Re: [A-List] Bush at the UN

["Annewilliamson" <Annewilliamson@xxxxxxx>]

As I understand it, Stratfor is a crowd of ex-CIA trying to run a global
intelligence service on a commercial basis.  So here's those hacks'
contribution to the "spin."

Unbelievable manipulation of the record in that the most egregiously
defiant nation vis a vis UN resolutions is Israel (not a word about that,
natch!).  Sickening. -A.
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                            S T R A T F O R

                    THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY

                        http://www.stratfor.com
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            12 September 2002

THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT - FULL TEXT FOR MEMBERS ONLY

  -> ON OUR WEBSITE TODAY FOR MEMBERS ONLY:

      * Bush Issues Veiled Ultimatum to United Nations
      http://www.stratfor.com/standard/analysis_view.php?ID=206165

      * Balance of Global Opinion Shifting on Iraq
      http://www.stratfor.com/standard/analysis_view.php?ID=206167

      * Iraq War Plans IV: Operation Desert Storm II
      http://www.stratfor.com/premium/analysis_view.php?ID=206166

      * Brazil-Argentina Defense Alliance Could Hurt U.S.
      http://www.stratfor.com/standard/analysis_view.php?ID=206164
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Bush Issues Veiled Ultimatum to United Nations

Summary

U.S. President George W. Bush did as he was asked, taking his
case for an attack on Iraq to the United Nations Sept. 12. But
rather than allow the U.S. plan to be stalled by bureaucratic
sandbagging, Bush implied a harsh ultimatum to the United
Nations: Either enforce the resolutions that you passed and that
Iraq has mocked for more than a decade, or the United States
essentially will abandon the institution.

Analysis

U.S. President George W. Bush Sept. 12 answered the calls of his
critics at home and abroad when he presented the U.S. case for
attacking Iraq to the U.N. General Assembly. Rather than proving
the moral or technical need for an attack, Bush checkmated his
critics by instead challenging the validity of the very
institution they support in hopes of thwarting both despots like
Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and perceived unilateralists like
Bush.

In short, Bush challenged the United Nations to live up to the
responsibility it claims or step aside.

In the year since the Sept. 11 attacks, international support
for the U.S. war on al Qaeda gradually has ebbed as countries
have bridled at U.S. pressure or sought concessions in return
for their aid. As Washington turned its attention to a potential
attack on Iraq, much of the world openly balked, arguing that
Iraq had nothing to do with the war on al Qaeda. Opposition to
an Iraq campaign even began to divide the U.S. Congress and the
Republican Party.

After numerous attempts to make the case for an attack, as well
as continued debate within the administration over whether the
United States really needed international support to topple
Hussein, Bush agreed to consult Congress, U.S. allies and the
United Nations.

But the administration had no intention of allowing
"consultations" to descend into sandbagging. Rather, Bush
essentially asked the various critics, "OK, you don't like our
plan, what's yours?"

The general response from Europe, the Middle East and others was
along the line of "we don't have an alternative plan besides
more of the same, but that doesn't mean we have to like or
support your plan. And your plan still has nothing to do with
the war on al Qaeda."

The United States has a problem. It needs a coalition whether it
wants one or not. If it is to attack Iraq effectively, it needs
access to the territory of neighboring states. If it is to hunt
down al Qaeda and other militant organizations, it needs the
support of other countries' intelligence services and police
forces, as well as access to their financial and communications
infrastructures.

Receiving no support and no alternative might have left the Bush
administration on the rhetorical high ground, but it did nothing
to advance the U.S. plan. Washington did not have support before
consultations with other governments, and it still did not have
support after the consultations.

Washington instead needed leverage. It needed an "or else." It
could not be, "Or else we'll go it alone," because the United
States could not go it alone, at least not effectively.
Washington needed an "or else" that generated active
cooperation. It appears from Bush's speech to the United Nations
that Washington found the lever it needs.

During his speech Bush reframed the rationale for an attack on
Iraq. The issue now is not about whether Iraq does or does not
have weapons of mass destruction, nor is it about whether
Baghdad supports al Qaeda, though both are still important
aspects. Rather, Bush made the case that the Iraq problem is a
test case for the superiority of multilateralism over
unilateralism. It was a test case for the validity and viability
of the United Nations itself.

He argued that the United Nations was created to bring peace,
stability and security to the world and that the Security
Council was created to ensure that the United Nations is not
merely a venue for empty rhetoric. He then issued a simple,
veiled ultimatum. If the United Nations would not or could not
back up the numerous resolutions it has passed over the past 12
years -- resolutions that Hussein has brazenly flouted -- then
the body is irrelevant.

Washington's "or else" is a tacit threat of a possible de facto
U.S. abandonment of the United Nations. Bush's argument, in
short, was that if the international community wants the United
Nations to have any say in what the United States does -- to
have any hope of leashing U.S. unilateralism -- then it must
make the organization more than a venue for obfuscation and
delay.

There remain many unanswered questions about the Bush plan for
Iraq and many pitfalls should the United States be left to go it
alone. But the ball is now squarely in the United Nations'
court, and the question now is not merely about the future of
Iraq, but the future of the United Nations.
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