[A-List] Europe/US rivalry

["Keaney Michael" <Michael.Keaney@xxxxxx>]

This is interesting because the author identifies several themes that
have been explored in some detail on the A-list. His analysis is a bit
wide of the mark, as you would expect, yet it's a decent enough
indication of the sort of concerns currently preoccupying especially the
"new" social democratic Third Way Policy Network pro-EU integration
types of which Blair, Schröder and Persson are the three leading
examples. Just about every pro-Europe commentator in Britain is praying
for a Schröder victory on Sunday, and making absolutely clear why it
is important. This is itself remarkable because never before has there
been such a deep-rooted and openly expressed fear of and opposition to
US hegemony as now. Hence the chastisement (however misplaced) of
European leaders for failing to establish an effective counterweight to
Bush and co.



The real weakness of Europe
By Philip Stephens
Financial Times: September 20 2002

The crisis over Iraq bears painful witness to a feeble Europe. An
American-led war to oust Saddam Hussein would represent for Europe a
serious strategic failure. Except perhaps for Tony Blair, there is not a
European leader who thinks it sensible or safe to invade Iraq. Yet if,
or when, the US marches on Baghdad, every one of these leaders - even
Gerhard Schröder if he wins Sunday's German election - will step
meekly into line.

The glib analysis of the hawks in Washington says that these hopeless
Europeans oppose war precisely and solely because they are weak. We must
put aside the awkward possibility that raising the Stars and Stripes
over the Iraqi capital might actually make the Middle East a more
dangerous place. Appeasement of tyrants is the reflex of those who lack
the means and resolve to do the right thing. If France had stealth
bombers and Germany smart missiles, they too would be eager to get rid
of Saddam Hussein.

Such is the fog of misunderstanding across the Atlantic. The truth, of
course, is that the object of Europe's fear is not Iraq but America.
European leaders will bite their lips if George W. Bush sends in the
marines because they are afraid to do otherwise. They fear greatly the
consequences for Europe's (and America's) security of a war that would
leave US troops occupying Iraq. But they are more reluctant still to
contemplate the consequences for the transatlantic alliance and the
international system of defying the sole superpower.

A strong Europe, sufficiently sure of its political cohesion and
military capabilities to dispense with the US security guarantee, would
say No - or at the very least set its own rules for any conflict. It
would dare Washington to act unilaterally. Even Donald Rumsfeld, a
defence secretary seemingly as certain in his misjudgments as was Robert
McNamara when the US plunged deep into the mire of Vietnam, might then
think twice.

If only. Europe's malaise runs deeper than its failure to recalibrate
and re-equip its armed forces after the cold war. Power and prestige on
the international stage are a measure of inner strength, of political
self-confidence and of economic success. Europe can claim neither.
Instead it holds itself hostage to an absence of leadership.

This should, after all, be a moment of high excitement. The European
Union is on the brink of an historic transformation. By the end of the
year, Europe's political contours will begin again to mirror its
geography when the EU admits 10 eastern and southern neighbours.

The strategic benefits of EU enlargement are self-evident. The
entrenchment of liberal democracy and economic prosperity in the former
communist states. New markets and investment opportunities for existing
EU states. New workers to fill the jobs left open by western Europe's
ageing populations. The stability in which to confront the criminal
networks and racketeers that have flourished since the fall of
communism.

You won't hear this from France's Jacques Chirac, Spain's Jose Mara
Aznar, or Italy's Silvio Berlusconi. Nor, with one or two honourable
exceptions, from any other EU leader. In place of a celebration of the
new Europe there is almost universal foreboding. The promise made when
the Berlin Wall came down is now cast as threat.

Next month the Irish Republic votes on whether to ratify the EU's Nice
treaty, a vital prerequisite for the smooth entry of the 10 applicant
states. That country's voters have already said No once. A second
rejection would plunge the enlargement process into chaos. And that, if
they were ever compelled to tell the truth, is what many EU leaders
want.

Enlargement, they would whisper, is unpopular with domestic electorates.
Voters fear a new influx of immigrants - listen to Edmund Stoiber, the
centre-right challenger in the German election, garnering votes with
anti-Islamic xenophobia. People resent the prospect of their taxes being
diverted to Czechs and Slovenes, farmers fear that their hefty subsidies
from Brussels will be paid instead to Poles.

In truth, electorates can scarcely be blamed for such fears. Their
leaders have never told them otherwise. The politicians have never
quarrelled with the characterisation of enlargement as a zero sum game -
the absurd notion that any gain for the new entrants must be a loss for
existing members. None has been brave enough to say that the continent's
demography is such that the western half actually needs those immigrants
in order to sustain its prosperity.

Why? Because it has seemed easier to prevaricate than to admit that the
long-term prizes will be at the expense of some short-term pain: that
enlargement will oblige the EU to confront the absurdities of an
agricultural policy that swallows half of its entire budget; or that
high unemployment has much more to do with their own policy mistakes
than with immigration. No, why get into risky arguments with rightwing
populists such as Jean-Marie Le Pen when you can draw the negotiating
noose ever tighter around the countries waiting nervously on the
doorstep? Barmy as it may seem, some of the newcomers may now start off
as net contributors to the EU budget.

Here we touch the failure that lies at the heart of Europe's weakness.
To borrow Bill Clinton's famous phrase, it's the economy stupid. When
New York's twin towers came down on September 11, everyone knew that an
already-shaky US economy would suffer. Europe, by contrast, took refuge
in complacency. And now? As the US shows signs of recovery, the European
economy splutters and stalls.

There is nothing new in this. It has been the story of most of the past
decade. Even if the US productivity miracle now seems to have been
something of a mirage, Europe's economic performance has been truly
dismal. The reasons are just as familiar - a central bank that has
nightmares about inflation even when the world is tipping towards
deflation and - much more important this - a generation of political
leaders who, with one or two exceptions, have lacked the courage and the
conviction to grasp the nettle of economic reform.

For as long as its economy is weak, Europe will be weak. It will remain
trapped in the cycle that sees its armed forces starved of the resources
to modernise and its voters fretful and suspicious about the huge
potential of a continent reunited. And, unsurprisingly, its views will
be scorned in Washington.