[A-List] UK sub-imperialism: Iraq and the Scott inquiry

["Keaney Michael" <Michael.Keaney@xxxxxx>]

Don't trust Bush or Blair on Iraq

The Scott inquiry revealed the cynicism of politicians' approach

Richard Norton-Taylor
Wednesday August 21, 2002
The Guardian

Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons in the past is repeatedly cited
by the US and British governments as justification for his removal from
power now. But just what was their response to his use of poison gas
against Iranian troops and Iraqi Kurds in the 1980s? Far from condemning
his actions, they stepped up their support for Baghdad.

One of the most damning revelations to come out of the Scott inquiry
into the arms-to-Iraq affair was the British government's secret
decision to supply Saddam with even more weapons-related equipment after
he shelled the Kurdish town of Halabja in March 1988 with gas bombs,
killing an estimated 5,000 civilians and maiming thousands more. Saddam
said he had punished the Kurds for "collaboration" after the town had
been successfully attacked by Iran. The weapons were produced with
German-supplied chemicals.

At the end of the Iraq-Iran war later that year, Sir Geoffrey Howe, the
foreign secretary, drew up a paper entitled The Economic Consequences of
the Peace. There were "major opportunities for British industry", he
said. But he was terrified his plan to increase British arms exports to
Iraq, secretly agreed by the government, would be leaked.

"It could look very cynical if so soon after expressing outrage about
the treatment of the Kurds, we adopt a more flexible approach to arms
sales," one of his officials told the Scott inquiry. The government's
decision to change its policy, but keep MPs and the public in the dark,
was even more cynical, replied Lord Scott.

As Whitehall turned a blind eye to exports to Baghdad of equipment which
ministers and officials admitted could be used to produce chemical and
nuclear weapons, Howe ordered his paper to be kept under wraps until, in
the words of Ian Blackley, a senior Foreign Office diplomat, the "cloud
had passed" - a reference to the attack on Halabja.

This cynicism and hypocrisy was matched only by the US. Soon after the
attack, Washington approved the export to Iraq of virus cultures and a
$1bn contract to design and build a petrochemical plant the Iraqis
planned to use to produce mustard gas. And while the Reagan
administration condemned the use of chemical weapons during the
eight-year Iraq-Iran war, US officers were secretly supplying Iraqi
generals with bomb-damage assessments and detailed information on
Iranian troop deployments.

"The use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of
deep strategic concern," Walter Lang, a former senior US defence
intelligence officer, told the New York Times this week. Washington was
worried about the threat of Iran spreading its Islamic revolution to
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Ever since TE Lawrence and his admirers in Whitehall drew the map of the
modern Middle East after the first world war, the British and, later,
American approach to the region has been dictated by naked
self-interest. It is an approach which demanded a totally craven
approach towards human rights. Saudi Arabia, no respecter of these and a
past funder of Islamist extremism in Pakistan, Afghanistan and
elsewhere, remains one of Britain's biggest arms markets and a key
supplier of oil to the US.

Whatever the reasons, and there are many, for seeing the back of Saddam,
don't listen to Bush or Blair when they talk of morality, democracy and
good governance. The evidence of Lord Howe and his officials to the
Scott inquiry revealed the government's priorities. This might be
salutary to remember as the government prepares to respond to pressure
for a debate about the Bush administration's plans to invade Iraq.

"Public opposition in this country might have been embarrassingly
vociferous, particularly in view of the use by Iraq of chemical
weapons," Scott told Howe. Howe replied that he wanted to defend British
corporate interests from "malicious commentators" and "emotional
misunderstandings". The decision to prevent MPs from knowing about the
government's shift in policy was a "perfectly legitimate management of
news", he said.

Then, the evidence against Saddam was there for all to see, but
conveniently ignored. Britain and the US were desperate to benefit from
Saddam's massive arms procurement programme. Now, we are told, Saddam
must be overthrown because he is again said to be developing weapons of
mass destruction, but we are not given the evidence.

A senior Foreign Office official told the Scott inquiry: "If there had
been an outcry [over the change in policy towards Iraq] I am not sure it
would necessarily have reflected the view of the country, only of the
number of people prepared to comment." Those words may be worth
recalling in the weeks ahead.

· Richard Norton-Taylor is the author of Truth is a Difficult Concept:
Inside the Scott Inquiry