[A-List] US state: ruling class split

["Keaney Michael" <Michael.Keaney@xxxxxx>]

Democrats can't duck this fundamental shift in policy

Al Gore has been vilified for attacking the rush to war. But for once he
was right, writes Joe Klein

Thursday October 3, 2002
The Guardian

The default position on Al Gore appears to be ridicule. He opens his
mouth and is immediately assumed to be cynical, tactical, self-serving,
self-pitying, awkward, embarrassing, unintentionally hilarious or all of
the above. Much of this comes from Republicans, who seem afflicted by
near-psychotic rhetorical twitching whenever the man who won the popular
vote in 2000 makes a public appearance. Last week, for example, an
amoeba from the Republican national committee stepped out and said that
Gore's criticism of the Bush administration's rush to war in Iraq was
"more appropriate for a political hack than a presidential candidate".
But the press has been equally dismissive (often with cause: Gore is an
oafish politician), and so have many of his fellow Democrats.

A few months ago, Gore told some of his supporters he'd made a mistake
in the 2000 campaign by paying too much attention to "polls, tactics and
all the rest - I should have let it rip, poured out my heart and my
vision, and let the chips fall where they may". These quite sensible
remarks occasioned a small tornado of disdain from the press and
politicos. James Carville and others said, inaccurately, that Gore was
blaming his consultants. He wasn't. He was blaming himself. It was, in
fact, an altogether admirable pronouncement. Would that more politicians
were able to distance themselves from their witch-doctors.

Gore's Iraq speech was rather inconvenient for Democrats, especially for
those in Congress running for re-election, who have "decided" to take
Iraq off the table as quickly as possible so they can go home and talk
about prescription drug benefits for senior citizens and other issues
that poll well. Indeed, it is now assumed that most Democrats will stow
their doubts and better instincts, and rush a vote in favour of a
slightly modified war resolution next week. They will do this merely
because their political consultants are convinced Iraq is a "bad" issue
for them.

The unanimity of this conviction among consultants (and the willingness
of commentators to buy into it) should give us pause. It is especially
noxious because the issues they want Democrats to run on - pandering to
the elderly on drugs, demagoguing on pensions and blaming George Bush
for the business cycle - are minuscule compared with the decisions about
to be taken by the Bush administration. This is not merely about Iraq:
the White House is proposing a radical new military and diplomatic
doctrine for the US - the right to intervene, unilaterally and
pre-emptively, whenever we see fit. This has actually been put into
writing, into words so simple, the president has said, that "the boys in
Lubbock can understand it". And the Democrats don't want to talk about
it?

Gore's speech wasn't a masterpiece. It seemed hastily composed and
rewritten (he has an unfortunate habit of putting in sweaty all-nighters
before a major address). The tone was resentful and it was filled with
sloppy, contradictory thinking. An argument can be made that there was
politics involved - that Gore was positioning himself for 2004, currying
favour with Democratic activists, who tend to be more dovish than most
Americans. But raising an important issue for tactical effect is quite
different from ignoring an issue for tactical convenience. Gore
performed an essential public service. He nudged a necessary debate. He
was followed to the podium, several days later, by Senator Ted Kennedy,
who delivered a more eloquent and tightly argued version of the same
message (and, yesterday in Blackpool, by a somewhat more cautious Bill
Clinton).

Furthermore, Gore made a crucial distinction: a war against Iraq and the
campaign against terrorism are not identical. Indeed, an immediate
attack (in January, one assumes) on Saddam Hussein could complicate the
larger cause. A successful war against Iraq raises at least three
nettlesome questions. Will it increase or decrease the threat of a
biological or chemical attack on the US? Will it increase or decrease
the stability of the region? Will it increase or decrease the number of
young Muslims who believe the propaganda about America's satanic role in
the world?

Almost every American politician I've spoken to - Democrat and
Republican - has grave doubts about at least some of the details of the
operation we seem to be hurtling toward. There are fierce divisions
within the Pentagon over strategy and purpose. After all, for the past
20 years it has been America's tacit policy to keep Saddam in power
because his removal was likely to destabilise the region. It is quite
probable that the next government in Iraq will not be perceived by its
neighbours as the avatar of democracy and religious tolerance, but as an
American client state. The notion that pummelling Baghdad will usher an
Islamic enlightenment is laughable.

There are other problems. As the American military pieces are slowly
wheeled into place for the campaign, Iraq's chemical and biological labs
are likely to be shut down, the germs and gases that are transportable
put in suitcases, and then sold or given away to the very people we
fear. It is entirely possible that Saddam will attempt to build a
coalition of his own with a pre-emptive chemical or biological attack on
Israel. Ariel Sharon has said he will retaliate, which could precipitate
a wider war. At the very least, Saddam would have the satisfaction of
knowing that he'd be remembered in history as the man who incinerated
Tel Aviv.

These are only the most obvious questions. Perhaps the president and his
advisers have planned for these contingencies, and for the dozens of
other profound issues raised by this proposed course of action. Perhaps
they have devised the strategies that will assure the desired result -
the removal of Saddam - with a minimum of disruption. Perhaps they have
answers they can't share with us now. But the recent history of American
foreign policy - not just in this administration, but in the previous
one as well - has not been marked by careful planning, long-range
thinking or attention to detail.

The rush to war, the tendency of conservatives (and their propagandists)
to go berserk whenever legitimate questions are raised, the giddy moral
certainty in the air, the fact that we are not talking about one quick
war against a psychopath but about a fundamental shift in American
policy that may shape the world for the next 50 years - all this should
cause us to pause, slow down, and talk this over.

Gore's speech was a start. And more, it was a gauntlet wisely thrown.
Those politicians - Democrat and Republican - who neglect these crucial
issues now, for whatever reasons, should be taken at face value.
Apparently, they have nothing of interest to say on an issue of
overwhelming importance, a course of action that could have a profound
impact on the future of the US and the UN, and on the stability of the
region. And they should have no call on our attentions, sympathies or
support in the future.

· Joe Klein is author of The Natural: The Misunderstood Presidency of
Bill Clinton and Primary Colors. A version of this article appeared in
the web magazine Slate