime change" in
Moscow was understood.

Then the tide turned in 2001. The Kosovo war was won. NATO crossed into the
Balkans. The alarming Afghan developments led to a convergence of US-Russian
security interests. Russia's response to the Taliban threat was piecemeal,
which created misgivings in Central Asian minds. The sense of insecurity
added to their growing disenchantment over the hiatus between what Russia
often promised and yet failed to deliver over the years. Russia's own
gravitation to the West, ironically, became a twist to the situation.

By the time Moscow gave its unwilling consent to the establishment of the
American military presence in Central Asia post-September 11, these states
were already sensing the oncoming epoch. They understood well that Americans
were coming for the long haul. Some, like Uzbekistan, were prescient. As
Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov put it while receiving a delegation
of American senators in Tashkent on January 17: "A qualitatively new
security
and stability system is being formed. We understand well that this process
is
a part of the process of formation of a global security system."

The Central Asian leadership did not react uniformly. Compared to the
response from Tashkent, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev stated at a
joint press conference with the visiting US Secretary of State on December
9,
"I consider that the policy of excluding Russia from the deliberation of
global problems is not beneficial, not correct, for the West, and the world
as a whole. It is a big country, a big power. It must be involved in all
these processes." Kyrgyzstan hastily clarified that the American military
presence would be temporary. Kazakh strategic thinkers called for an active
role by China in the region.

What are the expectations of the Central Asian political elites? The NATO
countries' military presence doubtless gives them a comforting sense of
protection. They expect financial support and investment from the West. They
feel that since regional stability is in focus, their regimes will be
appreciated as bulwarks against the deluge. They doubt whether the Afghan
war
has been a resounding success. In the bargain, they feel emboldened to
settle
one or two scores with their domestic opposition, while the world looks the
other way. Some among them feel that the specter of Islamic radicalism in
their courtyards would gain favorable resonance abroad in today's
circumstances. Their bargaining capacity vis-a-vis Russia has increased. But
some feel a new need for a Russian role in the region so that they can be
resilient against the expected onslaught of globalization.

The American way of handling these complexities will constitute a
fascinating
study of how great powers go about getting their job done in faraway lands.
The early signs are that the Americans have doubtless moved into Central
Asia
for the long haul. This would imply a long-term American approach. Secondly,
there is renewed emphasis on democratization and human rights - that only
democratic pluralism, independent media, local government and free and fair
elections can ensure good governance; and good governance remains a
prerequisite for creating investor confidence, for political, social and
economic stability, sustainable development, and national security. Of
course, the argument is being somewhat selectively applied.

As months pass by, we should expect a growing crescendo over the human
rights
issue. A mitigating factor would be that the Central Asian elites are not
innocent about the ways of the world either. As a Kyrgyz news agency put it
last week, "The West often conducts a policy of double standards. Human
rights are discussed, but when there is a need ... human rights are
forgotten. The partnership with Turkmenistan may be cited as an example.
Western politicians put it among the states where human rights are not being
observed at all ... but the smell of oil and gas turns out to be stronger."

The international financial institutions have been brought into the picture
in Central Asia to hasten the process of globalization. This will be
trickier
ground and a battle of unequals. The Central Asian elites know about the
perils of debt traps, but they need to borrow to tide over today's
existence.
How the US will foster regional cooperation in Central Asia remains unclear.
For such cooperation to take root, the US will have to wade deeply into
"conflict resolutions". But, intra-Central Asian disputes pose a can of
worms. Other than for purposes of polemics, these tensions cannot be
disregarded as a mere legacy of Russian imperium.

Meanwhile, the US has triggered a militarization of the region. With active
American encouragement, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have announced plans to
build up their armies. The US will provide financial assistance to modernize
the Kazakh army, while the US will provide training to the Tajik army.
Americans have begun supplying weapons to these armies at "friendly prices".

The Central Asian countries for their part have begun to spend tens of
millions of dollars to realize their geopolitical interests. Russia and
China
are also entering the fray. Russia and Tajikistan are negotiating for a base
for Russian troops near Dushanbe; Russia is reportedly drafting agreements
with Kyrgyzstan for the stationing of Russian troops on Kyrgyz soil and for
Russian warplanes to be stationed in Kant; a sophisticated optical tracking
Russian facility for monitoring space objects was formally commissioned in
Tajikistan.

China's military assistance related to countering terrorism has remained on
a
restrained scale until now and focuses on Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan. The dangers of militarization of a highly volatile region need
no
reiteration. This must be counted as an unfortunate spin-off from the
American policy of "deepening and broadening" its engagement with Central
Asia.

The changing faces of Central Asia remain susceptible to the rising mantra
of
Russia's incipient detente with the US. And, more importantly, how that
mantra will be heard across the Pamirs and Fergana, across the endless
Kazakh
steppes and the mysterious deserts of Kizilkum and Karakum.