[A-List] Britain/US split: Iraq

["Keaney Michael" <Michael.Keaney@xxxxxx>]

Here's the article by Malcolm Rifkind, which, besides its criticism of
the present Conservative Party leadership, is really about the concern
among Tory grandees over the current trajectory of the US and the
apparently slavish kowtowing to that of Blair. You may recall that
relations between the Major government and the Clinton administration
were very frosty indeed, largely thanks to the stupidity of Major who
authorised assistance to Bush Senior during his unsuccessful re-election
campaign in 1992. Subsequently people within Clinton's national security
apparatus were very critical of Britain's "appeasement" of Yugoslavia as
that country disintegrated during the 1990s. Rifkind was at the helm
during this time, first as defence minister and then foreign secretary.
So his criticisms of the US come with an interesting background.

See http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archives/a-list/2002w26/msg00067.htm


The Opposition must oppose
Malcolm Rifkind explains why the Tories must subject the government's
policy on Iraq to rigorous scrutiny
The Spectator, 5 October 2002

We live in the best of times. We live in the worst of times. Britain and
the Western world enjoy unprecedented security from invasion. But we are
also vulnerable to an unprecedented threat from international terrorism.

With the probability of Britain going to war in the next few months, the
Conservative party has a duty to subject the government's policy on Iraq
to the most rigorous and critical scrutiny. The Tories have such a
responsibility whether or not they support, in general, the strategy of
intervention and regime change.

That obligation exists for two reasons. The first is that of
self-interest. An Opposition that is seen to be giving uncritical and
unqualified endorsement to the government on such a fundamental issue is
unlikely to enhance its credibility as an alternative and preferable
government. The second reason is even more important: the whole purpose
of Her Majesty's Opposition is, as part of Parliament, to hold the
executive to account; to ensure that the Prime Minister discharges the
heavy burden of proof before soldiers are sent to fight and, perhaps, to
die; to ensure that the government has not only honourable aspirations
but also a coherent and credible strategy.

Once our fighting forces are engaged in combat, it is right and proper
that the Opposition should give its full support and demonstrate that
the military have behind them a united country. But until then,
intelligent criticism by the Opposition does not indicate a descent into
crude partisanship and party politics, but a fulfilment of its
constitutional duty.

I have deep reservations about the government's policy on Iraq, but,
even if I did not, there are many issues that I would like to have seen
given more attention in the recent debate in the Commons.

A prime question is what it is that has persuaded Tony Blair to become
so committed to the invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein's
regime by force. He has been Prime Minister for more than five years. As
far as I am aware, he made no effort, publicly or privately, to persuade
Bill Clinton towards a more aggressive policy regarding Baghdad. His
conversion to regime change appears, by a remarkable coincidence, to
date from George W. Bush's advocacy of such a policy. This is no mere
quibble. It is important for the British public and Parliament to know
whether the Prime Minister really believes in the need for war or
whether his conversion has more to do with a desire to remain close to
Washington.

There is nothing dishonourable or undesirable about a British prime
minister wanting to be close to the President. All British prime
ministers since Churchill have had that as a major objective. But in the
past this has not led to an uncritical approach to any and every
initiative from the White House. Few relationships could have been as
intimate as that between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, but that
did not prevent furious rows over both the US invasion of Grenada and
the American attempt to impose sanctions on European companies for
trading with the Soviet Union over the gas pipeline. I recall being sent
by Mrs Thatcher and Geoffrey Howe to try to sort out the latter with the
US deputy secretary of state, Kenneth Dam. We made progress. The main
thing on which we couldn't agree was whether to call our conclusions the
Rifkind/Dam or the Dam/Rifkind agreement. The Americans preferred the
latter.

A crucial question that the Tories need to raise is the British
government's view on the new American doctrine of pre-emptive strikes
against potential aggressors. This represents the most fundamental
change in US policy for a generation, but not much has been said about
it by either front bench in Parliament. I am not necessarily against
such a doctrine. If hard evidence were to exist that you are about to be
attacked, it would be pretty foolish to wait until it happens before you
respond. But to be justifiable the evidence must be substantial and
demonstrable.

It is also difficult for Washington to claim that right for itself
without every other member of the UN claiming a similar entitlement.
Henry Kissinger has said, 'It cannot be either the American national
interest or the world's interest to develop principles that grant every
nation an unfettered right of pre-emption against its own definition of
threats to its security.' If a Republican former secretary of state can
issue such a gentle rebuke to his own President, it would not be
unreasonable for either the British Prime Minister or the Leader of the
Opposition to do likewise.

Yet again, whatever the Opposition's view of Saddam Hussein, it must be
right and proper for them to press the government very hard on the
overstretch in our armed forces and on the potential unfairness of
expecting them to participate in a major new war unless they are either
provided with substantial new resources or see a significant reduction
in their commitments elsewhere. Having been defence secretary, I can
imagine at least one member of the Cabinet who would be more than
delighted if the Tories were to step up the pressure in this direction.

The Prime Minister has combined his robust calls for action against
Baghdad with a declaration about the need for a new Middle East
conference to make progress on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. It is
obvious why he is doing this, and there can be little doubt as to the
need for a new initiative. Other Arab states undoubtedly welcome any
linkage that is conceded between the two issues. But the Opposition
should be pointing out that any such conference could do more harm than
good if the groundwork has not been prepared and if those most
intimately involved, namely the Israelis and the Palestinians, have not
indicated, however privately, a willingness to make the concessions
necessary for a breakthrough to be achieved.

Most importantly, the Tories should be pressing Mr Blair not just on
whether he has a strategy for going into Iraq but on whether he has one
for getting out. The day on which the Americans and the British reach
Baghdad and oust Saddam, there will be a massive power vacuum in Iraq.
If there are no Arab armies in the invading force, the Americans will
have to turn Iraq into an American protectorate for one or two years. We
have seen how in Afghanistan the Americans are having to provide the
bodyguard for the Afghan Prime Minister months after the Taleban have
gone. The prospect of an American occupying army having to remain for
months, perhaps years, in a country as important as Iraq is profoundly
disturbing and would be destabilising.

Finally, it should be pointed out to Mr Blair that Saddam did not use
his chemical and biological weapons during the Gulf war, because that
would have led to the destruction of his regime. If he knows that his
removal is the American bottom line, he will have nothing to lose if he
launches a chemical attack on Israel and turns a bilateral war with the
United States into a full Middle Eastern conflagration.

None of these concerns is improbable or fanciful. Accepting them does
not mean that nothing should be done. I would like to see the
Conservative party advocating an alternative military strategy calling
for regime change and the ousting of Saddam - but only by a Western-Arab
coalition similar to that which liberated Kuwait. Until such a coalition
can be formed, sanctions and the no-fly zone should be maintained and
strengthened. The Americans should follow the example of the Israelis 20
years ago and, using special forces in surgical strikes, take out any
nuclear installations that they identify. Simultaneously, they should
provide a major infusion of help to those Iraqis prepared to take up
arms against Saddam within the country.

Such a strategy would be different from that now advocated by Mr Bush
and Mr Blair, but it would command considerable support from other
Western powers and from the Middle East itself. Any invasion of a
foreign country has both significant opportunities and serious problems.
The Tories should help the government to identify how to enhance the
former and reduce the latter.

Of course, there are those in Washington who would be upset by the
advocacy of such a different policy. But we could do worse than to
remember Winston Churchill's dictum that one 'can always rely on the
United States to do the right thing - after they have tried every other
option'.

Sir Malcolm Rifkind was secretary of state for defence (1992-95) and for
foreign and commonwealth affairs (1995-97).